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For many years tax competition models and empirical analysis have been showing 
taxation as a key variable in FDI location decisions. Countries reduce taxation to attract 
firms in order to create employment and economic development. Firms locate their 
investments where the net return on capital is higher due to a lower tax burden. But tax 
competition is not optimal because the lowering of the tax burden causes an inefficient 
allocation of capital and provision of public goods. Thus, it requires coordination of tax 
policies in an economic area such as the European Union (EU).  
Despite data not showing a complete “race to the bottom” in tax rates, the predictions of 
the model are widely believed by businessman and the public opinion. But tax 
competition has been exclusively based on neoclassical theory where imperfect 
decisions by managers and certain features of the decision making process such as 
uncertainty are assumed to be not essential. The same applies when considering 
incompatibility with FDI theory. 
A complementary approach, based on the Heiner model, underlines the central role of 
uncertainty and the relevance of cognitive characteristics in managers´ FDI decisions. 
By applying an inductive and qualitative method through questionnaires, interviews
with managers and statistical tests, the reliability of the behavioural model is confirmed. 
Furthermore, location decisions are shown to be significantly explained by heuristics 
and biases arising from the uncertainty faced by managers. 
But the role of taxation in these decisions appears less significant than is usually
considered. From a sample of 112 Portuguese FDI operations only 4 are explained by 
fiscal variables. Then, if managers do not rely on taxation to decide the location of their 
firms´ investments abroad, countries should not emphasize this variable when 
implementing policies to attract FDI and the main argument for corporate tax
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“I wonder who it was defined man as a rational animal. It was the most premature 
definition ever given. Man is many things, but he is not rational. I am glad he is not, 
after all” 
Lord Henry 
in The Picture of Dorian Gray 











1 - Introduction 
Investment is essential for economic growth and employment. National and local 
governments are assumed to use fiscal policy, and within it corporate taxation, to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) so that their jurisdictions can secure economic development. 
FDI flows registered a huge increase in the last 20 years due to globalization of the economic 
activity. This is more evident in the case of the European Union where the liberalization of 
goods and capital flows and the implementation of a single currency strengthened the process. 
Statutory tax rates, on the other hand, have been decreasing in developed countries, and these 
two simultaneous trends explain why competition for investment has been a hot topic in the 
last few years both among economists and in the media (shown in the recent news about an 
UK firm, Shire, leaving to Ireland).  
The standard tax competition model (e.g. Wilson, 1986, and Zodrow and Mierszcowsky, 
1986), developed in the context of competition among local governments, predicts that 
jurisdictions would engage in an inefficient competition for capital that would drive down 
corporate tax rates. According to the model, the immediate consequence of tax competition 
would be a decrease in fiscal revenue and thus the inability of jurisdictions to guarantee an 
optimal provision of public goods. The inefficiency would therefore require tax 
harmonization among jurisdictions.  
The focus on the role of fiscal variables in capital flows by both the economic literature and 
the media led to the now generally accepted conclusion that the former has a huge influence 
on the latter. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, p. 673), for example, refer to a “median value of 
the tax rate elasticity of -3.3, that is, a 1 percentage point reduction in the host-country tax 
rate raises FDI in that country by 3.3 percent”. Indeed, a significant number of econometric 
studies (presented in chapter 3) show an inverse relationship between the flows of FDI and 
the level of taxation. 
Empirical evidence, however, does not show a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates
as predicted by the tax competition model (Boss, 2005, Stewart and Webb, 2006). This can be 









provision of public goods is not in danger, and by the continuous growth of corporate tax 
revenue. The reasons for this contradiction between theory and empirical evidence are not 
well understood. It may be that governments are too hesitant in implementing fiscal policies 
to attract FDI, the corporate sector is growing faster than the economy or that the level of 
corporate tax rates is better explained by internal (to the jurisdiction) factors, such as the level 
of revenue required for budgetary purposes, and not by tax competition concerns. Whatever 
the reason, there is a mismatch between neoclassical theory and observation that requires an 
explanation. 
Furthermore, while tax competition theory assumes that business taxation is a key 
determinant of foreign investment, FDI theory presents a handful of determinants 
where taxation is only one potential reason for the location of firms. In other words, the 
FDI literature in itself does not give too much weight to tax variables. Thus there is a clear 
contrast with the assumption of tax competition literature and this “incompatibility” between 
both branches of neoclassical economics has yet to be resolved.  
The generally accepted role of tax variables in capital flows and the consequences predicted 
by the standard tax competition model rely, first, on the will of jurisdictions to attract FDI 
and, second, on the assumed behaviour of firms to search for a maximum profitability through 
a lower tax burden. The economic literature has been greatly concerned with the first of these 
two sides of the question. This dissertation, however, aims to complement the existing 
literature by focusing on the second. 
Firms are considered to be profit maximizers in neoclassical economics. In the tax 
competition literature the maximization process is modelled in a way that it directly depends 
on the tax burden. The lower the tax burden the higher the marginal productivity of capital 
and this seems to be the only decision criterion when firms choose where to locate their 
investments. Uncertainty has a negligible role in the decision making process. In a world of 
certainty it would be easy for managers to make such a decision. They just would need to 
calculate the difference between revenue and costs for all the available options in terms of
location, to consider the different corporate tax rates and to choose the one that result in 







However, in the real world of a manager’s life things are not that simple. Capital flows vary 
in terms of mobility and term. FDI location decisions require a huge amount of information, 
are relatively immobile and focused on the long term, and may take several months or years to 
complete. In the meantime environmental variables are permanently changing in 
unpredictable ways and decision makers are themselves affected by rather different events. 
The process involves a lot of different people that, directly or indirectly, influence the 
outcome. Taxation has a different role depending on the stage of the decision process: when 
information on potential locations is collected; when the location decision is made; when 
reinvestments or tax planning activities are developed.  
Furthermore, and as the behavioural finance literature has shown, comparatively simpler 
decisions, in the ambit of equity markets and portfolio investment, cannot be fully explained 
by a neoclassical approach (e.g. Shiller, 2000). In consequence, location decisions presented 
as just “business taxation explaining foreign direct investment” are an oversimplification and 
cannot fully explain what is happening in reality. 
Given the “incompatibilities” between tax competition and FDI theories and given that firm
behaviour is more complex than usually is assumed in economic models, it is necessary to 
give a prominent role to uncertainty in order to explain the behaviour of firms in FDI location 
decisions. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to fully understand the relevance of 
uncertainty in FDI location decisions but to display uncertainty in accordance with reality. 
That is, to enhance the relevance of factors that go beyond the standard assumptions of 
neoclassical theory, such as the existence of imperfect information, and to include behavioural 
characteristics that affect the perceptions of managers in their decision making process. Hence 
it is important to understand the different perceptions, of managers, economists and the 
general public opinion, on FDI location decisions and to understand how they impact real life 
decisions. 
The focus on uncertainty allows the use of a behavioural framework, based on the 
behaviouralists (e.g. Simon) and on economic psychology (eg. Tversky and Kahneman), and 
thus complimentary to neoclassical economics, to improve the knowledge of the key 
determinants in FDI location decisions. That is, and by following a similar path to the 






                                                          
  
foreseen. In this context, and central to this dissertation, is the relevance of fiscal variables 
for location decisions. The aim is to assess the role of taxation so that an explanation could 
be given to the mismatch existing between neoclassical theory and empirical evidence on the 
recent evolution of corporate tax rates and revenue. 
The inefficient outcome of the standard tax competition model is also the basis of the attempts 
made by the European Union (EU) to harmonize national corporate tax policies (EC, 1997, 
2001). The explicit reasoning is to prevent EU countries from competing for investment by 
using fiscal variables due to the resulting inefficiencies in the allocation of capital and in the 
provision of public goods. The EU is an innovative case of economic integration and, so far, 
important steps such as the Single Market and the Monetary Union have been taken. But the 
role of fiscal policy is not yet clear and it is in the centre of the debate over the economics of 
integration. The proposed framework in this dissertation, centered on the decision making 
process and the behaviour of firms, may provide new insights on fiscal policy for corporations 
inside an economic area. By looking at corporation decision making it may be feasible to 
provide a better understanding of the situations when it may be advantageous for a 
government to engage in tax competition. Therefore the purpose of this dissertation is also to 
contribute to a clarification of the type of corporate fiscal policy that is desirable at a national 
level and to qualify its expected effects on public policy in the European context. 
To extend the analysis of an intensely studied theme such as tax competition requires a better 
understanding of each firm’s decision1 making process. This is obtained by using the Heiner 
(1983, 1985a, 1989) model, where the usual optimization assumptions of the neoclassical 
literature are disregarded. The proposed approach will use some inputs from psychology, 
namely the so called heuristics in decision making in the presence of uncertainty. This 
improves the understanding of the objectives and motivations of firms and managers when 
investing abroad. The methodology employed is mostly based on a qualitative analysis, where 
the empirical work is composed of interviews, questionnaires and statistical tests to confirm
the hypotheses arising from the literature, so that the complimentary nature of this dissertation 
with the standard neoclassical approach is reinforced. Given the novel approach it is an 
exploratory study that, hopefully, will generate a diversified set of cues for future work. 
1 The meaning of decision is “the execution of a choice made in terms of objectives from among a set of 
alternatives on the basis of available information” (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 19). In this dissertation, the 






Part I of the thesis deals with the theoretical background. After this introduction, Chapter 2 
presents the main findings of the standard tax competition model by individually considering 
the various assumptions of the neoclassical foundations. Chapter 3 compares the outcome of 
the tax competition model with FDI theory and underlines the existing incompatibilities 
between both branches of neoclassical economics in this area. After exploring the weaknesses 
of neoclassical theory a behavioural approach, based on the Capacity-Difficulty model of 
Heiner, is proposed in Chapter 4 where the role of uncertainty is central to understanding how 
managers make FDI location decisions.  
Part II develops the approach presented in Part I. Chapter 5 details the methodology. Chapter 
6 aims to assess the perceptions of the general public, students and managers about the role of 
business taxation in FDI and includes a natural quasi-experiment based on questionnaires 
made to managers and students. Chapter 7 discusses the results of interviews with Portuguese 
firms, with a total of 112 foreign operations, concerning the influence of several intrinsic and 
extrinsic variables in FDI decisions. It also empirically addresses the hypothesis of the Heiner 
model that uncertainty is directly associated with the use of behavioural rules by managers. 
Chapter 8 presents evidence on the role of business taxes in FDI location decisions and 
addresses its consequences for public policy at national and EU levels while distinguishing 
between the relevance of this variable in FDI location decisions and its impact on firms’ 
profitability. Finally, Chapter 9 ends this dissertation with the final conclusion and 





































2 – Neo-classical models of tax competition 
This chapter reviews the tax competition literature. It starts by considering the public 
finance literature where both the standard tax competition model and its main 
extensions, those that deal with the assumptions of the model, are presented. It proceeds 
by introducing the main arguments in favor and against the integration of corporation 
tax policy to understand changes if a group of countries moves from a situation of 
complete fiscal autonomy to some degree of cooperation1. In this way it allows for the 
comprehension of how tax competition theory may influence corporate tax policy in an
economic area such as the EU. 
The chapter concludes by presenting the political economy view and the new economic
geography perspective and by underlining the unaddressed assumptions of the model. 
The final goal is to assess the weaknesses of the dominant neoclassical view that 
justifies the behavioural approach proposed in this dissertation. 
2.1 - The standard model of tax competition and its assumptions 
This section introduces the standard tax competition model and provides a list of its
assumptions. Some of them were dealt by the public finance literature and will be 
considered here. The remaining will be discussed further below.
2.1.1 – Tax competition and fiscal federalism
The tax competition literature was initiated within the framework of fiscal federalism 
(Oates, 1972). Fiscal federalism (FF) looks at the implementation of fiscal policies and 
1 A simplified definition of tax cooperation, derived from James (2004, p. 27), is followed. Tax 
integration means the delegation of fiscal autonomy to a supra-national institution. Countries are
supposed to abide to its tax policy decisions (Robson, 1998). Tax harmonisation or tax coordination
means an agreement between countries about tax policy (rules and rates) without a mandatory 














                                                          
the allocation of its instruments at different levels of decision in a federation: federal,
state or sub-state. It states that fiscal policy should be managed at its most efficient level 
given its objectives: efficiency in resource allocation, income redistribution and 
economic stabilization (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973). Fiscal policies aiming at
income redistribution and economic stabilization are better managed at a centralized 
level due to economies of scale and externalities. But resource allocation should be 
shared among different levels of government, depending on the type of goods and 
services and on the preferences revealed by the population. For example, all goods and 
services provided at a state level, whose only beneficiaries are in the very same region, 
should be paid and implemented by this region's inhabitants and its elected 
representatives. 
Tax competition may be considered as a sub-product of fiscal federalism in the sense
that it was initially presented within a federal scenario where lower levels of 
government raised tax revenue to finance the provision of local public goods and 
services. However, it is not essential that a federal scenario prevails for tax competition 
to occur. If there is a federation, there are two possibilities: only the states intervene in 
the fiscal policy decision-making or both the federal institutions and the states 
intervene. If there is no federation or an upper-level of decision, then only a set of 
countries can compete.  
This is the case of the European Union (EU) where a set of countries form an economic
area and both the redistribution and stabilization policies are partially defined at a de­
centralized level. That is, although the tax competition model is valid both to a
federation and to an economic area, in the latter case concerns about redistribution and 
stability at a lower level are also relevant and thus countries do need to raise revenue for
that end2. 
A different question is that of the desirability of fiscal harmonization in an economic
area. In this case the similarity with fiscal federalism would be higher if the economic
area had a centrally managed fiscal authority with the power to tax all individuals and 
firms and able to self-manage the obtained revenue. In order to have a better assessment 
of this possibility the starting point should be the pre-cooperation situation, where each 










                                                          
 
country has complete autonomy to define its fiscal policy. This “status” should then be 
compared with the outcome expected from fiscal cooperation in order to access the 
advantages and disadvantages of changing fiscal rules. Thus, consideration of a non­
cooperative scenario seems a necessary way to start, where both efficiency and equity 
issues are considered. The stability objective demands a wider view of a country’s 
economic situation and is outside the scope of this dissertation.  
2.1.2 –The standard model of tax competition 
The effects of different tax policies adopted by local constituencies to finance the 
provision of local public goods was raised by Tiebout (1956) when stating that the 
ability of individuals to “vote with their feet” by moving across jurisdictions would 
result in an efficient provision of these goods. Tiebout apparently solved the difficult
problem of the efficient provision of public goods given that people tend to “free-ride” 
on their consumption. However, the efficient outcome of the Tiebout hypothesis is 
explained by the use of taxes that do not distort the behaviour of private agents and by 
assumptions similar to those of perfect competition models representing markets for 
private goods. Given its simplicity the model was widely criticized both in theoretical 
and empirical terms3. But despite its limited applicability Tiebout’s paper is the basis of 
the efficiency perspective that advocates jurisdictional autonomy in the taxation of 
factors of production. 
How tax policy affects the investment behaviour of profit-maximizing firms was
demonstrated by Jorgenson (1963) by assuming that firms invest up to the point where 
the marginal product of the capital stock (MPK) is just sufficient to cover the real user 
cost of capital. Tax policy impacts on the real user cost of capital in three different 
ways: By affecting real interest rates and by changing both tax rates and the rules of the
tax system. In the first case a fiscal stimulus raises the real interest rate and crowds out 
investment. The other two cases, of direct relevance to tax competition, have an 
immediate impact on net profits. By lowering the corporation tax rate a government is 
effectively reducing the user cost of capital and increasing the firm’s desired capital 
stock, and thus investment, given that MPK can now be smaller. By changing the tax 
rules governments may allow firms to reduce the corporation tax burden. The 









liberalization of the accounting rules on the depreciation rate of capital goods allows 
firms to deduct a higher value in the years where profits are higher. Investment tax 
credits, tax holidays, tax breaks, deferrals and so on also permit a reduction in the tax 
burden. Therefore, it is this wider concept, rather than a simple nominal tax rate, that is 
implicit throughout this dissertation and represents the role of tax variables in 
explaining capital location decisions in tax competition models. 
Tax competition was initiated by Oates (1972) where the work of Pigou about the 
financing of public goods with tax distortions was mixed with an implicit criticism of 
the Tiebout model. Oates (1972, p. 143) states that if a jurisdiction increases its tax rate 
on capital, a mobile factor, then this change is expected to cause an outflow of capital to 
other jurisdictions with lower tax rates. This is seen by the literature as a positive 
externality because the positive effects for third parties from the change in tax policy are 
not considered by decision-makers. In the same way, if a jurisdiction decreases its tax
rate, it is expected to cause a negative effect by attracting capital from other places. If 
there is competition for capital, countries or other jurisdictions tend to set their tax rates
in a level that may be too low to ensure an efficient provision of public goods. The
inefficiency exists because “… local officials may hold spending below those levels for 
which marginal benefits equal marginal costs…” (Oates, 1972, p. 143). 
The “Tiebout hypothesis” made a comeback in the 1980’s and, since then, the literature 
has focused on the welfare effects generated by tax competition for capital or labour and 
on different scenarios of tax cooperation. The standard tax competition model is based 
on the assumption that countries want to attract capital in order to enlarge their 
production possibility frontier and investors want to maximize the return on their 
investments by lowering their tax burden. Thus, tax competition exists when countries, 
regions or states pursue active policies in order to attract capital, or other factors of 
production, from other places. The critique of Oates is now the main argument against 
tax competition when efficiency is the perspective considered. The criticism of the 
Tiebout’s hypothesis gave a foundation to the formalization of the standard model of tax 
competition by Beck (1983), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). 
Wildasin (1988) and Hoyt (1991) explicitly introduced strategic interactions between 
jurisdictions. Given that tax competition models have two opposing forces in the 









willingness to increase taxation to maximize the utility of residents through the 
provision of public goods, they will be presented separately.  
2.1.2.1 – The effect of tax changes on capital flows 
An example of tax competition can be shown using the following simplifications:  
a) A Nash competitive world economy, with two symmetric countries, has a fixed stock 
of mobile capital and a fixed stock of immobile labour in each country; 
b) Residents in both countries are the same in number and own equal endowments of 
labour and capital, so they can be normalized to one representative consumer (income
distribution is not relevant); 
c) Production of a homogeneous private good (X) occurs in a competitive market, is a 
function of capital and labour [F(K,L)] and exhibits constant returns to scale. Firms sell 
good X to consumers and to the government as an intermediate good for the production 
of a public good (G); 
d) Capital has a decreasing but positive marginal product, i.e., F’(K) > 0 and F’’(K) < 0;  
e) A source-based unit tax on capital is the only source of revenue for the provision of 
the public good (G); 
f) Benevolent governments try to maximise residents’ utility, that is, the consumption of 
private (X) and public goods (G). Each government chooses the capital tax rate, the
strategic variable, to compete for the mobile factor given the tax rate chosen by the 
other country 
Figure 2.1.2.1: 1, built on Hindricks and Myles (2004), shows this world economy of 
two countries, for e.g. Germany and the UK. Each vertical axis represents a country’s 
marginal productivity of capital (F’(K), Germany left and UK right) and the horizontal 
axis the fixed stock of capital that is distributed between the two countries. The [rg,ruk] 
axis represents the net rate of return to capital (r), which is assumed to be the marginal 
productivity of capital less a unit tax rate (T). The free movement of capital looking for 
a higher net rate of return determines its allocation between the countries. In the initial 
equilibrium (point 9) the tax rate in both economies is the same (Tg0 and Tuk0) and 
capital is equally split between the two countries, at K0.  
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  Figure 2.1.2.1: 1 - Efficiency effects of a tax change on capital flows 
Now consider that Germany tries to attract capital from the UK by lowering its tax rate
to Tg1=0 (the difference between the 2 countries becomes Tuk0 – Tg1, the distance 
between points 8 and 9). The size of the reduction in the tax rate is defined given UK’s 
tax policy and, ignoring for the moment the need to provide public goods, it represents 
Germany´s maximization of the stock of capital. The economy moves to point 5 
because some capital moves from the UK to Germany (from K0 to K1) up to the point 
when its rate of return is equal in both countries. Therefore, the model considers a
marginal effective tax rate. After the change the UK will have a smaller stock of capital 
due to the decision taken by the German authorities and the world net rate of return rises 
due to the lower tax rate and the ability of Germany to influence the world capital
market (it is now represented by the horizontal axis [r’g-r’uk]). There is an inefficient
allocation of capital because the additional units of capital employed in Germany 
have a lower marginal product. Therefore, the world is worse-off by the inefficiency
represented by the triangle [3-5-8]. In the overall, the German economy is now better 
off by [8-5-K1-K0], at the expense of the UK economy. This is true even if it is 
assumed that all capital moved to Germany is owned by British investors and that its 
returns will be repatriated to the UK. The total welfare of the German economy would, 
in this case, increase only by [5-6-8]. A first conclusion from tax competition is that a 
country, such as Germany, can benefit from lower tax rates through the attraction of 
investment but these gains are made at the expense of other countries. However, the 








          
       
    
 
             
             
          
                         
          
                 
                     
          
 
 
                                                          
  
   
it is not certain that a country would compete through a tax instrument without 
considering the consequences of its policy. 
In fact, and given that this is a Nash world, the UK is expected to react to this change by 
choosing its best response to maximize the capital stock given the tax rate chosen by 
Germany (ignoring again the provision of public goods). The optimal tax choice for the
UK is to lower its tax rate to Tuk1=0 and a symmetric equilibrium is reached in point 8,
in Figure 2. In this case both countries have the same stock of capital, tax rate and 
labour income and produce the same quantity of goods and services as in the initial 
equilibrium in point 9 (Figure 1). But the rate of return of capital is now higher than in
the initial situation, at [r”g,r”uk]. The only difference to the initial equilibrium is that 
public revenue was “transformed” in return to capital because there was a “race to the 
bottom” in tax rates and both the UK and Germany ended down with a zero 
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                          Figure 2.1.2.1: 2 – Race to the bottom 
This is the expected result of tax competition frequently referred by the literature and 
presented in Frenkel et al (1991, p. 206)4. The difference with the initial situation is that 
both countries lost all their tax revenue in “exchange” for capital owners income (which 
is now [8-r”g-K0-Kg] in Germany and [8-r”uk-K0-Kuk] in the UK). Labour income is 
4 The “race to the bottom” outcome depends on the existence of immobile sources of taxation when the 










the same as in the initial equilibrium - [7-8-r”g] in Germany and [1-8-r”uk] in the UK. 
Therefore, only capital owners benefited from tax competition due to the increase in the
rate of return. And public revenue was eliminated (or reduced when there are other
sources of revenue) limiting the ability of governments to implement their policies.   
2.1.2.2 – The provision of public goods 
Now assume the economy at point 5 (Figure 2.1.2.1: 1), with capital in fixed supply 
divided between the two countries at K1. The initial excess burdens of taxation are [8-5­
3], in UK’s perspective, and nil in Germany. The German authorities, willing to 
maximize residents’ utility by increasing the provision of public goods, raise the tax rate 
from Tg1 to Tg0 (in the opposite direction of the example above) and the perceived 
excess burden in Germany increases to [5-8-9]. From a “world” perspective this change 
is favourable due to the disappearance of the inefficient capital allocation. The loss in 
the provision of private goods is compensated by the gain in the provision of public 
goods and the perceived excess burden is, in “world” terms, extra tax revenue for the
UK. But the question is that, from a German point of view, the increase in the tax rate is 
perceived to cost more (the sum of revenue raised with the perceived excess burden)
than the benefits (the provision of public goods from the extra revenue). In other words, 
the marginal cost of the increase in tax rates is perceived to be higher than the marginal 
benefit. It is this overstatement of the cost, in the presence of fiscal competition, that 
explains why countries end up with a sub-optimal level of public goods provision 
where, in equilibrium, the marginal cost of public funds is lower than the marginal 
benefit of public goods provision (Wildasin, 1989, p. 196).  
A better explanation for the under provision of public goods is the fact that decision 
makers in each country perceive an elastic reaction of capital to a change in tax rates 
and, in order to avoid a reduction in capital supply, tend to set sub-optimal tax rates. 
The inefficiency can be shown from the optimal condition for the provision of public 
goods, obtained by maximizing the utility of residents of one country with respect to the 
tax rate and subject to the public and private budget constraints and the international 
capital market condition (F’(Ki) – Ti = r, where i is the country considered – Zodrow 
and Mieszkowsky, 1986). Ug / Ux are the ratio of marginal utilities of public and 




       
 
 







with respect to its tax rate. Efficiency is achieved when government sets a tax rate level 
where the ratio of marginal utilities is one (Ug / Ux = 1) and equal to the marginal cost 
of public funds (MCPF). The MCPF is represented by the right hand side of equation 
(1.1) and depends both on the level of taxation and on the effect of a tax rate change in 
the stock of capital (dK / dT). 
Ug / Ux = 1 / [1 + Ek] (1.1) 
with Ek = dK / dT * T / K 
and given dK / dT = [1 / F’’(K)], obtained by totally differentiating the international 
capital market condition with respect to the tax rate,  
Ek = T / K * [1 / F’’(K)] (1.2) 
is always < 0 because F’’(K) < 0 (capital is assumed to have a decreasing marginal 
product) 
As long as Ek is different from zero the utilities obtained from the consumption of an 
additional unit of public and private goods are also different. Given that Ek is negative, 
the cost of provision of an additional unit of public good in terms of lost consumption of 
private goods is higher than 1 and, therefore, equilibrium is obtained with sub-optimal 
provision of public goods. 
This inefficient equilibrium is implicit in Figure 2.1.2.1: 2 above, at point 8, where the 
“transformation” of tax revenue in return to capital prevents the utility maximization of 
consumers. That is, by assuming that the marginal revenue is used on the provision of 
public goods, the lower tax rate on capital reduces this provision. Therefore, a 
coordinated increase of the tax rate in the two countries would improve their welfare. 
Figure 1 below, taken from Wilson (1991), shows more clearly this sub-optimal and the
optimal equilibriums.  
In Figure 2.1.2.2: 1 X and G are, respectively, private and public goods and curves ww’ 
and cc’ represent, respectively, the production and the consumption possibility frontiers 
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from private firms can be transformed into one unit of the public good and thus the 
curve ww’ has a slope of –1, which is the marginal rate of transformation. The curve cc’
has a higher slope when it crosses ww’, as it is shown in equation 1 above (Ug / Ux > 
1), provoked by a consumption distortion in favour of private goods. This is due to the
perceived effect of changes in taxation presented above. Therefore, when there is tax 
competition the equilibrium is inefficient and it is represented by [x*g*] (equivalent to 
point 8 in Figure 2.1.2.1: 3). Here, there is an under provision of public goods in 
relation to the optimal point, O, where an indifference curve with higher utility is 
tangential to the production possibility frontier.  
Figure 2.1.2.2: 1 - Sub-optimal and optimal equilibrium
The figure also shows that both countries would be better off if they move to O by 
raising its tax rates in a coordinated way and by eliminating the consumption distortion. 
If there is tax harmonisation capital flows are not induced, the misallocation of capital 
does not arise and there is no wrong perception about the effect of tax changes. The
locative efficiency is achieved, given taxes available, whenever the German and the UK 
tax rates are equal, from zero to the maximum possible capital tax rate, because the 
excess tax burdens are not relevant from a world perspective given that the total tax 
base is fixed and the common tax is levied with no distortions. However, in order to 
have an efficient provision of public goods it requires a certain amount of tax revenue 
(dependent on population preferences), and as long as the tax rate increases there is also 
a reduction in the consumption of private goods (through the owners of capital given its 
lower after tax rate of return). So, the optimal tax rate will depend on the utility function 
of residents in each country and their desired quantity of public and private goods. Tax 











that level is the equilibrium efficient. In Figure 2.1.2.2: 1 this is in point O, where both 
the UK and Germany would be located in a superior indifference curve.  
This is, from a neo-classical perspective, the main theoretical criticism against tax 
competition and, simultaneously, the main argument for tax harmonization between 
countries in an economic area such as the EU (tax cooperation is further developed in 
2.2.5). The above example of inefficient equilibrium with a finite number of regions
was presented in Wildasin (1988). Zodrow and Miezkowsky (1986) and Wilson (1986) 
have presented the same result for an infinite number of regions or countries. Hoyt 
(1991) showed that the bigger is the number of countries in the world economy the 
larger is the amount of capital attracted when one jurisdiction changes its tax rate, the 
greater is the under-provision of public goods and the lower is the utility in equilibrium.  
2.2 - Extensions of the standard model 
The standard model is very simplistic given that it relies on a large number of 
assumptions that are mere simplifications of the real world where firms, consumers and 
governments operate. Some of the extensions of the standard model and the remaining 
approaches, namely the political economy view (2.3) and the new economic geography 
perspective (2.4), are based on the assumptions of the public finance literature. 
Throughout these chapters the assumptions will be relaxed and the model will become
more representative of the “real world”. 
The first assumption is the setting of the standard model, a Nash world. The literature 
presents other approaches that disputes its main findings and considers that tax 
competition results in an efficient outcome. A Tiebout-type model of competition for
firms is presented in Oates and Schwab (1991) where each jurisdiction acts like a 
private firm in a competitive market setting. Local jurisdictions compete by lowering 
tax rates while providing a public input to corporations and, in return, expect to enlarge 
its capital stock so that their residents may benefit from higher wages. They are “price 
takers” in the sense that the rate of return on capital is taken as given by the market. 
Jurisdictions also provide a local public good for residents and the provision of both 












cost of the used public inputs and, in the same way, the tax on residents is equal to the
cost of the public goods they consume. So, they are benefit taxes (acting like a 
marginal-cost price for public goods provision) and the model has an efficient outcome
similar to that of a competitive market. Both firms and individuals choose their location 
based on the local public goods provision and the correspondent taxes, and consume the
public goods up to the point where the sum of marginal benefits is equal to the marginal 
cost of provision to society. 
The model is presented as a benchmark for local tax competition for two reasons. First, 
it is assumed that redistribution policies must be fulfilled at a national level, or the 
model loses its strength. That is, it can only be applied to tax competition between 
countries if redistribution policies may be settled at a supranational level. But even if 
this is the case, the second reason, the existence of market imperfections, rules out its 
applicability to countries. Oates and Schwab recognize the existence of market 
imperfections but consider that these are only relevant at a national level. For instance, 
strategic issues are considered not as relevant at a local level as at a national level and 
local jurisdictions are assumed not to have an effective market power. Moreover,
although there is imperfect information about taxes and expenditure, corporations are
expected to consider local public policies when choosing a place to locate, as happens 
with households. Finally, externalities may be “corrected” by matching grants from an
upper administrative level and the mobility of the factors of production is not a problem 
as long as local governments use benefit taxation and do not try to extract extra revenue. 
The assumption of the Oates and Schwab model are too restrictive. There are several 
reasons to consider that the findings of this model do not dispute the findings of the 
standard tax competition model. A first reason is benefit taxation and the commitment 
by governments. Local governments are supposed to keep unchanged their tax policies 
after firms invest in the recipient jurisdiction. But governments do change, in ideas and 
in representatives, and at a local level there is also a temptation for governments to 
pursue policies that demand extra revenue on top of benefit taxation. Another problem 
is the non-relevance of strategic issues. This is also questionable given that local 
governments may pursue active tax policies in order to increase their budget or to attract
population. Therefore, these two reasons and the inapplicability to countries are 
















2.2.1 - Factors of production 
2.2.1.1 - Perfect capital mobility 
Capital is considered, in most of the tax competition literature, to be perfectly mobile
(moving in the direction of the highest net rate of return). This means that capital does 
not have any obstacles to its movement but this assumption is very restrictive if it is
considered that even inside an economic union, such as the European Union, capital
mobility is not totally costless due to several sorts of barriers (legal, cultural, etc.).  
Furthermore, the economic literature has presented signs of imperfect mobility of 
capital. These include the existence of real interest rate differentials across countries, the 
high correlation between domestic savings and investment, the fact that domestic capital 
ownership still prevails (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, and Mishkin, 1984) or imperfect 
product substitution (Gravelle and Smetters, 2001). Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) 
explain the lack of perfect mobility with the existence of asymmetric information across 
countries. 
The perfect mobility assumption was firstly relaxed by Lee (1997) but with no
significant change in the main findings of the literature, namely the under provision of 
public goods predicted by the standard model. The main change is that imperfect 
mobility reduces the effects of tax competition given that capital does not flow so
easily to other jurisdictions (Eggert and Haufler, 1998, Sorensen, 2004) 
2.2.1.2 - Labour immobility and in fixed supply 
These are strong assumptions on labour supply. When a labour tax is added to the 
model the capital tax rate goes down to zero due to tax competition and labour bears all 
the burden of public goods provision because it is immobile and in fixed supply (2.2.2.4 
below). If these assumptions are relaxed and if residents of a country may choose 
between labour and leisure or if labour may move to other jurisdiction, then its supply is
no longer fixed. The consequence is that the fiscal externality still exists, although its 











                                                          
 
The reason, exposed by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), is when the labour tax is 
increased in a country to compensate a zero tax rate on capital and the distortion 
disappears from the capital market, there is still an outflow of capital and its respective 
fiscal effect because both the labour supply and, consequently, the demand for capital in 
that country are reduced. Labour supply is reduced due to the higher labour tax, 
meaning that some residents either choose to stay out of work or to move abroad. Given 
this reduction in the use of labour, the economy demands less capital in order to
maintain the initial relative levels in the use of factors of production (assuming no 
technological or production changes in the short term). This reduction in the demand of 
capital maintains the fiscal externality because it provokes a flow of capital to other 
countries and, due to the government’s perception of this outflow, the labour tax will 
not be sufficiently raised to allow for an optimal provision of public goods. In other 
words, if the marginal tax revenue is used for the provision of public goods, this 
provision will be inefficient. 
Thus, the “replacement” of a capital tax by a labour tax does not avoid the existence of a 
fiscal externality and does not change the results of the standard model. The difference, 
in this case, is that the fiscal effect does not arise from a change in the capital tax rate 
but from a distortion in the labour market arising from the labour-leisure choice and/or 
labour mobility (Eggert and Haufler, 1998). This conclusion is also valid for 
consumption taxes (Gordon, 1986) but cannot be applied to a lump sum tax on 
residents, where distortions are absent.  
2.2.2 - Taxation5 
2.2.2.1 – Source-based and host country taxation 
The standard model uses a source-based tax on mobile capital, which means that only
the income earned within a jurisdiction is taxed. However, this source-based tax distorts 
investment location decisions because it is an incentive for capital owners to invest 
5 The tax competition literature seldom clarifies what capital is being taxed but it may include corporate














abroad when income is taxed with a lower rate. This is the source of the inefficient 
allocation of capital predicted by the model.  
There is an alternative possibility, residence-based taxation, where capital is taxed in 
the same way independently of its location. In this case single-rate taxation does not
provoke misallocation of capital because there would be no incentive for capital to 
move abroad. The outcome of the tax competition model becomes efficient given 
taxes available (Razin and Sadka, 1991, Mintz and Tulkens, 1996). This result is 
derived from Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), where a residence-based tax on capital is 
advocated. They show that for the marginal rate of substitution between two factors of 
production to be equal for all firms it is required that capital taxes are the same
independently of its location. Thus, from an optimal tax theory perspective a residence-
based tax on capital should be adopted and not a source-based system. 
However, residence based taxation is very difficult to implement because it requires
close cooperation among countries in the exchange of information about the income
obtained by non-residents (Giovannini, 1990, Keen, 1993). The country where a non­
resident obtains income is not able to tax it and thus has an incentive to hide
information or to cheat in order to keep investment within its boundaries. 
Furthermore, the existing systems to avoid the double taxation of foreign profits 
complicate the analysis even without changing the main finding of the standard tax 
competition model. When a company wants to invest abroad both the tax rates of the 
home country (where the head office is located) and the host country (where the new 
investment will be located) are relevant if profits are taxed in the country where they are 
made (the source based system) and the parent company wants to repatriate retained 
profits. In this case the system of taxation of the home country may make a difference. 
There are two main systems, tax exemption and tax credit, and both aim to avoid double 
taxation of foreign profits (Keen, 1993). Tax exemption is a source based system where 
profits obtained abroad are not taxed in the home country. Tax credit countries, on the
other hand, allow for the deduction of taxes paid abroad in the home tax bill. There is a
limit to these deductions and, usually, the amount deducted can never be higher than the 
home tax liability. In practice, if a company does not have profits at home it is less keen 











deducted. This is permitted in some countries by the use of a tax deferral, where profits 
are only taxed in the home country when repatriated. So, companies tend to repatriate 
profits to their home country when they can totally or partially eliminate the home tax 
payments.  
2.2.2.2 - Tax rates have the exclusive aim of attracting capital  
Tax competition literature implicitly assumes that tax rates are determined with the sole
aim of attracting capital in order to enlarge the production possibility frontier or, at 
least, to maintain a capital base. But corporate tax rates may be established for other 
reasons. Corporate tax revenues in developed countries were stable in the last 20 years 
because the effect of a decrease in tax rates was cancelled out by the broadening of the 
tax base, mostly through a less favorable depreciation regime (Devereux et al, 2002, p. 
459). This may be a way of keeping stable or even increasing the level of revenue 
obtained from corporate taxation in order to assure the financing of public expenditure.  
Slemrod (2004), however, considers domestic influences over the determination of 
capital taxes and does not find empirical evidence of a direct relationship between its 
tax rate and the revenue needs of governments. But there are other domestic
determinants that seem to be relevant for the level of capital tax rates: 
- Avoids the reclassification of labour income as capital income in search for a lower 
tax rate. If capital tax is lower, capital income would be transferred to shareholders as 
dividends or in other way in order to avoid labour income taxation. So, higher capital
tax rates are usually associated with higher top individual tax rates in order to prevent
income shifting (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000). 
- It is a way of taxing economic profits or rents and transfer revenue from foreign 
owned domestic firms to domestic consumers (Mintz, 1996, Huizinga and Nielsen, 
1997). 
- For administrative efficiency it is thought to be better to collect taxes at the 
corporation level than at the shareholders’. Therefore, it is expected that corporate 
income taxes are higher in countries where there are more administrative difficulties in 
collecting taxes from individuals.  
- When government activities result in cost-reduction benefits for firms, these should 












corporation tax may be a good substitute. So, variations in corporate taxation can be 
associated with cost-reduction benefits from public activities. 
- Capital tax should be higher in countries where the egalitarian sentiment of the 
population is prominent because, in voters’ eyes, it is usually associated with tax
progressivity. Equity in taxation between labour and capital may be an internal 
determinant due to pressure from voters. 
- Corporation tax is a “price” to pay for the limited liability that shareholders enjoy in 
the event of bankruptcy. 
Besley and Case (1995) present a further reason in a model of yardstick competition 
where jurisdictions are constrained in their tax policy options by comparisons, made by 
voters, with those of similar jurisdictions. Thus, a better understanding of the role of 
internal determinants of capital tax policy is needed because it seems that the attraction 
of capital in itself, as predicted by the tax competition model, does not provide a 
complete explanation of the level of capital taxes. 
2.2.2.3 – Capital taxes finance the provision of public goods 
The standard tax competition model was first presented in the context of local tax
competition in the USA, where jurisdictions rely mainly on property taxation to provide 
public goods. But this does not happen in a country where other sources of taxation are 
available. Countries can rely also on several types of labour and consumption taxes and 
may even disregard capital taxation.  
Frenkel et al (1991) added to the model a single-rate labour tax and assumed labour to 
be immobile and in fixed supply. The labour tax acts in a lump sum way and, therefore, 
has no distortions. When two jurisdictions engage in tax competition for mobile capital 
the outcome turns out to be different than the one presented in the standard model. Both
countries end up with a zero capital tax rate, the “race to the bottom” outcome where 
capital flows stop, but there is an optimal provision of public goods totally financed by 
the labour tax. Thus, when a lump sum tax on residents is available in the model 
jurisdictions no longer need to tax capital to ensure an optimal provision of public
goods. This result is optimal in terms of tax policy from a single country perspective. 





















Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) show the “replacement” of a capital tax by a labour tax 
does not avoid the existence of a fiscal externality. 
Table 2.2.2.3: 1 - Tax competition and types of taxation 








(Oates, 1972, Zodrow and 
Mieszkowsky, 1986,
Wilson, 1986).
Efficient given taxes 
available
(Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991)
Inefficient if labour is 
not in fixed supply 
(Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991,
Eggert and Haufler, 1998)
Residence-based 
capital tax 
Efficient given taxes 
available 
(Razin and Sadka, 1991)
Efficient given taxes 
available 
(Gordon, 1986)
Wage tax Inefficient if labour is 
not in fixed supply 
(Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991)
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) also allowed governments to use together a source based 
and a residence based capital tax on investment and savings and found that the 
equilibrium of the model is efficient given the tax instruments available. This is because 
there is no distortion in the labour market and in the capital market given that the 
residence-based tax “disincentives” capital to move abroad. The same efficient result in 
the provision of public goods can be derived from Gordon (1986) when a residence-
based capital tax and a wage tax are used. Therefore, the existence of more than one 
tax source turns the model efficient if and only if residence-based taxation is used 
or a lump sum tax is available. Table 2.2.2.3: 1 presents a summary of the results 
reported in the literature.
2.2.2.4 - Tax rates are the sole instrument to compete for capital 
The literature implicitly assumes that tax rates represent the complete fiscal burden for 
capital. There are, however, other instruments that can be used as a way to attract 
mobile factors of production. These can be divided in two groups: tax related 
instruments (see 2.1.2.3 above) and other type of fiscal or non-fiscal variables. 
In the first group there are a number of variables besides taxation that have direct 
influence on the tax burden. More strict depreciation rules may counterbalance the 










a temporary reduction in tax rates are used by Bond and Samuelson (1986) as a way for 
a government to signal the attributes of its jurisdiction.  
Some of these models have a different result than the standard model due to very 
restrictive assumptions and the reliance on the existence of initial distortions that are 
reduced with tax competition. They do not dispute the main findings of the literature but 
give some new insights with reference to potential welfare-enhancing outcomes of tax 
competition. Garcia-Milá and McGuire (2001) present a model, based on Oates and 
Schwab (1991), where corporations are attracted with a tax break that “pays” for the 
benefits brought in the form of concentration economies. Black and Hoyt (1989) model 
two cities bidding, through a subsidy, for a large firm and its workers. The outcome of 
the model is efficiency enhancing in social terms when the existing distortion in the
provision of public services is reduced by the bidding (through the reduction of the 
average cost of providing public services). Finally, Janeba and Wilson (1999) and 
Janeba (1998) model tax competition in an international trade setting. In both cases the 
efficiency enhancing outcome of tax competition is obtained through the elimination of 
wasteful subsidies.  
A second type of instrument includes the provision of public goods, especially public 
inputs. When a country has a higher level of public expenditure (and this higher level 
means better public inputs or favorable conditions for the development of economic 
activity - like better roads and infrastructures), it may have a comparative advantage 
over other countries in attracting corporations or foreign direct investment (Oates, 
1995). 
Wildasin (1988) shows that fiscal competition among a small number of jurisdictions 
obtains different Nash-equilibriums depending on the chosen strategic variable: tax rates 
or public expenditure levels. However, results are not qualitatively different from the 
literature and for a sufficient large number of jurisdictions the two Nash-equilibriums
are the same. Keen and Marchand (1997) show that competition for capital with public 
expenditure results in an overprovision of business related public inputs and an under
provision of non-business related public outputs. Finally, a different way of competing 













inefficiently lax environmental policies are used as a strategic variable to attract 
investment.  
2.2.3 – Countries, firms and consumers 
2.2.3.1 – Country symmetry 
The symmetry of countries is a clear simplification of the real world. Different country 
size means asymmetric tax competition where decisions have different economic 
impacts. A large country is characterized by a higher number of residents, the ability to 
change the international rate of return on capital, to engage in strategic competition or 
by facing a finite elastic supply of capital with respect to its capital tax rate. A small
country, on the other hand, does not have these characteristics because it takes the 
international rate of return as given and faces a much more elastic supply of capital. 
Theoretically, the smaller the country in relation to the rest of the world the higher the 
elasticity it faces. In an extreme case, it faces an infinite elastic supply of capital. 
The symmetry assumption was firstly relaxed in the literature by considering that a 
large country has more residents than a small one and thus by using the capital-labour
ratio as a determinant variable in tax competition (Wilson, 1991, and Bucovetsky, 
1991). To see this consider the standard model with two countries where, for example, 
the UK is a large country with a share of total population Suk higher than the share Sp 
of, say Portugal, a small country. These economies have the same characteristics of the
standard model (see 2.1.2 above) except that Kuk and Kp are now capital-labour ratios 
for both countries and F(Kuk) and F(Kp) represent the output produced per worker 
when the capital-labour ratio is Kuk and Kp, respectively for the UK and Portugal. 
Consider also that residents use private income only to buy private goods and that 
public income from the tax on capital is exclusively used to provide public goods.   
The difference in size translates into the fact that decision makers in the UK have a 
perception of capital being less elastic in reaction to a change in tax rates in comparison 
with the Portuguese perception. This can be seen from the expression of the variation in 
the capital-labour ratio with respect to a tax rate change (Bucovetsky, 1991):  
28
 











                                                          
  
 
dKi / dTi = Sj / [Sp * F’’(Kuk) + Suk * F’’(Kp)] (2.1) 
where i is one country and j the other. The elasticity of the supply of capital per capita 
with respect to the tax rate for both countries is (Ek(p) and Ek(uk) for Portugal and the 
UK, respectively6): 
Ek (p) = dKp / dTp * Tp / Kp = 
= Suk * Tp / {Kp * [Sp * F’’(Kuk) + Suk * F’’(Kp)]}  (2.2) 
Ek (uk) = dKuk / dTuk * Tuk / Kuk = 
= Sp * Tuk / {Kuk * [Sp * F’’(Kuk) + Suk * F’’(Kp)]} (2.3) 
If Kp = Kuk and Tp = Tuk then, Ek (p) > Ek (uk) given that Suk > Sp 
Therefore, due to differences in size countries have a different elasticity of capital to its 
rate of return, and indirectly to tax rates, being the elasticity in the Portuguese economy 
higher than in the UK. Due to this difference in the elasticity countries are expected to 
have different tax rates in equilibrium in a tax competition scenario, or a different level 
of public goods provision. Portugal ends up, in equilibrium, with a lower tax rate 
because for a similar change in taxation more capital, in relation to the size of its 
economy, is suppose to flow than in the case of the UK, but with a lesser impact on the
international rate of return on capital. 
A first difference between the asymmetric and symmetric cases is that given the lower 
tax rate in Portugal, its capital-labour ratio becomes higher than it would be in the 
symmetric case presented above due to the more than proportional attraction of capital. 
In a neo-classical economy this may be translated into a higher productivity of labour 
or, in other words, a better remuneration of this factor of production than in the
symmetric case. But the reduction in the tax rate also means a reduction in tax revenue
and, therefore, in the provision of public goods. So, as in the symmetric case presented 
above, not only is there a misallocation of capital but the provision of public goods in 
6 The elasticity for the UK is obtained by totally differentiating the international capital market condition
F’(Kuk) – Tuk = F’([Kª - Suk*Kuk]/Sp) – Tp with respect to Tuk where Kª = Suk*Kuk + Sp*Kp is the









      
 




                                                          
 
 
the small country is inefficient in equilibrium. In this sense, the consequences of the
asymmetric equilibrium are not qualitatively different to the symmetric example given 
above. The remaining gains and losses of the small country case are similar: capital 
owners are benefited and the state looses revenue7. 
But although the standard model is still inefficient with the introduction of asymmetry, 
there is a difference if the outcome is compared with the results presented in 2.1.2. The
advantage of being small is further extended to the fact that residents in the small 
country may be better off even when in comparison with the situation of efficient tax 
integration. Considering the private (Xp) and public (Gp) budget constraints for the 
small country (Bucovetsky, 1991) it is seen that the level of public goods provision 
depends both on the tax rate and on the stock of capital. The smaller (less units of
labour) is the country competing for capital the smaller is the tax rate Tp in equilibrium 
but the larger is the attraction of capital per unit of labour. A reduction in the tax rate in
a very small country attracts a very small amount of Kp in absolute terms but a 
proportionally higher amount is needed in order to equalize its rate of return with the 
world’s due to the higher elasticity of capital to its tax rate. It can be seen from equation 
(4) that an increase in the stock of Kp increases the provision of private goods as long as 
its marginal productivity is positive. Therefore, a sufficiently small country has a 
proportionally higher provision of both private and public goods and their 
residents may be better-off in a tax competition situation if the difference in size or 
in the elasticity between the small and the large country is big enough8. 
Gp = Tp * Kp          (3)  
Xp = [F(Kp) – F’(Kp) * Kp] + r * Kª (4) 
The questions, then, are how small should be a country and how much can it benefit 
from tax competition. Eggert and Haufler (1998) conclude that in a simple world of two 
countries the small one has a potentially large gain. Depending on the size of the
country and on the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods, it varies
7 For a large country tax competition is never advantageous in efficiency terms (Wilson, 1991) given that
 
it is always better off with tax cooperation.












between 1.3% and 8.1% of an utility increase (which stems from an higher capital-
labour ratio and is equivalent to per capita income changes – p. 347) when tax 
competition is compared with tax harmonization. These gains may be undervalued 
because the size of the small country considered is in the range of 25% to 5% of the 
world population, a quite large value if it is compared, for example, to 2% of Portugal in
the EU population. But they may also be reduced when the existence of transaction 
costs or imperfect capital mobility, a world of multiple countries and multiple tax 
instruments are considered (Eggert and Haufler, 1998, Table 2, p. 346).  
2.2.3.2 – Countries attract capital by lowering tax rates 
Bruckner and Saavedra (2001) and Carlsen et al (2005) derive reaction functions and 
present empirical evidence of competition with average effective tax rates between local 
jurisdictions. But at a country level this is more difficult. Devereux et al (2008) tried, 
since 2000, to find evidence of tax competition by estimating reaction functions for EU 
countries. The study has had many versions and was able to present evidence for 
statutory and marginal effective tax rates, but not for average effective tax rates, those 
that are regarded as relevant for location decisions (chapter 3, section 3.3.2). 
Even ignoring reaction functions, it is not certain that countries are pursuing tax policies 
with the exclusive aim of capital attraction, as shown in 2.2.2.2 above, and this is not a 
guarantee of an inefficient provision of public goods. 
2.2.3.3 – Markets, firms and consumers 
The standard model does not consider any type of inefficiencies in markets within 
countries. Agglomeration externalities will be considered below, in 2.4.2. But Mintz 
(1996) and Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) show the source-based tax regime to be an 
optimal way to tax capital in the case of foreign-owned rents. The tax is not only non­
distortive but the burden falls on non-residents and allows a transfer of revenue to 
domestic consumers.  
Firm heterogeneity (only some firms receive fiscal incentives) is included in Han and 
















     
 
 
prevent the misallocation of capital in a tax competition setting. Frenkel et al (1991) 
considered the case of consumer heterogeneity without any change in the results
presented, that is, tax competition is efficient if there is an immobile tax source. 
2.2.4 – Tax cooperation 
The results obtained by the public finance literature on tax competition consider the 
disadvantages to the real world versus the “optimal world” of tax integration, where all 
countries, independently of their size, would have the same tax rates and capital would 
bear the same tax burden. Tax integration in the entire world would avoid efficiency 
losses in the allocation of capital or other factors of production and in the provision of 
public goods and all countries participating, except very small ones, would benefit from 
it. 
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        Figure 2.2.4: 1 - Tax cooperation versus tax competition in the world economy  
The “world” perspective is shown in Figure 2.2.4: 1 where Portugal and the United 
Kingdom are assumed to be symmetric and are represented in a Hamada diagram. In the 
axis, Tp and Tu represent the tax policy of both countries. Their objective is to 
maximize the welfare of its residents and this depends on the level of tax rates. Rp and 










allow to maximize welfare given the other country’s policy. U and P are, respectively, 
the indifference curves for the UK and Portugal and U4 represents a higher welfare to
the UK than U1 (the same applies to Portugal). Suppose that the initial policies of both 
countries are represented by Ou. It represents a determined level of tax rates in Portugal 
(T’p) and in the UK (T’u), and is located on UK’s reaction function. That is, given the 
Portugal’s tax rate the UK cannot improve its welfare. But policy makers in Portugal
may decide to lower the tax rate to T’’p and, given the new outcome (point 2) in a 
higher utility curve, to increase its residents’ welfare. UK residents are now in a lower 
curve and thus worst-off. But now the UK can improve its situation given Portugal’s tax 
policy (point 3) and further changes in the tax policies of the two countries would end in 
a Nash equilibrium represented by C. 
A cooperative solution would improve the welfare of both countries in comparison with 
this non-cooperative outcome. This is represented by the contract curve Op-Ou, where 
all solutions between points H1 and H4 are simultaneously preferable for both countries 
because they would be located in a higher indifference curve. That is, in theory all 
countries in the world, except very small ones, could benefit by increasing their 
capital tax rates in a coordinated way. The outcome on the contract curve would 
depend mainly on the bargaining power of each party and the result can be generalized
for a world of many countries (Sorensen 2000, 2004).  
The final outcome depends also on close cooperation in tax-related policies because 
national authorities may relax its audit commitments against tax evasion providing 
scope for businesses and individuals to lower their real tax rate. Cramer and Gahvari 
(2000) consider a tax competition model with tax evasion and conclude that tax 
coordination is only effective if there is also a coordination of audit strategies. 
Otherwise it may be a bad policy because it can make all of them worse-off and it may 
cause “honest” countries to become “evading” ones. 
But two further questions need to be addressed when assessing the effects of tax 
cooperation. First, in spite of the advantages of coordinating taxes all over the world it 
is very difficult to reach an agreement on tax policy among almost two hundred 
different countries. Therefore, tax coordination is more feasible for a smaller and closer 















                                                          
  
achieved by its members. A question, then, is how important are the gains from tax 
cooperation, that is, what is the size of the inefficiency provoked by tax competition, 
and how would these gains or losses change with a reduced number of countries 
participating in the process. The size of the gains was considered in some studies and 
their values are presented in Table 1.
                   Table 2.2.4: 1 – Simulation studies: gains from tax cooperation
Study Key parameter / location Gains from coordination
Wildasin (1989 - Table 1, p.204) Demand elasticity for capital (USA) 0.07% - 1.44% of GNP 
Parry (2003 - Fig. 4, p.47, 48) Capital supply elasticity (USA) 0% - 1.65% of GDP 
Sorensen (2004 - Table 4, p.1209) Regional coordination (Europe) 0.03% of GDP 
Sorensen (2004 - Table 5, p.1211) Global coordination (World) 1.42% of GDP 
Wildasin (1989) worked on the Zodrow-Miezkowsky tax competition model and 
presented a welfare loss from the under provision of public goods depending mainly on 
the demand elasticity for capital with respect to its gross return and on the demand 
elasticity for public goods. Using parameter values in line with empirical estimations 
the size of the welfare loss is about 0.2% of GNP. Parry (2003) further developed 
Wildasin’s estimates by looking at the inefficiency effects in a bloc of regions where the 
supply of capital is no longer fixed. He found that only under some circumstances the
size of the fiscal externality may be significant. But with more reasonable values for the
parameters the “welfare losses can be modest or quite small” (Parry, 2003, p. 49)9. 
Sorensen (2000, 2004) uses an elaborated model and an egalitarian welfare function to
estimate the gains from tax cooperation when marginal public revenue is spent either in 
public goods provision or in income redistribution. If there is world coordination of tax 
policy among symmetric countries the benefit exceeds 1% of GDP. But in the case of 
regional tax cooperation in an economic space such as the EU the gains would be
negligible. In the end, only in an idealistic integrated world would the gains from tax 
cooperation be meaningful. The benefits in the EU seem to be very small. 
A second question arises because countries have different tax rates before cooperation is 
implemented. When harmonization is made with a level of taxes near the average of the 
countries involved, the general conclusion is that countries with higher initial tax 

















rates would benefit (in terms of a rise in its income) while countries with lower ones 
would lose (e.g., Fuente and Gardner, 1990). Small open economies, facing a higher 
supply elasticity of capital, are expected to benefit or lose more than the remaining 
countries. Regional tax cooperation is beneficial as a whole if the average value of the 
effective tax rate of the countries participating decreased after the coordination because
they would benefit from the attraction of capital at the expense of the rest of the world. 
Table 2 present some simulation results for the EU. The fact that tax cooperation 
implies gainers and losers makes it only conceivable if there is some type of 
compensation or transfer from the first group to the second. If there is an overall gain 
for all countries those that are benefited may transfer part of the benefit to those who 
lose by harmonisation. But the snag is that it may be very difficult to get an agreement 
among the parties on the amounts to be transferred.  
   Table 2.2.4: 2 – Simulation studies on tax cooperation in the EU
Study Measuring Main beneficiaries Main loosers or gaining less 
Country Value Country Value 
Bénassy-Quéré et al (2000 - Table 10)* Change in FDI inflows Spain 29% FDI inflow Ireland -45% FDI inflow 
Bénassy-Quéré et al (2000 - Table 12)** Change in FDI inflows Denmark 63% FDI inflow Spain -88% FDI inflow 
Sorensen (2000 - Table 5)*** Change in welfare Nordic countries 0.53% GDP Continental Europe 0.07% GDP 
Gropp and Kostial (2001 - Table 5)* Net change in FDI flows Italy 0.87% GDP Ireland -1.33%GDP 
Sorensen (2004 - Table 4) *** Change in welfare Nordic countries 0.95% GDP Continental Europe 0.03% GDP 
* Harmonization equal to the average of statutory tax rates.
 
** Harmonization equal to the average of effective rates.
 
*** Coordination as a minimum capital tax rate endogenously determined by the model.
 
2.3 – The political economy of tax competition
The political economy literature addresses tax competition mainly via the Public Choice 
view. 
2.3.1 – The Leviathan hypothesis 
The Leviathan hypothesis, states that tax competition is beneficial because it acts as an 
opposite force to the rational temptation of elected representatives to increase its budget 
in order to assure re-election. It is focused on the political mechanisms through which 
fiscal decisions are determined. They are the result of choices on the part of both 











(e.g. the components of a public budget). In this scenario tax competition is 
advantageous because it drives down tax rates while elected officials wish to increase 
them in order to finance a higher level of public expenditure. The reason is that higher
levels of public good provision tend to be associated with a more entrepreneur
government and that usually fits well with voters’ aims. While in most of the tax 
competition literature benevolent decision-makers try to implement fiscal policies with
the aim of maximizing people’s welfare, in Leviathan models the government acts like a 
non-benevolent “dictator” where its officials are supposed to maximize revenue or its 
own utility. 
The first defenders of this argument were Brennan and Buchanan (1980) by proposing 
tax competition among jurisdictions as a substitute for constitutional rules to limit the 
ability of the “despot” (the elected representative when acting in the periods between 
elections) to use public funds from taxpayers in order to seek re-election. This 
competition would prevent each level of government from setting tax rates above those 
strictly necessary to guarantee public goods and services required by citizens. The 
central feature is that the costs of tax competition are lower than benefits obtained when 
the ability of elected representatives to raise taxes for electoral purposes is limited. 
Thus, Leviathan models regard tax competition as a problem of government size and do
not dispute its inefficient outcome. In this context, Rauscher (1998) shows that, under 
benefit taxation, tax competition improves the efficiency of the public sector by taming 
Leviathan governments.  
An example of the Leviathan hypothesis applied to tax competition can be shown by 
using the setting of the standard model. Assume the optimal equilibrium in a world of 
two countries, UK and Germany, is at point C, in Figure 2.3.1: 1, with tax rates Tuk0 
and Tg0, respectively. In point C the level of provision of public goods in both countries 
matches the preferences of the respective populations. In a Nash economy all 
equilibrium will be symmetrical so the problem of misallocation of capital disappears if 
countries are also symmetric as long as tax rates are equal. Thus, any unilateral change
in tax rates would be Pareto worsening because individuals would not have their utility
maximized. Now consider the elected representatives that seek reelection in the UK and 
in Germany. Without any constitutional limits the elected representatives can freely 

















to increase public spending, as predicted by the Leviathan hypothesis, taxes would be 
raised to Tuk1 and Tg1 and the equilibrium would be at point L, where all capital 
income is transferred from private investors to the public budget. This new equilibrium 
is, given the initial situation of optimality, achieved with an overprovision of public 
goods, and so it is inefficient. 
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Figure 2.3.1: 1 - The Leviathan model 
Consider now the new equilibrium, at point L. Given this situation, the public choice 
school argues that the existence of tax competition is Pareto improving. Suppose that 
the two countries cannot engage in collusion. They have to diminish tax rates in order to 
be competitive in the attraction of capital while considering their aim of reelection. The 
outcome can be anywhere from L to R, where, in an extreme case, a zero tax is levied in
both countries (the “race to the bottom”). Even in this extreme situation there would be
an improvement over L, given the population preferences, but with an under provision 
of public goods. The inefficiency is smaller in the Leviathan case, as can be seen in the 
graph by the distance between point C and points L and R. Thus, tax competition is 
positive in the sense that it is a brake to representatives’ temptation to maximize their 
own utility at the expense of country’s populations’ utility.  
Edwards and Keen (1996) present a model with a double objective function for the
government: The maximization of its own consumption (Leviathan term) and that of the
representative citizen, which utility is derived from the consumption of public and 












fall in tax revenue may be offset by a decrease in wasteful consumption by the 
government or by lower spending on public goods. In the first case the representative 
citizen gains because there is lower waste of funds by government and more private
goods may be bought. But in the second loses because the loss in utility from lower 
public goods consumption is bigger than the gain obtained from the additional 
consumption of private goods. Therefore, the outcome depends on which objective is
more important for policymakers.  
However, Cullis and Jones (1987) provide a detailed analysis of the Leviathan
hypothesis and conclude that there is a tendency to overemphasize the “bad” procedures
of government activity. This is explained by, among other things, deficiencies in 
measuring the size of the public sector, different views on what are an excessive 
government intervention and a tendency to exaggerate bureaucratic inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, the public choice approach also gives too much weight to the idea that 
government officials act like “despots” in the periods between elections, when they are 
mainly interested in assuring reelection and tend to underestimate individuals’ wishes
by avoiding their benevolent role. That is, all kinds of pressures governments suffer 
throughout the period in office and coming from newspapers, strikes or other, are 
ignored. It also assumes that an increase in public spending is mostly welcomed by 
voters, who suffer a fiscal illusion when outweighing its benefits against its costs. 
Therefore, the potential advantage of tax competition presented by the Leviathan 
hypothesis may be exaggerated and in reality governments have diminished powers to 
collect taxes from mobile capital (Swank, 1998, calls it “diminished democracy”). 
The empirical evidence on the Leviathan hypothesis is not conclusive. The public 
choice school expects a more centralized government to spend a higher proportion of 
public money and several studies using US state or local data reach this conclusion 
(Giertz, 1981, Wallis and Oates, 1988, or Zax, 1989). But others reject it (Oates, 1985, 
Nelson, 1987, Forbes and Zampelli, 1989, Anderson and Van den Berg, 1998). 
However, as Oates (1989) noticed, all empirical studies using country data do not find 
evidence of Leviathan. Therefore, it is unlikely that fiscal competition acts as brake to 
revenue-maximizing governments at a country level. This questions the existence of a 











2.3.2 - Other contributions 
Frey and Eichenberger (1996) present an original system of Functional, Overlapping, 
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) where the advantages of competition (for capital or any 
other factor or goods and services) arise from the reduction of economic and political
distortions by popular referenda and competitive federalism. Wilson (2001) presents a 
model where tax competition is not only welfare improving but it also increases 
government size. Tax rates are used to finance public inputs whose provision raises the 
productivity of capital and, thereby, attracts further units of capital. This not only may 
increase tax revenue but may also reduce the cost of public input provision from the 
perspective of government officials. Given the lower effective marginal cost of 
productive public expenditures residents increase their demand for them leading to a 
larger government. 
2.4 - The new economic geography viewpoint 
A third approach to tax competition, new economic geography (NEG), uses the 
framework of international trade models where production has increasing returns to 
scale and there are positive transaction costs. These models were developed by 
considering agglomeration economies (concentration of a mobile factor in one region) 
and their outcome present a different argument against tax integration between countries 
with different levels of development.  
2.4.1 - The standard model 
The aim of the NEG literature is to explain the spatial distribution of economic activity, 
namely why is it more agglomerated in some areas than in others. It has evolved from 
trade models with imperfect competition, developed in the 1980’s to explain intra-
industry trade (Krugman, 1980, Helpman and Krugman, 1985), to formal
representations of spatial economic agglomeration (Krugman, 1991, Fujita et al, 1999). 
These differ from the public finance approach in the sense that primarily tries to 









                                                          
 
   
and, after this, on tax competition. In this sense it is a complement rather than a 
competing view to the tax competition model. 
Given the different framework it is useful to present a brief explanation of the NEG 
model. There are two opposite effects: An agglomeration force that attracts the mobile 
factor and a dispersion force that repels it. The first, a home market effect, is usually 
associated with a country with more residents where the market size is larger and, due to 
scale economies and the reduction of transaction costs, it better remunerates factors of 
production. In this case a domestic firm has an advantage over foreign firms because its 
domestic sales generate more revenue on average. A mobile factor of production is 
attracted by this higher level of remuneration. The dispersion force is a competition 
effect where the accumulation of a mobile factor of production in one country increases 
not only its supply but also the competition among firms. Therefore, prices of goods and 
remuneration of factors go down and the mobile factor is dispersed.  
Which of these two opposite effects prevails depends on the level of economic
integration, that is, on transaction costs (i.e. trade costs plus other costs such as cultural 
barriers and legal differences) and factor mobility. In the case of high transaction costs 
there is no trade between countries and production occurs everywhere. Below this
critical level trade exists and the effects start to operate conducting to two types of 
equilibrium: Concentrated, where the home market effect prevails and all production 
based on the mobile factor is mostly located in the core; Diversified equilibrium, where 
the competition effect prevails and production occurs in all countries. These outcomes 
are common to the new economic geography literature, although the models widely 
differ in its details and the order of the equilibrium when transaction costs are 
decreasing is not always the same10. Therefore, the general example presented below is 
representative of the literature in its two possible results. 
2.4.2 – Tax competition  
In the NEG literature the possibility of (source-based) tax competition is only 
10 The new economic geography literature usually has an initial diversified equilibrium with higher 
transaction costs, a core-periphery one with middle-size transaction costs and a second diversified 
equilibrium when transaction costs are low (Krugman, 1991). A simpler example where only a diversified 











introduced when the free market outcome is determined. The tax game occurs on a 
concentration or a diversified equilibrium but there are differences between the 
symmetric and asymmetric cases.  
Figure 2.4.2: 1a, adapted from Ludema and Wooton (2000), shows a diversified 
equilibrium (at point E), where the two effects are equal and the population and capital 
endowments are evenly split between the two countries. The figure presents the 
differential in the agglomeration effect between the two countries, the UK and 
Germany, and the dispersion effect increasing with the share of capital in the UK (while 
simultaneously decreasing in Germany). The dispersion effect is steeper than the 
differential of the agglomeration effect because the transaction costs are not sufficiently 
low to allow for the full benefit of scale economies when supplying both markets and a
diversified equilibrium arises. To the left of E, the agglomeration force is favourable to 
Germany but the dispersion effect is unfavourable and dominates. To the right, the
agglomeration differential is favourable to the UK but the dispersion effect is not, and is 
stronger. So, the equilibrium is stable. When the UK lowers its tax rate on capital more 
firms move from Germany changing the differential in the agglomeration force (the
curve moves upward by D, the difference between the tax rates in the two countries). A 
new equilibrium is reached at E’, where the stock of capital is more than proportional to 
UK's size. If the tax differential is big enough all capital can move to the UK because 
the difference is sufficient to compensate for the transaction costs when the German 
market is supplied. If the two countries engage in a Nash-type game for capital the 
equilibrium will end at E with the same tax rates in both countries given the symmetric 
setting (Ludema and Wooton, 2000). The level of tax rates in equilibrium has a U 
relationship with the level of integration, that is, initially tax rates decrease with 
integration but when the agglomeration force is strong enough (due to sufficiently low 
transaction costs) tax rates rise again because tax competition is weaker. 
In the asymmetric case (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2002) a country, the UK, has more 
than half of the population and owns more than half of the stock of capital. The
equilibrium tax rates are determined given each government’s welfare maximizing 
functions subject to a budget constraint. Both the UK and Portugal, the small country, 
have an upward sloping marginal productivity of capital (up to a certain limit) because 














                                                          
capital per unit of labour). In other words, the rate of return on capital in both countries 
increases with capital. Because the UK is a larger country, with higher returns to scale, 
it has a steeper curve than Portugal.  
Initially, when transaction costs are high, the rate of return of capital (r = F(K) / K, 
given the zero profit condition) is the same in both countries. When transaction costs 
become sufficiently low, profit maximizing firms located in its domestic market 
consider a move to the other country. Given the differences in the slopes of the r’s, the 
first Portuguese firm to move to the UK will get a higher return than the first UK firm to
move to Portugal. This will lead more Portuguese firms to move to the UK than the 
other way around11. However, Portuguese firms only move to the UK up to the point
where the additional benefit obtained from being located in the larger market and taking 
advantage of greater economies of scale compensates the additional transactions costs 
needed to supply the Portuguese market. This means that some firms do move. The
number depends on the competition effect and on the level of transaction costs (as in the 
symmetric case) and also on the relative size of the markets. Then, with high transaction
costs (but sufficiently low to allow for trade) the outcome would be a diversified 
equilibrium. The difference with the symmetric case is that the equilibrium is achieved 
with the larger country hosting a more than proportional (to the size of its 
population and capital holdings) share of firms due to the home market effect
(Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2002, p. 20). Its equilibrium tax rate is inefficiently high
while that of the smaller country is inefficiently low. This is explained by a fiscal
externality arising from the attraction of capital by the large country and motivated by 
the agglomeration effect. This outcome can be improved if coordination between 
countries reduces the tax rate differential, resulting in the allocation of capital that 
maximizes welfare where the after-tax return on capital is the same in both countries. 
Figure 2.4.2: 1b presents a concentration of production in the core, where the
differential in the agglomeration effect dominates the competition effect and the 
equilibrium can be at point G, where the UK does not have capital, so it is all
concentrated in Germany, or at point UK, as now the UK is the core. In this case the 
agglomeration effect is steeper, indicating that transaction costs are sufficiently low for 
firms to take full advantage of scale economies when supplying the UK and Germany. 






                     
              
  
                     
   
       




If initially capital is evenly split, the outcome depends on the first change in the share of 
K in both countries. The equilibrium might exist with a 50-50 capital split, but it is 
unstable. If, for any reason, a unit of capital moves from the UK to Germany, all capital 
in the UK will follow the same direction because the agglomeration force in Germany is
now stronger, due to the increasing return on capital, and becomes even stronger with 
the progressive influx of firms. The new equilibrium would be in G. 
 a: Diversified equilibrium  b: Concentrated equilibrium 
UK' 
E'  D UK
 D 
UK*




0   0,5 Share of K 0   0,5 Share of K
 in the UK in the UK
  Dispersion effect Differential in the agglomeration effect
       Figure 2.4.2: 1 - Symmetric fiscal competition with increasing returns to scale 
Nevertheless, once the core is defined tax competition becomes an attempt from the 
periphery to attract all capital. Suppose the equilibrium is in point G and the UK lowers 
its tax rate (by D), then the agglomeration force in Germany is opposed by the 
difference in tax rates and the differential of agglomeration curve moves upward, to 
[G*,UK’]. The core will still be located in Germany, but now at point G* (where both 
effects are equal), and D represents the maximum difference in tax rates between the 
two countries that does not change the location of capital. In other words, the German 
tax rate can be higher than the UK’s by D, because the difference in the gross return of 
capital between the two countries (favourable to Germany and exactly equal to D)
creates a taxable rent. If the difference in tax rates is larger than D, the core changes to 
the UK because the dispersion effect becomes dominant in Germany. The difference in 
the rates of return to capital no longer compensates the differences in tax rates. The 

















level at which the UK is indifferent to be the core or the periphery, that is, it becomes
worst-off if tax rates are reduced to attract the core (Ludema and Wooton, 2000). 
The asymmetric case is similar to the symmetric. Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2002) 
find a concentrated equilibrium when transaction costs are sufficiently low so that firms 
are able to take full advantage of higher economies of scale in the large country and 
export to the smaller one. This is because benefits outweigh the transaction costs and a 
“cluster” occurs in the large country, allowing for a higher tax rate without the danger of 
capital changing its location to the small country. The equilibrium tax rates are 
determined given the governments’ welfare maximizing functions and tax coordination 
allow for a Pareto-improvement similar to the diversified-asymmetric case.  
Table 2.4.2: 1 - Tax competition with increasing returns to scale 
Equilibrium tax rates (T) in countries A and B 
Equilibrium / Country size Symmetric (A = B) Asymmetric (A > B) 
Diversified TA = TB 
(Ludema and Wooton, 2000) 
TA > TB (1) (2)
(Baldwin and Krugman, 2004, 
Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 
2002)
Core-Periphery (core in A) TA > TB 
(Ludema and Wooton, 2000, 
Kind et al, 2000, Andersson and
Forslid, 1999)
TA > TB 
(Baldwin and Krugman, 2004, 
Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 
2002)
(1) Both TA and TB may be < 0 if an immobile source of taxation is available 
(2) Country A hosts a more than proportional share of firms 
These extreme cases where capital is entirely located in one of the countries may be 
attenuated by cost differences when an immobile factor is used in production (Baldwin 
and Krugman, 2004) or different location preferences by workers if labour is the mobile 
factor (Ludema and Wooton, 2000). But they are useful for the purpose of illustrating 
the main contributions of the literature. First, the effects of tax competition, from an 
efficiency perspective, depend on the level of economic integration. Second, when 
integration “promotes” the agglomeration of economic activity it also limits the 
effects of tax competition. Third, efficiency is not achieved by tax rate 
harmonization. The existence of different tax rates in equilibrium (except for a 
diversified equilibrium between symmetric countries) is a direct consequence of 














Finally, NEG models do not establish absolute levels of taxation but relative ones 
(differentials) and thus most of the studies fail to address the provision of public goods. 
However, the welfare in each country depends on the level of taxation and not on its 
differential. So, a coordinated increase of tax rates in both core and periphery, with the 
tax differential constant, would mean, in practice, a transfer of resources from the core 
to the periphery (less firms would move to the core given its low return to capital) and
could achieve a Pareto-improvement if tax competition provoked an under provision of 
public goods in the small country.  
2.4.3 – Equity considerations 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) use a slightly different approach when developing a core-
periphery model for the integration between high developed and less developed 
countries in the EU. Mobile and immobile factors of production are taxed by the same
amount, which means that the immobile factor cannot be used to “finance” tax 
competition. Tax competition is modelled as a three-stage game where developed 
countries act as Stackelberg monopolists using a price-limit strategy to set tax rates at 
the highest level where less developed countries have no advantage by competing for 
capital. In other words, where there is no incentive for poorer countries to choose lower
tax rates because developed ones may react by lowering their tax rates. Therefore, less 
developed countries are expected to act rationally by implementing a tax policy that 
provides answers to its inhabitant's preferences (assumed to be lower public expenditure 
levels than in developed countries), while developed countries may have higher tax 
rates given the existence of agglomeration economies. But they have also a limit to raise
its taxes due to the danger of seeing mobile factors moving away to less developed 
countries. The model suggests that, contrary to the “race to the bottom” prediction, 
economic integration with tax competition is consistent with the maintenance of 
large welfare states. 
Under this scenario they also show that tax harmonization between two countries with
different levels of development always harms at least one nation in welfare terms, and if
a common rate is set at a level between the un-harmonized rates it may harm both 















                                                          
  
weaker agglomeration effects) would lose the tax advantage for attracting companies
and industry would tend to concentrate even more in the core. In this case 
harmonisation may induce negative welfare effects for less developed countries. On the 
other hand, developed countries would have less revenue if harmonisation is at a lower 
level than the initial level of tax rates and, most probably, a worst quality in their public 
services. The authors conclude that tax competition is not inconsistent with a higher 
level of public expenditure and that different tax rates are needed to avoid an 
overconcentration of capital in richer countries. 
2.5 – Conclusions 
The public finance literature shows that tax competition is inefficient given the
misallocation of capital and the under provision of public goods (due to the perception 
of an elastic supply of capital with respect to the tax rate). The Leviathan hypothesis 
relaxes the assumption of benevolent governments and states that tax competition may
be Pareto-improving if it reduces the temptation of elected representatives to maximize 
tax revenue and engage in wasteful expenditures in order to assure re-election. NEG 
stresses that the effects of tax competition are limited by economic integration and it 
justifies, through increasing returns to scale and transaction costs, different tax rates
between countries with unequal levels of economic agglomeration. Table 1 (Annex 1.1) 
summarizes the assumptions of the standard model and its extensions.  
Economic evidence, on the other hand, shows the eventual benefits of tax integration to 
be small and its implementation to imply a loss for very small countries with lower tax
rates and eventually for high tax countries. Furthermore, NEG demands some tax 
coordination between countries but shows that it is preferable to maintain different tax
levels. These are key findings for corporate tax policy in an economic area such as the 
EU. Nevertheless, the European Commission seems to keep on wanting to achieve the
long pursued objective of corporate tax integration12 and, as the Ruding Report (1991) 
advised, “...the adoption by all Member States of a common system of corporation tax is 
a desirable long-term objective”.  







There are still some unaddressed assumptions that may eventually not confirm the 
above presented outcome in all situations. Capital is seldom differentiated between 
portfolio and foreign direct investment flows despite their different nature. FDI has a
larger and direct impact in economic growth and employment. Therefore, chapter 3 will 
address FDI theory to assess whether it is compatible with these conclusions. Moreover, 
most of the literature emphasizes the role of jurisdictions attracting capital while
assuming that firms search for profit maximization by locating their investments in low 
tax countries. Firms and managers are thus thought to have perfect information about
the variables affecting the profit and loss account, including tax burdens, and to act as 
rational decision makers even in the presence of uncertainty. These assumptions will be 












3 – FDI theory and empirics: A brief overview and the 
role of taxation 
The widely acknowledged results presented by the tax competition model are based on some
restrictive assumptions such as the perfect mobility of capital and their unique nature. The 
distinction between portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI) is crucial because capital 
flows are usually considered independently of their characteristics. In this dissertation capital 
is restricted to FDI due to its nature and potential impact on economic development. FDI 
includes a diversified number of determinants while tax competition heavily relies on the role 
of taxation, within the risk-adjusted profitability goal, as an explanatory variable. These 
differences may impact on the outcome of the tax competition model as presented in chapter 
2. This is even more relevant for countries within an economic area such as the EU where the 
effects of tax competition are potentially stronger. 
The chapter focus on the choice a firm makes to invest in some location and the respective 
role of taxation. The aim is to confront both tax competition and FDI theories in order to show 
that, despite the formal incompatibilities, these two fields have been developing side by side 
without any adequate attempt by economists to reconcile their differences. The emphasis on 
the decision making process is a first step to address the assumptions of the model. 
3.1 - Concepts 
A small number of concepts are introduced to complement those presented in chapter 2.  
3.1.1 – Foreign Direct Investment 
“Direct investment refers to investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the investor’s purpose 
being to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise” (IMF, 1977, p.136). 
Thus FDI implies an investment made in another country, a long term commitment and a role 








abroad, both an ownership control (at least 10% of ownership or voting power, according to 
the IMF, although it varies across countries) and/or a managerial control over affiliates. 
The ownership control may be obtained through three different ways (i) Greenfield 
investment, when a company starts from scratch, (ii) merger or acquisition of a controlling 
share in an existent firm or (iii) a joint venture with other partners. In all three cases financing 
can be obtained through debt, own capital or reinvested earnings. From the perspective of the 
investor all three alternatives represent an increase in productive capacity. However, from the 
perspective of the host country only Greenfield investment (be it from one firm or from a joint 
venture of several firms) is certain to lead to new productive capacity. This difference is 
important because countries competing through taxation are thought to be more willing to 
attract FDI that increases their gross fixed capital formation and, consequently, impacts in a 
positive way on their economies.   
Furthermore, direct investment does not necessarily involve movements of capital given the 
possibility of financing it in the host country, through borrowing or retained earnings, or by 
payments in kind (technology, machinery, patents, etc.). However, this dissertation is mostly 
focused on FDI originating capital movements because that is what tax competition is all 
about, capital flows searching for a lower tax rate. 
FDI may be divided in flows, which refer to the amount of capital moved in a determined 
period of time, and stocks, which is the total amount on inward FDI existing in a country or 
outward FDI made by firms located in the same country (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 351). A further 
division in the FDI literature is between “horizontal”, which refers to producing (and 
marketing) abroad similar products to those made and sold in the home market, and “vertical” 
FDI, which is focused on cost reduction and refers to investments made to produce abroad 
intermediate goods. These are to be exported back home (or to a different country) where they 
are assembled as part of a final product. 
Firms with direct investments abroad and controlled affiliates are multinational or 
transnational (TNC) companies. They have assets in more than one country and are able to 
centrally organize, coordinate and control them under common objectives and strategies 







3.1.2 – FDI and Portfolio investment 
Although FDI relates to movements of capital it is different from portfolio investment. 
Portfolio investment is a purely financial flow, usually of a short term nature, where different 
types of securities are bought but the establishment of an ownership or managerial control is 
not necessarily included (Hymer, 1960, cited by Ietto-Gillies, 2005). FDI is typically a long-
run investment, where profits are often expected only after five or even ten years after the 
initial date of investment. As Dunning (1979, p. 272) puts it, FDI “...involves the transfer of 
other resources than capital (technology, management, organizational and marketing skills, 
etc.) and it is the expected return on these, rather than on capital per se, which prompts 
enterprises...” to invest abroad. This transfer of resources under direct control of the parent 
firm does not happen with portfolio investment.  
The difference can also be seen in the liquidity of both types of capital. FDI refers to physical 
assets such as buildings, property and machinery, with rather less liquidity than portfolio 
investments. These, on the other hand, are composed of applications in financial markets, 
represented by paper or electronically registered assets, and are very liquid and easily 
movable from one market to another. FDI is also recognized to have larger information costs 
and thus to be more sensitive to geographic variables than portfolio (Guerin, 2006). 
FDI is often associated with an agreement between the investor and the host country where 
the former promises to keep the investment for a determined period of time. Thus, when the 
investment is made it is more difficult to sell these assets and capital becomes more immobile 
(at least during the implementation of the investment or the period agreed). FDI is not mobile, 
at least in the short to medium term (given that it has “sunk” costs and specific barriers to its 
movements) thereby impeding FDI stocks to move even when fiscal conditions are worsened. 
In the tax competition literature, on the other hand, capital is usually assumed to be perfectly 
mobile by reacting immediately to a change in the tax rate (while moving in direction of the 
highest net rate of return). Therefore, one should expect that tax competition theory better 
applies to short term financial flows. However, the theory was initially developed in the 
context of competition between local jurisdictions (Oates, 1972, Beck, 1983), where financial 












                                                          
Furthermore, section 2.2.1.1 above presented several reasons to explain the lack of perfect 
capital mobility. Those reasons apply to both types of capital but surely, given its nature, they 
are more relevant for FDI. Not only is it difficult to accept the perfect mobility of capital 
assumed by the tax competition model, but both the motives and the consequences of
portfolio investment are of a different nature. The theoretical effects of tax competition for 
FDI (given this imperfect mobility) are slower and smaller than with short-term flows1. 
3.2 – FDI location decisions 
Consider a firm deciding whether to invest abroad and where to locate its investment. A 
rational decision-maker attempts to maximize the present value of the difference between 
revenue and costs when answering these questions. For this end it must collect substantial 
information and by assuming a discount rate from the expected inflation, the desired rate of 
return and the presumed associated risk, it can calculate a net present value for the 
investment. 
The decision to invest abroad and where to locate the investment depends on the decision­
maker’s expectations about the value of these variables for the various available alternatives. 
If the decision to invest abroad is already made, the location of the investment, and its 
expected revenue and costs, becomes the relevant issue. Thus, the two key variables for 
rational location decisions are revenue and costs. 
3.2.1 – Revenue-based decisions 
Increasing revenue is a permanent concern of firms and managers. FDI theory has explained 
the “internationalization” of this goal by considering that TNC’s have specific advantages 
over local competitors in the host market that dominate the additional costs of investing 
abroad. These may originate in the increased power of a few large firms operating in 
oligopolistic markets, with significant barriers to entry, in the home country (Hymer, 1960, 







                                                          
 
   
cited by Ietto-Gillies, 2005)2. This reduction in competition allows these firms to have extra 
gains and thus specific advantages abroad that would drive investment and be sufficient to 
outperform FDI-related costs and local competitors. Several advantages are noted: product 
differentiation, managerial and marketing skills, technology, scale economies, better and 
cheaper access to capital and government induced distortions (Kindleberger, 1969). These 
advantages allow firms to search for new markets in order to grow and have more revenue. 
However, they only explain why firms invest abroad without presenting reasons for the exact 
location of the investment. The same happens with other explanations of FDI, such as 
spreading risks through diversification of locations (Hymer, 1960, cited by Ietto-Gillies, 
2005) and the possibility to offer after-sales services and to adapt the product to local tastes 
(Knickerbocker, 1973). 
Vernon (1966) was able to explain the location of international production by using the 
technological gap (Posner, 1961) and the product life cycle theory (Hirsch, 1965). The 
cumulative advantages of product innovation in the initial stages of the product cycle (the 
innovative and growth phases) where intensive capital, managerial ability and skilled labour 
are needed, would explain the location of production in developed countries. In the last phase, 
where products are standardized, imitation is easier and unskilled labour is required, location 
might move to countries with lower costs. In this context, Gruber et al (1967) also point to the 
fact that exporting firms have a lower marginal cost when deciding to produce abroad 
(because they already have information about foreign markets). The location of production 
abroad may also be a source of exports to nearby markets, mainly when transportation costs 
are significant. 
Vernon (1979) shows proximity and familiarity to play a role in location decisions of US 
firms before World War II. However, this role has been reduced in more recent years when 
TNC’s started to globally plan their activities. Furthermore, the lag between the introduction 
of a new product in the home market and in other locations decreased significantly and the 
product life cycle theory also became less relevant as an explanation of location decisions.  
2 Before Hymer, the neo-classical explanation of capital flows relied on the perfect competition setting and
included loans, gifts, war reparations, the search for higher interest rates up to the point of equalization of capital 








Knickerbocker (1973) also relies on the above mentioned specific advantages to explain why 
firms in the same industry tend to invest in the same countries. Given the oligopolistic 
structure of the market, a first move by one of the few sellers to invest in a different country 
(aggressive investment) would be followed by rivals (defensive investment), so that an 
eventual significant advantage from cost reductions and scale economies of the “aggressor” 
could not be used against the competition. For “defensive” firms, the cost of this matching is 
more predictable than the costs of its absence. Despite evidence provided by Altomonte and 
Pennings (2008), to explain firms’ defensive investment behaviour only with risk mitigation 
concerns seems to be too simple because there are a wide range of possible answers for rivals 
in terms of products, technologies, horizontal or vertical integration, joint ventures and 
including firms acting themselves as first movers in other countries.  
Cantwell (1989) explains international production as an outcome of the competitive process 
between firms belonging to common industries. Firms are able to actively create their own 
competitive advantages from the cumulative use of innovation and technology in processes 
and products. The leaders in each area are those TNC’s that, through successive ownership 
advantages, become more successful both in domestic and international markets. The author 
relates it to location advantages by considering that innovative firms tend to invest in different 
centres and countries and thus generate spill over effects to the location and the industry that 
attracts even more firms, investment and innovation in a wealth creating cumulative process. 
Consequently, the location advantages are endogenous to the process and arise from
agglomeration economies (in a similar way to the new economic geography theory developed 
by Krugman). Each firm located in a determined centre/country benefits, not only from the 
transfer of knowledge and innovation within the network of its economic group, but also from
the external economies of agglomeration arising from the location of other innovative firms. 
In this way it compensates for an economic group to be simultaneously present in different 
locations. 
In the context of imperfect markets, the proximity-concentration model explains multi-plant 
TNC´s and two-way horizontal FDI when it becomes relatively less expensive in comparison 
with exporting (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992, Brainard, 1993). This model originates with 








A final approach, focused on how firms behave during the decision-making process of 
internationalization, was developed by the Scandinavian school. Firms are seen as learning 
organizations (characterized by bounded rationality and limited knowledge) where resources, 
competence and influence are dispersed by a complex structure (Bjorkman and Forsgren, 
1997). The idea of going abroad starts when the domestic market is no longer sufficiently 
large to provide profit opportunities and allow the growth of the firm. The resulting 
internationalization is divided in four stages - that depend on the performance of current 
activities of the firm, the accumulated experience abroad and the decision to commit further 
resources – which develop in a linear pattern (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975): (1) 
Exporting for one country at a lower psychic distance and by using local agents; (2) Opening 
a sales subsidiary in the same country; (3) Establishing production abroad; (4) Moving to 
third markets at a lower psychic distance from the chosen foreign country. The relevant factor 
for the location decision is psychic distance, that is, “… the sum of factors preventing the flow 
of information from and to the market. Examples are differences in language, education, 
business practices, culture and industrial development” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, p. 24). 
This process may be simplified after a critical point in terms of knowledge of international 
markets (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). 
To sum up, it can be seen that a significant part of FDI theories assume firms to have 
higher (not lower) costs when investing abroad. That is, the concern with tax expenses is 
not deemed relevant. Firms, when making location decisions within imperfect markets, seek 
to improve their revenue stream by using specific advantages, aggressive or defensive 
behaviour, or by benefiting from agglomeration economies. To pay lower taxes is not an 
important reason for FDI.  
3.2.2 – Cost-efficiency objectives 
Efficiency concerns by firms and managers are usually focused on cost cutting. The FDI 
literature presents several explanations of location decisions based on the will to avoid (or 
minimize) transactional costs. The expected gains are a better allocation of resources (from






Aliber (1970) explains FDI by considering the existence of additional advantages, originated 
in the value of the patents owned by each firm, to compensate the costs of doing business 
abroad. The managerial or technological advantage materializes through “…the capitalized 
value of the difference between production costs before and after the patent is used” (Aliber, 
1970, p.22). The capitalized value depends on exchange rates and on interest rates in the 
financing country (where the source of financing is located) and varies with the three possible 
ways of internationalization by the firm (exporting, licensing and investing abroad) and with 
the type of economic area countries belong to (currency area, customs area or both). Aliber 
uses these variables to introduce a set of different scenarios that will predict the behaviour of
firms in terms of cost minimization.  
The theory connects FDI decisions with currency and trade regimes and gives useful insights 
for the EU, where there is a customs area and a partial currency area. He explains FDI 
location decisions with reference to the situation of each country, weighing simultaneously 
the dispersion of capitalization rates (interest and exchange rates), the size of the host 
country’s market, the height of tariffs, the cost of doing business abroad and the value of 
patents. While the first three explain FDI locations, the remaining two are an explanation for 
FDI (without a specification about its location). 
A second approach to explain FDI flows originates in Coase (1937). Coase noted that the 
allocation of resources and production in the market are defined by the price mechanism but 
within a firm this is done through planning and managerial direction. This difference leads to 
a cost comparison between market transactions and the internal allocation of resources. A 
firm will expand until the internal costs of organizing production become equal to market 
transaction costs (deriving from asymmetric information, legal costs, etc.). McManus (1972) 
concludes that resources within a firm will be allocated, in a coordinated way, between two or 
more countries if the sum of its values – depending on transaction costs - is greater than it 
would be if activities in each country were independent. Williamson (1975, 1981) considers 
that firm’s activities and organization are driven by the aim of achieving economies of 
transaction costs from: (i) a better prevention of opportunistic behaviour by managers, 
employees and external parts through the access to more and better information; (ii) asset 
specificity, where resources used together within a firm are more productive than in 






the firm allows for more rational decisions. Therefore, the better and cheaper the legal 
framework and existing information channels, the lower the potential advantages of 
internalization (both domestic and international) and the higher the incentive to operate within 
the market. The bigger the firm and the level of internalization the more complex and 
inflexible becomes its organization and the closer the limit for internalization gains (Penrose, 
1959). Although these economies can be achieved both at a domestic or international level 
they are not significantly dependent on taxation. 
Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1989) and Caves (1996) further developed this 
approach by stating that imperfect markets, and the resulting market power, are an incentive 
for internalization. Firms operating in industries where these incentives are stronger and 
where the benefits of internalization outweigh the costs are more likely to become TNC’s. 
These imperfections (of the transactional type) arise from the nature of “research and 
development” (R&D), and the resulting knowledge, and from intangible assets (such as 
brands) which are assumed to have low costs of transmission within a firm and across 
boundaries. Buckley and Casson (1976) present the difficulty to organize markets for these 
goods and the increasing demand for knowledge-based products as an incentive for firms to 
invest in other countries to exploit the expertise they own and benefit from discriminatory 
prices (horizontal integration). On the other hand, given the asymmetry of information in 
these markets, buyers may want to internalize these intermediary products (vertical 
integration - Caves, 1996). 
Besides the ownership of technology, the reasons for specific location decisions presented by 
this theory are mainly related with government induced costs on cross border transactions 
(capital mobility and exchange rates) and tax policies. In this sense differences in tax rates 
may explain internalization. Buckley and Casson (1996) give it a specific role when 
underlining the possibility of transfer pricing manipulations. But they are not mandatory 
within the theory. 
Other models of TNC’s behaviour (using a perfect competition setting) explain location 
decisions in single-plant firms that fragment their production process into different stages 
based on different relative factor endowments and thus prices across countries (e.g. the factor 








(from richly endowed countries to cheaper labour endowed locations). Again, taxation is not 
significant. 
The last contribution gives a more prominent role to taxation, although within a set of 
different variables. TNC’s are assumed to have various degrees of market power and 
competitive advantage. These are specific advantages of being transnational and in order to 
maintain or increase them firms act strategically towards national regulatory regimes. In other 
words, the existence of borders has not only some costs for firms, as exposed above, but it 
may also provide an opportunity for TNC’s to gain specific advantages in order to reduce 
costs (Ietto-Gillies, 2002). They arise from different currency and tax regimes, risk-spreading, 
and negotiations with governments and unions. There are potential gains for TNC’s from a 
stronger bargaining position (e.g. the threat of reallocation) towards governments, such as the 
access to higher financial incentives for inward FDI (Oman, 2000, Phelps and Raines, 2002), 
or towards unions, to achieve a reduction in wages and other labour costs. 
In brief, taxation may have a role in terms of cost-cutting objectives by firms (given that it 
has a direct impact on final profitability). However, the presented set of theories only gives 
it a complementary role. Theories are mainly focused on transactional costs either within the 
firm or induced by government intervention. This is completely different from the mandatory 
role played by taxation in tax competition models. 
3.2.3 – FDI and the role of taxation 
The above set of FDI theories shows that firms have a diversified range of concerns in terms 
of location decisions. These include many variables that have a direct effect on costs and 
revenue, on one hand, and a second group where the role of governments and other 
institutions indirectly impact the financial analysis of an investment. Dunning (1979) explains 
FDI decisions by considering advantages in terms of Ownership, Location and Internalization, 
and presents an extensive list of 47 determinants. A country trying to attract FDI must offer 
location advantages to be used together with those of ownership and internalization. 
Therefore, location decisions are also influenced by the two remaining parts of the OLI 







Managers make decisions within the firm strategy and have an active role in forming 
competitive advantages in order to benefit from market imperfections. The aim is to increase 
revenue and to minimize transaction costs. Each of the mentioned theories was developed in a 
specific context and time period and tried to explain the latest observed trends in FDI flows. 
They all try to explain why firms want to expand their activity abroad and why they locate 
production facilities in foreign countries and markets. But they give a very limited role to 
taxation in these decisions. Markusen (1995, p. 171) explains: “Apparently, most firms first 
choose foreign production location, and then instruct their tax departments to minimize 
taxes”. 
Therefore, the first thing to note is that the role of the tax rate, or the tax burden, is limited by 
just being one more variable with impact on profitability. This may be easily understandable 
in a simple example where a firm investing 10,000 has to choose between two different 
countries where to locate its investment (Table 3.2.3: 1). 
Table 3.2.3: 1 - The role of taxation in FDI location decisions 
Country Profits before taxes Corporate tax rate Profit after taxes 
A – Invest: 10,000 1,000 30 % 700 
B – Invest: 10,000 700 20 % 560 
In the example, the rational choice of the firm is to invest in country A, where the profitability 
is higher despite the corporate tax rate being also higher. In the tax competition model the 
firm would choose country B simply because everything else is assumed to be equal. 
Referring to the net present value not only the inflation rate, the cost of capital or labour costs 
but all the remaining tens of variables that directly or indirectly impact on revenue and costs 
would be exactly the same so that taxation can be the only variable affecting the marginal 
product of capital. But although the tax competition model assumes that everything else, 
besides tax rates, is equal, one can be sure that that is never the case. 
The second thing to note then is that firms have widespread concerns when engaging in FDI 
but taxation seems to be only a complementary variable. In other words, and contrary to what 
is assumed in the standard tax competition model, firm’s behaviour in FDI location decisions 






such as strategic and efficiency oriented, and consider a large number of variables in their 
analysis. 
In the standard tax competition model it is the difference in tax rates between the competing 
jurisdictions that is the key variable in determining capital flows. While this may be a 
reasonable assumption in highly price competitive markets such as those for financial assets, 
where short term financial flows occur, it is less so for international markets of goods and 
services where FDI is the vehicle of capital. As we have seen above, these markets are better 
explained by imperfect competition theory, where rents, agglomeration of economic activity 
or other externalities occur very frequently, and where taxation may have a role, but a limited 
one. To conclude, there are a large number of reasons that may explain FDI. To rely on just 
one possibility, as in the case of tax competition, is to allow too much distance from the real 
world. 
A description of the decision making process in FDI operations strengthens the above 
statements. ‘FDI location decision’ refers to the set of decisions, made by firms, about the 
place (other than the home country) to establish direct production, sales or distribution 
activities. It includes both new country locations and new important investments in an 
existing location. FDI locations comprise different steps where a large number of small 
sequential decisions are made during several months or years (Aharoni, 1999, p. 4). The final 
location is a one-off discrete decision and not, as tax competition assumes, a marginal type to 
where all capital with a rate of return above a pre-determined minimum is supposed to flow 
(Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
A first phase in the decision-making process is to decide to invest abroad. This is supposedly 
within the firm’s overall strategy. A firm or an individual investor wants, for several reasons, 
to diversify the location of its investments. For that end firms have to assess their internal 
capacity in terms of financing, human resources, inputs, etc. Then there is a second phase, 
which is the location of the investment. It includes many small and big decisions related to 
information collection, so that several alternatives may be established, and a risk and financial 
analysis provided to understand the possible impact of an FDI operation on the value of the 
firm. It finishes with the choice of the country and, afterwards, the choice of the exact 
















Figure 3.2.3: 1 – FDI location decisions 
FDI location decision process Activities after decision 
1 – Decision to invest 
abroad 
2a – Step by step process with many 
decisions: 
3a – Further investments 
- Collection of information (including fiscal 
variables) 
- Strategy and objective - Risk assessment and selection of alternatives 3b  – Tax planning 
- Assessment of internal capacity 
(options and constraints) 
- Economic and financial analysis based on 
revenue and costs
Profit shifting between 
plants/countries by using: 
- Impact on shares - Transfer pricing 
- … - Thin capitalization 
2b - Location decision 
Country and local jurisdiction 
(Firms may try to negotiate fiscal advantages)
Figure 3.2.3: 1 presents these two phases and allows for a better delimitation of the object of 
this dissertation. These phases are confirmed by interviewed firms (Chapter 5) and this 
dissertation is focused on phase 2, the location decision in itself, and not on the decision to 
invest abroad or the entry mode. Its aim is to understand why a specific location was chosen 
because this is central to the tax competition literature. 
The FDI decision making process is usually ignored by the literature. As it is shown in 
chapters 2 and 3 it is not considered by the several presented approaches except in the so-
called behavioural approach of the Uppsala model, where firms engage in internationalization 
by following a pre-determined course of action and locate their investments based on a 
“psychic” distance. But these approaches are not able to explain how exactly FDI location 
decisions are made. This is important because the process may be helpful in understanding the 
location choices of firms. 
Moreover, FDI contains various elements of organizational and managerial behaviour. When 
making an FDI decision managers are affected by their perceptions about past decisions and 
present and future conditions (Aharoni, 1999, p. 13). Their perceptions have both intrinsic and 
environmental origin, that is, it includes the personal cognitive characteristics of each 






usually not explicitly considered by neoclassical literature and thus only a partial 
understanding of FDI operations is possible. 
A further and important distinctive characteristic of the behaviour approach is the role given 
to the uncertainty faced by decision makers. Neoclassical economics often mixes risk and 
uncertainty and considers that investors assign a probability of zero to ambiguous or uncertain 
events. However, despite being not measurable, uncertainty impacts on decisions as it derives 
from ambiguity surrounding decision-making where it is not possible to apply any criteria 
based on probabilities or “degrees of belief” (Ellsberg, 1961, p. 657). Moreover, as the FDI 
location is a mutually exclusive decision it makes no sense to add up the probabilities of rival 
outcomes to get an overall expected utility (Earl, 1995, p. 113).  
Figure 3.2.3: 1 also presents an important distinction between FDI location decisions and 
tax planning activities. It shows that fiscal variables are always present in the decision 
process. First, when information is collected about tax and incentive policies and second 
when the exact location decision is made. In this latter case firms may try to obtain fiscal 
advantages both from the choice of the country and from the local jurisdiction. But the role of 
fiscal variables is not finished. Phase 3 shows that, besides making further investments in the 
same location, where the marginal tax rate has a role in the total stock of FDI (Devereux et al, 
2008), tax planning activities also arise after the location decision. Firms shift across 
countries costs and revenue in order to minimize their tax liabilities (Harris et al, 1993). These 
include transfer pricing, when a TNC manipulates internal prices (in transactions among 
affiliates and the parent company) so that profits are “placed” in low tax jurisdictions. And 
thin capitalization, that is, the process of placing debt related financial costs in higher tax 
countries. The profit shifting only happens after the location decision is made.  
The differentiation is relevant because this dissertation assumes that tax planning activities 
are not included in FDI location decisions. The standard tax competition model usually does 
not differentiate between capital flows nor fiscal variables or tax burdens. By using those 
techniques firms can pay taxes in jurisdictions with a lower tax burden. But this does not 
necessarily mean that firms are further investing in these jurisdictions. Thin capitalization, for 
example, may represent a flow of capital without an investment purpose. That is why a 









FDI locations are considered and other capital flows, related or not with tax planning 
activities, are disregarded. 
Moreover, different levels of enforceability of the tax system in each country, the level of tax 
evasion or the role of employers’ contributions to social security increases the difficulty of 
comparing potential target countries and thus it reinforces the option to study location 
decisions. Companies operating in a determined country pay taxes other than taxes on profits 
and these may also be significant to the decision of investment in that country. Labour costs 
are one of the variables that determine FDI and include both wages and other associated costs 
such as social security. 
3.3 – Empirical evidence 
FDI is a very complex subject where many variables are interdependent. The relevance of 
each of these variables tends to change with time and with firms and sector of activity. The 
empirical evidence on FDI determinants reflects this wide complexity. First, there are a large 
number of possible explanations of FDI flows and location decisions. Second, the empirical 
literature on the role of taxation has two main groups sharing a wide diversity of concepts (i.e. 
data sources and variables). One is specifically focused on the explanation of foreign direct 
investment. The other is concerned with the effects of capital movements in the context of 
economic globalization. 
3.3.1 – FDI locations 
There is a wide empirical literature on FDI locations. Results have been presented in surveys, 
e.g. Blonigen (2005), Chakrabarty (2001), Caves (1996) or Agarwal (1980). Different 
methodologies (micro and macro econometric analysis and surveys), data sources, 
perspectives and analytical tools used by researchers lead to different (sometimes opposite) 
outcomes. Furthermore, and as Chakrabarty (2001) puts it, “…these empirical studies …, form 
measurement without theory…”. Ex-post explanations are given to empirical results without a 
strong theoretical basis. Given the complexity of the relationship between FDI and the 







firms, the FDI literature is mostly based on partial-equilibrium models (Blonigen, 2005). The 
attempt to have a general equilibrium framework for FDI flows is made in Caves (1996, p. 
37). But it is not able to include all the complexity of FDI decisions and to explain the 
contradictory results obtained in empirical studies. 
There is no single FDI determinant that can explain where investments are located. Besides 
profitability and risk, a number of different factors impact on location decisions (see 3.2 
above). All the determinants are interrelated and influence FDI decision making. For instance, 
there are determinants that only explain why firms invest abroad – e.g. monopolistic 
advantages such as proprietary assets or the will to mitigate risk or improve the bargaining 
position towards other economic agents. Although these interact with location determinants 
they do not provide a cue to where FDI will be located. Empirical studies show a huge 
number of different correlations between variables but the problem is that these cannot fully 
explain the reasons behind FDI because it is not easy to assess which determinants are more 
relevant in each situation. Nevertheless, national policies and economic determinants are 
generally regarded as being important to attract FDI (see Annex 2.1).  
National policies have become more liberal since the 1980’s in order to create the necessary 
conditions for foreign firms to invest. Interest rate differentials, tariffs and other trade barriers 
are often shown to influence positively FDI flows (Horst, 1971, Brainard, 1993, and 
Millington and Bayliss, 1991). However these results are not always consistent. Culem
(1988), for example, does not find significant results for tariffs. Political instability and other 
risk factors are thought to be inversely correlated with incoming FDI (Schneider and Frey, 
1985, p. 167) but this is also not empirically observable in all studies (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992). Model misspecifications or different data sources may partially explain these 
differences but the absence of the relevant variables may also be a reason. 
Business facilitation measures such as fiscal incentives are also included in this group and 
gained relevance during the 1990’s, especially in the context of regional integration 
agreements (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 90). When intra-regional transaction costs are reduced and 
national policies have some degree of coordination in order to form a level playing field for 
businesses, national and local jurisdictions tend to rely more heavily on these measures to 







                                                          
Most of the studies on location choices within markets are focused on the USA where 
government promotion has a positive impact on FDI inflows (Caves, 1996, p. 54). Local taxes 
(see 3.3.2 below) and union membership, on the other hand, are negatively correlated with 
FDI (Coughlin et al, 1991, Woodward, 1992 and Ondrich and Wasylenko, 1993). The result 
for taxation is also confirmed for the EU as a single market (Devereux and Griffith, 1998, and 
Head et al, 1999). This view is supported by the evidence found on tax competition at a local 
level. Other variables such as unemployment and population density seem to be also relevant 
but positively correlated (Billington, 1999, p. 72). 
Although proactive facilitation measures are necessary they are not sufficient conditions to 
attract FDI. They have mainly a supportive role and become ineffective if the remaining 
national policies and economic variables are not business friendly. Therefore, they usually do 
not have a decisive role in attracting FDI and tend to become similar with increasing 
competition between countries thus reducing their effectiveness. Foreign firms are 
increasingly considering even more diversified FDI related economic policies to assess the 
business climate of a country. Nevertheless tax policy may make a huge difference in a 
specific investment or for some location trying to attract FDI. This means that the role of 
taxation may be significant for some operations while irrelevant for others3. 
Economic determinants are also relevant for FDI. But while small and medium enterprises 
(SME) may locate their investments in countries that have some of the location advantages 
herein referred, large TNC’s that follow complex strategies to manage their resources in 
different countries tend to look at a combination of several determinants when making FDI 
location decisions. FDI national policies and the main economic determinants must be right 
and the freedom to operate internationally should be guaranteed. Chosen locations should be 
transparent, stable, “predictable” and connected to the global economy. Therefore, countries 
wanting to attract FDI have not only to provide the basic location determinants but they must 
also match them with ownership and internalization advantages of TNC’s. Ireland is a good 
example (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 105). 






Among the economic determinants, the existence of natural resources was the most important 
explanation of FDI location decisions before World War II. Recently, however, this relevance 
decreased (partially due to the lesser importance of the primary sector) although it remains a 
determinant of FDI in several countries. Unskilled and low labour costs are other possible 
reasons for FDI, but mainly in labour intensive industries. The empirical relevance of low 
wages as a FDI determinant is not totally satisfactory as Wheeler and Mody (1992) have 
shown. This is partially explained because most FDI flows occur between developed 
countries. High-skilled labour and other indicators of human capital thus seem to be more 
relevant (Schneider and Frey, 1985, Culem, 1988 and Brainard, 1993). The same is true of 
openness to FDI (Brainard, 1993) and good economic infrastructures (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992). But physical infrastructures are more relevant for developing countries than for 
developed ones while the opposite seems to happen with R&D and its support infrastructures. 
Determinants such as market size and the similarity in terms of skills and human capital 
between the characteristics of home and host countries are usually accepted as explanatory of 
one-way FDI flows (Billington, 1999, p. 71, Buch et al, 2005, p.75) or  two-way flows in the 
context of models of monopolistic competition (Brainard, 1993). Larger markets can 
accommodate more firms and allow for bigger scale economies. However, it is surely a main 
location determinant for horizontal FDI, where market access is essential, but not for vertical 
FDI, where costs seem to be more important. Furthermore, while size is relevant for countries 
with large markets or with a large economic potential it does not explain FDI in small 
countries. 
Proprietary assets such as patents are also able to explain two-way flows of FDI (Cantwell 
and Sanna-Randaccio, 1992), although they cannot predict the exact location of investments. 
Purchasing power also seems to be a main determinant of FDI flows although it is more 
relevant in developed than in developing countries (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 135). 
Cultural and other affinities between countries also explain FDI flows due to the reduction of 
uncertainty and transaction costs. These include, for example, political alliances and former 
colonial ties (Schneider and Frey, 1985, Davidson, 1980, and Kravis and Lipsey, 1982). In the 







affiliates seems to increase with distance while the number decreases (Buch et al, 2005, for 
German TNC’s).  
Regional integration agreements are also relevant because they affect mostly market size and 
growth while creating the conditions for the agglomeration of economic activity. The 
evidence for the EU and for the USA shows that agglomeration economies, infrastructures, 
unit labour costs and human capital resources have a positive impact on FDI inflows and 
stocks (Wheeler and Mody, 1992, Devereux and Griffith, 1998, Caves, 1996, p. 54, or 
Billington, 1999). Depending on firms and sectors, some differences are relevant. First, for 
large firms market size is no longer considered from an individual country basis but is 
assessed from a regional perspective. The same applies to resources given that (with 
liberalization and the reduction in transaction costs) it is easier to access them from any point 
in the region. Therefore, country-specific location factors such as market size and growth 
become more important for small and medium size firms and non-tradable services due to 
new market opportunities. But for tradable goods and services it is important that countries 
trying to attract FDI are able to guarantee good access to the wider regional market by having 
physical accessibility or good policy coordination. In the same sense regional economic 
growth also becomes relevant.  
In summary, although these location variables are now better understood their ability to 
predict FDI flows and stocks still varies from country to country, especially with the level of 
development, and by sector of activity (Wheeler and Mody, 1992, Buch et al, 2005, Azémar 
and Delios, 2008, p. 96). Location decisions can also vary with other characteristics such as 
the motive and the type of FDI (horizontal or vertical and new or sequential), the size of the 
investor, large firms or SME, home countries FDI policies and, as predicted by theory, they 
can also change as the economic environment evolves over the years.  
The large number of relevant variables in FDI decisions is a difficulty for empirical studies. 
Chakrabarti (2001) executes a robustness analysis of the coefficient estimates for several FDI 
determinants when the conditioning information set is changed. That is, when there are 
modifications in the variables that are assumed to be constant when statistical tests are 
performed. He concludes that, with only one exception (market size), all variables are 






variables when statistical regressions are performed it is almost possible to choose the desired 
outcome. In the end, it is clear that empirical evidence (just like theory) cannot provide 
full and definitive conclusions regarding the explanation of investment flows given the 
large number of determinants impacting location decisions.  
3.3.2 – The role of taxation 
The tax competition model predicts that, et ceteris paribus, tax rates on investment flows 
would decrease with competition between countries. In a dynamic setting, and although the 
model does not refer to the period of time necessary for a “race to the bottom” to occur, 
countries would end up with zero tax rates. Statutory corporate tax rates have indeed been 
decreasing in the last 15 years in OECD countries but no “race to the bottom” has been 
observed (Boss, 2005). Figure 3.3.2: 1 present corporate tax rates for 18 EU and 6 other 
OECD countries after 1992 (KPMG, 2007, p. 54). This trend is confirmed by data presented in 
several studies and using different measures of the tax burden besides statutory rates - 
average, average effective and marginal effective (Mendoza et al, 1994, Bénassy-Quéré et al, 
2000, Gropp and Kostial, 2000, Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000, Devereux et al, 2002, and 
Sorensen, 2004). It can be seen that small EU countries have lower tax rates than larger ones, 
as predicted by theory, and the decrease was larger in the EU than in the rest of the OECD, 
indicating the stronger effects of tax competition in a single market.  
A second prediction from the model is that capital always searches for the lower tax rate 
because it is assumed that investors know perfectly well where to get the higher return and 
this exclusively depends on the level of tax rates. If this is interpreted in a strict way, it would 
mean that high rate countries, such as Germany, Italy or Belgium, would never have inward 
investment. But even without such a “draconian” view, it would certainly mean that these 
countries were losing FDI because firms were moving their business activities. According to 
the tax competition model, this loss of investment would result in a tax revenue decrease. 
However, corporate tax revenue has been increasing in the last 35 years in the EU (figure 
3.3.2: 2 based on OECD statistics). That is, despite the reduction in statutory tax rates the 
corporate tax burden is not diminishing. On the contrary, it is increasing even for countries 










                                                                                                                                                                                     
This might explain why there is no strong empirical evidence of tax competition at a country 
level despite the existing trend of increasing FDI flows and decreasing tax rates. There are 
several possible explanations. First, changes in corporate profitability (due to economic 
growth, lower interest costs, higher productivity or more concentrated market structures) 
might explain the increase in revenue. Second, the growing FDI flows within the EU and from
outside enlarged countries’ tax base (UNCTAD, 2004). Third, some governments have been 
broadening the tax base by adjusting depreciation rules so that lower tax rates were 
compensated (Devereux et al, 2002). These reasons do not contradict the model but the same
does not happen with other reasons explaining the level of corporate taxation (see 2.2.2.2). 
Figure 3.3.2: 1 - Corporate tax rates (%) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Average EU Small Average EU Large Average EU 
Average other OECD Average 24 OECD 
A final issue is the results arising from empirical studies on the existence of a correlation 
between increasing capital mobility and a lower corporate tax burden. De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2003) do a Meta regression analysis of 25 studies, since 1984, on the impact of taxation on 
FDI where a median tax rate semi-elasticity to FDI of -3.3 is found. However, the results 
presented varied substantially, from -84.5 to 17.8, and while all of them include a negative 







4 The 15 “old” EU countries and Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. OECD includes also Australia, Canada, 















































































of results has several possible explanations: model specifications, the origin of funds, the 
different systems of taxation in each country, the proxies on capital and tax burden, the use of 
control variables and the time period and space covered: 
Figure 3.3.2: 2 - Corporate taxes as % of Total taxes and GDP










Average Total taxes Stand.-deviation Total taxes Average GDP Stand.-deviation GDP
A) There have been four different model specifications to study the relationship between 
taxation and FDI flows: Time series, cross sectional studies, discrete choice models and panel 
data. De Mooij and Ederveen (2006) develop the precedent Meta analysis by including a total 
of 33 studies where the median and mean values of all semi-elasticity considered are negative 
in the four cases5. But these values are hugely influenced by a small number of publications 
with a large number of elasticity (the 5 larger studies represent 51% of the observations). 
Moreover, 48% of the observations are not significantly different from zero. The number of 
studies with positive semi-elasticity between FDI and taxation may be underestimated 
because the authors do not include information about unpublished results (De Mooij and 
Ederveen, 2006, p. 5). As De Mooiij and Ederveen (2006, p. 34) acknowledge, there is no 
account of quality differences among studies. Finally, there are other studies reporting a non­
significant or a positive elasticity that are absent from the Meta analysis (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992, Swank, 1998, Garrett and Mitchell, 2001, and other studies on globalization). 





B) Early studies made the distinction between financing of FDI through retained earnings 
and transfer of funds and concluded that only the use of retained earnings was responsive to 
tax rates (Hartman, 1985). Later, Slemrod (1990) looked at FDI flows to the US and did not 
find a significant relation between retained earnings and tax rates while concluding that 
taxation affects FDI flows of funds. However, most of the studies, and the more recent ones, 
do not distinguish the source of finance of FDI and thus it is hard to reach a definitive 
conclusion about the relevance of the source of finance (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). 
C) Studies also reach different conclusions in terms of the relevance of home country 
system of taxation (credit or exemption) in order to avoid double taxation. Slemrod (1990) 
and Auerbach and Hassett (1993) found no significant differences between the two systems of 
taxation in the determination of FDI flows. Devereux and Freeman (1995) do not find 
significant results in terms of the tax wedge as an explanation of the allocation of total 
investment between the domestic market and FDI. But Swenson (1994) and Hines (1996), 
looking respectively at FDI inflows to the US in 18 industries and across states, found that 
higher effective tax rates were positively associated with FDI levels from investors in 
countries with a tax credit scheme. Gropp and Kostial (2000), by looking at several OECD 
countries, also found that FDI outflows are inversely affected by fiscal policies in the home 
country. In the end, the possibility of deduction of taxes paid abroad and of deferrals in tax 
payments in the credit system makes it, in practical terms, quite similar to the exemption 
situation and prevents a definitive conclusion (Bird and Wilkie, 2000, and empirically De 
Mooij and Ederveen, 2006). 
D) The use of control variables is usually restricted despite the existence of a large number of 
FDI determinants. These variables not only affect FDI but may also be correlated with 
taxation and, if they are not included in the regressions, an important bias is ignored in the 
empirical studies. Hajkova et al (2006, p. 25) show that the inclusion of policy variables in 
regressions more than halves tax elasticity estimates, turning taxation an unimportant 
determinant. This is related with a further problem affecting empirical studies, which is their 
robustness. Chakrabarti (2001) considers 14 studies that include taxes as an explanatory 
variable of foreign investment. From these, in 9 there appears to be a significant negative 
correlation between the two variables, while the remaining 5 were not significant or, in one 








estimates for taxation when the conditioning information set is changed and concludes that 
the statistically significant negative correlation between FDI and taxation does not stand for 
all changes in the control variables. In other words, the manipulation of the set of variables 
when statistical regressions are performed allows for different outcomes. 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2005, p. 25) also show that the inclusion of control variables for 
openness and agglomeration effects reduces the effect of taxation in FDI flows, thereby 
weakening the importance of the results presented by the empirical literature. However, 
empirical studies seldom try to include all FDI determinants, not even those directly related 
with location decisions. Wheeler and Mody (1992, p. 67) is an exception where the corporate 
tax rate is not found to play a significant role. Therefore, the impact of these determinants is 
needed in order to allow for a more reliable assessment of the role of taxation.  
E) When considering the time and spatial dimensions De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, p. 689, 
2006, p. 19) are not able to empirically confirm that capital has become more mobile during 
recent years and do not find significant differences between investors located in several 
groups of countries (EU, US, small countries and peripheral countries). This is the opposite of 
what one should expect given the increasing globalization of economic activity worldwide 
and the process of economic integration in the EU since the 1980’s.  
F) Finally, many different proxies were used for capital and the tax burden. FDI studies focus 
on real long-term investments while globalization research also includes other types such as 
short-term inter-bank movements and portfolio applications. In total, we were able to identify 
9 different proxies on capital and 8 on the tax burden (Table 3.3.2: 1). 
The outcome of the studies was not the same. Garrett (1995), Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) 
and Garrett and Mitchell (2001) were unable to find evidence of the expected effect of capital 
mobility pushing down statutory or average tax rates. Garrett and Mitchell (2001) use three 
measures of capital mobility: the Quinn index on financial openness, covered interest parity 
differentials for three months interbank deposits and FDI flows in percentage of GDP. 
Contrary to what the theory predicts, they find a positive relationship between FDI flows and 
the average capital tax rate. The same unexpected result is presented in Quinn (1997) and 










and profits as capital movements became more liberalized. Therefore, these findings point to 
the opposite of what theory predicts because taxation tends to increase and not decrease with 
international capital mobility.  
Table 3.3.2: 1 - Proxies of capital and tax burden 
Capital mobility or flows Tax burdens 
Quinn index on financial openness Statutory corporate tax rate 
Covered interest parity differentials Cost of capital or pre-tax rate of return 
FDI flows (total and in % of GDP) Micro average tax rate (firm level data) 
Short-term inter-bank movements Differential of corporate tax rate 
FDI stocks Average effective tax rate 
Plants, equipment and property Average marginal tax rate 
Number of locations Macro average tax rate (%GDP or total taxes) 
Number of investment projects Average rate based on national accounts 
Number of capital controls 
Grubert and Mutti (2000), Cummins and Hubbard (1995) and Devereux and Griffith (1998) 
find that tax rates are important for the decision on how to locate firms’ production, but in the 
latter cases conditional on the decision to produce abroad. This is confirmed in a business 
survey presented in the Ruding Report (1992). However, they do not find significant evidence 
about the role of taxes in the choice between producing abroad, exporting or to be absent of 
external markets. Moreover, Devereux et al (2007) show the effect of governmental grants in 
the location of new plants to be weak in the presence of agglomeration economies. This raises 
further doubts about the role of taxes in explaining FDI location decisions. 
The tax competition model predicts that investment is to be located where the net rate of
return on capital is higher. However, Devereux and Freeman (1995, p. 98) test if corporations 
equate post-tax rates of return when deciding the location of investments and do not find 
significant results in terms of the tax wedge as an explanation of the allocation of total 





There are also many studies that present results more in line with theoretical predictions. 
Devereux and Freeman (1995, p. 96) also find a significant inverse relation with FDI inflows 
in some OECD countries. Rodrik (1997, p. 64) finds an inverse relation between the 
liberalization of capital restrictions and average tax rates on capital at high levels of trade 
openness. Gropp and Kostial (2000) use firm data for the tax burdens and IMF data for FDI 
flows and report a significant negative elasticity in several OECD countries. Most, but not all, 
of the published studies using US data also find a negative correlation between FDI flows and 
taxation (Hines, 1999). The same applies to Bénassy-Quéré et al (2000) when using the 
differential of the corporate tax in percentage of operating surplus as a proxy for the tax 
burden. Finally, Kroegstrup (2003) finds empirical evidence of a partial race-to-the-bottom by 
using covered interest parity differentials. 
Moreover, there are some studies that show an inverse correlation between taxation and FDI 
flows to be stronger and more significant at a local level, within a market, than at a market or 
country level (Devereux and Griffith, 1998, and Head et al, 1999). This is more in line with 
the existing empirical evidence of jurisdictions competing for capital.  
Besides the variety of proxies, there are other problems with the measurement of both 
variables. FDI flows do not include all investments made by foreign parent firms. Investments 
financed by debt in the host country are not included in FDI statistics and FDI does not 
comprise only real capital investments. FDI participations may be made through the exchange 
of shares where there are no real flows of money. Moreover, the problem with aggregate data 
is that it contains different components that may have different responses to changes in tax 
rates (Auerbach and Hassett, 1993). FDI can be divided by plants and equipment, joint 
ventures, mergers and acquisitions and equity increases. From this set, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) are not necessarily related with real investments in property, machinery 
and so on. This is quite relevant because OECD (2002) estimates that 80% of FDI flows 
between developed countries are of this nature and are usually associated with ownership or 
internalization advantages where the value of the elasticity to tax rates tends to be lower (De 
Mooij and Ederveen, 2006). Given these differences, some empirical studies tend to favour 
investment in plants, equipment and property as a better approximation to real capital 
investment. Swenson (2001) uses this definition for inward FDI to the USA together with the 







                                                          
    
and finds a negative elasticity to tax rates but in the case of mergers and acquisitions the 
elasticity is positive. Altshuler et al (2001, p. 14) use a measure of real capital and find that 
the host country average tax rates affects FDI location decisions. But the possibility to 
differentiate between types of FDI depends on data availability, which limits the studies to a 
few countries such as the USA. 
The measure of the tax burden on capital depends on what type of income is considered. The 
main interest of this study is about taxes paid by companies that are investing on a long-term
basis. Therefore, profits made by companies seem to be the relevant tax base. Interest and 
dividends may also be a part of the sources of revenue of a company but all of it is, in one 
way or another, included in pre-tax profits. However, the tax competition model includes a 
source-based tax in the return to all capital, independent of its term, which differs from a 
corporate tax on profits. 
The empirical literature presents four different types of tax rates. The average tax rate is the 
ratio of the corporate tax receipts over total taxes or GDP and it is used in most of the studies 
on globalization where there is weak, or no, evidence of a correlation between taxation and 
capital flows (e.g. Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998, and Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). The 
remaining three types are expected to answer to three different firm’s decisions (Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998). Decisions on profit shifting to lower tax countries rely on the statutory tax 
rate. The decision on how much is invested depends on the effective marginal tax rate, which 
is the difference between the pre and post-tax rates of return on a marginal investment 
project6. These are the source-based tax rates implicit in tax competition models where capital 
flows to a country up to the point where its marginal return (assumed to be decreasing with 
the amount of investment) is equal to the cost of capital, that is, the impact of the corporate 
tax in the level of invested capital is measured at the margin (OECD, 1991).  
Finally, location decisions, as mentioned in 3.2.3, are discrete and depend on the effective 
average tax rate (EATR), which is the net present value of tax payments related with an 
investment project as a proportion of the net present value of capital income generated by the 
same project (the pre-tax return of the investment project). In other words, it is the proportion 
6 The effective marginal tax rate is (p – r) / p, where p is the pre-tax rate of return on an investment and r is the 
post-tax rate of return on the same project (King and Fullerton, 1984, p. 9). 
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of profits taken by taxes. Rational firms choose the location that provides the highest post-tax 
profit or, in other words, firms consider taxes by measuring the reduction in profits predicted 
for each possible location. Then, the EATR is a measure that includes both the tax rate and 
the tax base and it is useful when a corporation does a lumpy investment or chooses between 
two locations (Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
EATR are forward looking and not based in the past tax rates, and so they are thought to be 
more precise and better in covering all the details of tax regulations that a potential investor 
faces when making a location decision. However, they are harder to obtain and to apply to 
empirical studies due to the dependence on several assumptions - interest rates, source of
financing, depreciation rates, assets, life of the investment, fiscal incentives and so on 
(Devereux and Griffith, 2003) - concerning a so-called typical investment project. Therefore, 
they may have significant different values for different firms and economic sectors. 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2005, p. 28) show that discrete choice models usually present a 
lower elasticity than other estimation procedures, that is, the impact of tax competition 
is considered to be less relevant. This is confirmed by the inexistence of evidence on tax 
competition based on estimation of reaction functions to changes in AETR at a country level. 
Even more important, it was only after effective tax rates were included in empirical studies 
on location decisions that the FDI elasticity became consistently negative (De Mooij and 
Ederveen, 2006, p. 30). Then, EATR seems to be the key to the inverse relationship between 
FDI and taxation in location decisions despite the existence of other studies with similar 
results using different model specifications and proxies on the tax burden (Bartik, 1985, 
Hines, 1996, Swenson, 2001). 
Furthermore, one cannot be sure that firms, mainly those of small and medium size, really 
know the tax code in a detailed way and apply it through the use of EATR. Bachus et al 
(2007) do not find a relation between capital and EATR in the OECD for the period 1980­
2004, indicating that this may be true. As Devereux and Griffith (2002, p. 488) acknowledge, 
the effect of tax reforms in developed countries has been in the sense of a larger reduction of 
the tax burden to investments with higher profitability (or a larger economic rent) and 
mobility. This means that different investment projects in the same location may face 









To conclude, although there is a role for taxation in explaining FDI flows it is not certain how 
relevant it is. Both empirical evidence and econometric studies present contradictory facts. 
What is certain is that the number of variables affecting FDI is too large to allow for a simpler 
explanation where only one factor says it all. Moreover, each location determinant of FDI 
may explain capital flows in certain circumstances while being irrelevant for other situations 
(developed and developing countries, financial and non-financial activity, “Greenfield” and 
mergers & acquisitions, large and small firms). Some may be empirically inconclusive when 
explaining FDI flows for certain countries but not for others. They are not universal 
explanations of FDI. This is due to the different characteristics affecting both the direction 
and the amount of FDI and it surely can be applied to fiscal variables.  
3.4 - The mismatch between tax competition and FDI theories 
FDI and tax competition literatures are two different fields that have been developing 
separately. Although both are part of the neo-classical paradigm, their theories and their 
findings were seldom related by economists. That explains why formal incompatibilities 
between these two areas of research have not yet been tackled. Chapters 2 and 3 together 
allow the identification of these “incompatibilities”:   
a) FDI is less mobile than short term flows   
b) Taxation has a very limited role in the FDI literature 
c) Tax rates are not the only variable that impacts on profitability 
d) Firms’ behaviour is not uniquely determined by tax-related concerns 
e) The tax competition model is not able to explain different characteristics of FDI decisions 
such as the type of FDI, the sector where firms operate, the size of the investor or changes 
occurring as economic environment evolve over the years. 
f) FDI location decisions are of a discrete nature and thought to be made by considering both 
the tax rate and the tax base (AETR) while tax competition models implicitly consider a 











Besides these “incompatibilities” there are two further problems not properly addressed by 
both the tax competition and FDI literatures: 
g) Taxation is not determined with the sole objective of attracting capital 
Tax competition theory assumes countries to have active tax policies to attract FDI regardless 
of other objectives in tax-setting policies. This is an incompatibility with the theory of
taxation that goes beyond the above described logic of tax burdens as an exclusive 
explanation of capital flows and looks at domestic influences over the determination of 
corporate taxation (Slemrod, 2004). 
h) Investors do not know perfectly well where to get the higher return 
A premise of the assumption that capital moves without barriers following the highest rate of 
return is that investors know perfectly well where they can get the higher return for their 
investments. In other words, they have perfect information about the conditions and the 
variables that affect their investments because they know the tax burdens on capital in each 
location. The FDI literature assumes investors are rational beings but recognizes the limits of 
information collection and is more concerned with how to explain the decision to invest 
abroad than with the outcome of the investment (Dunning, 1979, p. 272).  
To sum up, the assumptions of the standard model of tax competition do not match with the 
literature on FDI. From the point of view of FDI theory it seems too simplistic to use tax rates 
as a key determinant of investment flows. These two literatures do not match in the sense that 
while tax competition gives a disproportional high weight to the role of taxation in explaining 
capital movements, the literature on FDI considers taxation as just one among many possible 
explanatory variables. Moreover, the tax competition model is not empirically valid at a 
national level when considering location decisions. Similarly, the economic literature shows 
that taxes are more relevant after the choice of the market, when the investor is in the final 
stage of negotiations with recipient local jurisdictions (Devereux and Griffith, 1998), in profit 







3.5 - Conclusions 
For more than 30 years a significant amount of financial and human resources have been 
allocated to research tax competition and fiscal variables have been considered to play a role 
in influencing capital flows and location decisions. But the standard tax competition model is 
too general in its assumptions and is a reinstatement of the view presented in the 1930’s by 
Nurkse (cited by Ietto-Gillies, 2005, p. 53) where capital arbitrage would move investments 
from low-return to high-return countries (supposedly least well endowed with capital). This 
view was severely criticized by Hymer and others by showing that firms operate in 
imperfectly competitive markets where there are two-way flows, FDI has to absorb additional 
costs in comparison with local investors (Caves, 1996, after p. 25) and profits earned by 
TNC’s are not in line with the supposedly national marginal product of capital. Given the 
need to be accurate, the object of this dissertation is limited to FDI location decisions 
because they are relevant for jurisdictions wanting to attract capital to improve 
economic conditions. The findings of tax competition theory may differ according to the 
different natures of capital flows. A consequence of this delimitation is thus the need to 
address the existing “incompatibilities” between tax competition and FDI theory so that a 
better assessment of those findings can be achieved.  
The delimitation of the object allows for a new look on the role of taxation in FDI flows. FDI 
is not just a question of looking to a screen and finding out where the higher return is in order 
to put the capital there, as is often the case in financial markets. It is a far longer and complex 
process where location decisions are based on many factors that vary with the type of firm, 
the characteristics of the host country and with costs or strategic concerns. Theoretically FDI 
locations can be determined by the AETR. But taxation is just one of its determinants that 
impact on profitability. Moreover, location decisions are not like reinvestments or tax 
planning activities because decisions are made by investors with less information about 
selected alternatives and about those markets who are disregarded at the outset.  
The use of a behavioural approach does not affect the focus of neo-classical tax competition 
theory. However, it is not clear how important taxation is in determining FDI locations, 
as Markusen (1995, p. 171) recognizes. Many studies show an inverse relationship between 






a market than for FDI and, thus, is in line with the empirical evidence of tax competition. 
However, model specifications, data problems, insufficient control variables, robustness 
analysis, the continuous growth of corporate tax revenue and the existence of agglomeration 
economies prevent a definitive conclusion about how relevant are taxes in determining 
investment location decisions. Furthermore, empirical studies are not able to determine if 
taxation is causing FDI flows to occur or vice-versa and simulation studies show that the size 
of the inefficiencies is not large but it tends to augment with an increase in capital mobility. 
From the above it can be seen that the neoclassical approach of FDI and tax competition 
literatures are not able to explain the complete picture. Both fields are usually based in 
partial-equilibrium models that do not consider behavioural issues and the complexity of
economic decisions made by firms. The perceptions of firms’ decision makers are usually 
absent from both literatures. But given that there are a large number of variables affecting 
these decisions and firms are seldom directly asked about their decision making process, it 
cannot be clear how relevant are tax variables for location decisions. Therefore, instead of 
trying to explain why firms invest abroad, the behavioural approach may permit a better 
assessment of the role of taxation through the understanding of how the decision making 
process develops and how uncertainty affects firms’ behaviour. In this way the 











Chapter 4 – A behavioural approach to tax competition 
for FDI 
Economic literature did not address some assumptions of the standard tax competition model 
and thus its results are not able to explain everything that is empirically observable (Annex 
1.1). Moreover, its results are not totally compatible with FDI theory (chapter 3.4). The 
purpose of this chapter is to present a complementary approach to address these assumptions 
so that the predictive capabilities of the tax competition model are strengthened, including its 
implications for tax policy at national and EU levels, and to improve the compatibility 
between tax competition and FDI theories by gaining a better understanding of firm’s location 
decisions. 
The approach is based on behavioural economics and starts from the decision-making process 
in FDI operations by giving a central role to uncertainty when location decisions are made 
and by considering the perceptions of managers. The following chapter complements this one 
by applying the methodology outlined below to provide an empirical application of the 
behavioural approach. 
4.1 – An interdisciplinary approach 
The limitations of the neoclassical paradigm require an interdisciplinary approach, through 
the use of other social sciences such as psychology1, so that a richer and more complete 
approach to economic problems is achieved. This is done by, as Albanese (1991, p. 20) states, 
going “… beyond the boundaries of economics to make ‘bona fide’ contributions to 
economics. But go beyond economics we must, if we are to broaden the behavioural 
foundations of economic analysis and expand the limits of applicability of economic theory”. 
The behavioural view aims to address some of the usual assumptions of neoclassical literature 
such as rational behaviour, the aim to maximize profits and the access to perfect information 








                                                                                                                                                                                     
incompatibility existing between tax competition and FDI theories, namely capital mobility, 
the role of taxation in capital movements and its impact on firms’ profitability. 
It is based on two main sources of literature. First, the findings on firm behaviour and the 
related decision-making processes that are the cornerstone of behavioural theories of the firm
since the 1950’s. In brief, economic agents, managers included, are not fully rational in their 
decisions, even if they pretend to be, because they cannot collect, correctly perceive and 
process all of the relevant information. This is what Simon (1955, p. 114, and 1959, p. 277) 
termed as “approximate rationality”, a characteristic of most of the decision-making 
processes, where individuals are “satisficing”, or choosing among a restricted set of 
alternatives, their utility. Second, the more recent application of experimental cognitive 
psychology to economic decisions. These are based on behavioural anomalies and human 
motivation and their impact on the decisions of economic agents (behavioural finance is one 
of its finest examples). The developments of this behavioural approach have shown that 
individuals use judgemental heuristics or simplifying strategies in their decisions and that 
these lead to systematic errors and biases, that is, deviations from rationality that may be large 
and, thus, have huge social costs2. 
The two sources will be used together to understand if, despite all the time and effort 
dedicated by academics to the research of tax competition and the current visibility that it 
enjoys, this subject has the corresponding degree of interest in the world of corporations and 
investment decisions. The final aim is to understand the role of manager’s perceptions and 
other behavioural characteristics in FDI location decisions so that the impact of taxation 
can be better understood. In other words, the interdisciplinary approach is also focused on 
processes and not only, as neoclassical theory, on outcomes. 
4.1.1 – A behavioural perspective on FDI location decisions 
The neoclassical theory of the firm states that market optimization demands maximization 
from firms, that is, investing up to the point where its marginal benefits equal its marginal 
costs. This means that firms have both the objective and the ability to maximize and are 
1 As proposed by Lewis (1982, ch. 2) or Frey and Eichenberger (2001, p. 12). 

2 This is important because the failure of agents to maximize – even small deviations from rationality - may 







supposed to deal in an optimal way with uncertainty. Furthermore, they have access to perfect 
information about the conditions and the variables that affect their investments, i.e., they 
know perfectly well where they can get the highest return for their investments. Even if this is 
not achievable in the short term, learning processes and external incentives should enhance 
the ability of firms to reach optimal decisions in the long term.  
The behavioural approach, on the other hand, fully considers the FDI decision-making 
process by giving uncertainty a central role in each step. This is very important for three 
reasons: First, the emphasis on rules of behaviour in this dissertation arises from the fact that 
most situations faced by decision makers are related to “nonreplicable uncertainty or even 
ignorance” (Heijdra, 1988, p. 83); Second because individuals usually deal with each event in 
a separate way before combining the outcomes3 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279) and, 
therefore, this is also applicable to each different step in FDI decisions; Third, as Alchian 
(1950, p. 213) proposes, because it seems more sensible to develop a model from an initial 
situation of uncertainty and only then to add elements of foresight, and not to start it on a 
certain goal such as profit maximization and afterwards abandon it by considering uncertainty 
and different motives for agents’ behaviour. 
Uncertainty is a feature of most decision making situations and it may be described as “the 
absence of ability to decipher all of the complexity of the environment; especially one whose 
very structure itself evolves over time” (Heiner, 1983, p, 569). It includes, besides risk, the 
known unknowns and unknown unknowns. Contrary to risk, the remaining part of uncertainty 
cannot be mitigated and it is not possible to assign probabilities for each alternative (Knight, 
1921, Ch. VII.). However, the behaviour of all types of agents is thought to be highly 
influenced by uncertainty (Heiner, 1983, p. 562) and while neoclassical economics play down 
the outcomes to which they are not able to assign a probability the behavioural approach 
emphasizes it. That is, it differs from expected utility theory where risk and uncertainty are 
often faced as being the same thing while acting as a constraint to maximization (Hirshleifer 
and Riley, 1992, p. 10). 
It is the ambiguity arising from the considerable ignorance about the likelihood of an event 








                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
about the reaction of potential competitors when the firm invests abroad. This may lead to 
conflicting views among members of the board and to patterns of decision that systematically 
violate rational behaviour (Ellsberg, 1961, p. 669) such as inconsistency in the various steps 
of the decision making process. Thus, inconsistency also justifies a central and separated role 
for uncertainty in explaining FDI location decisions. 
Furthermore, as exposed in 3.2.3 each FDI location decision comprises not only the 
“economically rational” part but also the “behavioural” part, where perceptions and other 
cognitive features of managers are included (Katona, 1975, p. 328). Therefore, this approach 
concerns the way the behavioural component influences a FDI location decision by 
recognizing the relevance of managers’ cognitive characteristics4. 
The behavioural perspective considers that managers, like any individual, when facing 
uncertainty are subject to errors and anomalous behaviour in decision making due to cognitive 
dissonance5. Both may be corrected. But while errors may be a one time deviation from
economic rationality explained by the limited capabilities of human beings, heuristics are 
sequential deviations, where intuition has a role and its own rationality, and are represented 
by systematic and predictable biases arising from behavioural rules (Conlisk, 1996, p. 676; 
Frey and Eichenberger, 2001, p. 12). 
Generally speaking, these behavioural rules are usual choices typified in accordance with 
their place in the time span, that is, related with past or present events or concerning 
expectations about future developments, and by its intrinsic or extrinsic origin (Alchian, 1950, 
p. 213; Simon, 1959, p. 274; Aharoni, 1999, p.13; Frey and Eichenberger, 2001, p. 14). 
In a dynamic perspective, when agents are finally able to correct their anomalous behaviour 
the environment has changed in a significant way and, because a changing context impacts 
the perceptions of managers, agents have to permanently re-start their personal learning 
process to cope with the new environmental conditions. Therefore, the behavioural approach 




4 By cognition is meant the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning. 

5 Cognitive dissonance refers to conflicting thoughts between what one holds to be true and what one knows to 










aims to identify the relevant durable patterns of firms’ behaviour, as proposed by Winter 
(1986). This is relevant because FDI locations may take months to be completed and include a 
large number of decisions. 
The behavioural rules originated by the use of simplifying strategies to reduce complexity 
may provide explanations for FDI decision making that go beyond the traditional ones. Many 
have been applied to financial markets and, although the actions and the outcomes of these 
markets are much more easily observable than in the case of foreign investment, some may be 
extrapolated to FDI decisions and complement the current literature. They are valid both to 
explain information collection, selection of alternatives and for the final FDI location decision 
based on the information available. Thus, even without forming a unified model (Machina, 
1987, p. 149), they complement both the neoclassical and the traditional behavioural 
theories of the firm in the explanation of FDI. 
4.1.2 – The basic model 
The present approach attempts to predict the decision behaviour of firms by considering 
several optimization barriers while including optimization as a special case. This is in 
accordance with the Competence-Difficulty (C-D) model, proposed by Heiner (1983, 1985a, 
1989), where the “competence” of an agent is confronted with the “difficulty” in selecting 
most preferred alternatives. The Heiner model explains constrained behaviour or 
behavioural regularities from the existence of uncertainty (the C-D gap). Therefore, the 
unaddressed assumptions of tax competition theory, such as rational behaviour, profit 
maximization and perfect information, can be relaxed and the existing incompatibilities 
between tax competition and FDI theories can be addressed by focusing on the uncertainty 
surrounding decision making processes. 
An existing gap between competence and difficulty means that agents face uncertainty about 
how to use information in selecting an option from several potential alternatives when a 
decision has to be made. Therefore, uncertainty exposes the limits of any agent in any 
selection process. This is a different approach from neoclassical economics where it is 














agent’s competence and the difficulty of the decision problem to be solved …” (Heiner, 1983, 
p. 562). 
The Heiner model presents two types of variables, environmental (e) and perceptual (p). The 
first represents environmental (complexity-stability) influences from the past, present and 
future, in economic, legal, political or cultural terms, surrounding the decisions made by firms 
while the second refers to how managers perceive the connection between their behaviour and 
the environment, that is, how they react to information. The second variable includes both the 
intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of individuals. The two together determine the gap 
between capacity and difficulty, that is, the degree of uncertainty (U). The more complex is 
the environment or the less reliable are the perceptions of managers the greater is the C-D gap 
and the uncertainty in the decision making process. 
D - C = U, with C ≤  D (neoclassical theory usually assumes D = C) (1) 
Where U is uncertainty or the difference between D (Difficulty) and C (Competence) in 
selecting most preferred alternatives when making a decision. 
U  =  U  (e,p)  and         (2)  
U’(p) < 0 and U’(e) > 0 
Now consider a firm that, after an assessment of its internal capabilities and strategy, decides 
to invest abroad. To that end information is collected about several alternatives. The investor 
has now a determined repertoire of options and flexibility to consider an additional action in 
the decision making process. This new action may be access to new information on the 
existing alternatives or on how much to invest, or collecting information about a new possible 
location. It may include hiring a specialized firm to help the decision making process in terms 
of plant installation, financing or risk, for example, or the creation of an internal task force to 
develop the process. In all cases, however, because it is directly related with the FDI it 








                                                          
The flexibility of the investor to select a new action may improve their performance if, under 
the right perceptual and environmental conditions, this new action is preferred to the 
alternatives in their repertoire. That is, if it represents an improvement given the imperfect 
information and imperfect response to information but without necessarily reaching the 
maximum potentially achievable performance (Heiner, 1985b, pp 579 and 583). Otherwise, 
under the wrong conditions, the new action is less preferred than the alternatives in the 
repertoire and the investor has no advantage in having the flexibility to select it. Therefore, it 
all depends on how the agent perceives the likelihood of different conditions produced by the 
environment and this can be represented as the probability of the right or wrong times 
(conditions) to select an action, respectively q(U) and 1-q(U)6. 
Given uncertainty the investor cannot distinguish the right from the wrong conditions to select 
an option and thus they may not select the new action when it is the right time or may select 
the new action when it is the wrong time. For example, the investor does not know when it is 
the right time to start collecting information on a new location alternative. Then, the key issue 
is how the investor perceives their relationship with the environment, that is, his imperfect 
response to information. It is the degree of his sensitivity to new information and the way that 
he deals with it that influences the selection, or not, of a new action. Therefore, both the 
conditional probabilities of selecting the new action when it is the right {r(U)} and the wrong 
{w (U) times depend on uncertainty and as uncertainty increases r will decrease and w will 
increase7: 
r’(U) < 0 and w’(U) > 0 
When there is no uncertainty, r=1 and w=0, the new action will always be selected at the right 
time and thus it is reliable. In other words each new decision is on the right path towards 
maximization and agents behave as predicted by the neoclassical model (Heiner, 1983, p. 
565). This is the usual assumption of neoclassical models where agents use information 
perfectly by selecting actions that maximize the expected utility based on available 
information. However, in general there is uncertainty about how to use information or when 
6 The formalization of Heiner only considers the environmental (“e”) variable but the inclusion of the perceptual 

variable does not change the outcome of the model (Heiner, 1985b, p. 583). 

7 It should be noted that these “behavioural” probabilities are not known by agents. Therefore, this is not similar 








   
    
 
 
     
 
 
    
to select particular actions and r < 1 and w > 0. An extemporaneous decision to collect further 
information about risk characteristics of a country, for example, may be useless and may have 
a negative influence on a future location decision. 
The reliability of using new information or selecting a new action is r(U) / w(U), which 
represents the chance of “correctly” responding under the right circumstances relative to the 
chance of “mistakenly” responding under the wrong ones. Greater uncertainty reduces the 
reliability of the selection given that it reduces r and increases w.  
The gain or loss in performance from the selection of a new action, in comparison with the 
initial set of options, depends on how the environment affects the consequences from different 
actions and is presented as g(U) and l(U). For example, if a firm locates its investment in a 
chosen country when it is the right time to do so it will have an average gain of g(U). 
Otherwise, like investments located in Argentina before the currency crisis, it will have an 
expected loss of l(U). Schematically: 
Conditions   Firms’ option   Change in performance
Right Selecting a new action g (U) 
Wrong    Not selecting -
Right    Not selecting -
Wrong Selecting    l (U) 
It is possible now to determine when the use of new information or the selection of a new 
action is sufficiently reliable for a firm to benefit from having the flexibility to gain further 
information or alternatives affecting an FDI location decision. It happens when the expected 
gains to select the option when it is the right time cumulate faster or are superior to the 
expected losses of selecting the option when it is the wrong time: 
g(U) q(U) r(U) > |l(U)| (1-q)(U) w(U) (3) 
Dividing both sides of equation 3 by g(U) q(U) w(U): 






On the left side it is the reliability ratio, that is, the actual reliability of using information or 
selecting an action. On the right side it is a tolerance limit T which the reliability ratio must 
satisfy. T specifies a minimum requirement in terms of reliability for which there is a benefit 
for an investor from having the flexibility to decide what information they will allow to 
influence a FDI location decision. Equation 4 presents the relationship between the possible 
set of options of an agent and the structure of their relationship with the environment. When 
there is greater uncertainty, the reliability ratio is reduced and the selection of a new action 
has a smaller chance of improving the performance of the decision maker. With lesser 
uncertainty the opposite happens. Due to uncertainty the agent can never know when the 
reliability ratio is higher than the tolerance limit. 
Thus the C-D model implies that the access to a wider set of options is not necessarily 
advantageous for an agent in terms of performance. That is, and contrary to neoclassical 
economics, it may be advantageous for an agent to simplify their behaviour to less complex 
patterns by restricting the flexibility to use further information or to choose further particular 
actions. The restricted use of information by decision makers found in Simon (1955, p. 106) is 
an example. In this way uncertainty becomes the source of the regularities observed in agents’ 
behaviour while in neoclassical economics predictable behaviour arises from the will to 
maximize when choosing most preferred actions. 
This is explained by the inverse relationship existing between the likelihood of choosing an 
action in the right time, q(U), and the tolerance limit T. The reliability condition, for a given 
l(U) / g(U) ratio, accelerates to infinity as q(U) drops to zero (Figure 4.1.2: 1). That is, to 
satisfy the minimum requirement in terms of reliability (T) an agent tends to ignore actions 
which are appropriate only in unusual circumstances by relying on behavioural rules. This 
means that agents disregard actions that improve their performance with a positive probability 
q(U) > 0 and it shows a behavioural rigidity in adjusting to new situations. In other words, an 
agent must rely on actions which are adaptable to relatively recurrent situations. These rules 
of behaviour or patterns, such as norms, routines, administrative procedures or rules of thumb, 
systematically reduce the flexibility of behaviour. Given that these rules prevent the selection 
of preferred actions under certain circumstances and at any point in time, one can never say 





           
     
       
       
               
 
 
                                                          
The model predicts behaviour from uncertainty in a way where optimality is an exception. In 
the neoclassical world, if time, learning and the right incentives are introduced agents would 
improve their performance and behave “as if” maximizing (Horowitz, 1970, p. 317). But here 
this is not necessarily so given that uncertainty does not disappear and thus time and learning 
do not necessarily continuously improve the performance of agents8. Uncertainty is agent 
specific and is present, in different degrees, in all periods of the model given that its structure 
(environment and perception) also evolves with time. The access to new information or to a 
larger set of options may or may not reduce uncertainty (depending on the reliability of the 
selection) but it also increases behavioural entropy and thus can hardly eliminate it (Heiner, 
1985b, p. 580; Heiner, 1988b, after p. 38). This is confirmed by dynamic models showing that 
optimality may imply non regular and unstable behaviour leading to errors in agents´ decision 
making (Heiner, 1989, p. 234).  
Figure 4.1.2: 1 - Reliability condition 
Furthermore, the existence of dynamic learning processes does not guarantee that agents with 
an inferior performance will disappear. That is, the evolution of the behavioural rules to 
structure and limit the flexibility of agents in an appropriate way (that is, exactly coincident 
with the wrong conditions to select a new action) cannot be assured. Given the existence of 
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uncertainty one can never know when the environment would produce situations that severely 
punish agents with an inferior performance. Appropriate and inappropriate behaviour may co­
exist when weak selection (of competing agents) processes occur. An example is a firm
choosing the wrong place to locate its investment but proceeding with it despite the losses. 
Given that the firm may have investments in other places, the gains obtained there may be 
used to finance the losses. 
4.1.3 – Development of the model 
Two related developments can be included in this model of behaviour prediction and its 
application to FDI decisions made in Hosseini (2005). The first is to explicitly emphasize the 
intrinsic and extrinsic component of perception in the model in order to complement the 
relevance given to environmental variables9. The second is to consider the several steps of 
FDI operations by seeing it a “non-programmed” decision making process in the sense of 
Cyert et al (1956, p. 276). 
Each FDI related decision is supposed to be in accordance with the strategy of the firm and 
deals with potential sources of information on costs, revenue and risk. But the access to these 
sources has also a component of uncertainty. Due to uncertainty investors do not know if the 
selection of a new action improves their performance (if its reliability is above the required 
tolerance limit). The response to potential information depends both on the environment and 
on managers´ perceptions. Perceptions on information may lead to bounded rationality, where 
costs, management time and abilities are constraints, or to the use of simplifying strategies in 
recurrent situations. Therefore, competence is affected by bounded behaviour (B) and the use 
of behavioural rules (A). From equation (1): 
If D = C =» U = 0 
If D > C =» U > 0 
Considering that uncertainty provokes bounded behaviour and the use of behavioural rules 
9 Heiner refers it (e.g. 1983, p. 575; 1985b, p. 580) but not in a testable way. But others such as Frey and 
Eichenberger (2001, p. 14) or Simon (1955, p. 274) regard it as essential to explain behaviour. 
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U = B + Ae + Ai         (5)  
where A is divided into the extrinsic (Ae) and intrinsic (Ai) components of behavioural rules. 
As long as 
C < D =» U = B + Ae + Ai > 0 (6) 
Therefore, if there is bounded rationality or “anomalous” behaviour in FDI location decisions 
maximization cannot be achieved. The farther from zero they are the larger is the gap between 
the competence in a FDI location decision and the difficulty to implement it. 
In the case of bounded rationality it may be that firms are behaving “as if” maximizing even if 
they are not able to maximize due to imperfect information or any other reason. But if 
behavioural “anomalies” are repeated in recurrent situations, in order to minimize the number 
of decisions where performance may be reduced, firms are surely not behaving “as if” 
maximizing.  
After each decision or response to potential information the process re-starts until a final 
location decision is made. Thus, the model also applies to all the internal decisions related 
with a FDI operation made by the employees of the firm (Heiner, 1988a, p. 31,32). The model 
for FDI location decisions is shown in figure 1 and all the included “behavioural” steps are 
separately discussed below. 
Finally, the central hypothesis of the Heiner model results from equation (6): Assuming a 
fixed B, the higher the uncertainty the higher is the reliance of investors (or any other 
agents) on behavioural rules10. Higher uncertainty results in a higher probability of the 
wrong time to select an action {1-q(U)} and in a lower probability of the right time to select 
an action {q(U)}. This, on the other hand, represents an increase in the tolerance limit and, 
consequently, an increase on the needed reliability condition to select an action in the right 
time. The requested higher reliability constraints flexibility in adopting new options and leads 
to a higher use of rules of behaviour. 
10 Heiner (1983, p. 570) concludes: “greater uncertainty will cause rule-governed behaviour to exhibit 
increasingly predictable regularities, so that uncertainty becomes the basic source of predictable behavior”. 
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0 - Firms' strategy and internal capabilities 
Each decision deals with: 
1 - U (e,p)     Uncertainty
           Response to potential information on:
 - Costs    Financial
 - Revenue    analysis
 - Risk
    Managerial perception
 A) Time     Past       B) Motivation   Intrinsic 
Reference     Present   Extrinsic
    Future 
BEHAVIOURAL RULES BOUNDED 
For recurrent situations RATIONALITY
        U = B + Ae + Ai
CONSTRAINED BEHAVIOUR TO MINIMIZE r/w < T 
2a - Selection of actions when r/w > T or r/w < T 
2b - No selection
3 - Final location decision
 Figure 4.1.3: 1 – FDI Locations: Decision-making process in a C-D Model 
A prediction of the model is that firms tend to invest in countries with lower uncertainty. If a 
Portuguese investor has two alternatives, investing in an EU country or in Africa, and 
considering that uncertainty is higher in the latter case 
U(a) > U (ue), where (a) is for Africa and (ue) for European Union, then 
r(a) < r (ue) and w(a) > w(ue) =» r(ue) / w(ue) > r(a) / w(a) and 











T (ue) < T (a) 
According to the model decision makers should opt for investments in the EU given the lesser 
uncertainty, i.e. the smaller C-D gap, and the higher relative probability of selecting the right 
action at the right time. As noted in Hosseini (2005, p. 538), this is confirmed by the 
empirically observed predominance of FDI flows among developed countries. 
4.1.3.1 – Maximization and long term strategies 
Neoclassical theory states that a firm is maximizing when the cost of producing the last 
additional unit of a good is exactly the same of the additional revenue obtained with its sale. 
This marginalism approach is a clear method for decision-making. However, given that this is 
essentially a mathematical definition, it is not an easy-to-use procedure for a firm. 
Nevertheless, decision-makers are thought to employ marginal analysis with respect to what 
they believe to be the appropriate decision-making parameters (a subjective assessment of 
marginal costs and revenue). They may even not do it in a conscious way, but it is believed 
that through a series of errors and trials managers will end up “as if” maximizing (Horowitz, 
1970, p. 317). 
The Heiner model, on the other hand, considers maximizing behaviour as a special and 
theoretical case and is not explicitly concerned about the maximizing behaviour of agents. It 
follows Alchian (1950, p. 212) by stating that maximization is achievable if there is no 
uncertainty. Therefore, the existence of situations where maximization is not happening 
shows that the maximizing assumption is not needed in the behavioural approach.  
First, to achieve maximization managers need to follow long term strategies designed both 
from the environment and the internal capabilities of firms. Without a clear strategy to guide 
all the departments and workers of a firm in the allocation of its resources, where consistent 
decisions are consecutively made, profit maximization becomes impossible to attain (Simon, 







requirements and defined within the broader strategy of the firm. A FDI is one more operation 
for a firm and, therefore, maximization is attainable only if rational managers align all their 
efforts in the same direction. However, empirical studies show that even firms claiming a 
maximization objective do follow guidelines to make certain decisions, where strategic 
planning is ignored, that are inconsistent with optimization (Schwartz, 1998, p. 145). 
Second, other objectives for the firm than profit maximization have been suggested in an 
imperfect competition scenario: Growth in order to survive in the market or to be less fragile 
to hostile takeovers, following competitors, risk diversification or sales maximization (Simon, 
1959, p. 262, and Cyert and March, 1963, p. 9 and 10). There are also firms that have 
qualitative objectives such as social responsibility or to be environmentally friendly. These 
objectives are usually seen by neoclassical economists as necessary steps towards 
maximization in the long term. For example, growth in size may be just a first step for a firm
to become more capable of competing in international markets and, through the integration of 
suppliers or distribution networks, to avoid some transactional costs in order to maximize its 
expected returns in the long run. As Penrose (1959, p. 30) underlines when justifying the 
profit motive of the firm, «…growth (of the firm) and profits become equivalent as the 
criteria for the selection of investment programmes». But firms may have more than one 
objective and these could change over time. 
Third, the objective of having a minimum, predetermined, level of return on equity or of 
profits may act as a barrier to maximization. This goal is very common among firms and, in 
this case, there is not the explicit aim to maximize (Simon, 1955, p. 110). Suppose that a firm
has the objective of achieving a 15% return on equity in 5 years. If the firm achieves its 
profitability objective before the predicted date the concern immediately becomes to assure 
that profits are kept within the objective and not to keep on trying to increase them without 
limit. It may be argued that in the long run firms will improve the definition of their goals and 
the maximization aim will then be established (Horowitz, 1970, p. 317). However, this is not 
necessarily the case if firms keep on presenting a minimum profitability as an objective, even 
if this objective is continuously reconsidered, because market conditions are also not stable 
and managers have to learn how to understand and to deal with them in a continuous way. 
Thus, in an unstable scenario, such as competitive markets, managers are firstly concerned 







                                                          
 
 
reference for a firm but also as a limit to further improvements. This objective may be related 
with an industry benchmark and managers may avoid innovative alternatives for fear of doing 
comparatively worse and thus earning a low ability reputation (Zwiebel, 1995, p. 17). The C­
D model includes this view in its dynamic proposition by stating that not only maximization 
is prevented but less efficient firms remain in operation (Heiner, 1983, p. 569). 
Fourth, market contestability may operate as a limit to profit maximization when firms 
achieve too high a level of profitability because the attention of potential competitors, 
regulators, tax authorities or employees is attracted (Katona, 1975, p. 296). This should not be 
interpreted as managers making business decisions specifically with the aim of limiting the 
profitability of their firms but exerting some discretion over profits by relaxing their decision-
making and eventually behaving in an altruistic11 way when expecting profitability to be 
above the objective (Williamson, 1963, p. 1053). This can also happen for a middle manager 
with a determined sales goal in one year. If the manager reaches the objective in October, for 
instance, he can have a very relaxed November and a comfortable Christmas shopping with 
his expected bonuses. The incentive is not to further improve their sales because in the next 
year their goal will be determined by using as a basis the level achieved in the previous year. 
Thus, the objective of a minimum level of profitability may work as a limit to maximization 
when there are conflicting objectives among managers and the firm (Schwartz, 1998, p. 53). 
A different situation arises in monopolistic structures when a “relaxation policy” is included 
in strategic behaviour in the context of discretion by owner-managers about their preferences 
between leisure and work. Given the comfortable position of the monopolist (lack of  tough 
competition), the owner-manager can relax and not try to attain maximization. As Hicks 
(1935) puts it “The best of all monopoly profits is a quite life”. This can similarly be applied 
to state owned firms.  
Finally, the maximization aim should also consider how managers’ expectations are formed 
by confronting firm’s and manager’s objectives and confirm if they are compatible12. 
Managers have other concerns such as their own personal objectives, not necessarily 
coincident with those of the firm and its owners, and these may eventually prevent 
11 By giving away money for charities, NGO’s, environmental associations or cultural and sports events. 
12 Simon (1991) refers four organizational phenomena – authority, rewards, identification and coordination - to
explain people’s motivation to contribute to the goals of a firm and, therefore, to limit discrepancies between










                                                          
maximization. This can happen when a manager is too focused on short-term rises of share 
values, and consequently on higher bonuses that affect their personal wealth, and the 
relationship with customers and the firm’s reputation may be jeopardized. This is in 
contradiction with the firms´ long-term objectives (Simon, 1991, p. 30). When firms are 
“destroyed” by managers through the sale of their “juicy” assets, regardless of the interests of 
their owners (Sweezy, 1938, cited in Horowitz, 1970). Or, in the same principal-agent 
context, when objectives such as a minimum level of profitability are established by the same
manager or group of managers that have the responsibility of achieving them. If these 
objectives are linked with some type of success bonuses for managers, as happens in many 
firms nowadays, then they are tempted to avoid the setting of ambitious objectives and to 
establish a level of profitability more easily achievable, as long as it is sufficiently reassuring 
for shareholders, but short from maximization. They can even use an industry benchmark for 
that end despite the average firm in the industry being no closer to maximization13. 
In the case of FDI, whether firm’s and manager’s objectives are compatible or not may 
depend on the consequences of the location decision for managers involved. For example, if 
they believe that their job is at risk because the operation is not being successful or if there is 
a potential increase in their own benefits from a too quick successful FDI, they may opt to 
“place” costs further in the future and to anticipate revenue. Or if they opt to locate the 
investment near a more pleasant but expensive place. 
It can be argued, in the presence of different goals for managers and the firm, that managers 
would want to maximize profits anyway but, instead of distributing it to owners, they would 
prefer to reinvest it in order to gain personal prestige via the successful growth of the firm
(Penrose, 1959, p. 28). This is easily understandable if it is considered that managers, through 
a feeling of group behaviour, tend to identify themselves with the firm they manage (Katona, 
1975, p. 292). However, this is only one possibility which does not avoid selfish (personal 
wealth of the manager), altruistic or relaxed behaviours.  
How important are minimum profitability and the private goals of managers as constraints for 
maximization is not certain and it may depend on the context in which the decision-maker is 
located. Simon’s idea that firms aim to reach satisfactory profits, that is, profits sufficiently 








superior to a reference point such as last years’ seems more realistic than maximization given 
that it does not require consistent preference orderings or estimates of probability 
distributions in decision making. Therefore, one cannot take for granted that all firms, or 
any firm, follow the maximization objective. Other concerns – environmental, social 
responsibility - are nowadays present in firms’ annual reports.  
4.1.3.2 – Imperfect information 
The use of information is essential in decision making and thus it is necessary to understand 
what motivates the search for it by a firm (Cyert and March, 1963, ch. 4). FDI decisions are 
assumed to be based on expectations about outcomes in terms of revenue, costs and risk, and 
potential and actual competitor’s threats, and the information sought should be in accordance 
with these expectations. Furthermore, the ways in which information is obtained and 
processed through the organization should also be considered. 
Neoclassical theory assumes that new information decreases the complexity of FDI decisions 
and thus leads decision makers towards optimization. Hosseini14, in his FDI behavioural 
approach, also assumes the same but fails to acknowledge that this happens only temporarily 
for two reasons. First, as new information allows a more accurate description of the 
environment its entropy increases reducing the reliability of an agent in decision making 
(Heiner, 1985a, p. 394). Second, the environment permanently evolves changing uncertainty 
in unpredictable ways (Heiner, 1989, p. 234). Thus, due to uncertainty agents respond 
imperfectly to information and information is not perfectly available in FDI decision making 
and no assumption on this regard is necessary. 
This is better understood by considering that rational managers should locate their 
investments in an alternative where the marginal return is equal to the higher opportunity cost 
to achieve maximization. Given that each firm faces a large number of alternatives, it is 
necessary to collect all the relevant information on costs and revenue (including tax rates), on 
all the potential places to invest, and to process that information in a way that allows for a 
rational decision. Tax competition theory sees it as possible when considering the higher rate 
of return to be determined by the lower tax rate on FDI given that investors are assumed to 








                                                                                                                                                                                     
the information and to have it updated and available at the moment of the decision may be a 
“Herculean” task. Thus, some choices have to be made about which alternatives to select and 
the amount of information to collect.  
This has several problems. First, it is difficult to define an optimal search process for selection 
of alternatives and collection of information given the costs and the scarce resources of 
managers in terms of attention and cognition. As regards the amount of information to collect, 
an optimal decision requires that managers use marginal reasoning and stop collecting further 
information when its costs are equal to the benefits provided at the margin. But it is hard for a 
manager to know when that point has arrived. Gabaix and Laibson (2003) discuss and test 
how deeply should individuals approach complex decision problems given their constraints. 
The objective is to find near-optimal decision making processes through the use of 
simplifying procedures where the option value of continued analysis is determined by the new 
insight yielded by cognitive analysis (the smaller the new insight the lower the value of
continuing with the analysis) and by the existence of a particular choice that gains a large 
edge over the available alternatives (the larger the edge the lower the value of continuing with 
the analysis). 
This approach may be understood in terms of the sensitivity of managers to potential 
information in the Heiner model. But, although useful, it does not pretend to reach optimal 
decision making and is not applicable to all complex problems. For example, alternatives in 
information collection are often examined sequentially and not simultaneously and a selection 
may be based on a group of the first x alternatives that satisfy a determined set of conditions. 
Given the sequential process, the best alternative may be excluded. Moreover, alternatives are 
not always “conspicuous” and the more difficult it is for a manager to find satisfactory 
options the more they accept less satisfactory alternatives (Simon, 1955, p. 111; Schwartz, 
1998, p. 63). 
Second, wrong choices due to biased perceptions about the available information may also 
prevent an optimal FDI decision (Weber, 2004, p. 163, 164). Perceptions are thought to be 
both subjective and relative to a standard of reference. Different presentations of the same
information may lead to different individual responses or decisions. Moreover, FDI decisions 






are often made with the help of external consultants but these can have a different perception 
on information or on the problem faced by the firm. Thus if information is not correctly 
perceived, a manager can end up by trying to find a solution for a problem that is not the one 
he really faces. 
A related problem questions if managers are able to handle all the relevant information. Even 
with the huge advances in information technology, that allow for the processing of an 
enormous quantity of data, it is unlikely that they are. Either because a lot of information is 
needed in the decision making process and managers are not able to obtain it or because this 
excessive amount of information may overload managers. To collect information on all 
potential markets for a FDI decision is almost impossible. But even if possible, the quantity of
information would be an excessive burden. Furthermore, each firm handles information in a 
different way. Therefore, firms tend to choose only from a limited number of alternatives 
based on available information (Cyert and March, 1963, ch. 5). 
Information is also key in dealing with risk. Economic theory states that managers are aware 
that their decisions have risk as a constraint. This means that the decision maker is able to 
deal in an optimal way with the probabilities assigned to each alternative choice by 
considering its own attitude towards risk. This is addressed by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern in their model of decision making under risk. The model relies on four basic 
axioms and presents the conditions of a preference ordering among different alternatives for a 
decision maker (Horowitz, 1970,  after p. 342). A rational investor faces several alternatives 
where to locate its investments and the optimal choice should be based on (objective or 
subjective) probabilistic distributions of outcomes for all alternatives. By using this model, 
the decision maker is able to make consistent decisions, according to their own risk 
preferences, and to maximize the expected utility. This is supposed to be valid for several 
types of decisions including investments abroad. 
The assumption that managers have their objectives (and implicit values) ranked and very 
well defined, in a way that allows, in consecutive decisions, for a consistent preference 
ordering and choices from among several options available, has been severely criticized 
(Miljkovic, 2005). Several authors have shown that not all of Von Neumann-Morgenstern 







                                                          
285) show the independence or substitution axiom (if A is preferred to B, then an even chance 
to get A or C is preferred to an even chance to get B or C) to be not always valid. Ellsberg 
(1961, p. 663) discovered that individuals may have a strict preference between two 
alternatives that are normatively equivalent. This is explained by the preference for a less 
ambiguous option and shows that uncertainty cannot be discarded from decision theory as 
neoclassical economics often assumes. Furthermore, experiments have shown that individual 
choices are sensitive to how the options are presented and thus violate the invariance principle 
(the framing effect) and have also presented evidence of violations of the dominance 
principle, that is, if option A is better than option B in every respect, then A is preferred to B 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p. 454).   
Nevertheless, although risk is a component of uncertainty it should be considered 
autonomously given the possibility, based on collected information, of establishing a 
probability for each possible outcome. That is, risk is the part of uncertainty that can be 
predicted and, in some situations (e.g. exchange rate), eliminated by the appropriated 
measures and firms very often do that when making risk policy decisions within FDI 
operations. Investors, according to their preferences, may have the option to mitigate it or to 
opt, in a conscious way, for higher risk when coverage costs are deemed too high. The 
advantage of making risk autonomous in a model that pretends to predict firm behaviour is 
the possibility to consider risk policies. This has several implications for empirical analysis.  
In neoclassical terms an immediate implication is the possibility to consider investment 
projects in terms of risk-adjusted value. If an investor is not risk averse and is only concerned 
with maximizing profits, the optimization rule precludes the use of diversification strategies 
because investors would put all the money where the return is highest (Horowitz, 1970, p. 
302). Even considering that FDI has, after a certain point, negative marginal returns, this is 
also valid and the tendency would be always to concentrate it in just a small number of
locations up to the point when marginal returns are equalized. On the other hand, if the 
investor is risk averse it can be mitigated through diversification while following an optimal 
rule of investment with the maximization of expected returns (Markovitz, 1952, p. 7915). This 
rule presents a typical neoclassical problem of maximization subject to a maximum
15 Despite its age the Markowitz model is still accepted as a benchmark for portfolio investments in risky assets 






acceptable risk constraint. It assumes that investors want to choose the optimal solution but it 
does not consider if the investor is ever able to access all the required information to establish 
this optimal solution.  
Given that there is no consensus on diversification as a determinant of FDI (e.g., Markusen, 
1995, p. 171), it can be said that the presence of a firm in a wide number of locations is many 
times not due to risk diversification concerns but may be a sign that it is not maximizing its 
expected returns. In some situations, there may be reasons, such as servicing clients abroad, 
for a widespread location of FDI. But this is not necessarily always the case. 
Moreover, a rational or unbiased attitude by firms towards risk is to mitigate it while 
considering the costs of the process. In other words, a firm should cover as much risk as 
possible if it does not have a significant impact on profits so that among different alternatives 
with the same expected return the less risky one can be chosen. These include several types of 
risk that need mitigation, namely those of the operational type (exchange rate, interest rate or 
the fiscal risk). The failure to do so may imply that there are other less risky investments with 
the same expected return and, thus, the choice of the firm is located in the interior of the curve 
that represents the set of combinations of optimal solutions in the Markovitz model and thus 
optimization is prevented. Given that to achieve an optimal choice in this setting it is 
necessary that managers are able to correctly perceive and evaluate risk within the decision 
making process and that this implies access to all the relevant information, it is difficult for a 
group of managers in a firm to correctly assess and weight the importance of these 
constraints. Therefore, if the necessary information is not available managers are not able to 
deal with risk in an unbiased way and this means that just an approximation of the optimal is 
possible. 
Given the above problems it seems unreasonable to rely on the perfect information 
assumption as the standard tax competition model still does because managers, when 
deciding complex FDI operations, do not have access to all the relevant information. This 
assumption has been widely criticized even by neoclassical economists (Ross, 1973, or 
Stiglitz and Grossman, 1980) and Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) present the existence of 
asymmetric information as an explanation for the imperfect mobility of capital, as it is the 










The access to further information may be precluded by the lack of an optimal search process, 
cognitive limits or costs. Thus managerial behaviour is at best characterized by bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955, p. 114). At worst, however, heuristics may also determine FDI 
location decisions and the economic literature presents several examples of rules of thumb 
arising from the perceptions of managers that play a role when choices in the collection and 
processing of information have to be made. Some are presented now. 
4.1.3.3 – Competitiveness and bounded behaviour 
There are different reasons for bounded rationality to occur and, as shown above, in some
cases it is due to some unacceptable decisions in a firm that supposedly aims to maximize its 
expected returns. In other situations the incorrect processing of information, collection and 
handling procedures or risk policy failures explain the failure to maximize. There are further 
examples which will be addressed below (4.1.3.4) due to their different nature.  
Neoclassical theory predicts that firms operating in more competitive environments tend to 
become more efficient and thus to make more rational decisions. When firms also operate 
beyond their domestic borders and in more developed markets they tend to feel more strongly 
the level of competitiveness. In this sense, the higher the degree of competition faced by a 
firm the less should be the number of bounded situations. But only up to a certain point 
determined by the limited ability of managers to deal with information (Simon, 1955, p. 111). 
From this point on the number of bounded situations does not necessarily diminish. This is 
because a more competitive environment may also increase complexity and uncertainty 
limiting the ability of managers to decide. Thus, contrary to what neoclassical economics 
predicts the level of competitiveness is not necessarily always inversely associated with 
bounded behaviour (Heiner, 1985b, p. 580, 1989, p. 234; Guth, 2007, p. 521). 
4.1.3.4 – Managerial rules of behaviour 
Psychologists recognize that managers, as human beings in general, have several motivational 
factors that are either intrinsic to their personality or shaped by their environment and may 






                                                          
    
   
2001, p. 14)16. Furthermore, values are subject to choices and change with personal 
experiences of individuals. This change in values modifies the objectives that individuals 
attempt to attain (Akerlof, 1983, p. 54 and 62). It is within this complexity that economic 
behaviour must be considered. A simple example of intrinsic motivation is altruistic 
behaviour. The extrinsic type includes all environmental incentives to behaviour where the 
response of managers, as individuals, to incentives is conditioned by the degree to which 
stimulus, such as the present globalization of economic activity where the level of 
competition was substantially increased and technological change was accelerated, influence 
their motivations (Scitovsky, 1976, cited by Schwartz, 1998). Given that managers have 
checks on their performance (from competition, shareholders, customers and employees) they 
often do make their choices more carefully than as if they acted as individuals. But managers 
are not immune to moral, cultural and other social influences usually disregarded in the 
economic literature. 
In both situations perceptions may generate different types of heuristics and biases that 
systematically deviate from the predictions of unbounded procedural rationality (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 2001, p. 12). Behavioural rules are thus simplifying strategies to reduce 
complexity that are explained by uncertainty and initiate anomalies or biases from expected 
rational behaviour. 
In this sense all anomalies that are recurrent may be considered as behavioural rules. This 
includes both FDI location decisions not consistent with the strategy and others that are also 
inconsistent with optimization. In the first case consistent decisions imply FDI operations to 
be in accordance with the aim of maximization if they are within the broader strategy of the 
firm.  
The role of behavioural rules is not consensual, however. Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, p. 34, 
35), for example, consider that experimental evidence on heuristics only translate certain 
limitations of the human mind and give an incorrect idea of how individuals behave in real 
situations when making really important decisions. Therefore, the authors say, heuristics do 
not affect the findings of the neoclassical approach when dealing with uncertainty because 
16 Schwartz (1998, p. 48) lists eight different motivational factors that affect the economic behaviour of 
individuals: Need for achievement; locus of control; sensation seeking and risk taking; altruism; time preference;








they can be avoided through learning and the right incentives. The issue, then, is if there are 
behavioural rules, representing deviations of rational economic behaviour, which are 
systematically followed by decision-makers even considering both learning and incentives.  
The neo-classical approach deals with uncertainty by transforming it into subjective choices 
based on individuals’ expectations. The behavioural approach also recognizes this but 
highlights uncertainty as an evolving phenomenon by focusing on the cognitive 
characteristics of individuals as key to the decision-making process and, thus, as the basis of 
the changing expectations considered by the neoclassical theory. That is, the problems faced 
by decision makers change with uncertainty and thus the same happen with behavioural rules. 
Therefore, these cognitive characteristics initiate systematic behavioural deviations from 
rationality that economic literature has shown to exist in rather different situations and 
that are not immediately corrected through learning or incentives due to the limits of 
the human being (Heiner, 1983, p. 564; 1989, p. 234; Arrow, 1996, p. xvii). 
4.1.3.4.1 – Intrinsic cognitive behavioural rules 
There are several examples of heuristics arising from intrinsic motivational factors. Learning
processes are thought to induce managers to become more successful in optimizing by 
reducing the impact of limits to rationality through improvements in the way they deal with 
information and decision making (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 123). That is, prior and 
imperfect procedures should be corrected and the way to avoid the errors of the past is to 
change behaviour in investment decision making through learning.  
However, the role of learning is valid in optimizing when uncertainty is absent. Otherwise, 
and because both the environment and perceptual abilities of managers keep on changing, 
learning becomes a continuous process and optimal learning procedures cannot be 
implemented. Firms continue to follow imperfect procedures even if their specific nature 
changes both in terms of managerial behaviour or information collection and processing. A 
first explanation for it is that individuals change procedures by relying on past decisions (that 
act as a precedent for future decisions) subject to the constraint of imperfect recall, i.e., where 
individuals are not able to remember, in all situations, the contingencies that led to their past 





But this may also be explained by the tendency of individuals to minimize the importance of 
past negative events through the use of ex-post explanations that make them seem inevitable 
in retrospect. This is hindsight bias, where the world seems more predictable than it is in 
reality (Fischhoff, 1982, cited by Hilton, 2003, p. 281). 
Mental accounting is a different heuristic but it may also lead, in some situations, to 
systematic deviations from rationality. Economic research has shown that risk taking 
behaviour is affected differently by prior gains and losses. Expected utility theory only 
considers incremental outcomes from current wealth when decisions are being made. That is, 
past experiences of decision makers, be it gains or losses, are not considered and choices must 
be invariant across problem descriptions. Thaler and Johnson (1990, p. 658) find that under 
some circumstances investors find attractive opportunities to break-even after prior losses. 
This is consistent with what is called loss aversion in prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, p. 287). People are more cautious when they are investing to earn money and 
more adventurous when they have the prospect of loosing because they fail to adapt to 
recoverable losses. Thus, a loss that is recoverable may induce risk behaviour. This may 
indicate a tendency for managers to further invest in a non-profitable business if they believe 
it is possible to recover current losses. Staw (1976, cited by Thaler and Johnson, 1990, p. 659) 
discusses the effect of sunk costs on choice behaviour and finds that investors seem more 
willing to put additional money in a faltering venture when they have previously committed 
funds to it. 
Thaler and Johnson (1990, p. 657) also show that investors with prior gains (such as 
successful FDI decisions) may be more willing to accept a higher risk (or to have a more 
positive attitude towards risk, the house money effect) as long as the prior outcome is not 
totally cancelled, that is, as long as the potential loss is lower than the prior gain. This is a 
situation where investors have a feeling of control or the ability to limit loss, as shown by 
Olsen (1997, p. 64) in an empirical study with investment managers, and it is a type of mental 
accounting that explains how previous good experiences by managers affect current decisions. 
On the other hand, investors with prior losses (seen as non-recoverable) may be less willing to 
take risks because they are not able to integrate the subsequent losses with the prior outcome. 
The difference between loss aversion and the house money effect is due to the perception 







it helps explaining how previous experiences by managers in FDI decisions may affect 
current decisions. 
There are also examples of anomalies related with the present. The lack of “conspicuousness” 
between alternative options is shown when managers base similar types of decisions on 
different evidence. Slovic (1969, 1972) found that experts in financial markets use few clues 
to decide and have little insight as to which ones influence their decisions. Furthermore, they 
all seem to use different evidence than those used by other experts, which implicitly uncovers 
the existence of inter-expert inconsistency. This can be transposed to FDI by considering 
that location decisions can be made based on a few variables, such as production costs or size 
of the market, and for each firm the variables may not be the same. Therefore, at least some
firms seem to under use information.  
The framing effect happens when different presentations of the same information or situation 
may lead to different individual responses or decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p. 
454). In the context of selecting and collecting relevant information, for example, there may 
be biases towards the higher attractiveness of “vivid” over abstract information and also due 
to the relative visibility given to the information presented (such as relative order). This 
violation of the invariance principle is a serious obstacle to rationality if one thinks that 
inconsistency occurs in very simple experiments, where the decision-maker has only two 
options. Given that each FDI location decision is more complex and has a lot more options 
than simple experiments it should be more vulnerable to inconsistent choices. The existence 
of framing effects may alter the perceptions of decision-makers and, therefore, lead to non-
optimal decisions in two situations: when the relevant information for FDI location decisions 
is selected and when these decisions are made. A possible example of non optimal decisions 
due to inefficient information is the influence of internal recommendations or external 
advisers to managers when they do not have access to all the information. The more 
“convincing” and biased to the judgement of the proponent are these proposals the more they 
can “wrongly” influence decision makers. 
Representativeness is the tendency for an individual to view events as typical or 
representative of some specific class and to ignore the laws of probability – about the 









possible way of explaining how investors form beliefs or misinterprets information and, by 
reasoning by analogy and relying on small samples, how can they prevent optimal decisions 
by ignoring contradictory probability data that may be available. An example is weak 
competition in a foreign market to be thought to lead to higher profits.  
Rules of behaviour may also originate in feelings affecting individuals when making 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Lucey and Dowling (2005) review this literature 
regarding equity pricing decisions and present several situations where the mood state at the 
time of making an investment decision may affect the judgement of investors (Slovic, 2002, 
cited by Lucey and Dowling, 2005, p. 226). For example, when an investor chooses equity 
based on whether they like or dislike the firm. This can be similarly applied to a country 
location. 
Finally, expectations about the future may lead to overconfidence when the disregard of 
relevant information by managers leads to non-optimal FDI location decisions. Illusion of 
control or the tendency of managers to overestimate control over outcomes due to perceived 
better skills and abilities are examples of overconfidence (Hilton, 2003, p. 275). Other 
potential explanations include the situation when managers have more information than they 
can handle and thus tend to be overconfident, and the fact that people tend to think they know 
observable facts better than is actually the case. A further reason is the existence of mistaken 
beliefs, illusory correlations, such as “less developed markets means higher and easier 
profitability”. Overconfidence may also be explained by a tendency of individuals to interpret 
information to confirm their pre-judgements or initial information (confirmatory bias – 
Rabin, 1998, p. 26). 
All these reasons explain managerial overconfidence and there is empirical evidence of this 
problem. Russo and Shoemaker (1991) compared predictions made by experts in several 
domains (medicine, psychology and financial analysis) with simple linear regressions ran on 
half of the information available for experts, and found that the latter was, on average, better 
in predicting events. Malmendier and Tate (2005) also present empirical evidence of 
overconfidence in the context of corporate investment. 
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4.1.3.4.2 – Extrinsic cognitive behavioural rules 
The uncertainty arising from the influence of the environment over the perception of 
managers also helps to explain “anomalous” behaviour. An example is anchoring where 
traditional values and common historical and cultural practices condition present behaviour 
(Guiso et al, 2005). Anchoring happens when social states are evaluated from a particular 
starting point and the choice of this point influences behavioural outcomes (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 2001, p. 26). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001, p. 1064) and Beckmann et al 
(2008) provide examples in investors’ decisions through the identification of a reference point 
for decision-makers based on a common tongue and cultural background. This cultural 
influence can also originate from the specific historical practices of each firm that determine 
the concept of psychic distance (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975, p. 308). Therefore, 
cultural variables should not be ignored given that they can influence decisions and play a 
significant role in determining FDI locations.  
Referring to the present, the availability of recent, dramatic or well publicized events is 
usually overestimated by individuals. And the opposite characteristics, such as normality and 
regularity, leads to an underestimation of the relevance of events. This bias may alter 
judgements by managers in FDI location decisions. These are situations in which the 
frequency of an event is judged by the facility with which its occurrence is remembered 
(Tversky et al, 1982, p. 11). When there is a huge stream of news about the attractiveness of 
some markets, managers’ attention is immediately transferred from other potential targets. 
China, for instance, is an example of a recent and well publicized opportunity that may induce 
a firm to ignore other potential markets. It is composed both of a signal, relevant information 
about the Chinese market for a potential investor, but also by noise, that is, non relevant 
information that also impacts on the reaction of managers17. This heuristic is explained by the 
privilege given by individuals to the “strength of evidence”, that is information immediately 
evident, over the “weight of evidence”, which individuals only consider at a later stage in a 
secondary way (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
17 Noise helps to explain the existence of “bubbles” in financial markets through feedback between investors 





There are also models of social learning and information externalities, widely used for 
financial markets, which may be applied to FDI location decisions. They are an example of 
how maximization may be prevented due to misleading social influences. Herding refers to 
any behaviour similarity brought about by social influences on an individual’s thoughts, 
feelings and actions, and transmitted through words or direct communication, observation of 
actions or of outcomes (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Banerjee, 1992; Shiller, 1995). It means 
that the behaviour of individuals is based on both private information and the influence of 
others but that the later prevails over the first leading to similarity of decisions. When an 
individual’s selected action does not depend on their private information signals but is based 
only upon their observation of others, then they are said to be in an informational cascade
where their action is uninformative for third observers (Bickshandani et al, 1992; Hirshleifer 
and Teoh, 2003). The role of social influence has been also analysed in the context of 
(financial) market stability and aggregated group information. In this situation, investors tend 
to think independently when markets are stable because people feel surer of themselves 
(Crutchfield, 1955, cited by Hilton, 2003, p. 285) but pay more attention to the opinions of 
others when there is market instability (Schachter et al, 1985, cited by Hilton, 2003, p. 285).  
Strang and Macy (2001, p. 157) model fads in management methods, meaning that managers 
learn by observing the actions and outcomes of other managers and suggesting the existence 
of herding behaviour and informational cascading. Other papers present evidence of both herd 
behaviour and cascades in investment decisions in different markets (Jain and Gupta, 1987, p. 
84; D’Arcy and Oh, 1997, p. 475; Foresi et al, 1998, p. 404). In FDI, Kinoshita and Mody 
(2001, p. 456) show that Japanese firms are encouraged to engage in investment in other 
Asian countries when other (Japanese) rival firms do it. This suggests that managers have the 
perception that rival firms have useful private information about the desirability of such 
investment (in accordance with herding). Gilbert and Lieberman (1987, p. 26) study 
investments on 24 chemical products and find that larger firms tend to invest where the others 
do not while smaller firms tend to follow the larger ones, free-riding informationally the 
supposed «fashion leaders». The reason might be that large firms have scale economies in 
acquiring information or greater absolute benefit from acquiring precise information. Finally, 
in the context of agglomeration economies, Barry et al (2001, p. 12) show evidence of 
signalling, that is, managers perceiving the presence of rival firms as an indication of useful 







                                                          
the care, consistency or criteria with which people select information and make decisions, 
affecting an individual’s confidence in their own judgements, herd behaviour and cascades 
may lead, through a false consensus bias18, to non-optimal decisions by investors. This bias 
can be applied to FDI decisions when there seems to be unanimity towards the attractiveness 
of some markets, even with a less than required knowledge. China, India, or Eastern Europe is 
currently the most referred market opportunities but in the past other markets such as Latin 
America were among the preferences.  
A specific aspect happens when herding occurs due to reputational concerns of managers 
(reputation-based herding). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) present a model where it is better, 
in reputational terms, to fail by following the herd than to succeed by being a deviant, and 
Zwiebel (1995, p. 17) present another where it is always better to succeed but managers tend 
to follow the industry benchmark and avoid innovative alternatives for fear of doing poorly in 
relation to the industry and earning a low ability reputation. There are other reasons for non-
optimal behaviour by managers such as pleasing investors or clients and subordinate 
managers pleasing superiors by giving recommendations consistent with their (of superiors) 
expectations (Rajan, 1994, p. 427). Baumeister (2003) explains this individual self-defeating 
behaviour by emotional distress, social considerations such as reputation and the pressure of 
making too many important decisions in a short period of time that may alter the capacity to 
think correctly. 
Finally, there are moral constraints, from family, friends, institutions, religion and everything 
that helps or influences individuals by shaping preferences that affect the behaviour of 
managers. These have a role in economic decisions (Etzioni, 1988) and the actual concern 
with social responsibility confirms it. A studied example is fairness, when managers act in 
conformity with informal but socially accepted rules or standards (Kahneman et al, 1986). 
4.1.4 – Final remarks 
The behavioural approach brings a new set of variables to both FDI and tax competition 
literatures. First, all the questions concerned with the existence of the objective to maximize 
18 A tendency to overestimate the number of firms who share the investment preferences of another firm – 













and the problems that prevent this maximization have been deeply considered by “behaviour 
lists” such as Henry Simon. Bounded rationality means that economic agents, managers 
included, are not fully rational in their decisions, even if they pretend to be, because they face 
several constraints such as the mixing of personal and firm objectives, uncertainty and 
cultural influences, and they cannot collect, correctly perceive and process all of the relevant 
information (Conlisk, 1996, after p. 686). 
Second, the Heiner model presents behavioural rules as evidence of the relative rigidity faced 
by decision-makers and the impossibility of achieving optimization. These rules need to be 
considered so that the behaviour of economic agents in FDI location decisions can be 
understood. They are organized according to the taxonomy presented in Table 4.1.4: 1. The 
columns are divided according to its source of motivation, the intrinsic or the extrinsic 
dimension of cognitive characteristics. The rows are divided according to the time reference 
that originates them. However, this is not an exhaustive study of all behavioural rules but of 
those that could apply to FDI operations. Given the theory it is expected that FDI location 
decisions are explained by behaviour rules and are not dependent of maximization objectives.  
Table 4.1.4: 1 – Taxonomy of behavioural rules in FDI location decisions
Time
Type Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Past Learning, hindsight bias, Sunk 
costs, Mental accounting, 
Break-even effect, house 
money effect 
Historical anchoring, Cultural 
anchoring 
Present Framing, Representativeness Availability, Feelings, Fairness, 
Herding, Cascading, Signalling, False 
consensus bias, reputation-based 
herding, Inter-expert inconsistency 
Strategic inconsistencies 
Future Overconfidence, confirmatory 
bias 
Third, FDI flows are differentiated from short term capital flows and, in this context, perfect 









Fourth, managers are able to choose the highest net rate of return only if they correctly deal 
with uncertainty, avoid all types of biases and have access to all of the relevant information. 
This is valid for both tax competition and FDI literatures where the perfect information 
assumption is needed not only to know business tax rates but also the remaining variables that 
determine the tax burden of a company. Given that this is impossible, there are justifiable 
doubts about the role of the tax burden in explaining FDI flows. The same is true for the 
implicit assumption that taxation is the only variable to affect profitability.   
Both rationality in decision making and perfect information are the basis of the results 
obtained by the tax competition literature. But given that they are very strong assumptions 
there is a gap that can be filled in by using the behavioural approach. In this way it is possible 
to address the assumptions that the neoclassical literature failed to consider and to extend its 
application. 
4.2 – Small group decision making 
So far, no explicit consideration has been given to who is making FDI location decisions. The 
terms “firms” and “managers” have been used interchangeably without a clear definition of 
who is the decision maker. The behavioural approach builds its findings partially on 
psychology and, therefore, it is mostly focused on the individual. Then, an important question 
is if it can be used for firms´ decisions. 
A firm employs a lot of people, from simple assistants through middle managers to top 
managers. It is well understood in the theory of the firm that all levels or units within a 
company have at least some participation in the decision making process (for example, 
through the information collected and/or transmitted to the board, Cyert and March, 1963, ch. 
5). But the final say in important decisions, such as investing abroad, are taken by one or a 
small group of individuals. Thus, is it a collective or an individual process?
First, it may depend on the structure of the company. Individual decisions are more likely in 
family owned firms where the owner is the manager than in public or state owned firms. 






executive committee and thus it seems that small group decision-making fits better in the case 
of FDI location decisions, even if one of the members of the executive board is the leader and 
a large number of other individuals participate in the process by giving information and 
advising. 
It is widely believed that group decision-making is generally better than individual decision-
making as long as there is a pooling of information and knowledge and a complete analysis of 
the different options (Einhorn et al, 1977, p. 168; Hinsz et al, 1997, p. 52, 53). Furthermore, 
decision makers, when aggregated in a group, tend to overvalue private information and 
undervalue information obtainable by observing others. Thus, people tend to underestimate 
the impact of situational influences on their judgement when these are part of a group, relying 
on their own perceptions and thinking. 
However, there still remains individual thinking and objectives for each member of the group. 
The psychological literature presents two phenomena that balance the pooling of information 
and knowledge inside a group. First, ‘groupthink’, where a group of individuals mutually 
reinforce each other into believing that their collective point of view is right, although it can 
be wrong (Janis, 1982, p. 174). The underestimation of external influences by groups does not 
prevent individuals from being influenced prior to the group formation and the same applies 
for the group as a whole; Second, ‘risky shift’, where there is a trend, after group discussion, 
for the group to prefer riskier options (Stoner, 1968). The last one is a very robust result and 
may be explained by group polarization, where there is an intensification of shared attitude 
positions due to information sharing (when individuals participating in a group discussion 
find new reasons that support their initial position), and diffusion of responsibility (if 
anything goes wrong it is a group, not an individual, responsibility). 
Moreover, it should be noted that even in financial markets where managers are considered by 
the behavioural literature to make decisions on their own, there is usually a formal or informal 
pool of information and knowledge between individuals belonging to a fund management 
team or a dealing room (Hilton, 2003, p. 287). A significant difference between FDI and 
financial markets is that, in the second case, decisions are made, most of the times, on a daily 
basis despite using a lot of research, while a firm’s decision to invest abroad is much more 
















decisions and the behaviour finance literature has been widely used to explain them
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, p. 476). 
Therefore, despite the focus on small group decisions in the present work, individual 
behaviour should also be considered given that groups are made of individuals. Moreover, as 
Katona (1975, p. 287 and 289) puts it, “in line with the contention that the business firm 
represents an organization with a life of its own, we shall speak of the firm as a singular 
rather than a plural actor” and “it is not at all certain that genuine decisions play a larger 
role in business than in consumer behaviour. Nor is it certain that goal setting and decision 
making are more deliberate in large than in small firms”. That is, it can be assumed that 
group decision-making is not sufficient, in itself, to avoid the same type of heuristics and 
biases in decision making found by psychologists. Thus, the findings of psychology applied 
to behaviour finance are also valid to the specific case of foreign direct investment decisions.  
4.3 – Hypotheses 
Based on the approach discussed above it is now possible to define the main hypotheses of 
this dissertation. They are based on the assumptions not addressed by the neoclassical 
literature and, besides a confirmation of the Heiner model, are focused on two main areas. 
First, on the imperfect rationality of decision making within the FDI context, and second, on 
its impact on tax competition and on the formal incompatibilities with FDI theory. 
Hypothesis A – The Heiner model
H1 - The higher the uncertainty the more frequent is the use of rules of behaviour 













Hypothesis B – Firms are not fully optimizing agents because their managers are not 
‘neoclassical’ decision makers
H2 - Firms are not able to follow a maximizing behaviour in all situations 
H2a: Maximization is not an achievable objective 
H2a1: Firms do not have a clear permanent strategy, focused in the long term, as 

maximization requires (Simon, 1991, p. 37). 

H2a2: Most firms have different objectives, both quantitative and qualitative, and aim to 

reach a minimum level of profitability that is a barrier to maximization (Simon, 1955, p. 110; 

1959, p. 262; Cyert and March, 1963, p. 9,10) 

H2a3: Firms in a monopolistic position, that are not in public hands or where one of the 

managers owns a significant share and makes the decisions themselves are further away from
 
maximization (Hinsz et al, 1997, p. 52, 53; Hicks, 1935). 

H2a4: The personal goals of managers are often contradictory, and thus not compatible, with 

firms’ goals (Simon, 1991).   

H2b: There is imperfect information in FDI decision making 

H2b1: All of the relevant information is not perfectly available (Simon, 1955, p. 111) 

H2b2: Agents imperfectly perceive available information (Weber, 2004, p. 163, 164) 





H2b4: Managers deal in a biased way with risk by failing to implement optimal risk 

mitigation policies (Weber, 2004, p. 164) 

H2b5: Market diversification is not necessarily used as a risk coverage policy (Weber, 2004; 

Markusen, 1995, p. 171) 

H2c: The degree of competitiveness is not always inversely associated with the number of
 











H3 – FDI location decisions are explained by rules of behaviour and are not dependent 
on maximization objectives 
H3a: Intrinsic 

H3a1: Firms are not always able to learn from experience in FDI operations (Cyert and 

March, 1963, p. 123) 

H3a2: Managers are less risk averse when believing that previous losses are recoverable 

(Thaler and Johnson, 1990, p. 658) 

H3a3: Managers are willing to accept a higher risk after a previous gain as long as they 

perceive the ability to limit losses (Thaler and Johnson, 1990, p. 657).
 
H3a4: FDI decisions are not always consistent with the defined strategy (Intrinsic nature - 

Schwartz, 1998, p. 145). 







H3b1: FDI location decisions are influenced by cultural variables (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 

2001, Guiso et al, 2005, Beckmann et al, 2008) 

H3b2: FDI location decisions are influenced by the history of the firm that is investing 

H3b3: FDI decisions may be systematically inconsistent with rationality (Extrinsic nature - 

Schwartz, 1998, p. 145). 

H3b4: FDI location decisions are based on a widespread set of determinants and, therefore, 

there is no inter-expert consistency (Slovic, 1969,1972) 

H3b5: Managers make FDI location decisions based on the availability of publicized 





H3b6: Managers make FDI location decisions based on the assumed private information held 

by other firms (Bickshandani et al, 1992) 





















Hypothesis C – FDI and Tax competition theories are not fully compatible
H4: Tax rates have no key role in FDI location decisions 
H4a: Taxation is not the only variable that affects profitability (Devereux et al, 2002) 





H4b: Taxation is not a main driving force of FDI location decisions  

H4b1: The role of taxation in FDI location decisions is of minor importance (Hajkova et al, 

2006, p. 25) 

H4b2: The use of governmental incentives is not decisive for FDI location decisions 

(Devereux et al, 2007) 

H5: The perfect capital mobility assumption is not applicable to FDI flows 
These hypotheses will be tested in Part II. In light of the results, the consequences will be 
considered for FDI and tax competition theories and in the context of tax policy developments 
in the European Union. 
4.4 - Conclusions 
The standard model of tax competition is a very simplistic one, where a significant number of
assumptions lead to simple and clear results. Three of these assumptions were highlighted and 
discussed in the previous chapters: tax rates as the explanation for FDI flows, perfect mobility 







investment. The first is a simplification of the FDI literature, meaning that these two branches 
of economics are not entirely compatible. The remaining two are only understandable in a 
neoclassical world, where rational decision-makers operate. The rational approach is useful 
because it explains a significant part of the behaviour of individuals and firms, but it does not 
explain all of it. Given that our world is more complex than that, the discussion of rationality 
assumptions in this chapter was made with the help of behavioural economics.  
Individuals and firms, where individuals operate as a group, are thought not to be perfect but 
to exhibit an “anomalous” behaviour. By trying to understand these heuristics and biases the 
inclusion of behavioural economics allows a better and more complete understanding of how 
firms make their decisions, namely those that represent a geographical diversification of its 
activity. This is important given that the “anomalies” represent a deviation from the 
maximizing behaviour of firms traditionally assumed by the economic literature, i.e., a 
welfare loss for society. 
Given that there are doubts about the will of firms and managers to optimize and if they are 
able to do it, several hypotheses were considered to explain FDI decision making and why 
these decisions, at least in most cases, are not optimal. Only a few of them have been 
empirically confirmed so far, but all the remaining has had confirmation in other fields of 
economics, most notably in the behavioural finance literature. Therefore, it is likely that at 
least some of them will also be valid for FDI.  
If this is the case, then FDI literature would have a new set of determinants of capital 
flows. This also means that the neoclassical explanation of capital flows by the tax 
competition model would be even less compatible with the FDI literature. Tax competition 
would be even less relevant as an explanation for investment flows than it was shown to be 
above by comparing it with FDI theory. This complementary explanation of FDI, if 
confirmed, impacts on tax competition in two main ways. First, by turning its relevance 
mainly to short-run capital flows and investment flows after the location decision. 
Second, by significantly diminishing its negative influence to the allocation of capital and 
to the optimal provision of public goods. Table 4.4: 1 compares the presented economic 
theories with the behavioural approach to be used in Part II of this research. 
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Table 4.4: 1 - Economic approaches to competition for investment 






Paradigm Neoclassical Partially Neoclassical No unified framework. 
Object FDI location decisions and 
the role of taxation
FDI location decisions and 
the role of taxation
FDI location decisions and the 
role of taxation 
Method Deductive – Quantitative Deductive – Quantitative Inductive – Experimental and 
Qualitative 






- Rationality of agents 
- Optimal decision making 
- Perfect information 
- Perfect capital mobility 
- Investment follows the 
lower tax rate 
- Rationality of agents 
- Optimal decision making 
- Perfect information 
- Investment location 
dependent on many
variables 
- Non fully rationality of
agents 
- Non optimal decision 
making 
- Imperfect information 
- Decisions with uncertainty 














Tax competition for investment – 












                                                          
Chapter 5 – Methodology 
Part II of this dissertation consists on an exploratory study based on a behavioural approach to 
address tax competition for investment together with an attempt to enlarge the understanding 
of FDI location decisions. The present chapter introduces the methodological approach. It 
uses four empirical sources of information (questionnaires, natural quasi-experiment, 
interviews and documentation analysis) to better understand how FDI location decisions are 
made and to check the tax competition hypotheses (chapters 6 to 8). These are initially 
presented and subsequently complemented by the inclusion of statistical tests. The chapter 
explains how firms were chosen, how interviews were scheduled and made, and the way the 
data obtained was handled. 
5.1 – Methodological approach 
The methodology considers a mostly interpretative research philosophy where the two 
methods, deduction and induction, are included (Carson et al, 2001, p. 6). First, the 
hypotheses about FDI decision making are deduced based on the existing economic literature. 
This includes not only tax competition and FDI theory, but also psychology and behavioural 
economics1. Second, the hypotheses are tested through induction by using qualitative research 
and focusing on the decision making process of companies. The choice of qualitative research 
allows for a better understanding of the determinants of FDI location decisions from the 
perspective of a firm or its managers. The use of a natural quasi-experiment and 
interviews and the interpretation of information through content analysis act as a 
complement to the enormous amount of quantitative work found in the literature and are a 
different, and original, approach to the subject of this research. This is complemented by 
an analysis of several publications and a survey questionnaire on students and professionals 
about FDI determinants allowing a comparison of the perceptions of students, the general 
1 Previous literature on taxation with behavioural economics and psychology include Lewis (1982, 1986) and 
Cullis and Lewis (1997). Previous use of questionnaires and interviews in a behavioural approach include 




          
                                  
    
   
   
   
                                  





public and managers. Finally, statistical tests are performed, in order to assess the results 
obtained from the qualitative work, and the EU case is considered. Table 1 shows these steps. 
Table 5.1: 1 – Methodological approach to research 







   - Uncertainty leads to rules - Qualitative research 
of behaviour  .Questionnaires 
- FDI locations are explained  .Natural quasi-
by rules of behaviour   -experiment
- Business taxes have no  .In-depth interviews 
major role in FDI locations  .Documentation 
 Initial hypotheses Empirical application
- Quantitative analysis 
.Statistical tests 
- The EU case 
Testing
The choice of qualitative research is closely related with the focus of the study, namely the 
attempt to better understand the determinants of FDI from a managerial perspective. It 
considers all the FDI decision-making process and is better suited for an understanding of the 
contextual variables surrounding a manager (Marshall and Rossman, 1995, p. 44). 
Furthermore, it is more efficient to collect information through this process given the 
difficulties in obtaining detailed information on investments from companies due to the 
perceived danger of strategic information falling into the hands of competitors.  
But qualitative research has some problems of its own (Carson et al, 2001, p. 13). First, 
because it is based on an interpretive methodology, different from the positivistic approach of 
the theoretical and quantitative methods previously followed by economic literature, 
difficulties arise. The researcher is directly involved in data collection, despite not being 
independent from the subject of the research and, to gain a better understand, relies on the 
perceptions of the actors. 
Second, it depends on the ability of the researcher to interpret the data collected. Therefore, it 
is much more relativistic than quantitative research and the danger of drawing wrong 
conclusions is larger. But this risk can be minimized through actions to validate the 
information. Third, it relies on small samples, which makes it more difficult to generalize any 









                                                          
  
better understanding of how the cognitive characteristics of managers may impact on FDI 
location decisions. 
5.2 – Questionnaires and a natural quasi-experiment 
A questionnaire is a simple, cheap and practical way of understanding how respondents 
consider taxation in foreign investment decisions. Those presented in this dissertation were 
designed to be as simple as possible and follow Berdie and Anderson (1974), Fink (1995, 
2003) and Fowler (2002). There were two questionnaires made by or for the European Union 
with a similar aim although their design and sample of respondents are considerably different 
to the ones presented here (Ruding Report, 1992, and the European Tax Survey, European 
Commission, 2004). 
The first questionnaire2 has a specific target, managers and students, and it was designed both 
as a general survey and as a quasi-natural experiment3. In the first case the aim is, together 
with a documentation analysis of newspapers and other publications, to get an indication of 
the public’s perception of FDI determinants and to confirm if the results are in accordance 
with foreign investment theory.  
The natural quasi-experiment4 works by comparing the perceptions of FDI determinants of 
two groups of managers where the relevant difference is the existence, or not, of FDI related 
working experience. Although both groups are expected to be influenced by the public 
perception of FDI determinants the aim is to take advantage of this natural quasi-experiment 
to try to infer how important business taxation is. FDI decision-makers are expected to be 
more aware of the importance of business taxes even if public perceptions and FDI theory 
influence their views. 
2 Annex 4.2. There is also a second questionnaire, presented in chapter 8.4.  
3 An attempt to ask economists, with published papers on tax competition, about their perceptions on FDI 
determinants was made. The aim was to understand how they regarded the role of taxation. For that end 50 
emails were sent but only six got a reply, and from these only two with an answer. Unfortunately economists
were less keen than managers to cooperate in this research. 
4 It is a natural quasi-experiment because it is based on different managerial experiences, it is not in a laboratory 









The samples are not representative of both “public opinion” and corporate professionals with 
or without FDI related working experience. The quasi-experiment was nonramdomly assigned 
to respondents in the 100 largest Portuguese companies and in some British firms, in both 
cases dependent on availability. There was, however, a concern in terms of equivalence 
between both groups of managers given the risk of a selection bias (Fink, 2003, p. 38). Other 
variables such as social background or geographical location of the respondents were not 
considered relevant given the aim of the experiment. Given that managers have different 
perceptions of FDI it hopefully helps to elucidate differences between FDI theory and 
practice. 
One of the main problems with questionnaire surveys is to establish whether the findings are 
valid and reliable. But they have an advantage inasmuch as a quasi-experiment they are easily 
replicable and their findings confirmed or refuted (Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 4). 
In terms of validity, the answers should correspond to that which they are intended to measure 
(Fowler, 2002, p.76). This survey deals with some of the possible risks of invalid responses:  
- A pilot test was carried out with 10 students on the Masters in European Studies at the 
Portuguese Catholic University, in Lisbon. All these students had working experience but 
with very different backgrounds (law, economics, management, journalism, etc.). This test 
allowed improvements in the questionnaire design to be made in order to adapt it to the target 
respondents. The number of questions was reduced to lower expected answering time to 20 
minutes. Some questions were changed in order to become equally perceptible by respondents 
given the need for the questionnaire to be self-explanatory. 
- Answers from Portuguese and British respondents are mixed. This is done, in both cases, 
after looking separately for the two groups of respondents (working or non-working students 
in both countries) and confirming the country as an ineffective variable in triggering 
differences in answers. 
- The use of different participants, from British and Portuguese universities, reduces the risk 
of the findings being specific to one location and not applicable to other locations. This is 









- It is implicitly assumed that all universities (in management and economic courses) teach the 
same thing in terms of FDI theory. The prevailing theories explaining FDI flows (where 
Dunning´s eclectic Ownership-Location-Internalization paradigm is a synthesis) have been 
around almost 30 years and the main later changes, namely the role of multinationals, do not 
change the validity of the OLI paradigm. Therefore this assumption is not as strong as it may 
look initially. 
- The environment used for data collection tends to be neutral. In the classroom (group 
administration) the researcher was accompanied by the lecturer, assuring that the respondents 
were in standard conditions and helping by giving the questionnaire a similar “status” to the 
lecture. The danger of students providing uncharacteristic answers is reduced in this way. 
These questionnaires were only used for the general survey. The remaining questionnaires 
were answered without the presence of the researcher (they were either received by email or 
by mail) and voluntary respondents were free to choose if and when to answer them. 
Therefore, the risk of a respondent, for some reason, giving misleading answer is also small 
although not controllable. 
- In the quasi-experiment there was a concern about matching the two groups in order to avoid 
a selection bias. To avoid this problem both groups are similar in terms of years of working 
experience, sector of activity and studies at the baccalaureate level. The first group, called the 
“Yes group”, is made of managers with FDI working experience, while the comparison group, 
called the “No group”, includes managers with relevant working experience but not related to 
FDI. Given that both groups have individuals with similar working experience, they should 
also have similar ages. Non working students are younger and less experienced and would not 
match the first group thereby increasing the risk of influence of non-detected or unknown 
variables. Thus, the matching reduces the risk of potential bias arising from the differences 
between the groups. 










However, other problems with experiments such as the comparative simplicity of 
questionnaires compared to complex real life FDI decisions and the absence of any type of 
incentives for participants were not dealt with directly (Davis and Holt, 1993, Section 1.4, 
after p. 14). 
A study needs also to be valid in order to produce accurate findings. To that end the questions 
need to be reliable and to provide consistent measures in comparable situations (Fowler, 
2002, p. 76): 
- Given the use of self-administered questionnaires, the questions are essentially closed. The 
advantages of a self-administered questionnaire are that it allows for batteries of similar 
questions, as it is used in question 5, and respondents maintain anonymity (in the case of 
questionnaires answered in the classroom), without having to share their answers with 
someone else. The questions need to be closed in order to ensure that all answers can be 
interpreted in the same way so that those with unclear and/or double meanings can be avoided 
(Fowler, 2002, p. 91). 
- The fact that respondents have theoretical knowledge is a bias in itself because the answers 
are influenced by it. In the survey the aim is to discover the perceptions of respondents and
theory is a component of these perceptions. The only respondents that do not necessarily have 
theoretical knowledge of FDI are managers in the quasi-experiment. But it is not important if 
they do or do not know the theory given that the questionnaire tries to assess precisely the 
differences between the perceptions of those with and without practical knowledge of FDI 
decisions. Therefore, the bias is not relevant in this case. 
- There was also no concern for the geographical distribution of universities given that British 
and Portuguese students usually study in a place different from home. But given that the 
general survey is more concerned with the perception of respondents than with their full 
representativity this seems not to be an essential issue. It is not relevant for the quasi-
experiment. 
- Despite all the efforts it can never be one hundred percent certain that the findings are 








dependable. This means that it is difficult to check the reliability of some answers. The first 
four questions are objective and ask about respondents’ personal information. They are 
assumed to provide accurate information because an independent check is difficult to do. The 
last four are subjective, that is, they are about the perceptions of respondents. Given that it is 
impossible to objectively confirm subjective answers, the only way to validate them is by 
checking with other answers. Thus, questions 5 and 7 can be used to check each other in 
terms of its reliability although question 5 is divided between developed and less developed 
countries and question 7 is focused on the former type. Questions 7 and 8 can also be used to 
check one another for reliability on differences in corporate tax rates (Annex 5.2). 
5.3 – Interviews and documentation analysis 
The inductive nature of the investigation explains why in-depth interviewing is one of the 
chosen methodologies. First, the broad and often contradictory literature that currently exists 
(chapters 2 and 3). Second, because the use of direct observation is not possible. Decisions 
may take several months and firms are usually not happy with an outsider seeing what is 
going on and how things work, namely at a higher level where FDI decisions are made. Thus, 
only by a direct contact with those involved in the decision process it is possible to have a 
deep understanding of the motivations and rationale behind the decisions or, in Patton’s 
words (1990, p. 278), to “…enter into the other person’s perspective”. This was done by 
interviewing business managers that had taken part in FDI decisions.  
The research questions were designed based on the literature and on exploratory interviews. 
The interviews were made to Portuguese firms with FDI operations from different sectors of 
activity: agriculture, industrial, financial and services. The common denominator is that all of 
them have part of their production capabilities installed abroad. The number of operations 
abroad for this group represents 11.8% of the total Portuguese FDI. Overall, there were a total 
of 20 interviews with managers with the following three objectives: 
- To understand FDI decisions and its determinants 
- To detect non maximizing behaviour by firms in FDI decisions 



















Their final aim is, together with the remaining empirical work, to support or reject the 
research hypotheses of this dissertation. 
The choice was to use in depth or elite interviewing, a type of semi-directive or open-ended 
interview where respondents, in the course of an informal conversation, freely present, in their 
own words, all their thoughts, feelings, perceptions and experiences about a set of pre­
determined issues. This was done using the general interview guide approach (Patton, 1990), 
where a set of topics are outlined before being explored with each respondent through an 
interview. These topics served as a guide for all the themes covered in the interview and as a 
grid for the content analysis of the information collected (Quivy and Campenhoudt, 1998, p. 
192, and Patton, 1990, p. 280). Previous use of interviews with managers to apply behavioural 
economics theory include Schwartz (1994) and Bewley (1999, 2002). 
The necessary steps were divided into four phases and are summarized in table 5.3: 1 below.  
Table 5.3: 1 – Interviews: modus operandi
1- Evaluation Research questions 
 Theoretical concepts 
 Exploratory interviews
2- Data collection 
 Interviews
 Documentation 
3- Organization of information 
Case description 
4- Content analysis 
Coding using pre-determined themes from research questions 
Cross-case analysis for each theme 
Interpretation of results based on: 
- Research hypotheses 
- Other insights that emerged during data collection
5.3.1 - Research questions and themes 
The research hypotheses were defined from two main sources: economic theory relating to tax 












                                                          
interviews were also helpful for this end and included two professionals working in state 
institutions directly related with attracting FDI, one specific to the industrial sector and the 
other, more general, for all types of investment. It also included two professionals of the same
firm working directly with FDI decisions where one deals with information collection in the 
country where there is a potential investment, while the other handles these and other sources 
of information in the office. The work of the two, and their respective teams, is the basis of
the FDI proposals presented to the Executive Committee of the firm (the body with the final 
say about these decisions). These exploratory interviews allowed a better definition of the 
issues to be addressed and it was a way to minimize irrelevant information.  
Building on the above theory and information and considering the objectives of the thesis and 
its research questions, the following themes for the interviews were identified: 
Table 5.3.1: 1 – Themes
1 – Objectives of the firm 
2 - Decision maker 
3 – Rationale behind FDI investment 
4 – Collection of information 
5 - Market choice: key variables 
6 – Timing 
7 – Type of investment 
8 – Productivity 
9 – Performance 
10 – Risk 
11 - Governmental support 
5.3.2 - Data collection 
Data collection focused on two sources of information. First, interviews5 with business 
managers where the above set of issues were addressed. The second source is documentation 
directly supplied by interviewees and other available information in firms’ internet sites, such 
as annual reports, or national newspapers. Documentation analysis was used as a complement 
and as a source of validity for some of the information collected in the interviews.  






Although there are two sources of information, interviews are the main one. These were one-
to-one conversations (on one occasion there were two persons representing the firm) where 
the interviewed were not informed in advance of the real objectives of the study but vaguely 
about the issues to be addressed. The interviews were scheduled with a statement that referred 
to the study of the process and the determinants of FDI decisions in each firm. The role of 
business taxes was never explicitly mentioned. The idea was to avoid the respondents 
concentrating on the tax topic and not to influence their views of the importance of business 
taxation. As Marshall and Rossman (1995, p. 80) put it, “the participant’s perspective on the 
phenomenon of interest should unfold as the participant views it, not as the researcher views 
it”. 
The first contact, requesting an interview with the Chief Executive Officer, was made by 
email. The messages were sent either directly to the CEO or, when the information was not 
available, to the Public Relations office. When the answer was positive, there was a second 
contact by phone or by email to schedule the date and time of the interview. Most of the 
interviews were scheduled for July and beginning of August, a quiet period when firms 
usually have less activity in comparison with the rest of the year. All the interviews were 
made by the same person, the researcher, so there was no need to pre-define a set of precise 
questions and to conduct the interview in accordance with a pre-determined sequence. But 
given the need to cover several themes, the use of an outline of issues was useful in order to 
guarantee that all respondents addressed the same subjects.    
The sample was based on the top 100 Portuguese parent firms. From these fifty (on a total of 
464, or 10.8%, of Portuguese owned firms with FDI) were contacted and an interview was 
requested. Seventeen answered positively. The choice of firms to contact and request an 
interview was based on the following criteria: 
- The decision centre, that is, the executive managers of the firm and the main shareholders 
should be located in Portugal. Therefore, subsidiaries of multinational companies are not 
included in the target. 
- To have, at least, part of their production capabilities abroad. This means that FDI was not 
made only to promote exports. FDI should represent either a significant part of the investment 






                                                          
other distribution structures6. The reason is that the decision to invest abroad has to be very 
well thought and the risk associated significantly greater than, for example, the opening of a 
mere representative office (in most cases these are only a support for exports).   
- Large Portuguese companies, although these are of medium or small size in international 
terms. These firms are more relevant in the sense that they are better known in the press and, 
thus, their activity has more influence on the perceptions of the general public. This may be 
relevant to the role of business taxes in attracting FDI. Small Portuguese companies, on the 
other hand, are very small in international terms and their investment is totally focused in 
small market niches. Furthermore, the amount of investment is usually not very significant. 
This does not mean that small firms are not worthy of study but rather that large firms 
represent a significant share of the total of Portuguese FDI (Banco de Portugal, 2005). 
- Firms should be from different sectors of activity and levels of internationalization to 
increase their representativeness. The variety is justified by the fact that there may be 
significant differences between these cases. For example, different sectors of activity - 
agricultural, industry and services – can have different processes of internationalization. In 
the services industry, the firm often has to be geographically near the customer to provide a 
service. But that is not necessarily the case when a firm wants to sell goods. 
The focus on Portuguese corporations is justified by: 
- Personal interest in studying the Portuguese case given the phase of internationalization of 
the economy, different from more developed countries such as the UK or the USA where 
most economic studies are usually focused. 
- Easier to get managers to be interviewed due to the nationality and the personal contacts of
the researcher. The choice of managers located in Portugal is directly related with the location 
of the decision centre of the firm. 
- In the same way it was easier for the researcher to assess data credibility and quality. 
- Finally, they are small and medium sized companies in the global market that sometimes are 
starting the process of internationalization. Global companies are already located in many 
places and were already much studied. 
The position in the firm of the interviewees is presented in table 5.3.2: 1. All of them are 
directly related with FDI decisions within their firms, that is, all participate in the internal 












decision process. In four cases the interviewed member of the executive board had, together 
with the international area, also the responsibility of the financial area (being the Chief 
Financial Officer). All the interviewed middle managers report directly to the board or the 
executive committee. 
These interviewees were directly responsible for or participated in 76% of the total number of 
decisions to locate in a determined country considered in this dissertation, including the 
expansion investments made by these firms. Moreover, the actual management of the firms is 
the same or follows a similar internationalization strategy in 88% of operations. 
     Table 5.3.2: 1 - Interviewees
Job Number 
Chief Executive Officer 2 
Other members of the executive board 9 
Middle managers 6 
The profile of the firms is shown in table 5.3.2: 4 below. The information uses data for 2004 
and includes the FDI subsidiaries that consolidate with the parent company in Portugal. These 
are participations where the parent company has an effective control of the subsidiary. In total 
and per sector: 








The interviews followed a guideline composed by a set of issues. These issues have a 
correspondence to the pre-defined themes (table 5.3.1: 1 above) and are coded and compared 
during the content analysis (Annex 3.2). The idea was to acknowledge the participant’s 
perspectives on FDI decisions and to analyze together both their objective and subjective 
views. Each respondent was also asked to explain the strategy of the firm, supposedly the 











business FDI operation, the interview focused on the core (more important in historical and/or 
volume terms) business of each firm. Table 5.3.2: 3 show the issues addressed or the structure 
of each interview. There were a total of 24 issues, where only two were not directly related 
with the activity of each firm. These requested the opinion of respondents on if and how 
should the government support FDI activities and if (and why) the EU should harmonize 
corporate tax rates. 
Table 5.3.2: 3 – The pre-determined issues of an interview
I - Objectives of the firm
II – FDI decisions – Decision maker  
A - Rational behind the FDI investment 
- Comparative advantages/disadvantages in 
the foreign market 
- Learning experience 
C - Market choice: key variables 
- Cultural variables 
- Historical (of the firm) variables 
- Tax rates 
B – Collection of information 
- Perception of information 
- Handling of information 
- External advisers 
D – Timing 
- Exchange of information with managers 
from other firms  
- Other firms actions 
III – FDI outcomes 
A – Type of investment D – Performance 
B - Optimal size E – Risk 
C – Productivity 
IV – Governmental support 
A - Support from local authorities B - Support from the EU or other institutions 
V – Should the EU harmonize corporate tax rates?
There were no significant incidents during the interviews, meaning that the impact of the 
questions and of the context on the answers was negligible. The request for interview was 
made explaining the general themes to be addressed and there were no surprises for the 
interviewees. Some of them asked for the firm not to be named or for a copy of any document 
where its name is mentioned to be previously sent for their agreement about the included 
information. On two occasions middle manager interviewees were careful about the 
information due to its sensitivity internally and with the market. This was explained by fear of
not complying with stock exchange regulations, namely the need to inform stock exchange 
authorities about all relevant information that may affect the market value of the firm, and by 
the concern not to comment on areas within the firm where the interviewee had no 
responsibility. Overall the researcher was well accepted by interviewees and the information 






      
 
 
Table 5.3.2 : 4 – Firms’ profile * 
Nr. Firm Sector Ownership 
Countrie 
s Total Rank in 
First 
year % sales % assets
% 
employee 
s % profits 
(type) with FDI Sales * Portugal abroad in FDI * in FDI in FDI in FDI 
1 Corticeira Amorim Cork Family 9 429.5 1 1972 90.0% n.a. 26.0% n.a. 
2 Banco Espírito Santo Banking * Family 12 1427.4 3 1972 12.0% n.a. < 20% n.a. 
3 Laboratórios Bial Pharmaceuticals Family 1 88.2 9 1998 19.0% 20.0% 30.0% 0.0% 
4 Banco BPI Banking * Public 5 809.8 5 1996 14.8% 5.1% 10.6% 20.0% 
5 Caixa Geral Depósitos Banking * State 15 1941.0 1 1924 20.7% 35.5% 19.9% 1.5% 
6 Energias de Portugal Energy Public ** 5 7221.7 1 1997 24.8% 32.1% 29.8% 14.1% 
7 Inapa Paper distribution Public 8 1062.1 1 1990 95.0% 90.3% 89.2% 90.7% 
8 Jerónimo Martins Retail Family 3 3494.6 2 1995 30.3% 14.0% 41.0% 7.0% 
9 Mota Engil Construction Family 8 1168.6 1 1975 21.8% n.a. 23.2% n.a. 
10 Portugal Telecom Telecommunications Public ** 17 6023.3 1 1989 24.9% n.a. 48.7% n.a. 
11 Salvador Caetano Automobile Family 6 500.9 2 1984 22.1% 8.0% 46.4% -49.1% 
12 Secil Cement Family 4 445.6 2 2001 14.7% n.a. 28.9% n.a. 
13 Sogrape Wine Family 2 161.2 1 1997 11.5% 17.7% 26.1% 3.1%*** 
14 Vicaima Wood products Family 2 100.0 3 1988 40.0% n.a. 8.0% n.a. 
15 Modelo Continente Retail Family 2 3600.0 1 1989 27.1% 24.5% 53.4% 14.4%**** 
16 Brisa Highway operator Family 1 559.0 1 2001 < 20% n.a. < 20% 14.3% 
17 Millennium BCP Banking * Public 12 2811.0 2 1995 18.7% 10.0% 36.0% 11.1% 
* All values for 2004 and in Million Euros. Total sales are also represented by the banking product (interest + commissions + other net revenue) 
** The Portuguese state has a golden share for strategic purposes 
*** Profits in Argentina only







Finally, the following steps were taken to deal with potential disadvantages of the use of 
interviews: 
- Preparation was undertaken via the form of four exploratory interviews.  
- The interviews were also preceded by the collection of general information about each 
firm’s activity including the knowledge of the different business areas of each firm, the 
countries and places where firms had productive activity, some data about FDI operations and 
their results in terms of sales and profitability. This was a way of facilitating the interview by 
having a better understanding of the information provided by the respondents and also to help 
focus the interview on the pre-determined issues. 
- Managers that agreed to be interviewed were implicitly cooperating and accepting the 
researcher’s questions. Some of the respondents also mentioned that they were always open to 
collaborate in research studies and showed willingness to help with required information. 
Furthermore, an outline of the main issues to be addressed was sent in advance to the 
respondents when requested. 
- The researcher was used to dealing with CEOs and business managers from his previous 
working experience as a business journalist and as a sales manager in a banking institution. 
Although the type of meetings and questioning was different from what was required here, it 
helped by preventing the interviewees dominating the conversation and not allowing the 
coverage of the complete range of pre-determined issues. This experience was also useful to 
deal with less talkative interviewees, when it was more difficult to get information and 
frequent questioning was required. 
- A second contact with the interviewees was made and eight of them answered further 
questions or requests for clarification. In one case, the respondent did not allow the use of a 
tape recorder but agreed to review the notes taken by the researcher. After the interview, a 
“transcript” of the notes was sent to the respondent for confirmation of the information 
collected. Sending out transcriptions or the researcher’s interpretation of the interview to 
respondents was a way to validate the data. 
- Further ways to validate the information collected was documentation provided by 
interviewees, annual reports of the firms, information available at firm’s internet sites and 












                                                          
5.3.3 - Organizing information and case description 
The third step was to do the transcription of interviews and complement it with other data, 
mainly from the annual reports of the firms. This was based on the issues addressed during 
the interviews and allowed for the gathered information to be prepared for content analysis 
(coding and cross case analysis). Other types of information such as the strategy and 
quantitative data for each firm were also included in each case description. 
5.3.3.1 - Content analysis 
Content analysis focus on the FDI practical experience of respondents, transmitted through 
interview, and, together with the theoretical support and the research hypotheses, are the basis 
for the analysis of the obtained information. It is done by applying appropriated quantitative 
and qualitative techniques. In simple words, content analysis is «… the process of identifying, 
coding, and categorizing the primary patterns in the data.» (Patton, 1990, p. 381). 
The in-depth interview can be considered a complementary method of content analysis. The 
interviews and all the documentation obtained are the process of information collection where 
a qualitative examination helps to attain the final coding scheme, a first stage, while the 
content analysis works, in a second stage, this information with the objective of building 
knowledge about the perceptions and motivations of interviewees.  
The analysis is structured by themes (Quivy and Campenhoudt, 1998, p. 228), which, as 
mentioned above, arise from the research hypotheses. This is how the judgements and 
perceptions of the interviewees are highlighted7. Thematic content analysis allows the 
assessment of interviewees’ experience in FDI operations by scoring transcripts for content, 
that is, by measuring pre-defined variables (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 192).  
Content analysis follows the collection and organization of information and is divided into 
three main tasks, as per the diagram below. 

















Phase 0 – Collection and organization of information (interviews and documentation) 
Phase 1 – Coding 
Phase 2 – Cross-case analysis (based on each theme) 
Phase 3 – Interpretation of results 
Phase 1 – Coding 
The coding was defined a priori from the issues addressed during the interviews and further 
“calibrated” after a first qualitative examination of the information collected. The initial 
definitions arose from the literature and research hypotheses and allowed the establishment of 
indicators such as the number of bounded procedures or rules of behaviour used.  
The content of the data is also classified according to the several themes and “improved” after 
a first assessment of the information. Several other indicators, such as the level of 
internationalization and uncertainty, were then established. 
The goal was to simplify the enormous amount of information in a way that was easy to 
handle but appropriate to be used in similar studies. To that end, both the validity of the 
information, important as a guarantee that what is being measured really corresponds to the 
concepts used in the study (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 12), and the reliability of the measures were 
checked as far as possible by following the procedures described above (5.3.2). 
Phase 2 – Cross-case analysis 
There are two main ways of assessing each theme: By using quantitative and qualitative 
methods. The theme analysis has the goal of searching for patterns or comparing the different 
issues implicit or explicit in the interviews by using as a reference the research hypotheses. 
For each theme, the judgements and perceptions of the respondents are registered and 










considering the reasoning, and its construction and development, in the discourse of 
interviewees. The analysis also includes the validity of the gathered information as explained 
above. 
The frequency, direction and intensity found in the answers related with each theme and the 
corresponding judgements are evaluated in the context of a behavioural approach of FDI 
theory, namely within the research hypotheses concerning the rationality of FDI decisions by 
managers and the role of taxation as a determinant of foreign investment.  
To that end both categorical and evaluation analyses are used here. The frequency is an 
important indicator of the “trends” within the Portuguese corporations with investments 
abroad. This is complemented by a qualitative analysis of the perceptions and judgements of 
the respondents. This evaluation analysis allows for a confirmation of the detected “trends” in 
the frequency analysis. 
Phase 3 - Interpretation of results 
After the execution of these two tasks the results were ready to be interpreted (the explanation 
of the analysis and how the results were obtained are further developed in the following 
chapters). The results obtained were interpreted in the context of the behavioural approach by 
using as a reference the research questions and other insights that emerged during the process 
of data collection. 
5.4 – Statistical tests 
Non-parametric statistical tests are performed for some of the hypothesis where data is 
available so that the results of the inductive phase can be confirmed. Tests are performed in 
the SPSS software, version 12 (Norusis, 2003, ch. 19), and based on data collected during the 











                                                          





information provided by each firm in their annual reports of 2004 and previous years. The 
sample and the universe of Portuguese FDI operations in 2004 are presented in table 5.4: 18. 
The data for the universe (Table 5.4: 1) is based on the information provided by Banco de 
Portugal and originates in the 2004 (yearly) questionnaire on foreign direct investment 
completed by Portuguese firms9. These include information for all types of firms (financial, 
real estate, industrial, etc) and all types of investments (equity, loans, etc). Statistical tests 
include a total of 112 Portuguese FDI operations abroad with a productive component (Annex 
3.3), that is, 11.8% of the total number where it is included representative offices and other 
locations without a productive component, and affiliates of foreign-owned Portuguese firms. 
Therefore, this value is surely higher if only Portuguese owned “productive” affiliates were 
considered as the universe. Each operation corresponds to a country location by a Portuguese 
investor. The sample is skewed for large firms in Portugal although these are, at best, medium
size firms in international terms.  
Table 5.4: 1 - Universe and sample of Portuguese outward FDI - 2004 
Type of Countries Universe % Sample Sample / Universe 
Developed 500 53 58 11.6 % 
Portuguese Speaking 268 28 27 10.0 % 
Other countries 180 19 27 15.0 % 
Total 948 100 112 11.8 %
It is implicitly assumed here that the available information for each case with detected rules of 
behaviour or bounded procedures was collected. The remaining observations are either 
assumed to have zero “irrationalities” (situations 1 and 2 in chapter 7) or to be not valid if it 
is assumed that interviewees focused on some specific cases and did not cover all FDI 
operations made by their firms (situation 3). Therefore, in situation 3 only 72 observations 
will be used for statistical tests. These assumptions are justified by the exploratory nature of
this study and allow a better understanding of the collected data. It should be noted that a 
8 There were 8 divestments (Brazil 3, Spain 2, UK 1, Botswana 1, and Poland 1) that are in the sample but no 
longer appearing in the universe. 
9 “Questionário ao Investimento Directo de Portugal no Exterior” where by direct investment is meant all
resident firms or individuals with 10% or more of equity share or voting rights in firms abroad, any connection 
in terms of economic group together with the existence of financial transactions (such as loans or cash 













large number of the total observations where “irrationalities” are absent, 31 in 40, are in 
developed countries. 
The use of nonparametric tests is explained by the characteristics of the available information. 
The variables are mostly nominal or ranks, the size of the sample is not very large and the 
assumption of a normal distribution in the population is prevented by the one sample 
Kolgomorov-Smirnov and other normality tests (Siegel and Castellan, 1995, p. 35). 
Therefore, stronger parametric tests were not possible and measures of association and non­
parametric tests are used in the following chapters (Norusis, 2003, p. 453). Table 5.4: 2 
presents them.  
Table 5.4: 2 – Statistical tests 
 Symmetric Asymmetric 
Nominal Cramer’s V Coefficient Lambda 
Contingency coefficient Goodman and Kruskal’s Tau 
Ordinal Gamma Somer’s d 
Kendall’s Tau Eta 
These tests reveal how strong is the relationship between two different variables and its 
direction, that is, of a negative or positive nature. They will also be used to check the 
applicability of the model developed above in chapter 4. 
5.5 – Conclusions 
The behavioural perspective and the empirical application followed in this dissertation are a 
novel way to address the tax competition literature. By following qualitative research and 
using questionnaires, a quasi-experiment, interviews and documentation analysis, a 
complementary perspective to mainstream economics, and thus an enrichment of the model, 
may be obtained (James, 2006, p. 598). The qualitative nature and the emphasis on 
uncertainty of the Heiner model also allow to research the role of behavioural characteristics 
in FDI location decisions and to address the existing mismatches with tax competition theory. 
The resulting findings are strengthened by statistical tests and applied to the EU, where tax 










6 – FDI: Theory, public perception and professional 
experience 
Neoclassical theory states that business taxation is important in explaining foreign direct 
investment. The tax competition model assumes that business taxation is the major 
determinant of FDI. The behavioural approach aims to provide detailed information on how 
important taxation is in FDI so that a more complete understanding of location decisions is 
achieved. This chapter is a first empirical attempt in that direction by implementing the 
questionnaire presented in chapter 5 to students and corporate professionals. The aim is to 
have an indication of the perceptions of people in general as to the importance of business 
taxation in FDI decisions and to assess if managers are influenced by this public perception of 
FDI determinants.  
Is there a perception from respondents that foreign corporate investment is explained by 
business tax rates? How does business taxation compares with other determinants of FDI? Is 
there a difference in these perceptions between students and managers with or without FDI 
related work experience? The questionnaire aims to find an answer to these questions.  
The chapter starts by establishing the public perception concerning the role of taxation in FDI 
decisions by using a brief documentation analysis based on newspapers and on the world wide 
web. Then the general questionnaire is implemented to economics and management students 
to assess the relevance of a set of 23 different variables to investments abroad. Its outcome is 
compared with the answers of two groups of corporation managers, one with professional 
experience in dealing with FDI operations and the other without it. The chapter ends with a 
brief conclusion. 
6.1 – The general public perception 
A brief documentation analysis provides an understanding of the general public perception 
about the relevance of business taxes in investment decisions. The objective was to count the 








represent both the determinants recognized by FDI theory from the host country perspective 
and the variables used for the questionnaire. The higher the number of articles the more 
important tends to be the variable associated with FDI in terms of the general public 
perception. This is so despite the fact that the appearance of the words in the same article does 
not necessarily mean that the text associates the two subjects. But the frequency may be 
considered as a relevant sign of the importance given by the media to each of the determinants 
included in the search. 
It is focused on two types of mass media, the press and the world wide web. In the case of the 
press the analysis was done through two internet searches of newspapers for the general 
public: The Economist (2005, http://www.economist.com/search/search.cfm?qr) and the 
International Herald Tribune (2007, http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/search.cgi?query). The third 
was similar but it was done by using the search engine Google and focused on all texts that 
are on the World Wide Web.  
The Google search was made on the 23rd October 2005 and re-confirmed on the 20th 
November 2007. The search in the International Herald Tribune includes all articles published 
between 1991 and 15th November 2007 (around 6,130 editions) while The Economist 
considers only the print edition for the period between January 1997 and June 2005 (around 
390 editions). The period of the searches is not exactly coincident but the aim is to have an 
approximate idea of the public perception. 
A few remarks need to be made about the counting of the articles. First, in order to avoid 
duplication of the articles counted the procedure included an individual search for each word 
and one complementary search with all the words included for each determinant. For 
example, for the “legal” determinant there was a search for the words “legal system” and 
“foreign investment” and another for the words “law” and “foreign investment” and both 
numbers were added. Then, there was a  second search with the words “law”, “legal system” 
and “foreign investment” that allowed the identification of articles with the three words and 
the previous total was reduced by this number. 
Second, there are several specifications related to table 6.1: 1 below. The words “foreign 





              
 
Investment and FDI also appear but less frequently. A similar criterion was applied to the 
Google search. The word “tax” alone was not considered because it is not necessarily related 
with business taxes. If it was considered the number of articles would have been much higher. 
The word “union” includes the European Union and similar expressions with the word union 
or unions. Therefore, the value presented in the table is substantially inflated. For example in 
The Economist European Union appears 108 times. Moreover, the market size can sometimes 
be referred as value of Gross Domestic Product. For example, the association of “GDP” with 
“foreign investment”, although not included, was found 231 times in the case of The 
Economist. Finally, “Capital movements” were considered without the word restriction. 
Table 6.1: 1 – Nº of articles with words appearing together with “foreign investment”
Words associated Economist IH Tribune Google * 
Business tax, taxes or taxation 263 1,632 34,580 
Unions ** 237 267 22,900 
Local competition or competition 211 1,176 20,500 
Legal system or Law 198 1,441 36,900 
Raw materials or minerals or oil 189 1,964 18,940 
Corruption 182 612 5,410 
Technology 144 1,873 34,500 
Democracy 138 644 9,620 
Schools or hospitals 125 296 12,600 
Infrastructure or roads 124 1,170 26,170 
Culture or language 119 1,046 17,100 
Energy 107 1,328 23,200 
Exchange rate 90 1,017 23,300 
Skills 90 275 12,500 
Environment 77 817 29,200 
Growth rate or rate of growth (market) 62 1,442 28,300 
Labour costs or labor costs 23 386 17,380 
Purchasing power or GDP per capita 18 165 5,602 
Cost of capital or capital costs 9 682 24,000 
Stable government 9 395 15,900 
(Restrictions on) capital movements ** 4 95 11,800 
Market or country, size or dimension ** 2 2,112 30,590 
Labour or labor supply, availability 1 147 14,000 
* In thousands, approximately. ** See text 
The results shown in the table seem to confirm that foreign investment is indeed more 












                                                          
  
The Economist it is the first while in the Google “business taxes” is only outpaced by the 
legal determinant1 and in the IHT it is the fourth frequent determinant.  
Table 6.1: 2 – Ranking of “business taxes”
Search The Economist Int. Herald Tribune Google 
Rank 1 4 2 
A combined analysis of the three searches show some outcome similarity between the Tribune 
and Google. Scatter plots and correlation coefficients show that there is a quasi-linear 
relationship between these two searches but not with The Economist (also not-significant in 
non-parametric tests – Annex 4.1). This means that IHT and Google must have some common 
explaining factor for their ordering and thus they seem to be better suited to serve as a proxy 
of what is called here the general public perception than The Economist. The Economist may 
present a different outcome because it is a specialized magazine for economists and the 
business community. 
Therefore, in the so-called “public perception” there seems to be a bias towards taxation 
as a determinant of FDI, although most of the remaining determinants are also 
significant as predicted by FDI theory. The outcome of tax competition theory, and its 
dissemination through the economic community, and this public perception may have 
reinforced each other towards an overvaluation of the role of taxation in FDI location 
decisions. 
6.2 – Investing abroad : Questionnaire description 
The questionnaire is both a general survey on the public perception of FDI determinants and a 
quasi-natural experiment by comparing the perceptions of FDI determinants of two groups of 
managers with or without FDI working experience. The general survey was answered by 115 
economy and management students, in Britain and in Portugal, with no real-life knowledge of 
FDI decisions where both FDI theory and “public opinion” may influence the outcome.  








The quasi-experiment was conducted using two groups of managers with relevant working 
experience (not less than 3 years). The data used for this experiment comes from 59 
questionnaires made to managers in Portugal (30) and in the UK (29). Half of them (29) do 
not have FDI related working experience – the so called No group - and half (30) have - the 
Yes group. All the questions presented herein refer to an investment in a developed country. 
By FDI working experience is meant the participation of the respondent in a firm’s decision 
to invest abroad. This participation may vary from a say in the final decision to elaboration of 
recommendations or some technical work related with this decision. The respondents were 
asked to make a brief description of their participation in FDI decisions in order to check if
they are eligible for this experiment. 
In both cases respondents were asked to rank 23 host country variables according to their 
importance in FDI location decisions from the perspective of the investor and from the 
perspective of a country having an active policy to attract investors. Behavioural determinants 
as those presented in chapter 5 (e.g. mental accounting, herding, overconfidence, etc.) are not 
included because they are not easily perceived by respondents and the main goal is to assess 
the role of tax variables. The exception is “cultural affinity” which is also accepted by FDI 
theory (e.g. Kravis and Lipsey, 1982). 
The characteristics of the questionnaire are: 
a) Subject: FDI location determinants. The first survey aims to describe the perceptions of 
economic and management students about FDI determinants. Although they are not 
statistically representative of the public sentiment they may provide an indication of it. The 
second, a natural quasi-experiment, aims to compare the views about FDI determinants of 
managers with and without FDI experience. In both cases the questionnaire only considers 
host country determinants. 
b) Objective: to assess the perception of respondents about the determinants of foreign 
investment decisions and to understand the role of business taxation in these decisions. The 
aim is to answer the following questions: Is there a perception from respondents that foreign 
corporate investment is explained by business tax rates? If yes, how important is business 












these perceptions between students and managers with or without FDI related working 
experience? How different is the perspective of the country and of the firm? And how 
different is the perspective when the target is a developed or a less developed country?
c) Hypotheses: There is a public perception that business taxation has an important role in 
explaining foreign investment decisions. This is in accordance with tax competition theory 
and also with the perception created by different publications. But this perception may in 
reality be a bias towards taxation when FDI location decisions are the subject. According to 
FDI theory, business taxation is just one more variable in explaining FDI flows. Under the 
behavioural approach business taxes are expected to have a minor relevance in FDI location 
decisions (H4b in 4.3). In other words, the public perception may “hide” the fact that 
managers are not that rational, in the tax competition sense, with respect to the role of
business taxation in FDI location decisions. 
Given these considerations the expected results are: 
I - In the survey, where respondents are students, there should be a public perception that 
business taxation has a relevant role in explaining foreign investment decisions. This is in 
accordance with tax competition literature and it does not necessarily contradict FDI theory 
given that other variables should also be considered relevant. Business taxation is expected to 
be superior to most of the remaining FDI determinants if the tax competition view holds. 
Otherwise, if business taxes are found to be irrelevant the behavioural approach is vindicated. 
II – In the natural quasi-experiment general conclusions cannot be fully reached but only 
inferred from comparison or association of results between the variables. Nevertheless, in 
accordance with the behavioural approach taxation is expected to be less relevant for the 
group where there is experience in FDI location decisions. The reason for this difference is 
that FDI decision-makers should be more aware of the relative importance of business taxes.
However, taxation may be regarded as very important because the public perception and FDI 
theory are also expected to influence the answers of both groups. 









III – It is not entirely clear what to expect about the relative results of business taxes when the 
country is trying to attract investment or when a firm is searching for a place to invest. At a 
first sight the results should be the same when the interests of firms and governments 
coincide. According to tax competition theory both governments want to attract investment by 
using a fiscal variable and firms will locate where business taxes are lower. But it is not clear 
if the interests of firms and governments are totally coincident because the government 
perspective may be like a coin with two opposite faces. First, to lower taxes in order to attract 
investment, and this is credible when governments have active policies to attract FDI (e.g. 
Ireland). Second, to increase taxation in order to be able to provide a higher level of public 
goods so that it can be re-elected (the Leviathan perspective). Thus, in the neo-classical view 
it should be expected the results for this variable to be the same if the first perspective 
predominates.  
Otherwise, if the second is the dominant the rank of this variable is expected to be lower in 
question 6 given that the government’s option is to have an higher corporate tax rate and, 
thus, to disincentive FDI. The same outcome is expected if the behavioural approach is 
confirmed and tax rates are not significant for FDI location decisions because the level of 
taxation is a tool in the hands of jurisdictions which firms can, at best, try to influence. This is 
in accordance with preparatory interviews where business taxation is mainly seen as a selling 
point for a jurisdiction by government officials (chapter 8) and in the information search 
process of firms where business taxation is just one among many variables analysed (chapter 
7). 
IV – Economic theory does not suggest a clear relationship between the role of business taxes 
in FDI location decisions and the level of development of target jurisdictions. Nevertheless, 
an expected outcome is business taxes to be more relevant for developed countries (Azémar 
and Delios, 2008). These are more open economies and, in many situations such as the EU, 
economically integrated. A firm choosing to invest in an economic area with internal open 
borders may choose any jurisdiction inside this area (Devereux and Griffith, 1998). Thus in 
this case business taxes should be more relevant than when jurisdictions have higher barriers 









6.3 – General survey 
It is a one-off descriptive general survey of students to assess their perception about FDI 
determinants. The audience was composed of economics and management students with or 
without (less than 3 years) significant working experience but not related with FDI. These two 
groups of respondents comprised undergraduate (final year) and master students in economics 
and management in British and Portuguese universities. These were the eligibility criteria.  
A more detailed questionnaire, fully representative of the general public perception of FDI 
determinants, would require a rather larger and more representative sample. This would be 
almost impossible and very costly to implement in the ambit of a PhD dissertation, and it is 
not essential for the overall purpose of this research. Therefore, the option was to carry out a 
small questionnaire without representativity concerns.  
The expected outcome is for business taxation to have a very relevant role in explaining 
foreign investment decisions and to compare well with other FDI determinants if the public 
perception acts as a bias towards taxation when FDI decisions are the subject. This is because 
the questionnaire is answered by students without professional knowledge of FDI decisions. 
The questionnaire had eight questions and was divided in two slightly different versions (A 
and B). It was answered by individuals randomly selected within the eligibility criteria. The 
survey was carried out in two different ways. In the first, where undergraduate and post­
graduate students in economics at the University of Bath are included, the questionnaire was 
answered in the presence of the researcher in a classroom. In each classroom the lecturer was 
also present and helped in getting the questionnaires done. This allowed for a high response 
rate and for respondents to be more willing to answer the questions. In the second, for the 
remaining answers, the questionnaire was sent and received by email or by mail. In this case 
the response rate was lower. Only one answer was invalid. 
The first four questions refer to the characteristics of respondents and most of them (97) have 
or were completing a BSc in economics while the remainder studied management or other 
courses. The number of obtained answers divided as follows: 
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 Table 6.3: 1 – Respondents 
General Survey Number of Answers 
BSc Economics (final year) – U. Bath 62 
Master in Economics – U. Bath 36 
Master in Economics – U. Porto 11 
Master in European Economics – ISEG 6 
Total 115 
The objective of question 52 was to explain the perception of respondents regarding FDI 
determinants when a firm is making a decision to invest abroad. Given that all of them had 
studied economics or management, FDI theory was expected to have a big influence on the 
outcome. As expected the results show that all variables have a significant role in explaining 
FDI flows. The mean value given by respondents is always above 5 on a 0-10 scale. And the 
difference between the ‘most valued’ and the ‘less valued’ variables is only 2.4 regarding 
determinants of FDI to developed economies and 2.54 to less developed economies. That is, 
respondents, on average, and in accordance with FDI theory (e.g. Dunning, 1979), think 
that all variables are relevant. 
Also as with FDI theory, variables associated with a higher level of development, such as 
“highly-skilled labour”, “High purchasing power” or “Good schools and hospitals for 
employees”, receive a higher classification in developed countries. The opposite happens for 
variables associated with a lower level of development: “Low levels of corruption”, 
“Democratic political system”, “Low labour costs” or “Plentiful raw materials”. 
The answers also show that, according to the perception of respondents, “Low business 
taxes” is not one of the most important variables in explaining FDI decisions, although it 
is a relevant variable. This is in accordance with FDI theory, where fiscal variables are just 
one among many relevant variables, but it does not confirm the implicit assumption of high 
relevance as predicted by tax competition theory (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszcowsky, 1986). 
Moreover, it does not confirm the behavioural approach. The variance of business taxes is not 
significantly higher or lower in comparison with the remaining variables and thus it can be 
concluded that respondents roughly agree on its relevance (Annex 4.3). Finally, the 
hypothesis that business taxes are more important for FDI location decisions in 
developed countries is confirmed. 








Table 6.3: 2 - Determinants of a Firm’s Decisions to Invest Abroad 

Question 5: Mean Value and Rank 

Determinants (averages*) Rank Developed Rank Less developed 
Highly-skilled labour 1 7,5455 17 6,1641 
Efficient legal system 2 7,4217 10 7,2846 
Stable government 3 7,2679 1 7,8923 
High growth rate of the market 4 7,2432 4 7,6308 
Large market size 5 7,1205 8 7,3826 
Good infrastructure (roads, etc.) 6 7,0625 7 7,4231 
Exchange rate stability 7 7,0309 3 7,6384 
High purchasing power (GDP per capita) 8 7,0088 20 5,6769 
Few restrictions on capital movements 9 6,9636 9 7,3594 
Low business taxes 10 6,8897 14 6,5674 
Appropriate technology 11 6,8135 15 6,4927 
Low levels of corruption 12 6,7611 6 7,4615 
Available supply of labour 13 6,5982 5 7,5538 
Low cost of capital 14 6,5808 12 6,7749 
Good schools and hospitals for employees 15 6,5664 18 5,9923 
Weak trade union influence 16 6,3824 21 5,6041 
Democratic political system 17 6,3523 11 7,1541 
Weak local competition 18 6,1651 19 5,8659 
Low energy costs 19 5,8794 16 6,2771 
Low labour costs 20 5,5982 2 7,6489 
Low levels of environmental regulation 21 5,5273 23 5,3566 
Plentiful raw materials (minerals, etc.) 22 5,3750 13 6,6231 
Cultural affinity (e.g. Same language) 23 5,1027 22 5,4891 
* When the same determinant appears more than once in the questionnaire 
The role of the public perception, as assumed here via the IHT and Google searches, seems 
not to be relevant regarding taxation because it appears in a significantly lower rank than in 
those searches. Furthermore, scatter plots do not show a linear relationship between the 
findings of these searches and the answers of respondents. Statistical tests confirm this result 
(Annex 4.4). 
In question 6 the setting was not an investment decision by a firm but a government having an 
active policy of attracting FDI to their country. That is, question 5 shows the firm’s 
perspective and question 6 the government’s. The results of question 6 refer to the number of 
times each variable was ranked in the top 5 positions by respondents.  
Question 6 requires respondents to focus on the way to attract investment and, thus, in the 
neoclassical view the expected ranking should be very similar for both questions. However 
“Low business Taxes” was the 6th. determinant in question 6, a higher ranking than in 
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question 5 (10th. and 14th.)  3. It confirms the information collected during exploratory 
interviews that business taxes are better suited to act as a signal to foreign investors than as a 
variable for firms’ decisions.  
Table 6.3: 3 – Determinants of a government’s attempt to attract investment (Q.6)
Pct of Pct of 
Ranking - Category label Code Count Responses Cases 
Large market size 2 47 8,5 42,3
Low labour costs 3 46 8,3 41,4
Good infrastructure 5 46 8,3 41,4
High growth rate of the market 12 44 7,9 39,6
Exchange rate stability 23 42 7,6 37,8
Low business taxes 14 39 7,0 35,1
Stable government 18 39 7,0 35,1
Highly-skilled workers 1 34 6,1 30,6
Efficient legal system 11 32 5,8 28,8
Few restrictions on capital movements 13 27 4,9 24,3
Appropriate technology 7 21 3,8 18,9
High purchasing power 6 20 3,6 18,0
Low cost of capital 8 19 3,4 17,1
Available supply of labour 17 18 3,2 16,2
Low levels of corruption 20 18 3,2 16,2
Plentiful raw materials 9 14 2,5 12,6
Low energy costs 10 13 2,3 11,7
Democratic political system 22 13 2,3 11,7
Weak local competition 4 12 2,2 10,8
Weak trade union influence 16 5 ,9 4,5
Good schools and hospitals for employees 15 2 ,4 1,8
Cultural affinity 19 2 ,4 1,8
Low levels of environmental regulation 21 1 ,2 ,9 
------- ----- -----
Total responses 554 100,0 499,1 
3 missing cases; 111 valid cases 
Given the outcome what explains the greater importance of business taxation from a 
government perspective? A possibility is that respondents tend to perceive a greater 
association of business taxes with effective governmental policies because they are 
determined by public officials, and the level of taxation is not immediately (after a location 
decision) relevant for firms but only in the medium to the long-term, when profits are 
expected to arise. Moreover, it may be due to the visibility of this variable in newspapers and 
other vehicles of what is usually called “public opinion” (which has a direct impact on elected 
officials and their policies). In other words, respondents are not only influenced by FDI 
theory, as question 5 has shown, but also by the so-called “public opinion”. This is partially 
confirmed in statistical testing for one of the searches, Google (Table 6.3: 4).  
3 When the ranking is made for the top 3 positions “Low Business Taxes” is the 5th ‘ex-aequo’ and for the top 7 




















   
 
Table 6.3: 4 – Symmetric measures between Google and Question 6 
Value 
Approx. 
T(a) Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b ,200 1,800 ,072 
Kendall's tau-c ,200 1,800 ,072 
Gamma ,202 1,800 ,072 
N of Valid Cases 23 
a Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
However, both the public perception and FDI theory may “hide” the fact that managers are 
not that rational in what concerns the role of business taxation when corporations make their 
FDI decisions and thus taxation is not necessarily a key determinant in FDI location 
decisions. 
Finally, in both questions the only behavioural variable that is included, “cultural affinity”, 
presents a very low rank, in line with idea that both neoclassical FDI theory and the public 
perception have a great influence in these answers (in the Google search it ranks 15). 
Table 6.3: 5 - Question 7.1
A – Frequency A – Percent B – Frequency B – Percent 
Country X 12 19.7 % 14 29.2 % 
Country Y 28 45.9 % 25 52.1 % 
Country Z 21 34.4 % 9 18.7 % 
Total 61 100.0 % 48 100.0 % 
Table 6.3: 6 - Main variables indicated as reason for choice - question 7.2
Frequency
Quest. A Percent 
Frequency










Quality of infrastructures 
Corporate tax rate 
Hospitals and schools 
Highly-skilled workers 


































Question 7 re-considers the firm’s perspective. The goal is also to have an understanding of 
the perceptions of respondents in terms of the choice of a country where to locate an 






firm can locate the investment in one of the countries in order to supply the entire market. 
This makes more sense to the goods sector (manufacturing or agricultural firms) given that in 
part of the services industry the firm needs to be geographically near the client. The different 
scenario (that of an economic union) is expected to alter the perceptions of respondents about 
FDI determinants if the decision is perceived as being made inside a single market (Bruckner 
and Saavedra, 2001). 
The question asks respondents to choose a country (X, Y or Z) where to invest given the 
restricted set of variables. It is divided in two different questionnaires where, in questionnaire 
A, country Y, the most  attractive of the three in terms of corporate tax rate, has a lower 
corporate tax rate of 5% and 10% than countries X and Z while in B it is lower by 15% and 
20%. Both questionnaires present an overall more attractive country Z and equivalent 
countries X and Y if all the variables have the same weight in the perception of respondents. 
The answers for question 7.1 are shown in Table 6.3: 5 and the choice of the determinants that 
justified the choice of the country is presented in Table 6.3: 6. 
The first thing to note is that despite the overall advantage of country Z, country Y was 
preferred by more respondents in both questionnaires. This means that the variables are not 
perceived to have equal weight. Country Y tops in two variables when compared with the 
other countries: “Corporate tax rate” and “Legal system”. But given that “Legal system” has 
the same level of efficiency in countries Y and Z the corporate tax rate seems to be the main 
reason for the choice of country Y as a place for the firm to invest. This is also seen by the 
variables indicated as reasons for the choice. The perception of respondents thus confirms the 
higher relevance of taxation for FDI location decision inside a market as empirically 
confirmed by Devereux and Griffith (1998).    
The second thing is that the answer to question 7 contradicts that of questions 5 and 6 where 
“Good infrastructures” received a higher ranking than “Low business taxes”. If the ordering 
was the same in question 7, country Z would have to be the chosen one. Some possible 
explanations for this difference can be suggested. 
The first is the different context, possibly associated with the European Union, which may 










the 15 countries (at the time of the questionnaire) are similarly developed regarding the 
remaining variables. The second is the existing qualification of the variables in question 7. 
Instead of having only the variables, as in questions 5 and 6, they are qualified (e.g. 
reasonable, good, and very good). In the case of taxation, which seems to be the more relevant 
variable in question 7, its value is explicitly stated. Thus, it seems that the difference of 10% 
and 20% in taxation is the main reason why more respondents chose Y instead of Z.  
A further explanation for the change in the perceptions of respondents is that of a higher 
association of business taxes with firm’s FDI decisions due to the “public opinion” context. In 
question 7, the perspective is that of the firm investing abroad where the number of variables 
was reduced to seven and a “real” context and “real” values were given to them. Given that 
this context can also be favourable to a “bias” towards business taxation, if these variables are 
assumed to be more relevant within a market, the influence of the so-called public perception 
should not be disregarded. 
Table 6.3: 7 - Chance of changing FDI decision – question 8
Answers Questionnaire A (5%-10%) Questionnaire B (15%-20%) 
question 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.2 
Mean 51.0588 66.556 55.3846 62.6786 
Standard deviation 23.69 23.42 18.90 19.36 
Minimum 7 8 10 15 
Maximum 100 100 90 100 
Valid 51 (58,6%) 36 (41,4%) 39 (58,2%) 28 (41,8%) 
Finally, question 8 aims to understand how changes in corporate tax rates would affect 
investment decisions in the perception of respondents. This is an attempt for respondents to 
value the corporate tax rate in a FDI decision context by considering the chance of changing 
the location from the actual place to a different country with a lower level of taxation. In a 
similar magnitude to question 7 questionnaire A presents a change of 5% (question 8.1) and 
10% (question 8.2) from an initial rate of 20% while questionnaire B presents a change of 
15% and 20% from an initial rate of 40%. Table 6.3: 7 shows the results in both 
questionnaires. 
It can be observed that the chance stated by respondents is very high in all four cases, always 










differences between EU countries with higher and lower corporate tax rates, that would mean 
that, according to respondents, more than half of the FDI destined to countries with higher tax 
rates inside the EU would be about to be changed to lower tax countries such as the new 
members from Eastern Europe. 
This is consistent with question 7 when indicating that respondents give a high value to the 
corporate tax rate in FDI decisions, and it contradicts the results of the previous questions, 
especially of question 5. However, and contrary to question 7, in question 8 the larger 
difference from questionnaire A to B in the corporate tax rate between the actual location and 
the potential new location does not alter the outcome. But the fact that the importance of 
business taxation seems to be overvalued in comparison to the previous questions 
reinforces the idea that external influences such as newspapers, where neoclassical 
literature surely is an input, have a significant weight. 
6.4 – A natural quasi-experiment 
The natural quasi-experiment is essentially based on a comparison between the answers of a 
group of managers without professional knowledge of FDI determinants (No group) with 
another group with knowledge on FDI decisions (Yes group). The aim is to understand the 
effective role of business taxes in FDI decisions. The respondents have the following 
characteristics (Annex 4.5 presents a characterization of the two groups): 
Table 6.4: 1 – Origin of respondents 
Respondents – Quasi-experiment Yes group No group 
Portugal 17 13 
Other countries 13 16 
Total 30 29 
The results of question 5 are shown below, in Table 6.4: 2. The two groups were requested to 
rank 23 determinants of FDI in a developed country. The answer to question 5 shows that, 
according to the perception of respondents, “Low business taxes” is not one of the main 
variables explaining FDI decisions. It is in the second half, of 23 variables considered. 







“Yes” group valued this variable, on average, at 6.6 and the “No” group at 6.19. Despite the 
higher value given by managers with FDI experience both groups are below the general 
survey result of 6.88. 
Table 6.4: 2 – Ranking of the determinants of FDI in a developed country 
Rank Yes Mean value of the answers – Question 5 Rank No 
1 Large market size 2 
2 Efficient legal system 3 
3 High growth rate of the market 4 
5 Few restrictions on capital movements 12 
5 Low cost of capital 13 
6 High purchasing power (GDP per capita) 1 
7 Highly-skilled labour 5 
8 Exchange rate stability 12 
9 Low levels of corruption 7 
10 Weak local competition 17 
11 Available supply of labour 8 
12 Low business taxes 15 
13 Appropriate technology 9 
14 Good infrastructure (roads, etc.) 10 
16 Stable government 6 
16 Good schools and hospitals for employees 14 
17 Democratic political system 16 
18 Weak trade union influence 18 
19 Low labour costs 20 
20 Low energy costs 23 
21 Low levels of environmental regulation 21 
22 Cultural affinity (e.g. Same language) 19 
23 Plentiful raw materials (minerals, etc.) 22 
Given the small difference existing between both groups (“Yes” and “No”) the behavioural 
hypothesis that FDI knowledge would mean a lower relevance for business taxes fails to be 
confirmed. In the same sense the lower rank of taxation does not vindicate the simplified 
approach of tax competition theory. 
A comparison between the answers of the three groups (students and managers) confirms that 
the perceptions are not very different (Table 6.4: 3). However, as it happened with students, 









                                                          
Question 6 (Annex 4.6, table 1) confirms the general survey outcome regarding the relative 
importance of business taxation. The Yes group ranked “Low business taxes” in 5th place 
while the no group ranked it in 3rd, that is significantly lower than in question 5, and thus both 
consider that it is more relevant from the perspective of a government attracting FDI than 
from a firm investing abroad. The same occurred with students.  
                        Table 6.4: 3 – Comparison of answers to question 54 
Pairs of ranks Pearson’s R Approx T Sig. Spearman Approx T Sig. 
Yes group – No gr. 0.909 10.012 .000 0.811 6.355 .000 
Yes gr. – Students 0.865 7.914 .000 0.762 5.388 .000 
No group -
Students 
0.884 8.677 .000 0.879 8.434 .000 
Nr. of cases: 23 
Therefore with respect to the government’s view all the respondents seem to share the public 
perception of FDI determinants where, according to the three searches, there is a bias towards 
taxation. This is shown by comparing the answers of question 5 to those of question 6. Both 
students and managers think that governments should give a disproportional (to the 
interest of firms) weight to business taxes in their policies to attract investment. From
question 5 to question 6 the rank of “Low business taxes” moves from 10º to 6º in the answers 
of students and from 12º to 6º and 15º to 3º, respectively in the answers of the “Yes” and the 
“No” groups. Moreover, the same does not happen with other variables manageable by 
governments (e.g. “Good infrastructures”, “Exchange rate stability”, “Efficient legal system” 
or “Few Restrictions on capital Movements”). This is in line with the notion that business 
taxation has a lot of “newspaper” appeal and thus it is more associated with governmental 
policy. 
However, despite the close relationship existing between the values of the 3 groups of 
respondents (Yes, No and Students) in questions 5 and 6, confirmed by correlation 
coefficients, there is no connection between the answers of managers and the searches 
presented in 6.1 (Annex 4.6, Tables 2 and 3, and Figure 1). 
On the other hand, the outcome clearly shows the influence of FDI theory in the answers. In 
the case of theoretical knowledge, the expected answers would indicate the importance of a 











large number of determinants when a firm is deciding to invest abroad. Theory does not state 
any specific ranking for the determinants, and given that all of them were related with the host 
country conditions, the answers would depend on the perceptions of each respondent. But 
given that students and managers gave a similar ranking to taxation the experience-based 
view of professionals seems to be not relevant, in questionnaires, for a better understanding of 
investment decisions.  
In question 7 the firm’s perspective is reconsidered for a restricted set of variables within an 
economic area. Contrary to the survey, in this case only questionnaire B, where a more 
attractive country Z and equivalent countries X and Y (if the variables are perceived to have 
the same weight) are presented, was applied. Country Y has a lower corporate tax rate by 15% 
and 20% in comparison with countries X and Z, respectively.  
Table 6.4: 4 – Country location in an economic area: Question 7.1
Yes – Frequency Yes – % No - Frequency No – % 
Country X 9 30.0 5 17.2 
Country Y 12 40.0 15 51.8 
Country Z 9 30.0 9 31.0 
Total 30 100.0 29 100.0 
The answers show that the No group is more sensitive to business taxation than the Yes group 
but the later also chose Country Y. The determinants that justified the choice of the country, 
according to the perception of respondents, are reported in annex 4.6, table 4, and confirms
the higher relevance of “Low business taxes”. Although this clearly contradicts questions 5 
and 6, where “Efficient legal system” was considered more important for a FDI decision than 
taxation, it confirms the importance of taxation within a single market.  
Finally, question 8 reveals how changes in corporate tax rates would affect firm’s investment 
decisions in the perception of respondents. Table 6.4: 5 below shows the results of answers to 
question 8.1 for both questionnaires. 
It can be observed that when the difference in the tax rate is higher (questionnaire B) the 
average chance of changing FDI decision is higher only for the Yes group which gives a 
much greater importance to corporate tax rates when the difference is 15%. In both cases the 










most of respondents give a high value to the corporate tax rate in FDI decisions. These results 
are confirmed in question 8.2 although the Yes group reduces the difference between the 
means to 53 and 59 in questionnaires A and B, respectively, when the difference is 10% and 
20%. But the outcome may be affected by the low number of responses in each situation. 
Table 6.4: 5 - Chance of changing FDI decisions – question 8.1 
Answers Yes group No group 
Quest. A (5%) Quest. B (15%) Quest. A (5%) Quest. B (15%) 
Mean 43.92 65.00 44.64 40.66 
St. deviation 20.58 24.35 25.53 27.50 
Minimum 5 25 20 5 
Maximum 80 100 100 100 
Valid 14 16 14 15 
The main conclusions of the quasi-experiment are the greater importance of business taxes 
from the perspective of jurisdictions, those that are able to change them, in comparison with 
firms and in a context of an economic union between developed countries. These results 
confirm those of the general survey. But the outcome is clearly affected by FDI theory while 
the role of the public perception about the impact of taxation in FDI decisions is not 
conclusive. 
It is not clear, however, if this is a sufficient explanation for the relevance given to taxation by 
the three groups of respondents. Managers were expected to be less sensitive to the media 
than students due to higher maturity in terms of working experience. But the results of the 
experiment are not totally conclusive not only on this but also regarding the difference 
between those with and without FDI related experience. In question 5 the Yes group gives a 
higher (although marginal) mark to “Low business taxes”, contradicting the initial hypothesis. 
Given that these respondents have a better knowledge of FDI decisions a lower mark was 
expected. In question 6 the mark is similar, although the ranking is now higher in the No 
group. Question 7, on the other hand, shows that the No group is more sensitive to taxation 
while question 8 shows the opposite. Therefore, given that the corporate tax rate has no lower 
relevance in the answers of managers with FDI experience in comparison with those without 







6.5 - Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to assess the perception of respondents about the 
determinants of foreign investment decisions and to understand the role of business taxation 
in these decisions. First, newspapers and the world wide web showed that there is a public 
perception that tends to overvalue the importance of taxation in FDI decisions. Therefore, the 
initial hypothesis was this overvaluation would have an effect on the answers to 
questionnaires about this subject. The results presented in this chapter seem to confirm that 
taxation is one among many variables important to FDI (questions 5 and 6 in the 
questionnaire) and there is weak evidence of the “public perception” bias towards 
taxation when FDI is the subject (questions 7 and 8). 
It is found that, according to respondents’ perceptions, business taxes help to explain FDI 
decisions although it is not a very important variable (in a group of 23). This is in line with 
FDI theory and it confirms that the tax competition model is too simplistic. It is also seen that 
FDI theory has an impact in the public perception despite the supposedly exaggerated 
relevance of business taxes in the latter. 
A different confirmation is that business taxes are perceived to be better able to act as a 
governmental tool to attract foreign investment than as a key variable for firms in FDI 
decisions. Both groups, students and managers, agreed on it. Although this is expected given 
that taxation is a tool in the hands of public officials, its relevance is more clear when other 
variables managed by governments are not perceived in the same way and when the 
difference in tax rates between the possible locations is higher (question 7). Thus, it indicates 
an overvaluation of taxation in governmental policies when compared with the perspective of 
firms. The public perception “bias” may explain this overvaluation.  
Moreover, taxes seem to be more relevant when firms have to make FDI location decisions 
within a single market than between different countries/markets as theory predicts (Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998). The higher ranking given by students to the relevance of “business taxes” 
when the decision to invest abroad is between developed countries agrees with this if one 
thinks of the EU. But the hypothesis that a bias in favour of taxation as a FDI determinant 






An unexpected outcome is the small difference between the ranks of taxation generated by the 
answers of students and managers with or without FDI experience. The behavioural 
hypothesis that managers with FDI experience would consider taxation as less relevant 
is not supported. This is also seen by the very low rank given to the only behavioural 
variable included in the questionnaire, “cultural affinity”, and it signals that managers are 
affected by the public opinion independently of their working experience. 
Therefore, the questions about the rationality of FDI decisions and the real importance of 
business taxes remain to be confirmed. Because it is not possible to know the level of both the 
public perception’s and FDI theory’s impact on the answers, further work is needed to 
provide a better understanding of the role of taxation and to secure support for the validity of 











Chapter 7 – Findings from the FDI activity of firms 
The aim of this chapter is to better understand how FDI location decisions are made and if 
they are consistent with the assumptions and results of the bulk of the literature on foreign 
investment. Consideration of behavioural rules (as FDI determinants) adds to the literature 
presented in chapter 3 where two main issues (revenue increase and cost efficiency) were 
presented as the explanation for firms to invest abroad.  
This chapter starts with the main hypotheses to be tested about the existence of bounded 
behaviour and the role of behavioural rules as an explanation of FDI decisions. The analysis 
is focused on the rationality of decision makers and on how the C-D (Heiner) model is able to 
explain their behaviour in FDI operations. Evidence is then considered within the proposed 
approach. A test of the behavioural model is presented in order to assess its usefulness for this 
dissertation. The chapter concludes with a review of the explanations of FDI location 
decisions. 
7.1 - Hypotheses 
This chapter uses the above presented methodology to understand how FDI location decisions 
are made and to check the correspondent hypotheses. These are based on the behavioural 
approach. The general idea is that maximization and economic rationality is prevented by 
bounded behaviour and by the use of behavioural rules. 
Behavioural and experimental economics have established that managers use several rules of 
thumb when making decisions and thus systematically repeat errors that prevent 
maximization. This happens irrespective of the degree of competitiveness faced by firms. In 
other words, managers are not able to learn from past experiences in all situations and so the 
wedge between their behaviour and the optimality conditions of neoclassical models may be 
even larger than what Simon and others have predicted. The use of rules of behaviour is 














H1 - The higher the uncertainty the more frequent is the use of rules of behaviour 
This is the main prediction of the Heiner model and it will be tested by using country ratings 
and the level of internationalization as proxies to uncertainty. 
Furthermore, firms are not fully optimizing agents because their managers are not totally 
rational decision makers and thus make decisions inconsistent with maximization. Therefore, 
they are at best able to “satisfies” (i.e., to achieve a bounded rationality). The behavioural 
approach acknowledges the capacity of agents to improve their behaviour but only up to a 
point. The point setting the capacity of firms to make economically rational decisions is 
explained in terms of the existence of a limit in the abilities of their managers to deal with 
information (Simon, 1955). Thus the second main hypothesis is  
H2 - Firms are not able to follow a maximizing behaviour in all situations 
A consequence of H2 is that bounded behaviour in FDI decisions is not in accordance with 
maximization objectives as generally assumed by the tax competition and FDI literatures. 
Furthermore, and because the behavioural approach predicts that decisions are closely 
influenced by the use of rules of behaviour, these rules are also expected to explain 
investments abroad. This leads to  
H3 – FDI location decisions are explained by rules of behaviour and not dependent on 
maximization objectives
That is, behavioural variables are able to explain the exact location chosen by each firm to 
invest. 
7.2 - Results 
Chapter 4 considers three main hypotheses related to firms’ behaviour in FDI operations. 












(H2 and H3) assumption and finishing with a test of the Heiner model (H1). This inversion of 
the order allows for a detailed presentation of behavioural rules before testing the model. 
7.2.1 – Bounded procedures and needless assumptions 
The neo-classical literature assumes that economic agents have the will to maximize even if 
they are not able to do so. In this sense, firms and managers are supposed to make rational 
decisions so that profit maximization is achieved sooner or later by surviving firms. This is 
also what is supposed to happen in FDI location decisions partially explained by tax variables. 
Managers are expected to choose the location where the marginal productivity of capital is 
higher due to a lower tax burden. Even if it does not happen in the beginning of the 
internationalization process, the pressure from competition and the ability to learn would 
make it happen afterwards for the survival firms because the number of bounded procedures 
would be reduced to a minimum.
Given the insights provided by behavioural economics it can be inferred that the neoclassical 
theory does not tell us the whole story. As Simon proposed, decision makers are only able to 
achieve a bounded rationality. This is due to the incapacity of the human brain to aggregate 
all the knowledge and information needed to make a purely rational decision even with the 
support of modern technologies. Three possible hypotheses are going to be checked so that 
the existence of bounded rationality and the prevention of maximization in FDI operations are 
confirmed. 
7.2.1.1 – The ability to maximize 
Contrary to the assumption of neoclassical theory, firms and managers may not be able to 
maximize or do not have maximization as an objective. Chapter 4 presents four sub-
hypotheses (H2a1 to H2a4) that are now considered. 
The behavioural approach sees managers as users of simplification strategies in their decision 
making due to uncertainty. That is, managers are, many times, inconsistent in their FDI 
decisions. A first question, then, is whether firms have a clear strategy, focused on the long 












clear strategy is essential for all levels in a firm to know in which direction they should move. 

Without it, employees more easily embrace their own goals and forget those of the firm
 
(Simon, 1991, p. 37). Given that all firms have presented evidence of a strategic focus in 

the long term, considered by respondents from 3 to 5 years, H2a1 is not confirmed. 

The second sub-hypothesis concerns the will of managers and firms towards maximization. 

The goal is to understand if managers are rational and search for maximization of the actual 

net value of expected returns, as stated by neoclassical theory, or, if FDI is located where 

corporate tax rates are lower, as tax competition predicts. Otherwise, managers are not fully 

rational maximizers and behavioural theories are needed to explain firms’ activities.  

Firms often have several objectives including some that are not publicly stated and do not 

coincide with those known by the market. Therefore, it is assumed here that the most 

important goals are those underlined by interviewees. These are valid for the firm as a whole 

and not only for FDI. But given that FDI is included in firms’ activities, one should expect 

that a rational manager sets its objectives in line with those of the firm.  

The stated objectives of the firm were coded within the following possible options (Cyert and 

March, 1963, p. 9, 10): 

1 - To maximize expected returns. 





3 - There is more than one important quantitative objective or the main goal is different than 1 

and 2: market share, market diversification, size, etc. 

4 - There are also important qualitative objectives. 

5 - Both 2, 3, and 4. 

The results are presented in Table 7.2.1.1: 1. 

Table 7.2.1.1: 1 - Objectives of the firm 
Answer code 1 2 3 4 5 





- There are no firms with the explicit objective of maximizing future earnings or profits. The 
word maximizing was only used once (firm 15) referring to shareholder value. The 
commonest answers referred to the creation of shareholder value and minimum level of 
return. 
- The interviewee that mentioned maximization as an objective also referred to the annual 
plans of the holding (the investment allocation for all the sub-holdings of the group). This is 
done by considering the profitability potential of each business. But despite the differences in 
this potential capital is allocated to all sub-holdings, even those that have more than 10 years 
of losses (such as ‘newspaper edition’ in that specific case). 
- All firms aim to achieve a minimum profitability. These objectives are defined by 
interviewees with reference to an industry benchmark, business maturity, risk evaluation, 
market characteristics and competition and, in some cases, have the specific concern to be 
superior to the market interest rate. 
- Four firms (8, 10, 11 and 14) explicitly mentioned that the growth objective (size) in 
international terms was the main concern in the short to medium term and losses were 
admitted (profits were secondary in importance).    
- Two of the interviewees (3 and 11) explicitly stated that profits are only a necessary 
condition to achieve their objectives. Firm 3: “Profitability is not an objective, it is a pre­
condition to develop (the firm) in the medium to long term. The development (of the firm) is 
based on three strategic areas: product and operational quality, which is the main objective, 
research and development and internationalization”. Firm 11 said: “we have invested in the 
UK in 1984 but with the aim of channelling our production in Portugal. The goal to have an 
higher profitability was not there. And, nowadays, that is still our aim”. 
It may be concluded, then, that firms have not the explicit objective of maximizing profits 
although a minimum level of return is considered by all interviewees as one of their aims. It 
might be argued that even without explicitly referring to the maximization objective, firms do 
implicitly try to attain it. But the making of some non-maximizing decisions clears these 
doubts (Box 1, Annex 5.1). Some of these decisions are explained by interviewees for 
commercial reasons - firm 1. But other cases do not have a comprehensible reason. Firm 5 has 
a small investment in China, with fixed costs, that is not operating. And the same firm owns 







a very small market). Firm 11 relied completely on the host government cooperation for the 
success of its investment. The operation failed with the end of cooperation and no return came 
from it. 
These are clear signs that there is a wedge between full rational procedures and bounded 
rationality, where several obstacles prevent maximization to be achieved. Moreover, the aim 
of a minimum level of profitability seems to operate as a barrier to maximization, at least 
in some firms (3, 11 and 15), and H2a2 is confirmed. 
H2a3 considers how FDI decisions in a firm are made. A group decision is assumed to be 
better than an individual one due to the pooling of information (Einhorn et al, 1977, p. 168, 
and Hinsz et al, 1997, p. 52, 53). Given that it was not possible to observe firms in their 
decision process, the coding for the content analysis was done based on the existing 
relationship between members of the board (or the decision group) and shareholders. By 
individual decisions we consider those firms that are in reality family owned businesses. The 
5% limit is explained by the fact that members of the board usually own shares of the firm (as 
fringe benefits) but always below that amount. A shareholder with more than 5% of the shares 
usually has the right to have a representative on the board and is considered a significant 
shareholder. The identifying codes are presented in a way where 1 has a lower and 4 a higher 
expected performance:   
1 - Group decision when the Portuguese state is a significant shareholder (for example when it 
has a golden share) and influences strategic decisions. 
2 - Individual decision when the main shareholder is a member of the board and owns directly 
or indirectly, through family association, more than 50% of the equity. 
3 -Individual decision when one of the main shareholders is a member of the board and owns 
directly or indirectly, through family associations, less than 50% and more than 5% of the 
equity. 
4 - Group decision when the firm is public. 
The results are presented in Table 7.2.1.1: 2. 
Table 7.2.1.1: 2 - Decision making 
Answer code 1 2 3 4 










Only three of the firms are pure public ones and, thus, supposedly have a group decision 
process where all the information is pooled and the different options are analysed and openly 
discussed. However, this does not mean that the remaining firms do not follow the same
process given that all of them have been successful in their sectors of activity (at least in the 
home market). They all have several board members that may participate in the decision 
process even if the final decision is made by one of them, the CEO. There are three firms 
where the Portuguese state participates by nominating the chairman and some or all the 
members of the board. These have or have had, in the recent past, a monopoly component in 
their domestic market (energy, telecommunications and banking).  
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One way to assess the relevance of the decision making process is to relate it with the 
outcome of FDI operations. Graph 7.2.1.1: 1 shows, for 66 cases, the decision making process 
and the percentage of FDI operations with a level of profits (in percentage of total assets) 
above that of the consolidated accounts of the firm. A positively sloped relationship should be 
expected between the two variables given the expected performance presented above. 
Although all of them have been successful in domestic terms, most firms present worst results 
abroad than the consolidated ones (domestic and abroad). But there is some evidence of 
public firms (code 4) being closer to maximization than those owned by a family/individual 













A related hypothesis is firms in a monopolistic position to be regarded as being further away 
from maximization (Hicks, 1935). In this context markets are classified according to a high or 
low monopolistic position of the firm in its main market in Portugal (Table 7.2.1.1: 3). The 
monopolistic position is directly related to the high or low market share of the firm.
A high monopolistic position is usually associated with less competition and higher profits in 
the domestic market. Therefore, these firms are expected to relax and to present worst results 
abroad, that is, a lower percentage of FDI operations with a return on assets above the value 
registered in the consolidated accounts. From Table 3 it is not possible to fully confirm this 
although stronger monopolistic positions (high) register a low number of operations with high 
profitability. Therefore, H2a3 is at least partially confirmed. 
Table 7.2.1.1: 3 – Monopolistic position in firm’s main markets 
Firm Market Position % FDI above 
consolidated 
1 Cork High n.a. 
2 Banking Low 16.66 % 
3 Pharmaceuticals Low 0 
4 Banking Low 75 % 
5 Banking Low 25 % 
6 Energy High 25 %
7 Paper distribution Low 0 
8 Retail Low 0 
9 Construction Low 33.33 % 
10 Telecommunications High 0 
11 Automobile Low 33.33 % 
12 Cement High 0 
13 Wine Low 0 
14 Wood products Low 50 % 
15 Retail Low 0 
16 Highway operator High n.a. 
17 Banking Low 25 % 
Source: 66 FDI operations 
Finally, with respect to H2a4 the study was not able to confirm if managers and firms’ 
objectives are compatible. Managers always assumed an institutional position and referred 








7.2.1.2 – Imperfect information 
A second sign of the lack of full rationality in decision making is the collection and 
processing of information. One usual assumption of FDI and tax competition models is the 
access, by firms, to perfect information. But information is not perfectly available in FDI 
decision making and firms respond imperfectly to it for five main reasons (H2b1 to H2b5 – 
Chapter 4). 
The standard tax competition model assumes the access to perfect information but none of the 
firms interviewed have collected all the relevant information. For instance, firms defined their 
potential markets where to invest on the basis of a pre-selection that ignored the majority of 
the available locations. This pre-selection varies with the firm and is based in different criteria 
such as the geography, referred to by most of the firms, the size of the market, presence of 
customers or markets where the firm already exports. Given that this selection is based on a 
group of diversified range of alternatives that satisfied a determined set of conditions and that 
all the alternatives are not obvious in terms of outcome (a priori it is hard to know with 
certainty which alternatives are preferable), it is at least possible that the best locations are 
excluded every time a FDI decision is made.  
The perfect information assumption is also weakened by the actions of several firms. FDI 
decisions are assumed to be based on expectations about outcomes, opportunity costs and 
potential and actual competitor’s threats (Cyert and March, 1963, ch. 4). Therefore, rational 
agents are expected to collect information with the aim of maximization and within the 
overall strategy of the firm. In this sense, firms should use common indicators when 
collecting information such as general economic and business activity, legal and fiscal 
information or political stability, and use established criteria for the financial analysis of the 
operations. These allow for an initial expectation about outcomes of FDI operations. Local 
competition should be also considered in the analysis. But it is with reference to opportunity 
costs that information is most likely to fail.  
This is because firms also use different ways of collecting information. There are procedures 








rational procedures to collect information. First, a total of 27 (Annex 5.2) different variables 
were identified as being relevant for the decision process and all of these were used only by a 
few firms. Second, firms also use different ways of collecting information. Firm 1 bases it on 
its marketing network, sometimes from local salesman independent of the firm, while 
ignoring other markets. Firm 11 decided to invest in the UK due to a pressure from its local 
representative: ”In 1984 our local representative was in financial difficulty and convinced us 
to invest in the UK. But the market is not an easy one and there were several years of losses”
explains the manager. Firm 2, on the other hand, uses informal connections, sometimes with 
competitors, as a way to detect investment opportunities (examples in Annex 5.1, Box 2).  
Furthermore, to reach optimal decisions managers have also to perceive correctly the 
information. However, eight cases were identified where perceptions or the handling of 
information prevented an optimal decision. Firm 8, for example, made a bad decision when 
entering the Polish market by wrongly associating habits of consumption in Germany and 
Poland. Manager: ”I did travel throughout the country in the beginning of the 1990’s, trying 
to speak with consumers when they spoke German, and did reach the conclusion that their 
habits of consumption were very similar to those of Germany - where I had worked in 1957 
and 1958”. But the firm started in Poland with a cash-and-carry business, where retailers are 
supposed to buy large quantities of goods. However, in 1994 the Poles did not have large cars 
(or they did not have a car at all) to transport goods from large to smaller shops and store 
them. Moreover, consumers needed smaller shops and closer to home. The firm changed the 
strategy after 1997 by heavily investing in discount supermarkets. 
Firms 8 and 15, on the other hand, decided to acquire knowledge of a foreign market through 
a FDI operation. Firm 8 invested in the UK in an area that differed from the core business but 
failed because of ”… their culture. It was very difficult for us to adapt to the English culture. 
We were not able to learn”. Firm 15 tried to gain experience in the Portuguese and the 
Spanish markets simultaneously through the introduction of two new shop concepts. There 
was the perception that the market was similar, in both Portugal and Spain. But the firm
undervalued the competitiveness of the Spanish market and after a few years left with losses 










It is clear that firms do not have access to all the information needed and some procedures to 
collect it and the way managers perceive it and respond are not completely rational. Both 
H2b1 and H2b2 are confirmed and only a bounded rationality is possible. 
After its collection and perception, financial information is handled by interviewed firms in a 
similar way. All firms utilize established criteria to analyse the financial feasibility of FDI 
operations, mainly the discount cash flow and industry multiples. Therefore, H2b3 is not 
confirmed. 
Risk is frequently present in decision making and its influence on the behaviour of economic 
agents varies with the characteristics of investors. Nevertheless, it may lead to situations 
where maximization is denied when it is wrongly perceived and evaluated in decision making 
or is dealt with in a biased way. This happens if a firm could achieve the same profitability 
with a lower risk or a higher profitability with the same risk (Markowitz, 1952). That is, when 
just an approximation of optimality is achievable.  
A total of 9 situations were identified where risk policies were biased. In some cases 
maximization was prevented because the firm suffered losses due to a failure to mitigate risk. 
Firm 10 had an accumulation of unpaid debt from the Angolan state throughout the years but, 
despite using MIGA investment insurance provided by the World Bank when operating in 
other African countries, it never did in the case of Angola. The manager says: “We think that 
Angola is now more stable politically than most of the countries in the region, except 
Botswana and Namibia, and we have a privileged cultural relationship and very good 
connections, through the Portuguese state, with the local authorities”. However, this 
“privileged relationship” did not prevent the firm from pardoning 75% of the credits on the 
Angolan state. 
In other examples although there was no loss the risk was too high to avoid a mitigation 
policy. Firm 3 is not mitigating the risk of a huge investment in research despite the danger of 
bankruptcy and the decision to invest abroad (a double financial effort) being justified by the 
need to increase sales to pay for the investment (Annex 5.1, Box 3). These examples confirm 










The interviews also showed that all firms, except one, have some type of concern in terms of 
risk diversification, although there is no consensual empirical support for its importance as a 
determinant of FDI in the literature (Markusen, 1995, p. 171). Firm 4, a bank, has no financial 
participations abroad besides the affiliates. They only have a portfolio of participations in 
Portuguese corporations. The portfolio is not geographically diversified due to perceived 
access to better information about the Portuguese market and not because of profitability. And 
firm 5 opened in New York in order to be able to participate in syndicated loans and other 
financial operations where the volume is huge although the spread is thin. This allows an 
asset diversification but with a reduced return. 
According to the Markowitz model both firms are not maximizing if they can get a higher 
return for the same risk. In the first case the Portuguese stock market was less profitable than 
other markets in developed countries between 2000 and 2004 (Bloomberg, 2007) meaning 
that, most probably, other more profitable investments were available in the same period. In 
the second case there may also be other markets with similar risk and volume but higher 
spreads. However, given that there is no information about the exact investments of both 
firms it is not possible to confirm H2b1. Examples are presented in Annex 5.1 (Box 3) 
7.2.1.3 – Simple evidence and conclusions 
The interviewees provided several examples of non maximizing behaviour. From a data 
source of 112 operations, 26 situations were detected as not purely rational and preventing 
maximization of expected returns. They are divided as follows:  
a) Ability to maximize: 5  
b) Relevant information not perfectly available: 4  
c) Imperfect response to information: 17  
However, it can be argued these examples are insufficient to reach a conclusion about the 
ability of firms to have a maximizing behaviour. Managers, as any human being, are always 
prone to errors and able to learn and correct their procedures and decisions so that, with time 










Neoclassical theory states that the higher the degree of competitiveness the lower the number 
of bounded situations to be found in a FDI operation in all situations. That is, although 
bounded situations exist and prevent maximization, time and learning should diminish them
towards a maximizing behaviour. Thus the expected outcome is the longer the period of 
investment the lower the expected number of bounded situations.   
In opposition to that perspective, the behavioural view is tested by forming a variable named 
“Numbounded” where all detected bounded situations are included. The objective is to assess 
the direction of the association between the exposure of each firm to a higher degree of 
competition, measured through the level of internationalization, and the number of detected 
bounded situations (H2c). The expected outcome is the number of bounded situations to be 
not totally explained by rational behaviour arising from the pressure of competition but also 
by behaviour bounded from economic rationality. Considering: 
H0: The degree of competitiveness is inversely related with the number of bounded situations 
H1: The degree of competitiveness is not inversely related with the number of bounded 
situations 
Where the level of internationalization acts as a proxy to the degree of competitiveness and is 
a firm level variable measured by (Annex 5.3):  
- Nº of years abroad: 1 point per each year and 15 points for 15 or more years of presence 
abroad up to the end of 2004. 
- Percentage of sales and of employees abroad: 3 points per each 20% class (0-20%: 3; 20­
40%: 6; and so on up to 80-100%: 15) 
- Nº of markets where the firm has a FDI operation – 1 point per each market 
The final scale is an average of the 4 items where the higher the value the higher the level of 
internationalization of the firm. 
The graph shows the relationship between these two variables. For the null hypothesis to 
occur a line with a negative slope is expected. However, the slope of the trend is positive and 
thus the null hypothesis, based on the available observations, can be rejected. 
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Given this result it can be seen that, at least in certain situations, the competitive pressure is 
not sufficient to guarantee that firms behave as if maximizing because FDI decisions are 
many times inconsistent with maximization objectives. This does not mean that the degree of 
competitiveness does not help firms to be more efficient. It only says that there are 
circumstances where despite the will or the ability to maximize being not present and the 
access to information being too imperfect firms may keep on competing in the market without 
improving their behaviour in a neoclassical sense.  
This is in accordance with the findings of the previous paragraphs where it is confirmed that 
firms do not always aim to maximize future earnings as economic theory usually assumes. 
Firm 3 is the clearest example but all firms have a set of different goals and, as previously 
shown, some of their decisions also prevent maximization. Moreover, the aim of a minimum
level of profitability may act, in some cases, as a barrier to maximization. Imperfect 
information and imperfect response to information also introduce a wedge between optimal 
and bounded behaviour. Therefore, firms and managers are not always rational, although 
profitability is an important objective. Managers, are, as Simon puts it, only “satisficing” and 
achieving a “bounded rationality” and it can be concluded that there is a gap in the context of 
the C-D model. The consequence is that the optimization assumptions of neoclassical 
theory are not needed to understand firms’ behaviour in FDI location decisions. 
Nevertheless these conclusions should be carefully read given the very small number of cases 
available and the related impossibility to perform statistical tests. These results are based on 





                       
 
   
   
   
   














used. Therefore, the results indicate that firms are not able to indefinitely improve their 
behaviour towards maximization (H2).  
7.2.2 – Behavioural rules 
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Table 7.2.2: 2 – Rules of Behaviour in FDI location decisions 
FDI locations Number of firms 
1 - Decision to invest abroad 20 
Mental accounting 20 4 
2 - Location decision 140 
Learning 10 7 
Inconsistency 45 9 
Herding 23 14 
Cascading 4 4 
Anchoring 43 12 
Overconfidence 3 3 










The third hypothesis concerns the aim to identify the relevance of behavioural rules in 
explaining FDI location decisions. The use of these rules are expected to motivate firms to 
choose external markets. Although managers consistently follow them, they are not in 
accordance with what profit maximization requires. This hypothesis adds to the FDI literature 
presented in chapter 3 where two main reasons, revenue increase and cost efficiency, are 
presented as the explanation for investments abroad to occur. 
There was an identification of 175 situations (Table 7.2.2: 1 divides them as per the taxonomy 
presented in chapter 4 and Annex 5.4 allocates them per firm) where behavioural rules were 
followed but their different types should be qualified. The first type includes rules related to 
the location decision made by the firm, that is, Learning, Herding, Anchoring, Cascading, a 
share of Inconsistency (45), Overconfidence and Fairness in a total of 140 situations. Then, 
there are rules explaining the decision to invest abroad but not the exact location, namely 
Mental accounting (20). Table 7.2.2: 2 presents them. The remaining 15 rules are specific of 
the firm. 
The inconsistencies in the table are regarded as behavioural rules in the sense that they are 
kept throughout the years. The non-strategic “anomalies” (except those due to governmental 
intervention) are presented within the rules of intrinsic nature (7.2.2.1), although they also 
include extrinsic ones. The remaining inconsistencies are introduced below (7.2.2.2). In both 
cases the presentation follows the time span. 
7.2.2.1 – Rules of intrinsic nature 
Managers, as human beings, are not always intrinsically consistent and follow several 
behavioural rules, with reference to the past, the present and the future, that prevent 
optimization (H3a1 to H3a5). Those originating in the past comprehend the inability to learn 
and mental accounting. 
Although learning helps managers to improve the way they deal with information and make 
decisions (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 123), maximization is not achievable when prior and 
imperfect procedures are continuously used in current decisions. The way to avoid the errors 







“improvements” in FDI location decisions were found in the interviews. For example, the 
evaluation of FDI operations has significantly evolved since the 1990’s and all firms are now 
using established criteria such as the Discount Cash Flow and Market Multiples (Annex 5.1, 
Box 4). 
However, a few examples of the opposite were also identified. Seven of the interviewed firms 
did not use their previous experience, in ten different situations, in order to improve FDI 
decisions (Annex 5.1, Box 5). Firm 5 is presently engaged in a fourth venture in Brazil by 
returning to its initial role as an investment bank (Público, 4/10/2005, p. 45), although it was 
not very successful in the past. However, it recently sold its controlling share in a large 
Brazilian bank (Bandeirantes, before 2004) and its participation in one of the three largest 
Brazilian retail banks (Unibanco, after 2004), a potential source of business for the investment 
bank. Firm 8 invested in Brazil and in the UK in the second half of the 1990’s despite having 
a shortage of skilful human resources (a problem detected with the previous investment in 
Poland) to implement and manage their businesses abroad. Firm 9 had an accumulation of 
unpaid debts by the Angolan State despite knowledge of the market (where it has presence 
since 1946). It only changed its policy very recently to an approach where money should be 
received in advance. Firm 11 is trying for the third time, by following a third different 
strategy, to be successful in the UK. 
Given the presented evidence H3a1, where the use of rules of thumb originates repeated 
errors in decision making, is supported. This is a clear sign that managers are not always 
able to learn from past mistakes. Psychologists explain it as a hindsight bias where 
individuals tend to minimize the importance of past negative events through the use of ex-post 
explanations that make them seem inevitable in retrospect (Fischoff, 1982, cited by Hilton, 
2003, p. 281). They are further evidence of the failure to maximize.  
Rules of behaviour may also be directly linked with the decision to invest abroad, before the 
choice of the location. These depend on the attitude of decision makers towards risk and the 
previous situations in terms of gains and losses. This mental accounting (Thaler and Johnson, 






                                                          
In the first case a loss that is recoverable may induce risk behaviour by managers (H3a2). 
This seems to have happened with Firm 11 when further investing in a non-profitable 
business abroad. The firm invested in the UK in 1984 but the results were not satisfactory: 
“The level of profits was not good and we had several years of losses due to the negative 
impact of tourism and the difficulties of tour operators. These invested in used buses and 
destroyed the market for new ones”. In 1998 the firm made a new investment in the UK to 
produce coaches with a local partner. But despite the agreement, the joint venture was broken 
because the partner decided to joint venture with other firms. Again, market reasons explained 
the failure: “…we lost a lot of money due to market context, namely the demand for coaches 
that changed after the new investment was made”. Finally, in 2004 the firm invested again in 
the production of buses in Portugal to export to the UK and closed the production of coaches 
by transforming it in a car repairing business. The manager justifies the continuing investment 
in the UK with the possibility of channelling Portuguese production. But the fact is that, 
despite the weak results, the firm has been investing continuously since 1984.  
Risk taking behaviour may also be affected by prior gains as long as managers believe in their 
ability to limit losses (H3a3). This house money effect may explain how previous experiences 
by managers or firms affect current decisions. Namely, it can explain the amount of the 
investment, or at least an upper limit, because losses expected as possible should be below the 
previous gains. As explained above, Firm 11 is in the UK market for more than 20 years with 
accumulated losses. However, the firm is earning sufficient money in the domestic market to 
cover these losses and it uses the UK to channel its production in Portugal. Therefore, the 
investment in the UK is covered by the home gains. 
Three other firms (5, 6 and 10) had benefited from a monopoly situation in the Portuguese 
market until recently. Firm 5 had the monopoly of banking for public servants in Portugal for 
more than 20 years while firms 6 and 10 were utilities with a monopolistic position in the 
market. They were able to absorb sufficient liquidity that partially motivated and was later 
used to invest abroad. Table 7.2.2.1: 1 shows obtained profits since 1995. It may be seen that 
the return on assets of firms 6 and 10 decreases significantly in the period due to the 
liberalization of both industries1 . Firm 5, on the other hand, presented a significantly higher 




          






                                                          
financial margin than the average of the Portuguese banking sector throughout the 1990’s 
(annex 5.5). 
Table 7.2.2.1: 1 – Consolidated Profits and ROA (values in Million Euros)
Profits 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Firm 5 291.17 248.45 528.09 350.75 349.13 544.47 653.78 665.13 667.25 448.48 
Firm 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 522.79 513.94 548.97 450.83 335.22 381.11 440.15 
Firm 10 180.83 273.95 349.64 441.1 494.68 540.32 307.39 391.05 240.23 500.12 
ROA 
Firm 5 0.85% 0.68% 1.28% 0.72% 0.63% 0.87% 0.98% 1.00% 0.90% 0.64% 
Firm 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.22% 3.75% 3.69% 2.78% 1.85% 2.04% 1.95% 
Firm 10 4.31% 6.29% 7.01% 4.75% 5.81% 4.09% 1.74% 2.85% 1.77% 3.86% 
Source: Annual reports. ROA = Profits / Total assets
This is implicitly confirmed in two interviews. Firm 6 stated that ”the market was mature for 
us and the firm generated excessive cash-flows for our needs in Portugal. Thus, we needed to 
invest abroad”. The same happened with firms 5 and 10. Moreover, the manager of firm 12 
when explaining the internationalization policy of a direct competitor (not included in this 
study): ”they had a privileged situation during the privatization of the industry (in the 1990’s)
because the state left them with a lot of money to invest abroad”. This shows how consecutive 
Portuguese governments “allowed” state owned firms to earn from their monopoly position 
and start the internationalization process before being privatized. 
The investments made by those three firms were generally less profitable than the earnings in 
the home market. Although one cannot be 100% sure that managers accepted a higher risk 
when the investments were decided, it is clear that they have been not successful for a long 
time. Firm 5 invested in Spain in 1991 and it keeps on having losses (Pinheiro-Alves, 2001). 
Firm 6 invested in Brazil in 1997 and, although is having profits now, the new management 
hired in 2002 decided to focus on the Spanish market while Brazil is still “running” but in an 
autonomous and self-financing way. Firm 10 invested in Brazil in 1998 and, despite the 
accumulated losses (table 7.2.2.1: 2)2, obtained a commercial success and this is a possible 
explanation to keep the investment. But the motivation for these firms to maintain the 
investments abroad despite the bad financial results, and besides political considerations (the 
Portuguese government still has a word in the strategy of these firms), can be understood if it 
2 In the annual report of 2002 firm 10 presented ”…an improvement in the return of the investment in Brazil” as 












is realized that the three firms have shown systematic consolidated profits in the end of each 
year (table 7.2.2.1: 1). That is, the profits obtained in Portugal, and in some other less 
important markets, are “hiding” lower profitability in the larger and “strategic” FDI 
investments made by these firms. The profits from the activity in Portugal, in a way similar to 
tax revenue for the state due to their monopolistic component, have been financing these 
losses. Thus, the losses were not large enough to cancel the profits obtained in Portugal and 
managers are, in fact, operating through a mental accounting rule. 
Table 7.2.2.1: 2 – Net income of the main strategic investments abroad 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Firm 5 Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.16 1.84 0.4 -11.7 
Firm 6 Brazil n.a. n.a -24.9* 7.25* 79.9* -20.2* -86.3* 48.1 
Firm 10 Brazil - 17.00 9.42 122.1 -519.0 -34.2 -9.88 -59.2 
Values in Million euros 
* Contribution to consolidated accounts due to absence of minority interests. 
Therefore, both H3a2 and H3a3 are confirmed and FDI decisions, a total of 20, are 
explained due to domestic profitability in three situations partially arising from the 
monopoly component. That is, while risk policies or imperfect information may put a 
boundary to maximization, mental accounting situations, as described above, are systematic 
rules followed by investors where uncertainty reduces the possibility of maximization. Bad 
financial results abroad are kept and “hidden” year after year by domestic profits.  
The heuristics originating in the present are concerned with consistency in decision making. 
A rational manager is supposed to be consistent during all the decision making process. In 
FDI operations all the decisions are supposed to be consistent with the objectives and the 
strategy of the firm.  
Despite the long term focus, firms do often make FDI decisions - and fail to correct them - not 
consistent with the strategy (H3a4). They are expending efforts and resources (financial, 
human and others) into different directions and are not fully concentrated in their main 
objectives (Schwartz, 1998, p. 145). There were 22 situations of strategic inconsistency both 
of intrinsic and extrinsic nature (presented in Table 7.2.2.1: 3 and in Annex 5.4). Firms 8 and 
15 failed diversification attempts due to the absence of a clear strategy at the time of decision. 








abroad for several years although they are not within its strategy. The reason is its 
profitability indicating that a type of “sunk costs” prevents these investments to be channelled 
to the strategic businesses of the firm. Box 6 (Annex 5.1) details these examples and thus it 
supports H3a4 by showing this inconsistent behaviour to be an obstacle to maximization. 
Table 7.2.2.1: 3 – Non-strategic investments 
Firm Nr. FDI Y=Consistent ; 
N=Strategic inconsistency 
1 9 Y=9 ; N=0 
2 12 Y=12 ; N=0 
3 1 Y=1 ; N=0 
4 5 Y=5 ; N=0 
5 15* Y=8 ; N=5 
6 5* Y=1 ; N=3 
7 8 Y=8 ; N=0 
8 3 Y=2 ; N=1 
9 8 Y=5 ; N=3 
10 17* Y=8 ; N=7 
11 6* Y=3 ; N=0 
12 4 Y=2 ; N=2 
13 2 Y=2 ; N=0 
14 2 Y=2 ; N=0 
15 2 Y=1 ; N=1 
16 1 Y=1 ; N=0 
17 12 Y=12 ; N=0 
* Investments missing due to lack of information 
The continuation of the time line also affects agents’ decisions. Overconfidence may lead to 
non-optimal decisions due to a disregard of relevant information that can cause an illusion of 
control over future events (H3a5). Brazil is an example of overconfidence about the 
knowledge of the market for the CEO of firm 8: “I knew the market (for professional reasons)
but that was the reason we made so many mistakes. The Portuguese fell in love with Brazil, 
the food, the climate. The investment was a complete nonsense given that it is a different 
market, with very strong and cash-rich local and international competition. It is not for us”. 
Despite its previous experience in that market, the CEO showed a tendency to interpret 
information in order to confirm its own pre-judgements about the operation, a confirmatory 
bias (Rabin, 1998, p. 26) and to ignore non-favourable information such as the above referred 







A different reason is the existence of mistaken beliefs or illusory correlations, in which 
decisions or rules of thumb can be based. An example is the idea that it is easier to obtain 
higher profitability in less developed countries and markets due to perceived better skills and 
abilities (Hilton, 2003, p. 275). It may be based on an excess of information that managers 
cannot handle properly or on the fact that people think they know observable facts better than 
is actually the case. This seemed to be the case of some investments in Brazil, a Portuguese 
speaking and less developed market where, theoretically, it would be easier and profitable to 
invest. Firms 2 and 5 had previous experience in Brazil but repeated the mistake by making a 
huge investment in the second half of the 1990’s. In less than five years both firms (and firm
8) had divested or changed their investment (Annex 5.1, Box 7).  
Table 7.2.2.1: 4 - Perceptions on advantages and 
disadvantages in foreign markets 
Firm Nr. FDI Nr. Advantages Nr. Disadvantages 
1 9 3 0 
2 12 3 0 
3 1 1 2 
4 5 2 0 
5 15 1 0 
6 5 1 2 
7 8 1 2 
8 3 2 2 
9 8 3 1 
10 17 3 1 
11 6 1 2 
12 4 1 0 
13 2 1 0 
14 2 - -
15 2 2 3 
16 1 1 0 
17 12 4 2 
Another sign of overconfidence may be seen in the information provided by interviewees 
about advantages and disadvantages of their firms in foreign markets (Table 7.2.2.1: 4). The 
existence of advantages in foreign markets is a necessary requirement for a successful FDI 
(Dunning, 1979). But nine interviewees only perceived one or less advantages in the foreign 
market. It does not mean that investments are, or will be, not successful but it is a sign that 










competition. It also shows some (over) confidence on the competition capabilities of the firm
by assuming, implicitly, that one advantage is sufficient to be successful. This seems to be 
confirmed by the fact that 10 interviewees more easily recognized their advantages in foreign 
markets than their disadvantages. That may be either because they have more advantages but 
it may also be because they do not know very well the market and are excessively confident 
in their firm. For all the above reasons H3a5 is confirmed. 
7.2.2.2 – Rules of extrinsic nature 
Environmental characteristics are also recognized to influence economic agents in very 
different ways. Evidence of a reference to the past and the present is included in this 
dissertation. Regarding past events, cultural and firms’ values often act as an “anchor” to FDI 
location decisions. 
Economic theory says that cultural and historical (of the firm) variables are relevant for FDI 
decisions (H3b1 e H3b2). The use of these variables do not necessarily prevent maximization 
but they also do not guarantee higher profitability. What is clear is that decisions are not 
rational, in the neoclassical sense, if mainly based on these variables because they are very 
likely to prevent profit maximization.  
Cultural anchoring, a type of cultural influence, happens when investments are attracted by 
countries that communicate in the investor’s native tongue and have a similar cultural 
background. Almost one third (35 in 112) of the investments are located in Portuguese 
speaking countries and a further 3 also are explained by cultural or historical reasons. Thus, it 
seems that this type of anchoring is relevant for decision makers (as Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2001, p. 1064, have shown for Finland) because the decision to invest abroad was evaluated 
from a particular starting point, cultural linkages, and the choice of this point influenced 
behavioural outcomes (investment locations).  
The answers obtained in the interviews confirm this statement. Seven firms explicitly stated 
that cultural variables were determinants for investment location and a further three also 
referred to their relevance (Annex 5.1, Box 8). Moreover, six firms present historical (of the 








not good results. The outcome is inferior when compared with consolidated data. This is 
presented below for Brazil. But the same applies for other countries as presented in table 
7.2.2.2: 1. The information concerns 2004 when the majority of the operations were running 
for some years and thus had a sufficient time period to become profitable. All together there 
are 16 locations with lower and 11 with higher return than consolidated accounts. Therefore, 
both H3b1 and H3b2 are confirmed and the C-D model provides a further significant 
explanation for firm’s behaviour besides the neoclassical approach. 











Firm 2 0.60% Higher - - Lower - - -
Firm 4 0.80% Higher - - - Higher - -
Firm 5 0.64% - Lower - Lower Higher n.a. Higher 
Firm 6 1.95% - Lower - n.a. - - -
Firm 9 1.70% Higher - - - Higher - -
Firm 10 3.86% n.a. n.a. Lower n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 11 1.40% Lower Higher Lower - Lower - -
Firm 12 7.83% Lower Lower - - - - -
Firm 17 0.72% Lower - - Higher Higher - -
Brazil is presented in table 7.2.2.2: 3 below. 
Moving to the present, there are also some inconsistencies with a clear strategy and a long 
term focus (H3b3) directly related with the exact location decision of a firm. A total of 21 
operations abroad were identified as having some sort of inconsistency with the strategy of 
three firms (5, 6 and 10) due to specific instructions of the Portuguese state as a shareholder. 
The Portuguese state owns 100% of firm 5 and has a golden share with a compulsory say in 
the strategy of firms 6 and 10. It can be questioned if government instructions do necessarily 
prevent a maximizing behaviour. Although the answer is no the firm following government 
instructions is not investing by using an objective criteria in terms of expected returns and 
opportunity costs (even when profitability is a pre-condition for the investment, as the 
managers of the three firms referred). Furthermore, many operations were detected where FDI 
profitability is lower or negative and other cases where the investment simply does not make 
sense in rational terms. 
Overall, most of these investments were located in former Portuguese colonies (Spain and 











investments, starting in the beginning of the 1990’s when these Portuguese speaking countries 
had at least 15 years of independence. 
Table 7.2.2.2: 2 – Inconsistent FDI location decisions 
Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 10 
Brazil Brazil Angola 
Cape Verde Cape Verde Brazil 
China Macao Cape Verde 
Luxembourg Spain Guinea Bissau 
Macao Macao 
Mozambique  Mozambique 
S. Tomé e Princípe S. Tomé e Princípe 
Spain Timor 
Timor  
Regarding firm 5 it can be also said that given it is the shareholder who approves the strategy 
a FDI location decision can never be against it. However, while the different managements of 
the firm throughout the years expressed their own views of target markets, the corresponding 
“supervisors” had a strategy dominated by political issues. For example, firm 5 invested in 
Timor in 2001, when the strategy of the firm was mainly focused in Spain and Africa, 
exclusively for political reasons given the will of the Portuguese state to help a recently born 
nation and not to maximize the expected returns of the firm. Political considerations are also 
an explanation why the firm keeps two banks with similar capabilities operating in Cape 
Verde and why a branch in China is left almost inoperative for more than a decade. 
Firms 6 and 10, on the other hand, followed guidelines of the Portuguese state when 
considering investments in Brazil and Spain (see herding behaviour below). All FDI 
operations in Africa are related to the cooperation policy of successive Portuguese 
governments (trying to regain confidence from the rulers of the former colonies while helping 
their development). Firm 10, for example, is in Mozambique but is not authorized to sell its 
elected product in the internationalization strategy, mobile communications. 
The investments in Macao are also explained by the Portuguese presence until 1999. But 
these investments were made recently, although before 1999, and were related to the concern 
of the Portuguese state to leave signs of its presence in Macao after China took over the 








                                                          
    
agreement between Portugal and China. This presence together with the availability in the 
news of the huge potential of the Chinese market and a fad to invest in China led the firm to 
mention the country, very recently and only after the completion of these investments, as its 
main strategic market after Spain and Africa3. 
Although some of these investments are profitable the three firms are channelling resources to 
places very often not included in their overall strategy or, in the case of firm 5, altering 
strategy to accommodate politically driven FDI operations. Furthermore, they have no 
freedom to disinvest even if they want to due to the agreements and political goals that 
motivated these operations. Therefore, this systematically inconsistent behaviour is 
another obstacle to maximization and H3b3 is confirmed.
A different sign of inconsistency is the use of a widespread set of variables by all firms when 
making similar decisions. The use of different evidence by firms to their location decisions 
(H3b4) is confirmed in the information collected. The interviewees mentioned a total of 27 
different reasons to determine the location of their investments (Annex 5.2). This is in line 
with what Slovic (1969, 1972) identified as little inter-expert consistency when studying 
decision making by experts in financial markets. The nature of the businesses are not able to 
totally explain these differences. For example, four of the firms are from the same industry 
(banking) and together they refer to twelve different determinants. From these only 5 are 
common to at least two of the firms. The remaining 7 are specific to one of the firms.  
This lack of agreement over the relevant determinants is a sign of difficulty to define an 
optimal search process for selection of alternatives and collection of information given the 
scarce resources of managers in terms of attention and cognition (Gabaix and Laibson, 2003). 
Furthermore it shows that the available alternatives are not always conspicuous and given that 
firms have been using the same variables for a large period of time4 it can be concluded that at 
least some of them are not looking at the right determinants. Firms are under using 
information and this is a barrier to optimization.  
3 The annual report of 2002 does not mention the 10 years old branch of Zhuhai. In 2003 the branch is
 
mentioned and the same happens in 2004, when a small paragraph about China is included (CGD, 2002, 2003 

and 2004 annual reports). 







                                                          
  
Firms and managers are also believed to follow the “herd” in very efficient financial markets 
(H3b5). This may happen also on FDI. First, availability of well publicized events was 
overestimated by some Portuguese managers when deciding to invest in Brazil in the period 
between 1997 and 1999. In the specific case of the firms interviewed all, except one, of those 
that have investments in Brazil made a big investment in the mentioned period. But the firm
that invested later, in 2001, did consider investment in the same period. They were not the 
only Portuguese firms to invest in this country in the same years. According to Costa (2003) 
there were, in 2001, 147 investments in Brazil made by 83 parent Portuguese companies and a 
large majority of these had invested after 19965. This is not a coincidence. In 1996, the 
Portuguese government decided that Brazil was the main objective for the Portuguese 
economy (NPI, 1997). The Portuguese prime-minister at the time made several speeches and 
visits to this country, explicitly exhorting investors to move to that market. IPE (a state owned 
holding) participated as a shareholder in the investment made by firm 15 in Brazil. 
Furthermore, the year 2000 marked the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Pedro Àlvares 
Cabral to Brazil (following the 500th anniversary of Vasco da Gama’s journey to India), with 
widespread celebrations both in Portugal and in Brazil. Therefore, there was, on that period, a 
huge stream of news about the attractiveness and the opportunity of investing in Brazil. 
Portuguese firms were in the beginning of the process of internationalization (in terms of FDI) 
and cultural ties, common language, a huge market and a “push” from the government 
(through specific incentives such as interest free loans) explained the sudden interest in Brazil 
(Costa, 2003). In this process, judgements about FDI decisions were altered and other 
potential markets were clearly downplayed given the availability of evidence about Brazil.  
A related case is Herding behaviour, transmitted through direct communication between 
managers (seven of the interviewees confirmed the informal exchange of information between 
firms about foreign markets) or observation of actions or outcomes of other firms’ actions 
(Banerjee, 1992). In order to test whether Portuguese managers were vulnerable to this bias, a 
specific question was asked to interviewees about the hypothesis of investing in China or in 
India. The idea to explore is that China seemed, at the time of the interviews, to have a greater 
appeal than India (Fromlet, 2004, and The Economist, 24/9/2005, p. 99). This was probably 
due to the frequently mentioned rates of economic growth and the fashion phenomenon 
5 Banco de Portugal (2005) estimates, in 2001, the total number of 268 Portuguese firms with investments 









associated with China in the news. However, India was also growing very well, it is as large 
as China in terms of market size and it has lower political risk because it is an established 
democracy (in fact it is now, 2008, also a fashion in itself). Despite the similarities between 
the markets, five of the managers confirmed that their firm had considered the possibility of
investing in China but not in India showing that they were succumbing to the higher appeal of 
the Chinese market.  
In Portuguese FDI there are two markets where the herding phenomenon is easily 
recognizable and 16 situations were identified in the interviews (Table 7.2.2.2: 2). First, as 
shown above, the Brazilian market. Second, the Spanish market where 10 of the 17 firms 
invested after 1990. Another 170 firms followed the same path in this period, to an estimated 
total of 250 Portuguese firms in Spain (Pinheiro-Alves, 2001). In both cases it can be said that 
FDI decisions were influenced by an existing “unanimity” towards the attractiveness of these 
markets. This is true even when the required knowledge to invest seemed to be wrongly 
perceived. 
From our sample of seven investments in Brazil, four (firms 2, 5, 8 and 15) of them were sold 
a few years later and, of the remaining, one (firm 10) is significantly less profitable for the 
investor than the Portuguese market. Only firm 6 registered, in 2004, a higher profitability 
than the consolidated value. Moreover, the Portuguese state had a share of the investment 
made by firm 15 and sold it with a huge loss. Between 1997 and 2001 the Portuguese firms 
together invested 13,000 Million Euros in Brazil but divested half of this amount (Banco de 
Portugal, 2005). In Spain, the scenario is similar. In eleven investments, eight are less 
profitable (firms 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14 and 15), one (firm 13) was sold and in another one (firm 1) 
there is no available information in terms of profitability. The share of divestment over 
investment is even larger than in Brazil, 67%. This indicates that a significant part of the 
investments were not successful and firms had to leave the market. 
Table 7.2.2.2: 3 confirms the lower return obtained abroad by firms investing in Spain and 
Brazil. Values are taken from annual reports or verbally confirmed by the interviewees when 
there is no financial information.   
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Table 7.2.2.2: 3 – Return on FDI operations 
Consolidated Brazil Spain 
2004 ROA Starting Year ROA Starting Year ROA 
Firm 1 1.86% 1976* n.a. 
Firm 2 0.60% 1997 Lower 1992 Lower 
Firm 3 n.a. 1998 Lower 
Firm 4 0.80% 1996 Lower 
Firm 5 0.64% 1998 Lower 1991 -0.48% 
Firm 6 1.95% 1997 2.06% 2001 0.72% 
Firm 7 0.59% 1990 Lower 
Firm 8 4.14% 1997 Lower 
Firm 9 1.70% 
Firm 10 3.86% 1998 Lower 
Firm 11 1.40% 2001 1.63% 
Firm 12 7.83% 
Firm 13 8.94% 2002* n.a. 
Firm 14 n.a. 1991 Lower 
Firm 15 5.15% 1997 Lower 1997 Lower 
Firm 16 3.94% 2001 n.a. 
Firm 17 0.72% 
* Not included in the herding anomaly 
The trend to invest in Spain and in Brazil seems to be also a clear sign of a false consensus 
bias (Thaler, 2000, p. 133). By looking at other firms moving to these markets the idea of a 
“target market” and “good businesses” is automatically established and discussed among 
managers. Those that do not “follow the herd” are considered “suspicious” by the market and 
their reputation may be in danger (reputation–based herding – Zwiebel, 1995, p. 17). There is 
clear evidence in the interviews about this phenomenon. The manager of firm 15 stated: ”We 
had a lot of cash to spend and the government had limited the number of licences to operate 
in Portugal. So, we decided to invest abroad. On the occasion Brazil and Latin America were 
the most fashionable locations and this (the investments) has a lot to do with fashions, as you 
know”. Firm 2: “We went when other firms also went – PT, Jerónimo Martins, Sonae”. It 
should be noted that firm 2 is present in Brazil since 1976 but despite the knowledge of the 
market the investment was not successful. The manager explains: “We bought Banco 
Boavista in 1997 but it went badly wrong and in 2000 we exchange for Bradesco shares. The 
Brazilian market is very specific and foreigners have not been very successful in this market. 
It is necessary to have local managers because it is a peculiar market”. 
Additionally, the CEO of firm 8 explicitly stated that one of the reasons to invest in Brazil 
was the pressure received from financial market analysts, those who are responsible to 










because financial analysts did put a pressure on us by ‘threatening’ with a devaluation of our 
shares. But let me tell you that today I am very cautious with investment banks”. Thus, this 
investment was also to please investors (Rajan, 1994).  
Eastern Europe is a third market where a herding phenomenon can be recognized and it 
also confirms H3b5. This market has been in the news for several reasons since 1990, with 
the downfall of the “Berlin wall”. During the 1990’s these countries had a transition process 
to democracy and a market economy which culminated, in the 2000’s, with adhesion to the 
European Union. All countries have made important political and economic reforms, even if 
in different ways and speeds, that often led to periods of high growth. More important, it is 
believed they have a huge potential in terms of growth, due to their relatively skilful 
population and the financial support of the EU, and thus many business opportunities are 
arising. In this case, however, the herding phenomenon is not specific to Portugal given that 
firms of several other countries invested in Eastern Europe during the period (Altomonte and 
Pennings, 2008). But the return was also not superior to the consolidated accounts in all cases 
except firm 17. 
Table 7.2.2.2: 4 – Herding in Eastern Europe 
Firm Eastern Europe ROA (2004)
2 1997 Lower 







10 1990 n.a. 
17 1998 Higher 
A further detected anomaly (H3b6) happens when a firm’s selected action does not depend on 
its private information signals but is based upon the observation, by managers, of other firms’ 
actions and, supposedly, private information (informational cascade - Bickshandani et al, 
1992). 
It makes more sense for firms to “cascade” when they compete in the same industry because 
that is when holding private information may be more valuable relative to competitors. 







                                                          
engage in FDI in other Asian countries when other (Japanese) rival firms do it. And in a 
similar view, although in the context of agglomeration economies, Barry et al (2001, p. 12) 
empirically explain the investment in a country through the presence of other firms as a 
provider of information (signalling) about the attractiveness of the market. In our small 
sample, there are four firms from the banking industry whose managers invested in a total of 
23 countries. More than half of these locations have at least investments of two of the firms, 
five countries have investment of three banks and in two locations, France and Cayman 
Islands, there is a presence of the four firms.  
Considering the ten largest banks owned by Portuguese investors, and also including their 
representative offices (Annex 5.6), in half of the locations (15) there are at least three banks 
and in eight locations there are at least five investments. All the ten banks have or had a 
presence in the Cayman Islands but among the large number of available off-shore locations 
this was “elected” as “the” off-shore by Portuguese managers and their law consultants6. This 
is a clear sign of the existence of an informational cascading among Portuguese banks in 
some of their location decisions and thus H3b6 is supported. 
Moral influences also have a specific role in economic decisions (Etzioni, 1988) and the 
actual issue of social responsibility and the related reports issued by large firms confirms it. A 
studied example is fairness, when managers act in conformity with informal but socially 
accepted rules or standards (H3b7 - Kahneman et al, 1986).  
An example was found in firm 11: “We wanted to help the development of Mozambique and 
agreed, with the state as a partner, to install a factory to produce components and assemble 
buses. But the government, instead of giving some type of protection to the industry, decided 
to raise tariffs for the import of components and to eliminate tariffs for the import of buses. 
Thus, the factory is now inactive because there are no necessary conditions to develop any 
type of business. And we are very disappointed. It seems that they do not want our help”. This 
manager reflects a common feeling in Portugal about the need to invest in the ex-colonies and 
help them to develop. This may explain why the firm invested in good faith, without any 
formal guarantee, believing that the Mozambican government, as a shareholder, would 
support the operation. 















There are other examples in the firms surveyed, namely those closely related with the 
Portuguese policy of helping former colonies. This policy has been partly implemented 
through state-owned firms (firm 5) and public firms where the government still has influence 
(firms 6 and 10). Table 7.2.2.2: 5 presents the cases and confirms H3b7. 
Table 7.2.2.2: 5 – “Fairness” decisions 
Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 10 Firm 11 
Timor Cape Verde Angola Mozambique 
Cape Verde Cape Verde 
Mozambique  Guinea Bissau 
S. Tomé e Princípe Mozambique 
S. Tomé e Princípe 
  Timor  
7.2.3 – A few detailed examples 
The main objective of this chapter is to identify the relevance of rules of behaviour in 
explaining FDI location decisions (H3). The model predicts an association between 
uncertainty and the existence of these rules. All the hypotheses presented (H3a and H3b) 
confirm that managers do indeed use rules of behaviour in their FDI location decisions. A 
total of 175 behavioural rules were detected in 112 operations7. 
A few detailed examples help to better understand the difference between the neoclassical and 
the behavioural approaches. First, firms 2 and 8 decided to invest in the Brazilian market in 
the second half of the 1990’s. The tax competition literature explains this location decision 
with fiscal advantages. But both firms explicitly denied it (chapter 8). The FDI literature, on 
the other hand, provides two main explanations for these investments, cost efficiency and 
revenue. 
Firm 2 was already in Brazil, through an investment bank and other areas of business, when 
the decision to make a huge investment in a retail bank was implemented. Its manager refers 
to the exhaustion of the Portuguese market and thus the need for other markets to grow and to 






                                                                                                                                                                                     
abroad in businesses where it has a very good know-how in the domestic activity, like retail 
banking services. As reasons for the location in Brazil he refers to cultural variables such as a 
common tongue and a resident Portuguese community. Therefore, according to FDI theory 
the aim was to increase revenue by having access to new clients in a different market with 
cultural liaisons. 
The behavioural approach provides a more complete picture where expected profitability 
and business growth have a necessary role. However, these are not specific to Brazil. There 
were other possible choices with similar characteristics and where the growth potential could 
have been bigger. The choice of Brazil is explained by cultural variables, as already referred, 
but also by the presence of the group in the country since 1976 and the simultaneous move of 
a few hundred Portuguese firms to the country motivated by the Portuguese government (see 
7.2.2.2 above). It is also explained by an overconfidence in the project shown by the inability 
to learn form the previous experience in the market. As the interviewee stated “The Brazilian 
market is very specific and foreigners have not been very successful. It is necessary to have 
local managers because it is a peculiar market”. But the firm should have known that in 
advance because it was there since 1976. Therefore, in 1997 there was an overconfidence on 
the ability of their managers to obtain different results than those of other banks, more 
experienced in international activity. More than 20 years of market knowledge were not 
sufficient for the firm to realize that it needed local managers.  
Table 7.2.3: 1 compares the two approaches and underlines the more complete explanation 
provided by the C-D model. In firm 2, for example, the four last determinants of the location 
decision are not usually recognized by the neoclassical approach. But it is the existence of 
these determinants that confirm a gap in the C-D model where a maximizing behaviour is 
prevented. 
Firm 8 provides a very similar example. Its aim was also to increase revenue by having access 
to new clients in a different market. The firm also received some pressure from market 
analysts to invest abroad. The growth potential was also not exclusive to Brazil, as its present 
experience in Poland shows, although it presented an attractive market growth rate. But the 
main reason to choose the market was the cultural relationship. However, the behavioural 







approach provides two extra explanations: availability and herding, as noted above, and 
overconfidence from the CEO and main shareholder. He says: “In the 1960’s I was marketing 
manager of Unilever in Brazil. I knew the market … if I didn’t I would have not committed so 
many mistakes” and then “It was a nonsense to go to Brazil. It is a very different market, with 
powerful competitors, both locals and foreigners, very strong and with a lot of money. We 
have no balance sheet for the market”. But the information about competitors was publicly 
available and the manager had knowledge of it. Therefore, an illusory perception about the 
abilities of the firm and of control over future events also explains the investment. The 
manager recognizes: “due to a stupid pride I was convinced that we would make it”. 
In both cases the decision to invest in Brazil was made and the gap between the competence 
and the difficulty can be found in behavioural rules. The reliability condition was not superior 
to the tolerance limit and both firms dealt with uncertainty by using rules of intrinsic and 
extrinsic nature and related with the past (cultural and historical variables and 
learning), the present (availability and herding) and the future (overconfidence). Both 
firms left the market after a few years. 
A second example is given by firm 10 and two location decisions, in Mozambique and East 
Timor. Again, the tax competition model is not able to explain these investments. The main 
explanation of FDI theory is the cultural relationship existing between Portugal and these two 
countries together with the perception of a superior know-how by the investing firm and the 
need to serve clients in Mozambique. The behavioural approach provides several other 
explanations for the location decision that discard the traditional maximization aim. First, 
both operations are inconsistent with the firm’s strategy and thus are an obstacle for 
maximization. The internationalization of firm 10 is based on mobile communications and 
focused on Brazil and Africa. However, the firm is not a mobile operator in Mozambique and 
East Timor is in Asia. Second, the location decision was made after government instructions 
(the Portuguese state has a golden share in this firm) and with a sense of fairness. Both are 
Portuguese ex-colonies and very poor countries where the decolonization process was not 
correctly managed by Portugal. Therefore, there is a common will, in the Portuguese society, 










Table 7.2.3: 1 – Neoclassical and behavioural approaches in FDI location decisions 

Firms 2, 5, 8, 10 and 11 

Firm 2 FDI theory Behavioural 
Firm 2: Brazil - Growth potential 
- Cultural affinity 
- Growth potential 
- Cultural anchoring 
- History of the firm 
- Availability and herding 
- Overconfidence 
- Learning inability
Firm 5: China - Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Learning inability
Firm 5: Spain - Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- To compete with Spanish 
banks 
- Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- To compete with Spanish banks 
- Availability and herding 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting
Firm 8: Brazil - Cultural affinity 
- Market growth rate 
- Market growth rate 
- Availability and herding 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Overconfidence 
Firm 10: East Timor - Cultural affinity 
- Superior know-how 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Superior know-how 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
- Fairness
Firm 10: Mozambique - Cultural affinity 
- Superior know-how 
- To serve clients 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Superior know-how 
- To serve clients 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
- Fairness
Firm 11: Mozambique - Cultural affinity 
- Superior know-how 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Superior know-how 
- Fairness 
Firm 11: United 
Kingdom
- To channel domestic 
production 
- Market size 
- To channel domestic production 
- Market size 
- Mental accounting 
- Learning inability 
The interviewed manager refers that profitability is always the aim of investments abroad and 
“…in less developed countries the required return is higher and shorter – 5 years maximum -




                                                          
situation of the country. Moreover, both are small investments where the risk of losing money 
is limited namely in comparison with the huge revenue stream arising from the dominant 
position of the firm in the Portuguese market. Firm 10 enjoyed, for a large number of years, a 
comfortable position as a monopolist provider of telecommunication services. Today it still 
has a dominant position in fixed and cable services8. Therefore, the risk of losing money is 
cancelled out by the profits from its domestic activity. The existence of political objectives 
with a fairness component together with a house money effect arising from the near 
monopolistic position of firm 10, provide a more complete explanation of the decision to 
invest in these countries than the neoclassical approach. 
A similar example is given by firm 5. The investments in China and Spain are justified by 
growth potential and the aim of obtaining profits. Geographical proximity and willingness to 
serve clients are location reasons while fiscal variables are said to be of no relevance. But the 
interview reveals other important reasons. The group had a branch in Zuhai, near Macau, 
since 1991. This branch can only operate in foreign currency and thus is “…relatively 
inactive” in the words of the interviewee. It was inconsistent with the strategy of the firm up 
to 2003, when China was firstly considered as a target market. For more than 13 years capital 
was invested in the branch, without return, and the firm was not able to learn and change the 
situation. All the banking operations could be booked in other affiliates of the group, 
including Macao, and thus the branch was unnecessary. Therefore, FDI is better explained 
by the history of the group, for decades the issuing bank of Macao, and by the political 
need to maintain a Portuguese presence in the region and to strengthen a position in 
Macao, which was expected to become a special area of China after 1999. 
In the case of Spain the interviewee refers to several additional reasons: “…to be in a 
competitive market and Spain is a natural market for us due to geographical proximity. 
Furthermore, there is a strong presence of Spanish banks in Portugal and our 
competitiveness also depends on being in Spain”. Although these are valid reasons, and 
recognized by FDI theory, it should be noted that firm 5 has a market share of less than 1% in 
the Spanish market, and is mainly located near the border with Portugal. The biggest Spanish 
bank, on the other hand, is larger than the entire Portuguese market and has a share of 20% 
despite informal “warnings” by successive Portuguese governments against an excessive 










Spanish presence (Pinheiro-Alves, 2001, p. 139). Therefore, political reasons, namely 
government instructions, also help to explain the investment in Spain. The fear of an 
“invasion” of Portugal by Spanish firms was counterbalanced through government 
instructions and appeals for Portuguese investors to go to Spain (7.2.2.2 above). In both cases 
a house money effect can also be observed given that firm 5, owned by the Portuguese state, 
enjoyed, for many years, a monopoly position as the bank of civil servants and pensioners, 
and thus had a cheaper funding than other banks (annex 5.5). 
A final example is firm 11 where investments in the United Kingdom and Mozambique are 
justified by the need to channel domestic production and market size, in the first case, and 
cultural affinity and superior know-how in the second. However, both investments have 
peculiar stories. The investment in the UK started in 1984 when a local representative 
“convinced” the firm to invest in the country. More than 20 years after it started the firm was 
not able to become profitable and to learn from different attempts to change the business. The 
investment has been financed mainly with domestic cash-flows. In Mozambique there was an 
agreement with the local government where, informally, access to the market was 
“exchanged” for the superior know-how of firm 11 in assembling buses. But, according to the 
interviewee, the local government broke its promises and there was no formal guarantee in 
favour of the firm. This trust is explained by an attitude of fairness towards a very poor 
country. 
The above presented cases, where FDI location decisions are explained by behavioural 
rules, have as a consequence no aim or ability to maximize. The aim for profitability is 
always there but maximization is never an issue and it is impossible to reach due to several 
barriers (namely the use of behavioural rules). Therefore, location decisions are not 
dependent on maximization objectives and H3 is fully confirmed. 
7.3 – A test of the Heiner model 












                                                          
7.3.1 – Testable hypothesis 
The Heiner model explains the use of behavioural rules via the need to deal with uncertainty. 
Higher uncertainty results on an increase in both the tolerance limit and the needed reliability 
condition to select an action in the right time and thus it constraints flexibility in adopting 
new options (leading to a higher use of rules of behaviour - H1). When uncertainty increases 
the Competence-Difficulty gap also grows and decision-making is further away from
maximization. Therefore, from chapter 4 and assuming constant bounded behaviour (B), as 
long as C < D, the higher the uncertainty the higher is the reliance of investors (or any other 
agents) on behavioural rules of intrinsic (Ai) and extrinsic (Ae) nature: 
U = B + Ae + Ai > 0 (6) 
There is more information regarding behavioural rules and these are recurrent and not simply 
related to episodic occurrences, as with bounded behaviour. Nevertheless, the model will also 
be tested by considering bounded behaviour. 
A predicted consequence of the model is that firms invest more where there is less uncertainty 
(H1a). It shows how relevant is uncertainty in decision-making and how needed is a 
behavioural approach to complement neoclassical theory. The expected result of the test is a 
confirmation of a positive and significant relationship between uncertainty and the use 
of behavioural rules. 
7.3.2 - Characterization of variables 
In order to test the Heiner model it is necessary to define a measure for behavioural rules and 
uncertainty9. The data has a total of 112 observations representing 4.6% of Portuguese firms 
with FDI and 11.8% of FDI operations abroad (Banco de Portugal, 2005) where 68 register 
the existence of rules of behaviour and 20 of bounded procedures. There are 16 observations 
with both types of “anomalies”. When putting them together there are a total of 40 
observations without and 72 observations with detected anomalies. It should be noted that, to 
test the model, behavioural rules can be directly related to the chosen location. But all should 










be allocated to one of the 112 countries and in this way the test includes 160 rules. The 
remaining 15 are related with the decision making process but cannot be allocated to a 
specific FDI operation. 
Table 7.3.2: 1 – Frequencies of detected “irrationalities” per type of country 
Groups of countryrating Rules of 
behaviour 








38 25 12 9 
Rating B 
(medium uncertainty) 
45 17 10 8 
Rating C 
(high uncertainty) 
77 26 4 3 
Not allocated 15 - - -
Total 175 68 26 20 
A measure is obtained from the data collected in the interviews and documentation analysis. 
A variable called “Numbehav” is formed from the number of rules of behaviour detected for 
each firm and for each FDI operation in a total of 175 cases (Table 7.2.2: 1 above). The above 
(7.2.1.3) defined variable named “Numbounded”, with all detected bounded situations, is 
also considered. 
The most obvious way to measure uncertainty is sovereign risk ratings (proxy 1: 
“Countryrating”) as presented by firms such as Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s (S&P). The 
country historical ratings of S&P for long term debt in local currency have older values than 
those presented by other firms and thus are chosen (A means lower, B intermediate and C 
higher risk). Since these are not available for all cases, and given that the level of 
development is usually (by rating firms) recognized to be negatively correlated with risk, they 
are replaced, when absent, by the measure of development used by the World Bank (Annex 
5.8). 
This is not a perfect proxy because ratings strictly represent the ability of the country to pay 
its sovereign debt in local currency by considering political, economic and financial risks 
while the Heiner model refers to uncertainty as a whole and not only the risk component. 
However, the inclusion of these different risks indicates that the “known unknowns” of 
uncertainty that are not represented by a probability are somehow considered. Only the 










A second proxy is to define behavioural rules by underlining the cultural connections of 
Portugal. Thus a second variable called “Typeofcountry” is also considered where 
Portuguese speaking countries are regarded as having more uncertainty than OECD countries, 
to which Portugal is more integrated in economic and political terms, and less uncertainty 
than the remaining countries with no special connections with Portugal. 
Different proxies to uncertainty may arise from the level of internationalization of each firm. 
The longer a firm is exposed to foreign markets the higher should be the experience and thus 
the lower the uncertainty when choosing a new market to invest. Therefore, it can be 
considered that a longer presence abroad allows for an improvement in the knowledge of how 
to operate in unfamiliar environments and thus a decrease in uncertainty when the next 
location decision is made. This is considered even if this improvement does not necessarily 
lead to optimal decision making and does not prevent the use of repeated rules of behaviour. 
In this sense, uncertainty is expected to decrease with the number of external markets where 
the firm is active (proxy 3: “Numbmarkets”) and with the number of years abroad every 
time a decision to make a FDI is made (proxy 4: “Numbyears”). The lower is the number of 
markets and the number of years abroad the lower is the experience accumulated by the firm
and the higher should be the uncertainty faced by managers.  
The four proxies allow us to consider different perspectives in terms of measurement of the 
variables in the Heiner model. But they do not represent the perceptions of individual 
managers in terms of uncertainty and this would be the ideal measure in theoretical terms. 
From the above proxy 2 may be the one that is nearer the perceptions of respondents that 
mention the advantage of better knowing Portuguese-speaking countries. For example, 
manager of firm 11 says when justifying the investments in Angola and Cape Verde: “Our 
Irish partners do not understand the advantage of having a close cultural relationship with 
these countries”. 
The main assumptions to perform statistical tests is the independence of observations and the 
randomness of selection from the population (Pallant, 2001, p. 256). In the first case there are 
two potential problems: Money spent in one location is not available for other FDI operations. 











                                                          
necessarily eliminate them and it did not change the behavioural characteristics in FDI 
operations. Second, some FDI is located in neighbouring countries of previous operations, 
meaning that the location choice was possibly influenced by the location of previous 
investments. This may be the case of firm 9 for herding behaviour in Eastern Europe. 
However, each operation corresponds to an individual case in our sample and the remaining 
behavioural rules and bounded procedures are not related with it. Regarding the second 
assumption, the selection process was random but skewed to large firms in the Portuguese 
context. 
A second issue is that of the distribution of the population. The chi-square goodness of fit test 
assesses the degree of correspondence between the observed and expected observations, being 
the latter based on the population (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 45). The test can only be 
performed for the variable “typeofcountry” because that is where information for the 
universe is available10. The null hypothesis states that the observed values have a good fit 
with the expected values. The results are presented in Annex 5.10 (Table 1),  where it can be 
seen that for the variable “typeofcountry” the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
For the variable “Numbehav” there is no information about the population. It is assumed that 
expected values are in accordance with behavioural theory, that is, the higher the uncertainty 
the higher is the number of rules used by firms in FDI location decisions. Given the size 
differences in the number of countries included in each rating category (A-60; B-25; C-27)
the expected values should be more countries with zero or a smaller number of rules. But the 
theory does not tell us exactly how many rules should be detected in each case. Nevertheless, 
the number of cases in the sample is higher for occurrences with a lower number of rules of 
behaviour as predicted by theory (Table 2, Annex 5.10). 
The one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test allows for a confirmation of the distribution of the 
variables and is based on the following hypotheses: 
H0: The sample comes from a pre-defined (Normal, Poisson, etc) distribution 
H1: It does not 












For each variable it compares its observed cumulative distribution function with the pre­
defined distribution and it tests whether the observations could have come from this 
distribution. The outcome of the test shows that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and 
thus the sample of the variables “Numbehav” (aggregated and disaggregated in two different 
groups of rules – Annex 5.9), “Typeofcountry” and “Countryrating” could have come from
a Poisson distribution when each variable is grouped according to the decision making 
process (Table 3, Annex 5.10). But they cannot come from a normal distribution. This is 
confirmed in normality tests (both through K-S and normality plots – Annex 5.10, Tables 4, 5 
and 6, and Figures 1 to 6).
Therefore, it can be seen that the sample for the variable “Typeofcountry” has a good fit with 
the universe. But even if a similar statement cannot be confirmed for the remaining variables 
it should be noted that representativeness is not essential given the inductive nature of the 
dissertation. 
7.3.3 - Testing the model 
The Heiner model is now checked by testing the following null and alternative hypothesis: 
H0: There is no association between uncertainty and rules of behaviour 
H1: There is an association 
Tests are performed for three different situations given the lower number of observations 
where behavioural rules or bounded procedures were detected. The latter are included because 
they are also deviations from maximizing behaviour (Heiner, 1983, p. 564). These allow us to 
understand the impact of including bounded procedures and of disregarding observations with 
zero rules: 
Situation 1 – Only rules of behaviour that can be allocated to a specific operation are 
considered. The total number of operations is included and all observations without detected 







                                                          
 
Situation 2 – It includes rules of behaviour and bounded procedures (“Numbehav” and 
“Numbounded”) and the empty observations are assumed to be zero for both. It allows us to 
check for differences with situation 1, where bounded procedures are absent. 
Situation 3 – Observations with 1 and 2 or more rules of behaviour plus bounded procedures 
are included. No assumption is made of zero, thereby allowing us to see their effect by 
comparing with previous situations. In this case the number of observations is 72 
corresponding to the number of FDI’s where behavioural rules and/or bounded procedures 
were detected, that is, 7.6% of the total FDI operations in 2004. 
A first issue is that of the linearity in the relationship between uncertainty and behavioural 
rules. Scatter plots (Figures 1 to 4, Annex 5.11) show a very weak linear relationship between 
them. Thus linear tests are not appropriate for the data. But the null hypothesis that 
uncertainty and rules of behaviour are independent can be checked by using the chi-square 
statistic. All tests based on the chi-square calculate the difference between the observed and 
expected values and require each cell to have an expected value greater than 1 and more than 
80% of the cells to have a value greater than 5 (Norusis, 2003, p. 167). This means that data 
has to be aggregated for the number of behavioural rules. “Numbehav” is thus grouped by 0, 
1 and 2 or more behavioural rules. 
Table 7.3.3: 1 shows the results both for the Pearson chi-square and the likelihood ratio for 
uncertainty, “Countryrating”, and aggregated “Numbehav” (“Typeofcountry” is presented 
in table 1, Annex 6.11). In situations 1, 2 and 3 the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 
significance level of 1% (except in the test for “Typeofcountry” in situation 3) meaning that 
in fewer than 1 sample in 100 the two variables would be independent. This means that both 
the inclusion of bounded procedures and the no assumption of zeros does not have a 
qualitative impact on the outcome11. 
Several measures of association and direction are also tested in order to understand how 
strongly the two variables are related. Table 7.3.3: 2 presents the results for “countryrating” 
11 The outcome is robust and does not change qualitatively if the grouping is 0, 1 and 2, and 3 or more rules - 





            
          
  
          
  





                                                          
and “Typeofcountry” as proxies to uncertainty in situation 112. Given the weak linearity 
existing between variables and their characteristics (nominal and scale) tests are made both 
for nominal and ordinal data. The latter are usually considered more reliable than tests based 
simply on nominal variables (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 311). Non-parametric testing 
generally requires feeble assumptions and only in some cases outliers or ties in the data need 
to be considered. 
Table 7.3.3: 1 – Independence tests 

Countryrating and Numbehav 

0, 1 and 2 or more Situation 1 
Independence Tests Value DFr N Significance 
Pearson chi-square 30.2 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 34.9 4 112 0.000 *** 
Situation 2 
Independence Tests Value DFr N Significance 
Pearson chi-square 28.5 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 33.4 4 112 0.000 *** 
Situation 3 
Independence Tests Value DFr N Significance 
Pearson chi-square 10.2 2 72 0.006 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 10.4 2 72 0.005 *** 
*** Significant at a 1% level
First, symmetric measures are presented to indicate how strongly the two variables are 
related. Cramer’s V and the Contingency Coefficient are based on the chi-square statistic and 
are calculated from a contingency table with observed and expected values13. Given the need 
to aggregate them so that the chi-square statistic is valid both are transformed in nominal 
variables. The results below indicate a significant and fairly strong relationship between both 
proxies of uncertainty and “Numbehav”. 
Symmetric measures based on ordinal data are also presented. In this case the data for the 
number of rules is disaggregated. The Kendall rank-order correlation coefficient τ (Kendall’s 
tau) is based on the difference between the number of agreements and disagreements in the 
12 The outcome is similar for situation 2. But not for situation 3 where tests are no longer valid because the 




      
        
 
 
           




                                                                                                                                                                                     
ranks of the two variables (as a ratio over the number of pairs). Given the existence of a 
significant number of ties in the data both the Gamma coefficient and Kendall’s tau-b are 
performed so that their impact can be understood. When Gamma is calculated ties in the data 
are not included while tau-b considers ties within both variables. These statistics measure the 
strength and the positive or negative sign of the association (Norusis, 2003, p. 180). The 
results show a stronger and positive relationship between the variables in comparison with 
nominal measures. As expected the value of Gamma is higher but the inclusion of ties does 
not change the outcome. 
     Table 7.3.3: 2 – Association Tests: Uncertainty and behavioural rules (“Numbehav”) 
Situation 1 Value N Signific. Value N Signific. 
Uncertainty proxy: Countryrating Typeofcountry
Symmetric 
Cramer' V (1) 0.367 112 0.000 *** 0.496 112 0.000 *** 
Contingency coef. (1) 0.461 112 0.000 *** 0.574 112 0.000 *** 
Kendall's tau-b 0.467 112 0.000 *** 0.273 112 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.640 112 0.000 *** 0.344 112 0.000 *** 
Directional 
Lambda 0.118 112 0.009 *** 0.221 112 0.009 *** 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.089 112 0.000 *** 0.169 112 0.000 *** 
Somers' d 0.515 112 0.000 *** 0.280 112 0.000 *** 
Eta square 0.544 112 - 0.685 112 -
*** Significant at a 1% level
(1) Requires aggregated data in “Numbehav” because they are based on the chi-square 
Given that symmetric measures do not consider dependent and independent variables further 
(nominal and ordinal) asymmetric measures are calculated. Coefficient Lambda and Goodman 
and Kruskal’s Tau measure the proportional reduction in error when values of one variable 
are used to predict values of the other (in comparison with the situation when the explanatory 
variable is absent). Data is disaggregated and of nominal nature. Somer’s d considers the 
number of ties within the dependent variable and measures the difference between the 
probability that a pair of observations are in the same order and the probability that they 
disagree in their ordering (in a similar way to Kendall’s tau). Finally, Eta square measures the 
proportion of variability in the dependent variable, of an ordinal nature, that is explained by 
the independent variable, of a nominal nature (Norusis, 2003, p. 182). Somer’s d varies 
between -1 and 1 while the remaining coefficients vary between 0 and 1. The results show a 








                                                          
stronger relationship for ordinal measures and in all cases the values are significant at a 1% 
level. 
Measures based in proportional reduction in error (Lambda and Goodman) present very low 
values but this is explained by the use of more disaggregated data in comparison with the 
other nominal measures which are based on the chi-square distribution (and thus require 
aggregation)14. 
Similar results are obtained for “Typeofcountry”. However, the two other proxies for 
uncertainty, “numbyears” and “numbmarkets”, were tested without meaningful results 
(Table 4, Annex 5.11). It should be noted that these proxies were based on the assumption 
that higher experience would reduce the use of rules of behaviour. But it might be that these 
rules change with experience but are not necessarily reduced after a determined point as 
exposed in 7.2.1.3 above for bounded procedures and in accordance with the Heiner model. 
The results for “Countryrating” and “Typeofcountry” confirm the existence of a 
relationship between uncertainty and the number of behavioural rules as predicted by 
the Heiner model. Most of the values are fairly strong and all measures indicate positive 
direction. The Eta coefficient, for example, shows that “countryrating” explains 54%, and 
“Typeofcountry” 68%, of the variability in “Numbehav”. 
However, there is no guarantee that behavioural rules are caused by higher uncertainty. Other 
reasons may explain this positive relationship and thus it is useful to analyse if it is spurious, 
that is, if it is explained by a third or a group of other variables connecting both uncertainty 
and rules of behaviour. Non-parametric statistics allow us to include control variables. Table 
5 (Annex 5.11) shows the outcome when four control variables described in Annex 5.9 are 
considered: “Decision”, “Respondents”, “Objective” and “Previlevel”. For all the four 
control variables the association between uncertainty (“Countryrating”) and behavioural 
rules is still valid except for proportional reduction in error measures due to the level of 
disaggregation and the small number of observations. 
14 If the variable “Numbehav” is aggregated for these two tests, values would be 0,265 and 0,143 with a better 






       
  
 
       
     








Table 7.3.3: 3 – Type of behavioural rules in the Heiner model
Countryrating and Numbehav (Sit. 1) Rules of Extrinsic Origin Rules of Intrinsic Origin 
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance 
Independence 
Pearson Chi-sqaure 23.5 4 112 0.000 *** 22.4 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood ration 26.4 4 112 0.000 *** 21.6 4 112 0.000 *** 
Symmetric 
Cramer' V 0.324 - 112 0.000 *** 0.317 - 112 0.000 *** 
Contingency coef. 0.417 - 112 0.000 *** 0.409 - 112 0.000 *** 
Kendall's tau-b 0.396 112 0.000 *** 0.353 112 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.568 - 112 0.000 *** 0.560 - 112 0.000 *** 
- -
Directional 
Lambda 0.150 - 112 0.017 ** 0.083 - 112 0.548 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.094 - 112 0.000 *** 0.141 - 112 0.000 *** 
Somers' d 0.418 - 112 0.000 *** 0.313 - 112 0.000 *** 
Eta square 0.466 - 112 0.389 112 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 
Countryrating and Numbehav (Sit. 1) Rules Originated in the Present Rules Originated in the Past 
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance 
Independence 
Pearson Chi-sqaure 11.8 4 112 0.018 ** 40.2 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood ration 11.4 4 112 0.022 ** 43.8 4 112 0.000 *** 
Symmetric 
Cramer' V 0.284 - 112 0.006 *** 0.446 - 112 0.000 *** 
Contingency coef. 0.373 - 112 0.006 *** 0.533 - 112 0.000 *** 
Kendall's tau-b 0.276 112 0.001 *** 0.503 112 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.421 - 112 0.001 *** 0.711 - 112 0.000 *** 
- -
Directional 
Lambda - - 112 (1) 0.200 - 112 0.017 ** 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.041 - 112 0.032 ** 0,206 - 112 0.000 *** 
Somers' d 0.282 - 112 0.001 *** 0.491 - 112 0.000 *** 
Eta square 0.304 - 112 0.586 112 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 
(1) Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero
A further issue is to assess the individual relevance of each type of behavioural rule. There is 
enough information for extrinsic and intrinsic behavioural rules (114 and 46, respectively) 
and for those related with the past (73) and the present (84) in the time span. The testing of 
the model is made by considering both “Countryrating” (Table 7.3.3: 3) and 
“TypeofCountry” (Table 6, Annex 5.11) as the proxy for uncertainty. Statistical tests show
all types not to contradict the Heiner model, except rules of intrinsic nature in the second 
proxy where the results are very weak. In the first proxy, rules originated in the past – 
anchoring, learning and mental accounting - are the ones presenting a stronger relationship 
with uncertainty. 
Finally, the consequence of the Heiner model where investments are channelled to 













abroad are concentrated in developed (55%) and in Portuguese speaking countries (24%). In 
both cases uncertainty is regarded as inferior to most of the alternative locations. 
Table 7.3.3: 4 – Portuguese FDI abroad (1996-2004) 
Number of operations FDI flows 
Net value 
Number % of total Value 
(Million  euros)
% of total 
OECD countries 500 52.7 21.268 55.8 
Portuguese-
speaking 
268 28.2 9.219 24.1 
Other countries 180 19.1 7.704 20.1 
Banco de Portugal (2005) 
7.4 – Conclusions 
This chapter allowed for a better understanding of FDI location decisions and the role of 
behavioural economics. It is concluded that maximization is prevented in investments 
abroad both by bounded behaviour and the use of behavioural rules by decision makers. 
The above presented evidence supplies a wide set of new explanations for FDI location 
decisions. 
First, there are many situations in FDI location decisions where managers, as predicted by the 
traditional behavioural theory of the firm, behave as if “satisficing” by following a bounded 
rationality. It can be observed in firms’ objectives, collection and processing of information, 
and risk coverage policies. 
This behaviour is explained, in the C-D model, by the existence of constraints to 
maximization due to the limited capabilities of the human being to act in a fully rational way. 
It is in accordance with the analysis of Simon, Cyert, March and other "behaviouralists" and, 
as per the Heiner model, it constitutes a first limit to neoclassical analysis. 
These constraints are a first barrier for the correct use of the reliability condition proposed by 









indefinitely improve their behaviour towards maximization in a more competitive FDI context 
because the degree of competitiveness is not always inversely associated with the number of 
bounded procedures in firms’ decisions. 
However, these constraints represent just a low level of uncertainty where there is a C-D gap 
but not necessarily a large one. Theoretically, these are not sufficient to endanger the 
existence of a firm, namely if it is successful in the domestic market, where the turnover is 
very significant. Moreover, they do not fully impede the assumptions of foreign investment 
theory because it is more concerned with how to explain the decision to invest abroad than 
with the outcome of the investment (Dunning, 1979). Firms, in this context, may still be 
trying to maximize subject to limits of various natures such as resources and cognitive ability.  
There is also plenty of evidence of managers following simplifying strategies when making 
FDI decisions. FDI location decisions are made of a set of small steps where these 
behavioural rules are applied. An FDI operation is a new context for decision making where 
the degree of uncertainty is usually higher and unusual situations are more prone to happen. 
Portuguese firms are very focused in the domestic market and the higher the uncertainty the 
more they rely on the same rules of behaviour. Therefore, they do not behave “as if” they 
could attain maximization and optimization is not even a possibility in these cases, meaning 
that FDI location decisions do not depend on it. 
The use of behavioural rules by economic agents is influenced by the impact of emotions in 
the decision making process of an individual. The role of emotions in the human brain cannot 
be separated from the cognitive process and it affects the ability to make decisions as 
neuroscientists have demonstrated (e.g., Damasio, 1994). Behavioural rules are not explained 
by some occasional failures but represent a gap in the C-D Model where the degree of 
uncertainty is higher. They are no mere bounding constraints but behavioural regularities 
where the reliability condition explains why maximization is absent and decision making 
may, in effect, be far away from what is deemed to be rational in a neoclassical sense.
Several “anomalies” in managers’ behaviour were identified in specific FDI operations. 
Confirmatory bias, false consensus bias and reputation based-herding were evident only 







in a consecutive way or kept unchanged non-maximizing decisions for a long period. It 
happened due to overconfidence from the illusion of being in control, availability of
information, herd behaviour, cascading and signalling, cultural anchoring, fairness, mental 
accounting, decision making inconsistent with strategy, inter-expert inconsistency and under 
use of information in what concerns FDI determinants, and historical (of the firm) reasons. 
Therefore, time and learning are shown not to be sufficient for managers in what 
concerns improvements in decision making. 
Based on the available observations and performed tests, and given the association existing 
between the level of uncertainty and the number of behavioural rules detected in Portuguese 
firms, the Heiner model cannot be regarded as unsuitable to study Portuguese FDI operations. 
The model predicts that managers rely on actions which are adaptable to relatively recurrent 
situations but ignoring actions which are appropriate in unusual circumstances. Heiner (1983) 
explains them due to the behavioural rigidity of agents in adjusting to new situations. Given 
this learning “failure”, heuristics are needed for a better prediction of behaviour in FDI 
decisions. Therefore, the model seems a good tool to predict managers’ behaviour in FDI 
location decisions. Economic theory should not only understand why firms invest abroad 
but also how are these decisions made. Both perspectives are needed and, contrary to 
neoclassical theory, the model is able to include them. 
The above evidence presented a lot of examples where managers followed behavioural rules 
when facing uncertain situations arising from the decision to invest abroad. The behavioural 
approach was able to help explain 55% of FDI location decisions made by the 
Portuguese firms included in the study. Moreover, it should be remembered that probably 
not all of the non-rationalities were detected in the interviews. A deeper analysis of each 
operation would be needed to find them.  
Behavioural rules are new determinants of FDI location decisions usually ignored by the 
neoclassical approach and complement the two main motives presented by economic 
literature, revenue increase and cost efficiency considerations. These are manager and firm-
level determinants of a special kind because they do not arise from the reason behind the 
decision to re-locate production, such as market, asset or efficiency-seeking, but from the 








The hypothesis of the model is not fully confirmed because it has yet to be empirically 
applied for a wider and more representative number of cases. But it confirms that the 
neoclassical paradigm is not sufficient to fully explain FDI decisions and thus it further 
weakens tax competition theory as a universal postulate for all the firms. 
This is true even when considering some control variables. Among the regularities those 
originated in the past and of extrinsic nature seem to have a more significant role in the 
behaviour of Portuguese firms when making FDI decisions. But those of intrinsic nature 
and originated in the present are also valid. Although heuristics indicate that agents are not 
able to learn from past experiences in all situations and thus cannot improve indefinitely their 
behaviour towards optimality, the knowledge about behaviour rules might help managers 
improving their performance by considering and reviewing their use.  
But not all managers follow the same rules. As the model predicts, uncertainty varies with the 
perceptions of managers and these are different from one another given they both are intrinsic 
to one ’s self and extrinsic, that is, arising from the environment. FDI operations, especially in 
less developed economies, face a relatively high level of uncertainty and require actions 
which are not usually applied in domestic decisions. In the C-D model uncertainty explains 













Chapter 8 - The role of business taxes and other 
incentives 
Tax competition models were originally developed from the perspective of a jurisdiction 
using fiscal variables to attract capital. But this can only happen if firms or investors are 
willing to move to the jurisdiction due to attractive fiscal conditions. These two 
complementary perspectives are necessarily interconnected. Moreover, tax competition and 
FDI theories give a different emphasis to the role taxation, making the former seem like a 
special case of the latter. 
This chapter presents a different approach by focusing on the behaviour of firms to check and 
see if and how firms’ decision-making is influenced by taxation and to understand the 
incompatibilities existing between the tax competition and the FDI literatures. The aim is to 
address two simplifications of the standard tax competition model, the role of taxation as a 
direct determinant of profitability and as a driving force of FDI flows, so that their usefulness 
in explaining FDI flows can be assessed. 
The chapter starts by addressing the role of business taxation in profitability and in FDI 
location decisions by using empirical data arising from interviews with managers. It proceeds 
with statistical tests about the behaviour of Portuguese firms and with a second questionnaire 
to address the double role of taxation in profitability and location decisions. The case of the 
EU, the most integrated economic space, is then considered in the light of the behavioural 
approach. It concludes with an interpretation of results. 
8.1 - Business taxation as a determinant of FDI 
The literature on tax competition simplifies the world by stating that, other things equal, 
taxation is a driving force of capital movements. But this is a very general statement. The 
question of interest in this dissertation is the role of taxation in FDI location decisions. The 










taxation directly impacts profits firms would invest where tax rates are lower. Thus, tax rates 
are regarded as one more cost with a direct impact in the profit and loss account. Moreover, it 
also assumes that the level of taxation does not change in the host or in any other country 
before firms decide to locate their investments or, otherwise, each tax rate change would 
motivate firms to review their FDI location decisions.   
The behavioural approach emphasizes several motivations for FDI flows to occur. First, it 
disregards maximizing behaviour while accepting that profitability is essential for a firms’ 
survival in the marketplace. Given the importance of profitability taxation is surely relevant 
for firms. But the issue is to understand if “Greenfield” decisions and tax rates are really 
connected as the neoclassical approach states. The behavioural hypothesis is that tax rates are 
not a key factor because FDI location decisions are too complex to be simplified by a single 
variable explanation. 
H4: Tax rates have no key role in FDI location decisions
As it was shown in the preceding chapters FDI location decisions are based on different 
objective and subjective variables. It may be that taxation is one of them, as FDI theory 
recognizes. But tax variables are only relevant when profits exist and thus they are dependent 
on a pre-condition. It is only after this condition is fulfilled that taxation has a role. This 
makes the corporate tax rate a unique variable and not simply one more cost to be borne by 
firms. Therefore the behavioural approach considers that the key aim for managers is to be 
profitable and not to maximize profits by finding the lower corporate tax rate.  
Moreover, the outcome of the tax competition model depends on the mobility of capital flows. 
The higher the mobility the larger is the inefficiency arising from tax competition. But the 
explanations of foreign investment arising from the FDI literature are not dependent on the 
mobility of investment flows. Foreign investment theory recognizes the profit motive but it is 
more concerned with how to explain the decision to invest abroad than with the outcome of
the investment or the maximization aim of the investor (Dunning, 1979). FDI flows, as 
explained in chapter 3, face significant barriers to their movement and therefore: 










8.1.1 – The role of business taxes in profitability 
A simplification of the tax competition model is that, other things equal, it is through the 
difference in tax rates, and thus the marginal productivity of capital, that investment flows are 
explained. In other words, in this model taxation is implicitly assumed to be the only variable 
to affect profitability (H4a). But this is a rather simplistic perspective not in line with the 
behavioural approach where the decision-making process is also considered. 
The “irrationality” of this hypothesis is immediately evident although it is useful because it 
helps to explain the role of business taxes in profitability. The confirmation that taxation is 
not the only variable affecting profitability is seen in the 27 different reasons presented by 
Portuguese firms to invest abroad (annex 5.2). However, included in different ways are 
income and costs that eventually result in profits or losses. The same applies to 15 different 
criteria to assess an FDI operation where, besides revenue and costs, depreciation rules, 
industry benchmarking and other variables were at least as important as taxation. The set of 
different variables that impact profitability and are considered by firms when making FDI 
location decisions are recognized by the literature (Devereux et al, 2002). 
Table 8.1.1: 1 – Firms with losses in FDI operations 
Firm Country Year of investment 
2 Spain 1992 
3 Spain 1998 









Moreover, maximization requires a firm to have an equal marginal productivity of capital in 
its different locations and the tax rate is assumed to be the key variable in this equalization. 
Although there is no information about the marginal productivity of capital, the interviewed 
firms present a wide spread of results and thus seem not to follow a marginalist approach 
when choosing FDI locations (Tables 7.2.2.2: 1, 3 and 4 above). The existence of positive and 
negative profits on different investments made by the same firm, after a considerable number 







                                                          
are 5 firms in this situation: 2, 3, 5, 10 and 11. All these investments were operating for more 
than seven years with accumulated losses (Table 8.1.1: 1) and contrast with the accumulated 
profits of the consolidated accounts. Furthermore, the FDI performance1 of Portuguese firms 
is also unrelated to the difference between the Portuguese and other countries’ tax rates, as 
Table 8.1.1: 2 shows (confirming Devereux and Griffith, 1998). Therefore, not only is 
maximization prevented but firms seem not to be concerned about the equalization of the 
marginal productivity in their investments and thus both H4a and H4a1 are supported. 
Table 8.1.1: 2 – Performance and tax rate differences: Number of FDI operations *
Comparing with Portugal (2004): Higher profitability Lower profitability 
Locations with higher or equal tax 
rate 
3 8 
Locations with lower tax rate 3 21 
Total 6 29 
* Operations initiated before 2000 
But what is important, and usually disregarded by the tax competition literature, is that 
business taxes cannot be simply understood as one more cost in a profit and loss account for 
two reasons. First, given its special nature. Business taxes only arise when there are profits. It 
may be argued that a firm only invests abroad in a search for profits. This is generally true 
although chapter 7 provided evidence of investments motivated by different reasons. But the 
specificity of taxation is that its level is irrelevant if there are no profits to tax. This might be 
important for a FDI operation where the return on the investment is achieved only in 5 years 
and, in the meantime, firms have losses. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider that firms 
are concerned, in the first place, with profits and only afterwards with taxes. The behavioural 
approach allows for this recognition. 
Even considering that in a long term perspective firms expect to profit from their investments 
abroad a further issue arises. Tax rates are not fixed variables and governments can change 
them for different reasons that are not directly related with firms’ activities. The obvious 
example is the need to have public receipts. Therefore, in a dynamic perspective there is a 
“decalage” between the timing of a location decision and profitability and the incidence of 
taxation, and during all this time governments maintain a “monopolistic” position in their 
1 Measured by the return on assets in 2004 or based on the information provided by interviewees. It compares 
the global profitability of the firm with the profitability of each FDI operation whose beginning occurred at least 
5 years ago.  
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jurisdictions. The corporate tax rate is beyond the direct influence of firms2 while in the case 
of other variables, such as production costs and labour, the firm may choose the lowest price 
from different suppliers independent of their geographical location. They may even be located 
outside the host country. 
The importance of the behavioural approach is that it considers the entire FDI decision-
making process. A firm that decides now to locate its investment in some country bases this 
decision on an analysis where expected profits usually arise after a few years (Table 8.1.1: 3). 
The assessment of the investment is made just before the decision when the firm does not 
know the future evolution of tax rates in the chosen country and the differentials with the 
competing locations. If the firm expects profits after five years what will be the relative level 
of tax rates then? It will depend on several factors that are beyond control by the firm. One of 
them is the political cycle where new governments may change tax laws. Thus the firm cannot 
know future tax rates. Furthermore, other countries may also have lowered the tax burden in 
the meantime. So what does the firm do? Is it going to transfer the investment to a different 
country with a lower level of taxation and re-start the process? It seems very unlikely given 
the low mobility of FDI capital. Then, this is a second reason why firms are first concerned 
with having profits and only afterwards with taxation. 
     Table 8.1.1: 3 – The way to profitability and the role of taxation: An example 
Years: 0 1 to 4 5 to … 
Investment Losses Profit 
Costs > Income 
Tax rate irrelevant 
Income > Costs 
Tax rate becomes relevant 
If it is accepted that profitability always precedes the levy of taxes then, even in the 
maximization context of the neoclassical paradigm what is important for rational firms in 
making location decisions it is the profitability after taxation and not the corporate tax rate in 
itself that matters. That is, although the corporate tax rate has a direct impact when firms have 
profits it is the after-tax rate of profitability that is expected to determine location. Thus, the 
corporate tax rate may have an important role when firms can choose where to locate profits 
but it may have an inferior relevance when location decisions are made because its impact on 
2 The analysis is valid even considering that firms may negotiate a tax exemption for a certain period as large 
TNC’s usually do. This period always include the initial years of the investment when profits are rarer. 
Furthermore, governments may reduce long-term incentives anticipating the tax planning organization of TNC






profitability is limited and indirect and depends on a lot of different issues related with costs 
and revenue. 
This different perception on the role of taxation corresponds to separate approaches to the 
economic activity of firms. The tax competition literature (chapter 2) mixes these two roles of 
taxation while FDI theory is more concerned in explaining the location decision and the 
subsequent investments where taxation may have a role if the firm is profitable. The 
behavioural approach followed in this dissertation, on the other hand, tries to separate these 
two roles by focusing on the first so that a better understanding of the initial location decision 
can be reached. 
For the reasons noted above it is important to differentiate short-term capital flows and 
FDI in a tax competition context. The interviewed firms provided several examples that 
confirm the lower mobility of FDI flows where, within the tax competition model, only small 
inefficiencies are predicted. Several firms mentioned a concern with the repatriation of capital 
when deciding FDI. This is related to profits but the same can be applied to asset sales abroad. 
Two firms, 8 and 15, took a long time to receive the funds after making the decision to divest 
from Brazil. Firm 15 took four years while firm 8 took only two years due to financial 
difficulties but probably sold its network at a lower value (market conditions were worse). A 
different example was firm 11 which was dependent on the authorization from the 
Mozambican government to sell a factory and repatriate the money. Without it the firm could 
not get their money back. In the case of portfolio investment, however, and as long as capital 
markets have sufficient liquidity, the sale of securities and the consequent repatriation of the 
money can be done almost immediately. These exit costs impact FDI location decisions (e.g. 
Gorg, 2005). 
The standard model of tax competition refers to capital in general and even when there is 
imperfect capital mobility its inefficient outcome is still valid although on a smaller scale. But 
contrary to what happens with portfolio movements the imperfect mobility of FDI limits the 
options for firms to look for the lower tax rate. Moreover, FDI flows usually present a large 
temporal gap between the moment of the decision to invest and the incidence of taxation. 
Therefore, even considering that business taxes have a direct impact on profits, the difficulty 









                                                          
  
competition model. Because taxation is only relevant when profitability is achieved and firms 
do not know what will be the level of tax rates when that happens, the standard tax 
competition model is less able to explain FDI location decisions than the behavioural 
approach. H5 is thus confirmed. 
8.1.2 – The role of business taxes in FDI location decisions 
Following this clarification the question on the core of the tax competition literature concerns 
the role of business taxes in FDI decisions. The tax competition theory assumes that capital 
moves by searching for the highest rate of return and that this rate depends on the level of 
taxation or the tax burden. That is, the model assumes that maximizing behaviour explains 
why lower taxes attract investment. However, it was shown above that firms do not maximize.  
Therefore, in order to better understand the role of taxation preparatory interviews were made 
with two representatives of governmental institutions responsible for the attraction of FDI to 
Portugal3 where the role given to tax rates is not the assumed by economic literature. One of 
the interviewees first reported that “a good investment is not looking for fiscal incentives. The 
Portuguese state demands 30% of equity and fiscal incentives are only available if the 
banking system considers the investment viable”. He added: “Fiscal incentives are not a ‘sine 
qua non’ condition to attract investment. A better reason to lower the corporation tax rate is 
its role as a very good selling argument for the country. That is why it is so important”. For 
this interviewee tax rates are relevant by acting as a sign of liberal market conditions but this 
does not mean that firms locate their investments because of tax rates. It means only that 
firms have a closer look to the country when they are collecting information about potential 
markets if the corporate tax rate is lower. It is a way to attract the attention of investors. 
The second interviewee mentioned “The corporation tax rate is important when there is a 
very large difference with other countries. But it is not a determinant variable for firms when 
deciding to invest in this or that country. In the 1990’s Portugal did not use the fiscal 
instrument but was able to attract FDI anyway. Thus I do not think corporation tax rates to 
be decisive in location decisions”. 














These statements are in accordance with FDI theory, where there is a diversified list of 
reasons to explain investments abroad, but not with the tax competition model. This 
“incompatibility” was checked in the interviews with Portuguese firms. During the first hour 
of each interview a handful of themes were introduced (Table 8.1.2: 1). When commenting on 
these themes, and before being asked directly about the importance of taxation, only five 
interviewees mentioned the tax variable and all in different contexts from tax competition. 
Firm 15 in the context of the fiscal evasion by local competitors, firm 1 about tariffs on 
imports as a reason to move production to a specific country, firms 1 and 10 as information to 
collect when studying a market and firms 8 and 9 about reductions in business taxes levied on 
receipts from international operations by Portuguese authorities but not by the host country. 
Therefore, all interviewees were able to freely speak about FDI operations, their motives and 
characteristics, during one hour, but a reference to taxation as a determinant of foreign 
investment was completely absent.  
Table 8.1.2: 1 - Spontaneous reference to tax competition within a theme 
Themes Reference in the first hour of interview
(% of interviewees) 
How are FDI decisions made 0 %
Determinants to invest abroad 0 %
Criteria observed for the decision 0 %
Collected information 0 %
Why are markets chosen 0 %
Objectives 0 %
Risks 0 %
Advantages and disadvantages 0 %
When finally directly asked about the relevance of taxation in FDI location decisions all 
interviewees, except one, explicitly denied any relationship between the two variables. That 
is, they clearly stated that tax variables were not relevant for a market choice in any FDI 
location decision made by their firms. The only interviewee that mentioned taxes, the 
manager of firm 14, was thinking about a future investment, the delocalization of its factory, 
not of a decision that was made in the past. However, he simultaneously and explicitly 








taxes, and considered that all should be lower for a good business environment. This is, after 
all, a common thought among the business community.  
What is also relevant is that three of the interviewees also explicitly reported that only after 
deciding on an FDI location did they have a concern to minimize the tax burden. Thus, if we 
accept this result as representative for all the Portuguese firms, the tax competition model 
makes no sense at all for location decisions because firms do not consider taxation relevant in 
this specific case. 
Only after the introduction of the tax theme, two firms (banks), in a total of 28 different 
determinants and 128 statements (annex 5.2), mentioned fiscal efficiency as a reason to 
invest. But, in both cases, as a justification to have a subsidiary in the Cayman Islands, where 
the benefits are for their customers. 
Interviewees also mentioned some possible situations where some type of incentives to attract 
FDI may make some sense. One of them is the size and the type of the investment. Firm 3 
stated: “There was no support in Spain probably because we acquired an established firm. 
The state only supports foreign investment above a determined amount and in the case of the 
‘Greenfield’ type. For small and medium amounts there are no incentives”. Another firm
stated: “Our investments do not have enough size to allow for any kind of negotiation or to 
obtain any advantage in fiscal terms”. A third response mentioned that “only large 
investments are supported by the Brazilian government”. The CEO of firm 8, a retailer, 
declared that “fiscal incentives are important to attract investment but mainly in 
manufacturing”. This was confirmed by two of the banks included in the interviews where 
the idea was that there are no incentives for FDI of financial firms, only for manufacturing. 
The data shows that the banking sector does not have a broad access to fiscal incentives for 
FDI. Only 2 of the 44 operations had received these types of incentives. This is also 
confirmed in the European Tax Survey (EC, 2004). A telecommunications manager, on the 
other hand, reported that “our business is so good and profitable, with huge scale economies, 
that despite the big financial effort needed to invest, the host countries, instead of subsidising 
investment, tend to levy specific taxes”. The evidence shows that Governments may opt to 









Moreover, in some of the countries where the Portuguese firms invested there are no 
discriminations between foreign and local investments, that is, the incentives are the same for 
all firms. In Brazil and in the EU, for example, the support given by a country is typified and 
similar to all firms although there are negotiations on a case by case basis.  
The incentives received by the interviewed firms can be classified according to their nature, 
fiscal or non-fiscal, and the donor, Portugal or the host country (tables 8.1.2: 2). A total of  92 
operations received 22 different types of incentives but only 50% are of fiscal nature (Annex 
6.1). 
Table 8.1.2: 2 - Incentives received in FDI operations 
Supporter Incentives Fiscal Non-fiscal Total 
Portugal 6 7 13 (59%) 
Host country 5 4 9 (41%) 
Total 11 (50%) 11 (50%) 22 
In general most (59%) of the incentives received by these firms were given by the Portuguese 
government, as a support for the internationalization of Portuguese firms, and not by the host 
country. Therefore, the available information is in clear contradiction with what tax 
competition theory predicts, that is, the attraction of FDI is expected to be done by recipient 
countries through the use of fiscal variables. In this way the statements made by managers 
about the lack of relevance of fiscal incentives to their FDI decisions are confirmed by the 
nature and the number of received incentives4. 
It should be remembered, however, that these investments have different years of completion 
and public policies varied throughout the period covered by this work. Furthermore, some
information is based on the perception of respondents and thus may be incomplete.  
A further question was made about the importance of fiscal incentives or subsidies in the 
decision where to locate an investment inside a chosen market. In this specific case three 
interviewees think that taxation has an important role in the location decision inside a market, 
although only two had received support from local jurisdictions. It confirms the findings of 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) that incentives by local governments are more relevant for the 












                                                                                                                                                                                     
Table 8.1.2: 3 – The real role of taxes in Portuguese FDI location decisions 
The role of taxes in 
FDI locations were: 








Irrelevant 108 96,4% Received 22 Portugal 14,1 % 
Relevant 4 3,6% Not received 70 Host country 9,7 % 
112 100 % No information 20 23,8 % 
From the above it is easily seen that both H4b1 and H4b2 are confirmed. The tax 
competition model is too simplistic to explain FDI flows at least in the case of Portuguese 
firms. FDI location decisions are complex and rely on a huge variety of determinants, more in 
line with FDI theory. According to interviewees, tax variables, including governmental 
subsidies, were not relevant for firms’ 112 location decisions (the exception was off-shore 
subsidiaries), and even among those whose job is to compete for FDI attraction the role of 
taxation is deemed more symbolic than effective in explaining corporate behaviour.  
8.2 - Statistical tests 
The conclusion above is in accordance with the behavioural approach where the expected 
association between business tax rates and location decisions is not seen as essential because 
all the complexity of the FDI decision-making process is considered.  
To confirm this conclusion a first test compares corporate tax rates between the actual 
location decisions and potential locations in the same period where investments could have 
been made if the firm had chosen a different alternative. All countries with available 
information about corporate tax rates are considered a potential alternative. 
Information on tax rates has two different origins. Top marginal corporate tax rates are 
available from a database located on the website of the University of Michigan (2007). Data is 
available for 57 countries between 1980 and 2002. These do not include local tax rates. 
4 All interviewees referred that their firm would apply to any type of incentives when available, even those that 
























Statutory corporate tax rates (including local taxes), effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) and 
effective average tax rates (EATR) are available from Devereux et al (2002) for the period 
between 1979 and 2003 and for 19 OECD countries. 
Figure 8.2: 1 shows, for the first dataset, the relative rank of corporate tax rates in the location 
decision made by Portuguese firms in a total of 74 operations. The ranks are built from 57 
countries, the 1st. being the lowest and the 57th the highest statutory tax rate in the year of the 
investment. It clearly shows that firms frequently opt for higher tax countries.   
Figure 8.2: 1 – Frequencies of relative ranks in FDI location decisions: Michigan 
1 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 57 
Rank 
This is confirmed if one considers the total data for Portuguese FDI (Banco de Portugal, 
2005). Between 1996 and 2004 the three major destinations of Portuguese FDI were Brazil, 
Spain and Angola (with around 40% of total FDI flows) and these three countries have a 
significantly different rank in the Michigan database (table 8.2: 1). Moreover, these corporate 
tax rates were only subject to one change in Brazil and Angola during the period considered 
and there were FDI inflows even without a significant decrease in tax rates. Thus it seems that 
statutory tax rates do not have a key role in FDI location decisions. For example, there are a 
huge number of potential locations with lower tax rates that were not able to attract the 
investment flows channelled to Angola. 
Given that this outcome is based on statutory tax rates the same analysis is made for AETR, 
considered by theory to be relevant for location decisions. It includes data for 19 OECD 
countries between 1980 and 2002, the same period as above. The outcome, however, is 
















may also be seen when Portuguese firms make location decisions in countries with a higher 
EATR then Portugal. Other things equal it would be rational to invest in Portugal. 
Table 8.2: 1 – Rank and statutory corporate tax rates 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Brazil Tax rate 25% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Rank 8 5 5 4 4 4 4 
Spain Tax rate 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 
Rank 28 29 33 35 35 39 41 
Angola Tax rate 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 35% 35% 
Rank 47 50 53 55 54 39 41 



















Total Portuguese FDI outflows are also useful to consider the role of tax variables because 
they include the 112 operations used as a reference for this dissertation. FDI flows to 13 
different countries are based on OECD data (OECD FDI statistics, 2005) and their respective 
EATR. Although the behavioural approach hypothesizes that there is no key association 
between both variables it should be noted that the observed trend in the last 20 years was for 
corporate tax rates to decrease in OECD countries (Devereux et al, 2002, p.451) and 
Portuguese FDI to increase due to the progressive opening of Portugal’s economy after the 
accession to the EU (Banco de Portugal, 2005). In this sense one could expect that the 






















Austria 12 0.50 0.55 0.051 0.864 
Belgium 17 -0.177 -0.213 -0.211 0.209 
Canada 13 0.016 0.02 0.02 0.941 
France 21 -0.304 -0.307 -0.306 0.043** 
Great Britain 23 -0.522 -0.551 -0.551 0.000*** 
Germany 14 -0.33 -0.341 -0.326 0.111 
Greece 11 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 8 0.218 0.333 0.333 0.414 
Italy 12 -0.5 -0.516 -0.516 0.066* 
Netherlands 13 -0.261 -0.667 -0.667 0.286 
Spain 18 -0.148 -0.167 -0.167 0.252 
Switzerland 13 -0.43 -0.6 -0.6 0.018** 
USA 23 -0.137 -0.164 -0.163 0.385 
1. FDI outflows are the dependent variable.  
2. The significance is the same for the 3 tests. Level of significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; *10%. 
Scatter plots show that there are no significant linear correlations between the two variables 
and thus the Pearson correlation coefficient is of no use (Annex 6.2). But when using 
measures of association based on ordinal variables the result predicted by the behavioural 
approach is found. These are presented in table 8.2: 2 where it is confirmed that in the large 
majority of the cases effective tax rates are not associated with Portuguese FDI outflows. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis (there is a significant association between tax rates and FDI 
location decisions) can be rejected in most of the countries considered. The exceptions are the 
UK, France, Switzerland and Italy but from these only the UK has an acceptable scatter plot 
and a significant value (at a 5% level) of the Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.5 indicating 
a negative association between the two variables. 
8.3 – FDI location decisions and tax planning activities 
Statistical tests confirm the unimportant role of taxation on Portuguese FDI outflows but 
partially contradict the outcome of the questionnaire presented above in chapter 6. Some of 
the interviewed managers also participated in the natural quasi-experiment but their answers 
in the questionnaire were not consistent with those given about the role of business taxes in 
FDI operations made by their firms. While in the experiment they consider business taxation 







their own firms. This inconsistency can also be noted in the variable “cultural affinity”, where 
a low rank in the questionnaire does not fit with the statements addressing the relevance of 
cultural linkages presented in chapter 7. 
As was explained above, business taxes only arise when there are profits and thus profitability 
always precedes the levy of taxes. Therefore, taxation has a double and separate role, which is 
not explicitly recognized by economic models, concerning location decisions and tax planning 
activities. Taxation may have an important role when firms can choose where to locate profits 
but this does not necessarily imply that the same happens when location decisions are made.  
In an attempt to better understand this double role of taxation a second questionnaire was sent 
to 69 Portuguese managers and students. The implementation was by email or in the 
classroom at the end of 2006 after a pilot test with 15 students. The activity of respondents 
was as follows: 
Table 8.3: 1 - Respondents 
Professional activity Number Percent 
Technical 6 8.7 % 
Middle manager 19 27.6 % 
Board member 6 8.7 % 
Student 38 55.0 % 
Total 69 100 % 
The second questionnaire tries to create a market situation (Annex 6.3) for respondents to act 
as decision makers despite the absence of real incentives, as usually happens in laboratory 
experiments (Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 14). Question 1 focused on profit shifting or tax 
planning activities and question 2 investigates its relevance for the profitability of a 
hypothetical firm in the perception of respondents. Question 3 refers to FDI location decisions 
while question 4 is similar to question 2 by asking the perception of respondents of the 
relevance of this decision to the profitability of the firm. Questions 5 and 6 directly confront 
the two roles of taxation but in the latter case respondents are not obliged to opt for one of 
them and may choose indifference between the two roles. 
Rational decision makers are expected to consider both roles as important for the profitability 
of the firm. However, and as explained above, the corporate tax rate is expected to be more 











and 4) where the impact on profitability is indirect and depends on a lot of different issues 
related with costs and revenue. Using the same logic respondents are expected to choose more 
frequently tax planning activities (question 5) and to give higher relevance for corporate 
taxation in terms of profitability than in explaining location decisions (question 6).  
The answers to questions 1 and 3 show that respondents have a different perception about the 
role of taxation and its impact on profitability is deemed to be more important than on FDI 
location decisions. This is more relevant for managers than for students where the mean value 
is similar (Table 8.3: 2). The different perception is also confirmed in questions 2 and 4 
(Figures 8.3: 1 and 2 below). However, the differences are not large and in both cases taxation 
is perceived to be relevant for location decisions. 
Table 8.3: 2 – The double role of taxation 
Questions about tax effects 1 – on profitability 3 – on location decisions 
Mean (students and managers – 
69 answers) 
63.4 % 53.6 %
Standard deviation 30.6 28.7 
Mean of students (38 answers) 59.2 % 56.9%
Standard deviation 27.8 27.0 
Questions 5 and 6 confront both roles. In the first case the difference is not meaningful given 
that 51% of respondents chose question 1 (tax planning) as more important in terms of 
profitability of the firm while 48% chose question 3 (location decisions). The effect of the 
activity (student or manager) is not large in this case although students give higher relevance 
for the location decision than managers (Graph 8.3: 3).  
But in question 6 the outcome shows the majority of respondents (55%) as indifferent 
between the two roles. From the remaining, 22 (32%) chose profitability as the main role of 
taxation while only 9 (13%) chose location decisions (Graph 8.3: 4). That is, when given the 
option respondents perceive taxation as indifferent between profitability and location 
impacts indicating that they tend to mix the two roles. Overall the questionnaire does not 
clearly differentiate the two roles of taxation. This mixture explains the outcome of the first 
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Figure 8.3: 2 – Question 4
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Figure 8.3: 3 – Question 5
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8.4 – The European Union case 
The European Union is one of the areas where the literature on tax competition has been 
focused. The International Tax and Public Finance journal (volume 10, nº 6, 2003) has even 
devoted an entire number to this subject. After the completion of monetary integration there 
has been pressure from EU bodies to proceed with tax integration ideally to a federation-like 
entity where corporate tax revenue would be managed at a central level. However, the EU is 
not a federation and thus the effects of taxation to FDI location decisions are here considered 
from the perspective of different and autonomous countries considering some type of 
corporate tax harmonization (following chapter 2). 
8.4.1 - Background 
The EU has tried to achieve at least some level of tax harmonization since its inception. This 
was explicitly proposed by the Neumark Report in 1962. The legal basis is, according to the 
European Commission (EC), in the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty mentions, in its art. 2 that the 
aim of the European Economic Community (EEC) is to promote the economic development 
of its member states through the establishment of a common market, with free movement of 
people and capital, and the progressive approximation of economic policies. But there are 
other reasons besides this vague and general statement. An argument for fiscal integration is 
the need to increase the revenue in the European budget. Art. 201 of the Treaty of Rome
expressed the own resources principle as the source of financing of the European 
Communities. In 1970, this principle was adopted and three sources of financing were 
introduced: the Common External Tariff, the first example of fiscal integration on the revenue 
side among the then EEC countries, agricultural levies and the harmonized Value Added Tax 
(the 1st and 2nd VAT directives). 
Almost simultaneously, full tax integration was considered by the EEC. A first effort to 
harmonize capital duty payable by companies was made in 1969 (e.g. for increases in capital 
or share issues – Directive EEC/335/69) although it was only accomplished in 1985 (through 
the Directive EEC/303/85), and each member state kept full autonomy in the decision of 






                                                          
Commission of the European Communities (CEC), following a broader interpretation of the 
Treaty of Rome, made a proposal for tax uniformity – integration of corporate and personal 
income taxes and harmonisation of withholding taxes on dividends – and the Council of 
Ministers endorsed it to the European Parliament. The European Parliament dismissed it, in 
1975, on the basis that tax bases and the way taxes are implemented should also be equalized 
in order for it to be possible to achieve full tax uniformity.  
The idea of fiscal integration lost strength in the difficult economic conditions of the 1970’s 
and the CEC moved to further tax harmonisation through the 6th VAT Directive of 1977, 
where a tax credit type of VAT was introduced to prevent indirect taxation acting as a barrier 
to trade (by replacing internal tariffs). But the pressure for tax harmonisation in the EU did 
not only come from the CEC. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) made several decisions 
condemning tax discrimination in excise duties in the 1970’s, forcing an approximation in tax 
rates. 
Although the European Commission kept the idea of full tax integration, the reservation of 
European countries and the differences in tax bases led to advances in more acceptable issues. 
The idea of fiscal harmonization was more easily accepted by European countries than the 
thought of losing responsibility for defining tax policies to a higher level than the national 
one. So, the option to proceed with tax harmonisation, instead of tax integration, was 
maintained during the 1980’s in order to guarantee the completion of the Single Market. This 
applied mainly to product taxation and corporate tax burdens, and the main aim was to reach 
the goal outlined by the Treaty of Rome of the establishment of a freely competitive common 
market in the EEC. In 1987, the European Commission (EC) proposed a move to origin-based 
commodity taxation with a clearing system to avoid revenue transfers between countries. 
However, the need to align VAT rates was not accepted by countries and an agreement on the 
clearing system was not reached. The solution was a mixed system of the origin and 
destination principle, with the first as a basis for cross-border acquisitions by individuals 
(which allowed for the end of border controls for almost all products5) and the second for 
corporations. 







In the 1990’s there was another attempt for some kind of tax coordination under the 
surveillance of European institutions. The Economic and Monetary Union and the 
reinforcement of regional and cohesion policies brought the idea of a higher budget for the 
now European Union. A parallel with the USA federal budget was drawn suggesting an 
increased capability of the EU in dealing with differences of development. The aim was to 
follow the experience in the USA and other federations because countries were no longer able 
to use exchange-rates and monetary policies as a way of adjustment. Therefore, fiscal 
transfers were considered appropriate to deal with asymmetric shocks and to help less 
developed regions or countries. In 1996, the EC re-proposed fully origin-based commodity 
taxation, VAT, with equal tax rates and equal tax bases. 
Simultaneously, the need for a level playing field in the EU moved from product tax rates to 
corporate income tax rates. After the complete elimination of barriers to capital movement 
inside the EU there were several efforts to put corporations from EU countries under equal 
taxation conditions. The Ruding Report (1992), based on a survey made to 965 firms about 
the role of taxation in location decisions, proposed a minimum tax rate for corporations of 
30%, but it was not accepted by member-states for fear of firms moving to third countries. 
The trend of globalisation was also relevant, with a much criticised freedom of movement for 
capital in search of tax havens. Both the OECD (1998, 2000) and the EC (1997) criticized 
harmful tax competition and asked for greater international coordination. Presently, these 
reasons together with the enlargement of the EU, where a group of relatively poorer countries 
with lower tax rates became members, are the basis for the defence of more equalisation of 
taxes and more revenue for the EU institutions.  
8.4.2 – Present situation 
In spite of several attempts by the EC and the ECJ (e.g. the Marks&Spencer case), the 
progress towards a common fiscal policy is slow. Presently countries maintain their fiscal 
autonomy over direct taxation, social contributions and partially over indirect taxes. However, 
the idea of a common fiscal policy and of uniformity of tax rates did not lose ground and 
keeps coming up every once in a while. The same happens with the introduction of a 







The present stance originated in a new report on corporate taxation (EC, 2001) where several 
alternative options for tax coordination were presented. The explicit aim was both to reduce 
cross border investment distortions and compliance costs.  
The consequence of the report on corporate taxation is the introduction of a common tax base 
for corporations with EU-wide activities under two different regimes: Common Consolidated 
Base Taxation (CCBT) and Home State Taxation (HST – Gerard, 2006, Nicodéme, 2006). In 
the first case, countries would harmonize their rules to calculate taxable profits. In the second, 
countries maintain their own rules and businesses with cross border activities would only be 
taxed in their home country (where headquarters are located) and not separately in each 
country where there are subsidiaries or affiliates. In both cases taxes would be levied on the 
basis of consolidated accounts and “distributed” to the countries where firms are established 
by using a formula apportionment based on sales, payroll and property. Each country would 
be free to set its own level of taxation. Finally, firms operating only at a national level would 
follow the present national rules.   
The proposal of the EC aims to distinguish between large multinationals operating in the EU 
and SME’s (Small and Medium Enterprises). CCBT was designed for large firms so that they 
only have to fill in one tax declaration in the EU. This means lower compliance costs for 
firms and, as expected, they strongly support it (EC, 2004). HST was designed for SME’s 
with activities abroad. Its implementation means that countries hosting subsidiaries or 
affiliates lose the autonomy to tax them as presently happens. The level of tax revenue for 
these countries would depend on the corporate tax rules of the country hosting the 
headquarters. Therefore, this is hardly acceptable for EU countries and it may explain why, so 
far, there are no adherents to this scheme.  
The whole process has some other problems. First, the outcome of the proposal to create a 
common tax base is a two-tier system where rules to calculate taxable profits will be different 
according to each firm’s geographical area of operation. This may be a simplification for 
large multinationals but it will be a burden for national tax authorities. Its costs, however, 
were not considered by the EC. Furthermore, it would allow for tax arbitrage to occur if two 







Second, tax distortions seem to be much more relevant at a domestic level than in cross 
border investments. As it was shown in chapter 2, cross border distortions are not large if tax 
integration happens only at a regional level and cross border distortions will never disappear 
for firms also established outside the EU. But the differences between corporation taxes and 
top individual income tax rates within countries influence firms’ policies in terms of financing 
or dividends (Cnossen, 2003, p. 635). However, these distortions are outside the scope of the 
harmonization process. 
Third, corporate tax rates are not explicitly included in these proposals. The immediate reason 
is that only countries can grant authority for the EC to establish an EU-wide single 
corporation tax rate. But because there was no common tax base the issue has been left on the 
shelf. However, if countries keep their autonomy in setting tax rates after the implementation 
of a common tax base then cross border distortions would not disappear and tax rate 
competition may even increase because the tax base could not be used to attract FDI. HST 
would probably increase tax competition for headquarters locations (Cnossen, 2003, p. 640). 
In other words, if the aim is to reduce cross border distortions the process in development by 
the EC only makes sense if there is a harmonization of corporate tax rates. 
Finally, the all process of creating a common fiscal policy relies on a survey made in the 
ambit of the Ruding Report and was reinforced by the European Tax Survey (EC, 2004, after 
p. 101). Both surveys report managers asked for greater tax coordination in the EU. However, 
the conclusions of these two surveys should be handled very carefully given the above 
detected inconsistencies between questionnaires and interviews. 
Respondents are not those who make FDI decisions. In the Ruding Report they are mostly 
finance or tax managers whose job is precisely to minimize the tax burden for their firms, and 
in the ETS the survey does not indicate the respondent. Therefore, in the first case it was like 
asking someone if their job is really important, and the most probable answer is yes, and in 
the second there is no information about who is really answering the questionnaire. That is, 
those that make FDI decisions, the members of the board, are not necessarily involved in the 
answers. This is probable given that ETS is mainly about compliance costs, a very specific 










There is also significant bias in terms of the answers received. In the ETS large and medium
size firms are overrepresented in comparison with small firms and the same happens with 
respect to countries. For example, The Netherlands and Denmark provide 37% of the answers 
(EC, 2004, p. 17). In the Ruding Report the overrepresentation arises from industrial firms 
(68, 1%) and the UK and The Netherlands (37%). 
Moreover, The European Tax Survey is a questionnaire about compliance costs where a few 
questions related to profit shifting and the relevance of taxation to location decisions are 
included. That is, these questions are answered in a context where the differentiation between 
the role of taxation in terms of profitability and location decisions is not considered and, as 
shown in the questionnaires above, managers tend to mix the two roles of taxation. 
8.4.3 – Consequences of EU corporate tax policy from the behavioural perspective 
Corporate tax integration has as a common starting point the public finance view that tax 
competition between jurisdictions is inefficient and thus Pareto-inferior to a centralized 
management of fiscal income. This positivistic outcome relies on the usual set of assumptions 
that encompass the neoclassical paradigm. But as we have seen some of these assumptions are 
not valid because at least some firms do not follow the lower corporate tax rate when 
investing abroad. 
The behavioural approach showed that Portuguese firms do not rely on tax rates for their FDI 
location decisions. It may be that these are small firms in international terms and that the 
same cannot be said of large multinationals. However, the bulk of companies around the 
world are SME´s and not large multinationals although these originate a significant share of 
FDI flows. If it is accepted that corporate tax burdens are not key in explaining FDI location 
decisions then this result is very significant for the literature in the sense that the 
inefficiencies arising from tax competition are surely even smaller than the already very small 
ones reported in empirical studies (chapter 2).
This is reinforced by the existing harmonization of incentives to attract FDI in the EU. Since 
1999 the EU member states have to comply with rules established within the Social European 






country to an investor is defined ex-ante by the European Commission. It includes three areas: 
training, environment and research & development. All the remaining measures, including 
fiscal incentives, have to be negotiated on a case by case basis with the European Commission 
and there are heavy sanctions for countries that fail to comply with it including the obligation 
for beneficiaries to return the subsidies. 
Therefore, the present situation legitimates a question about the real aims of the EC in this 
process. If one considers that the distortions existing at a cross border level are small and can 
hardly justify tax harmonization or tax integration, and that the co-existence of different tax 
rates with CCBT and HST would probably intensify tax competition and thus the distortions, 
then it is difficult to believe that this change in tax rules proposed by the EC only aims to 
reduce compliance costs for large multinationals.  
A different view of the objectives of the EC might be a further step to help “European” 
champions to compete with US, Japanese, Chinese, Indian and other multinationals, in line 
with the goals fulfilled by EU’s Research & Development policy, and to create the conditions 
for a future European tax levied on large corporations. This is in line with the creation of legal 
status for the European Company (Societas Europeae) and would be impossible without a 
common tax base and a single tax rate. Under this view the real aim of the EC is not to reduce 
distortions or compliance costs. Putting it bluntly, the reduction in compliance costs was only 
a bait to get the support of the business community in the EC’s tax integration plans. 
The main conclusion is that, despite public finance theory, there are very good reasons to be 
doubtful about significant welfare gains arising from corporate tax harmonization in the EU. 
The aims of simplification in tax laws expressed by bodies such as the European Economic 
and Social Committee (2006, p. 9) and the costs to be borne by national tax authorities are 
fully ignored in this process. There is a justifiable doubt even without considering at what 
level tax rates would be set in case of tax integration and the consequent gains and losses for 
each EU member, its impact towards the rest of the world or the eventual effects in terms of 
efficiency costs of increased corporate taxation. The doubts almost disappear if, as economic 
theory states, the effects of tax competition as a barrier to an overexpansion of the public 
sector and the existence of agglomeration economies are also considered. Finally, if it is 









integration because large multinationals would use establishments outside Europe for this end 
it becomes evident that the option for EU corporate tax integration is mainly a political 
decision without a clear economic basis. 
8.5 – Interpretation of results and conclusions 
The use of a behavioural approach provided a real view about the role of taxation and 
business incentives in FDI location decisions. Portuguese firms seem not to be guided by tax 
considerations in their location decisions abroad and the received incentives were mostly 
provided by the Portuguese government, a complete contradiction to tax competition theory 
where jurisdictions are expected to implement fiscal policies to attract investment. Therefore, 
the tax competition model is not suitable to explain their behaviour. Statistical evidence 
shows it and confirms the statements of managers in interviews. There is thus a reasonable 
doubt about the usefulness of the standard tax competition model to explain the behaviour of 
all firms without distinction when it assumes that all capital searches for the lowest tax rate.  
The results presented above confirm the initial research hypothesis that taxation is not a 
key variable in FDI location decisions. Based on the evidence it may be seen that, for the 
interviewed firms, FDI does not follow the highest rate of return, whether it is influenced by 
differences in tax rates or not, because managers cannot know either what is the optimal 
decision to be made nor if they are close to it. This applies both to the successful corporations 
and to less-competitive firms in the sense that it is not only the degree of competition but also 
the level of uncertainty that explains the behaviour of firms.  
This outcome can be understood if it is considered that there is no evidence of tax competition 
with EATR at a country level and the literature shows empirical results to depend on some
characteristics. They vary with the type of FDI, namely new locations, reinvestments and tax 
planning activities, and with the existence of agglomeration economies. Agglomeration 
economies reduce the role of subsidies and the effects of tax competition (Devereux et al, 
2007). Moreover, discrete choice models present a lower FDI-tax rate elasticity (De Mooij 
and Ederveen, 2006) and econometric studies always include an insufficient number of 










The existing empirical mismatches between the absence of a complete “race to the bottom”
and the increase in corporate tax revenue can be explained by the lower importance of 
taxation for firms when deciding the country of location. Firms do invest in high tax countries 
and thus contribute to the tax revenue of these “hosts”. In this way, tax competition is 
consistent with large welfare states and, contrary to the ‘Leviathan’ assumption, it is not a 
question of government size. 
However, there can be no generalization to all firms in the EU because this outcome may be 
explained by many other factors such as the size of the investments or the relatively early 
stage of the process of internationalization of Portuguese firms. The European Tax Survey 
(EC, 2004) shows that taxation is a main relevant factor in the case of large firms. Thus, the 
evidence presented here needs to be confirmed for a wider number of cases and countries. 
Furthermore, this conclusion is weakened in the case of location decisions inside a market or 
in further investments in the chosen country despite these being decisions made after the 
location choice. 
The behavioural approach also solves the “incompatibilities” existing between tax 
competition and FDI theories by separating short from long-term capital flows and the 
profitability issue from location decisions. First, FDI flows are not perfectly mobile as tax 
competition requires for its effects to be of greater relevance. The lower the mobility the 
lower these effects are and FDI flows are very immobile when a firm is committed to stay in a 
country for several years; Second, tax rates are not the only variable affecting profitability, as 
the tax competition literature assumes in an oversimplified way by mixing the two roles of
taxation. It is a fact of life that firms want to minimize the fiscal burden to be more profitable 
but that is not the same thing as deciding the country location of investments based on tax 
variables. The second questionnaire shows that this double role can be easily mixed by 
respondents. Therefore, it is totally unrealistic to consider taxation as the only variable to 
affect profitability because there must be profits before the tax rate is levied. Otherwise the 
level of taxation becomes irrelevant; third, while the tax competition model is based on the 
marginal tax rate, location decisions are theoretically related with the average effective tax 





The compatibility between both fields is thus achieved if tax competition is restricted to 
profitability in short-term flows of the portfolio type and capital flows to locate taxable 
profits, and taxation is included among the variables to be considered by investors when 
making reinvestments. The behavioural approach, by focusing on location decisions, makes a 
clear distinction between the two roles of taxation and it allows for both theories to become
acceptable and compatible. By considering how FDI decisions are made the behavioural 
approach complements neoclassical theory. 
Finally, the basis for tax integration in the EU is undermined by this clarification of tax 
competition and FDI theories. The inefficiencies arising from cross border capital movements 
become much smaller if location FDI flows are eliminated from the tax competition setting 
and only short-term capital movements and reinvestments are considered. Moreover, these 
inefficiencies do not disappear with tax integration because the rest of the world is still out 
there. The consequence is that both facts cast serious doubts on the potential welfare gains of 
tax integration in the European Union as predicted by public finance theory. Moreover, 






















9 - Concluding Remarks 
The tax competition literature has been dominated by mainstream neoclassical economics but 
the richness of economic science is the possibility to use different and complimentary 
approaches. This is shown by the new insights for both the tax competition literature and FDI 
theories brought about via the use of behavioural economics. 
The contradictions between evidence and theory, the narrow assumptions of the standard tax 
competition model and the incompatibilities with FDI literature required a behavioural 
approach where both the environmental context of decision making and the perceptions and 
motivations of firms’ decision makers could be considered. This is readily understandable if 
one thinks of how complex FDI location decisions are and how long they may take to be 
completed.  
The research methods employed in this dissertation, based on qualitative techniques, allowed 
for a better understanding of how FDI location decisions are made and for tests of hypotheses 
derived from behavioural economics and the Heiner model. The robustness of the findings 
based on interviews, questionnaires, documentation and content analysis are confirmed, 
whenever possible, by statistical tests. This is a novel approach in the tax competition field 
and also in the Portuguese FDI literature. 
In this context, the behavioural approach complements neoclassical theory by relaxing its 
standard assumptions, namely that investors are rational decision makers that aim to 
maximize and behave as if maximizing by choosing the best alternative from a set of options 
based on probabilistic risk adjusted expected returns. More precisely, it exclusively focuses 
on long term and imperfectly mobile FDI, it avoids an oversimplified role for taxation, it 
considers imperfect knowledge about the marginal productivity of capital in every potential 
location and, above all, it assigns uncertainty a prominent role in the decision making process.  
The behavioural framework developed from the Heiner model was tested based on the 
information provided by Portuguese firms with FDI operations. The role of uncertainty in 






be confirmed. The objective financial analysis based on costs and revenue that translates the 
maximization aim of the neoclassical firm, framed with strategic goals, is not able to fully 
explain FDI location decisions. In a world where the role of uncertainty is highlighted, 
managers also rely on certain rules of behaviour in their business practices for the long term. 
This confirms what was previously found in the behavioural finance literature where portfolio 
operations are recognized to be influenced by these rules of thumb.   
Thus the C-D model can be regarded as a relevant predictor of Portuguese manager behaviour 
in FDI decisions. Statistical tests show that the predicted role of uncertainty is not refuted by 
empirical evidence. Portuguese firms invest more in places where there is less uncertainty and 
use more behavioural rules when there is more uncertainty. Moreover, the new determinants 
introduced by the behavioural approach were helpful in explaining 55% of the locations 
chosen by Portuguese managers and, thus, to provide a significant complementary 
explanation to neoclassical economics.  
However, questionnaire evidence shows the perceptions of managers on FDI location 
decisions to overvalue the variables usually addressed by the neoclassical literature. The two 
groups that answered the questionnaire, students and managers, presented similar perceptions 
on the key variables to explain FDI. These are roughly in accordance with FDI theory. The 
only behavioural variable included, “cultural affinity”, was regarded as being of minor 
importance. But in the interviews this variable was regarded by managers as relevant for a 
significant number of FDI operations. Evidence shows that a large share of Portuguese FDI is 
channelled to Portuguese speaking countries. Thus there is a contradiction between the 
answers in formal questionnaires, where FDI theory seems to have great influence, and 
“informal” interviews where managers freely explain their ideas, and the latter seems to be 
closer to reality. This contradiction also arises for the role of taxation, raising doubts about the 
validity of survey results. 
The neoclassical literature does not provide a complete understanding of FDI location 
decisions. Thus, an important finding of this dissertation is the new explanations of why a 
country is chosen as a location for production brought about by the applied behavioural 
approach. These new determinants originate from the environmental conditions surrounding 







decisions, and happen in all phases of the time span. A better comprehension of these 
determinants may help firms improving their behaviour. 
There is, thus, an enhancement of the FDI literature via the introduction of determinants such 
as overconfidence from the illusion of being in control of events, availability of information, 
herd behaviour, cascading, cultural anchoring, fairness or mental accounting. These are key 
determinants arising from the decision making process and not from the traditional 
neoclassical reasons behind the decision to locate production, such as market, asset or 
efficiency-seeking issues. 
Furthermore, in this dissertation behavioural rules are extended to firms’ decisions. These 
simplifying strategies, usually presented at a level of an individual, are not a one-off thing but 
are consecutively repeated happenings or non-maximizing decisions kept unchanged over the 
years by a collective body. Thus, the behavioural approach is also valid in a dynamic 
perspective when it reveals the learning inabilities of managers and, therefore, it allows for a 
better understanding of FDI location decisions. 
The evidence in this dissertation also justifies the conclusion that maximization may be muted 
when TNC’s are investing abroad. This is not the “satisficing” of the traditional behavioural 
theory of the firm where constraints from the limited capabilities of the human being explain 
why TNC’s are not able to indefinitely improve their behaviour towards maximization. 
Rather, it is the following of behavioural rules and the avoidance of actions appropriate only 
in unusual circumstances that prevents maximization. This behavioural rigidity in adjusting to 
new situations, in accordance with the Heiner model, is explained by uncertainty and this is 
an improvement on the neoclassical literature. Portuguese firms are very focused in the 
domestic market and face a high level of uncertainty when actions, which are not usually 
applied in domestic decisions, are required. This is very prominent in investments in less 
developed countries, as this dissertation shows. Therefore, in the context of the model 
neoclassical assumptions such as the will and the ability to maximize are not needed for 
FDI location decisions. 
Among the determinants explaining FDI, taxation is the relevant one in tax competition 






pressure groups and even the media, taxation is generally not a very important variable 
for the choice of the market where to locate FDI investments. From a total of 112 
operations only four (off-shore branches owned by banks) were clearly explained by fiscal 
criteria. In the remaining operations the fiscal variable was not considered to be a key element 
by decision makers. Contrary to what the tax competition model predicts most of the 
incentives received by Portuguese TNC’s were given by the Portuguese government, as a 
support for their internationalization, and not by the host country. 
Thus, if this result is accepted as representative for all the Portuguese TNC’s, the tax 
competition model makes little sense for Portuguese FDI location decisions because firms do 
not consider taxation to be a driving force of location flows. If this conclusion is enlarged to 
include other countries, then the negative influence of taxation to the allocation of capital 
across countries significantly diminishes because initial investments represent a very 
significant share of international FDI flows. The same applies to the provision of public goods 
by national jurisdictions, which is not endangered by FDI tax competition. Taxation is 
overvalued when it is seen as a key variable for location decisions. Its role seems to arise 
mainly from the direct impact on firm’s profitability and not as an explanatory factor for FDI 
location decisions. 
This overvaluation is confirmed in the perceptions of students and managers. Questionnaires 
show that there is a “gap” between the two sides of the tax competition model because the 
role of taxation is deemed to be more important for jurisdictions than for investors. Managers 
(and students) see taxation as being overvalued by governments relatively to what they 
consider as its importance for location decisions. This was confirmed both in formal 
questionnaires and in “informal” interviews with managers. 
The overvaluation of taxation as a key variable for FDI location decisions means that the 
mismatch existing between the tax competition theory and empirical evidence can be, at 
least partially, explained by the lesser importance given by firms to taxation when 
locating their investments abroad. Public officials understand both the limited role of 
taxation (as the interviews show) and the relevance of public inputs in new investments, and 
so do not claim for a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates. Furthermore, tax rates impact 








further reinvestments, after the initial location decision. The increasing in FDI stocks is an 
enlargement of tax bases and explains why corporate tax revenue has not been decreasing 
with tax rates. 
Moreover, the unimportant role of taxation in location decisions arising from the behavioural 
approach allows for both the tax competition and FDI theories to become compatible. FDI 
location decisions take a long time to be completed, demand a lot of information and make 
capital immobile due to “sunk” and “exit” costs. Therefore, location decisions and the long 
term perspective of investors seem to be better explained by FDI theory while tax planning 
activities and portfolio movements, and thus the short-term view where tax rates immediately 
impact on profitability, better adhere to the tax competition framework.  
But there are two other consequences from this overvaluation of taxation. First, some national 
governments may be relying too much on fiscal policy to attract new investment and, when 
this is the case, national policies should be changed accordingly. In other words, 
governments should move the focus of their FDI policies from taxation towards other 
determinants. Second, although tax competition literature is not definitive about what should 
be the corporate tax policy in an integrated economic space, the EU aim of having an 
integrated corporate tax policy, which is theoretically based on the adhesion to reality of the 
tax competition model, is significantly weakened by the lesser importance of taxation in 
FDI location decisions. If fiscal variables are not that important for FDI location decisions 
then it does not make sense to rely on them as a justification for tax integration in the EU.  
Finally, the main implication of this dissertation is that economic theory should not only seek 
to explain why firms invest abroad but also how are these decisions made and the model 
employed here, in contrast to neoclassical theory, includes both issues. In general, it is shown 
that the neoclassical and behavioural approach may complement each other. 
Some caveats and future work 
This is an exploratory study where the findings and consequences presented above rely on 
some features that may be improved in future work. There are three possible lines of research 











First, the enlargement of the database so that the conclusions reported above can be 
confirmed for a larger number of cases. The inductive nature of data collection relies on 
the ability of the researcher to detect and interpret information, and is based on the activity of 
a relatively small number of operations, 112. Therefore, further evidence is needed to 
strengthen these results: 
a) A confirmation of the hypotheses derived from the Heiner model for an enlarged database; 
b) The dissertation might be too focused on Portugal. The information collected comes from
Portuguese firms which are relatively new to the internationalization process. On average 
these firms have 18 years of experience abroad but a few of them have a very short presence 
in international markets. Therefore, it would be useful to study firms from other countries, 
and from different industries, in a different stage of the internationalization process; 
c) The surveyed firms are of small and medium size in international terms. Although they are 
representative of the vast majority of firms from all over the world, large TNC’s have a very 
significant share of the total volume of FDI flows and usually are thought to have better 
expertise in dealing with tax issues across different countries. Thus these results have to be 
confirmed for TNC’s; 
d) Tax planning activities are not included in this dissertation. The results obtained only relate 
to location decisions because these are the ones which may bring jobs and significant 
economic growth to host countries. However, there is the implicit assumption that location 
decisions are not related to tax planning activities. That is, TNC’s do not choose a country 
where to invest because of potential future savings in corporate tax payments. But this 
assertion has yet to be confirmed;  
e) Reinvestments are made after the location decision and the role of tax variables are 
probably more important in this situation, as Devereux et al (2008) have shown. Countries 
also look at actual investors so that their exit can be avoided. A better understanding of the 











f) It is also necessary to have a better understanding of the potential relationship existing 
between decision makers, whether in state owned firms, family businesses or public 
companies, and firms’ performance. This means knowledge of how widespread the detected 
failures in information collection and perceptions among members of the business community 
are; 
A second line of potential research is to strengthen the tax competition model: 
a) It is important to have a better understanding about how relevant are the inefficiency costs 
exposed by the behavioural approach due to the failure of firms to maximize. Are they very 
significant, as Akerlof and Yellen (1995) have shown in theoretical terms?
b) Closely related is the need to understand why, and when, are firms unable to indefinitely 
revise their behaviour towards maximization. This dissertation presents evidence that an 
increase in the degree of competitiveness faced by TNC’s is not sufficient to allow for a 
limitless improvement in their behaviour or in their performance. The improvement, or the 
ability to learn continuously, seems to happen only up to a certain point and afterwards there 
seems to be no reduction in the number of bounded procedures or behavioural rules followed 
by firms. Therefore, a further research question is to examine when and how is this point 
likely to be reached; 
c) Some of the hypotheses presented above about the limits of maximization need to be 
further examined. Although there is some evidence that the aim to reach a minimum level of 
profitability may act as a barrier to maximization it might be that this only applies to some
firms, but not to all of them, or to impact different firms in different ways. Thus a better 
understanding of what separates these firms is needed. A similar reasoning may apply to 
firms’ risk policies attenuating maximization;  
d) The tax competition literature does not distinguish between the role of taxation in 
determining profitability and in the location chosen to invest. Thus it is necessary to devise a 
research mechanism, to be applied in business surveys, to avoid the detected confusion 









A third line aims to strengthen the behavioural approach and to improve the Heiner 
model: 
a) At the conceptual level a better definition of errors and “anomalies” in the behaviour of 
economic agents and a way to distinguish them in empirical work is needed. Taxonomy of 
economic behaviour, including both rational and less than rational decisions, should be 
developed; 
b) There is also a need to better understand how persuasive is the behavioural approach in 
indicating that the context in which firms operate has a huge influence on their activity and its 
associated outcomes. Economic science tends to minimize the contextual issues but the role of 
uncertainty shows that this is an important matter. There is potential for relevant 
improvements in distinguishing between the influence of each firm’s culture and history and 
the individual cognitive characteristics of managers, including cultural and moral variables. 
This is valid for all decisions and it suggests new determinants for country locations in FDI 
operations; 
c) Further work is also needed on detected behavioural rules. The taxonomy presented above 
is intended as a first step in classifying “anomalies” in firms´ decisions. So far the literature 
has been focused on different economic situations, such as those in financial markets or in 
consumption decisions. A better characterization of the influence of the time span and of both 
the extrinsic and intrinsic dimensions would be welcome; 
d) A deeper and clearer definition of inconsistent behaviour by managers, beyond its general 
meaning of not being in accordance with maximization, has yet to be provided; 
e) Finally, there is a need to survey jurisdictions in order to ascertain the effective variables 
employed when trying to attract investment. This would apply the behavioural approach 












































































    




Annex 1 – Assumptions and Extensions
The public finance, political economy and new economic geography 
contributions 
Main assumptions Extensions of the model Changes in results 
Nash world Perfect competition (Oates and 
Schwab, 1991). Stackelberg 
(Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).
Efficient under restrictive assumptions
such as benefit taxes. Tax harmonization
is Pareto-worsening.
Factors of production 
Perfect capital mobility Lee (1997). Ludema and Wooton 
(2000).
Reduces tax competition effects. 
Integration reduces tax effects.
Labour immobility and in fixed 
supply 
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) Distortion is probably smaller and it
arises from the labour market 
Taxation 
Taxation on capital is of a source
based type 
Razin and Sadka (1991), Mintz and 
Tulkens (1996) 
Efficient given taxes available with 
residence based taxation 
The system of taxation of the home
country is not considered
Gordon (1992) Tax competition is more likely to occur in 
tax credit countries 
Tax rates are determined only with 
the aim of attracting capital 
Mintz (1996), Gordon and Slemrod
(2000), Slemrod (2004). Edwards 
and Keen (1996), 
Rauscher (1998)
Do not change the results but it provides 
other tax determinants. Tax 
competition reduces
inefficiency.
The provision of public goods
depends only on capital taxation
Frenkel et al (1991), Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991)
If a non-distortion tax source is available 
the model is efficient  
Tax rates are the only instrument to
compete for capital 
Wildasin (1988), Keen and 
Marchand (1997)
Using public expenditure may result in an 
overprovision of public inputs
Taxation is the exclusive driving 
force of capital movements 
Not addressed
Countries 
Countries are symmetric Wilson (1991), Bucovetsky (1991).
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2002).
Residents of very small countries are
better off with tax competition. Tax
coordination > Tax competition > Tax
harmonization.
Countries have active policies to 
attract capital by lowering tax rates 
Bruckner and Saavedra (2001),
Devereuxt et al (2008) 
Reaction functions and evidence of tax 
competition
Governments are assumed to be
benevolent
Edwards and Keen (1996) Leviathan hypothesis.
Markets, firms, consumers 
Markets within countries are
perfectly competitive 
Mintz (1996), Huizinga and Nielsen
(1997),Garcia-Milá and McGuire
(2001)
Taxable rents or agglomeration 
economies do not change the results. 
Individuals have the same
preferences and the same income
Frenkel et al (1991). Baldwin and 
Krugman (2004).
Do not change results. Different taxes 
justified in equity terms.
The production function has
constant returns to scale 
Ludema and Wooton (2000), 
Ottaviano and v. Ypersele (2002).
Optimal outcome with different tax rates. 
Firm heterogeneity Han and Leach (2008) Efficient allocation of capital with low 
capital mobility  
Investor as rational decision maker Not addressed
Investor has perfect information on
the marginal product of capital 
Not addressed
Investors search for the lower tax 
rate to maximize profits 
Not addressed














Annex 2 – FDI Location Explanations
 
Location advantages are the only ones that host governments can manage in order to influence firms 
when choosing a market to invest. Countries’ location advantages can be grouped by policy and
economic determinants (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 91). The first refers both to the impact of general 
economic policies and incentives for incoming FDI. There is an implicit assumption that countries 
want to attract FDI. This may be true in most cases but restrictive policies such as a complete
impediment of FDI are also possible. 
The second comprises economic determinants that are favourable to different types of FDI according 















     
  
 
   
 Table 1 - Location determinants in FDI decisions 
Locational determinants Empirical Theoretical and empirical studies 
Evidence * 
1 - Governmental policies 
Interest rate differentials + Nurkse (cited in Ietto-Gillies, 2005), Culem (1988), Grosse and Trevino (1996), Billington (1999) 
Exchange-rate risk Inconclusive Aliber (1970), Grubert and Mutti (1991), Grosse and Trevino (1996), Blonigen (1997), Azémar and Delios (2008) 
Tariffs and other trade barriers Inconclusive Vernon (1966), Culem (1988), Grubert and Mutti (1991), Blonigen (2001), Gastanaga et al (1998) 
Political stability + Schneider and Frey (1985), UNCTAD (1999), Trevino and Mixon (2004) 
Efficient legal system Inconclusive Wheeler and Mody (1992), UNCTAD (1999), Buch et al (2005), Gastanaga et al (1998), Hajkova et al (2006) 
Restrictions on capital movements + Buckley and Casson (1976), Brainard (1993), Gastanaga et al (1998) 
Differences in rates of taxation - Buckley and Casson (1976), Garrett and Mitchell (2001), De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2006) 
Investment incentives + Aharoni (1999), Head et al (1999), Buch et al (2005), Gorg (2005) 
Level of corruption Inconclusive Wei (2000), Gastanaga et al (1998), Khamfula (2007) 
2 - Economic determinants 
2.1 - Market-seeking FDI 
Size of the market + Aliber (1970), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Culem (1988), Billington (1999), Bellak et al (2007) 
Purchasing power + UNCTAD (1999), Nocke and Yeaple (2008) 
Market growth rate Inconclusive Culem (1988), Billington (1999), UNCTAD (1999), Chakrabarti (2001), Gastanaga et al (1998) 
Psychic distance (language, customs) - Johanson and Vahlne (1977), Schneider and Frey (1985), Hennart and Larimo (1998), Bénassi-Quéré et al (2007) 
Imperfect market structure + Caves (1996), Pak and Park (2005) 
2.2 - Asset-seeking FDI 
Natural resources + Dunning (1979), Hausmann and Fernandéz-Arias (2001) 
Labour, energy, transport, production costs - Vernon (1966), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Schneider and Frey (1985), Bellak et al (2007) 
High-skilled labour and Unit labour cost + Schneider and Frey (1985), Culem (1988), Brainard (1993), Mody et al (1998) 
Physical infrastructure (power, roads, ports) + Wheeler and Mody (1992), Bellak et al (2007), Nicoletti et al (2003) 
2.3 - Efficiency-seeking 
Agglomeration economies + Cantwell (1989), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Devereux and Griffith (1998) 
Existant level of FDI + Wheeler and Mody (1992), Buch et al (2005) 
Physical distance - Grosse and Trevino (1996), Buch et al (2005), Bellak et al (2007), Bénassi-Quéré et al (2007) 
Degree of openness Inconclusive Muchielli (2002), Brainard (1993), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Buch et al (2005), Azémar and Delios (2008) 
Trade + Billington (1999), Culem (1988), Grubert and Mutti (1991)























Annex 3.1 – Organizations and interviewees
Firm 1 – Corticeira Amorim
Paulo Bessa – Investor Relations 
Firm 2 – Banco Espírito Santo 
Mário Mosqueira do Amaral - Board Member 
Guilherme Moraes Sarmento – Sales and Financial Institutions 
Firm 3 – Laboratórios Bial 
José Redondo – Board Member 
Firm 4 – Banco BPI 
António Domingues - Board Member 
Firm 5 – Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
João Real Pereira – International Business Manager 
Firm 6 – Energias de Portugal 
Joaquim Macedo Santos – International business Manager 
Firm 7 - Inapa 
Alberto Barata Salgueiro – Board Member 
Firm 8 – Jerónimo Martins 
Alexandre Soares dos Santos – Chief Executive Officer 
Firm 9 – Mota Engil 
Arnaldo Figueiredo – Board Member 
Firm 10 – Portugal Telecom
Tiago Alexandre Ribeiro – Competition and Market Analysis 
Ricardo Luz – International Business Manager 
Firm 11 – Salvador Caetano 
João Sequeira - Board Member 
Firm 12 - Secil 
Francisco Nobre Guedes – Board Member 
Firm 13 - Sogrape 
Fernando da Cunha Guedes – Board Member 
Firm 14 - Vicaima
Arlindo da Cunha Leite – Chief Executive Officer 






























Eduardo Piedade – Planning and Financial Control Manager 
Firm 16 - Brisa 
Victor Paulo Saltão – Board Member 
Firm 17 – Millenium BCP 
António Figueiredo Lopes - Planning and Control Manager 
Associação Portuguesa de Investimento (now AICEP) 
Diogo Alarcão – Assistant to the Chairman 
Directorate-Generale of Industry 
Eduardo Lopes Rodrigues - Director-General 
Annex 3.2 – Correspondence Between Themes 
and Discussion in Interviews
Themes Issues addressed in the interviews 
1 – Objectives of the firm I
2 - Decision maker II
3 - Rational behind FDI investment II-A
4 – Collection of information II-B
5 - Market choice: key variables II-C
6 – Timing II-D
7 – Type of investment III–A 
8 – Productivity III-B, III-C
9 – Performance III-D
10 – Risk III-E
11 - Governmental support IV
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 Annex 3.3: 112 FDI operations abroad 

 
F i r m  s  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1 0  1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  1 5  1 6  1 7  T o t a l  
C o u n t r i e s  
A n g o la  X X X X X X  X 7 
A r g e l ia  X  1 
A r g e n t in a  X  X X 3 
A u s t r a l ia  X  1 
B e lg iu m  X  1 
B o t s w a n a  X  1 
B r a z i l  X  X X X X X  X 7 
C a n a d a  X  1 
C a p e  V e r d e  X X X X X 5 
C a y m  a n  I s la n d s  ( U K )  X  X  X X 4 
C h e c h  R e p u b l ic  X  1 
C h in a  X  X 2 
F r a n c e  X  X  X X  X X 6 
G e r m  a n y  X  1 
G r e e c e  X  1 
G u a t e m  a la  X  1 
G u in e a  B is s a u  X  X 2 
H u n g a r y  X  X 2 
I r e la n d  X  1 
I t a ly  X  1 
K e n ia  X  1 
L e b a n o n  X 1 
L u x e m  b o u r g  X  X X X  X 5 
M a c a o  X  X X X  X 5 
M o n a c o  X 1 
M o r o c c o  X X 2 
M o z a m  b iq u e  X X  X X X X 6 
P e r u  X  1 
P o la n d  X  X X X 4 
R u s s ia  X  1 
S .  T o m  é e  P r in c í p e  X X  2 
S lo v a k  R e p .  X 1 
S o u t h  A fr ic a  X 1 
S p a in  X  X X X X  X  X X X X  X 1 1  
S w it z e r la n d  X X X X 4 
T im  o r  X X 2 
T u n is ia  X  X 2 
T u r k e y  X  1 
U g a n d a  X  1 
U n i t e d  K in g d o m  X  X X X  X X 6 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  X  X X X X  5 










Annex 4.1 – Relationship between searches
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            Table 1 – Correlation coefficients: Google and IHT 
Value 
Approx. 
T(a) Approx. Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R ,692 4,397 ,000(b) 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman 
Correlation ,712 4,653 ,000(b) 
N of Valid Cases 23 
a Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Based on normal approximation. 
Table 2 – Nonparametric tests 
                                     Symmetric measures between:  
a) Rank of The Economist and Rank of Herald Tribune
Value 
Approx. 
T(a) Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b ,274 1,568 ,117 
Kendall's tau-c ,274 1,568 ,117 
Gamma ,275 1,568 ,117 
N of Valid Cases 23 
a Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
b) Rank of The Economist and Rank of Google
Value 
Approx. 
T(a) Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b ,139 ,851 ,395 
Kendall's tau-c ,139 ,851 ,395 
Gamma ,139 ,851 ,395 
N of Valid Cases 23 


























Annex 4.2 – Questionnaire I
 
Questions are of four different types: yes-no (4), fill-in-the-blank (2, 3, 7.2 and 8), ranking (5
and 6) and multiple choices (1 and 7.1). The measurement of variables is of three types
(Fowler, 2002, p. 89): nominal (for questions 1, 3, 4 and 7) ordinal (questions 5 and 6) and 
scale or ratio data (asks for numerical data with intrinsic value, questions 2 and 8).  
Questions 1 to 4 – The objective is to identify the working experience and studies of those 
who answer the questionnaire. Working experience provides a deeper and different than
theoretical knowledge of an organization decision process. It facilitates a division between 
those with practical knowledge of FDI decisions and those without it.  
Question 5 – To rank and weight variables related with foreign investment decisions from a 
firm perspective. This question allows for two types of comparisons. First, to give a relative
ranking of the FDI determinants presented in the question. Second, to compare the answers 
between professionals with and without FDI related experience. The question is divided in six 
different groups or “boxes”, each containing 6 variables, and the division is used to avoid a 
simultaneous and direct comparison of so many different variables because it would be very 
difficult for a respondent to rank them all simultaneously (Fowler, 2002, p. 101). All variables 
are directly compared with “Low business taxes”, the main objective of the study. In this way 
the relative importance of taxation to other variables is revealed.  
Question 6 - To rank the same variables related with foreign investment decisions using the 
government’s perspective. Does the different perspective change the perception of the 
respondents?
Question 7 – Seeks to show how important are differences in corporate tax rates to FDI 
decisions relative to other selected variables in three different countries belonging to the same
economic area. Both questionnaires (A and B) present a more attractive country Z and 
equivalent countries X and Y (if all the variables have the same weight). Country Y is the 
most attractive of the three in terms of corporate tax rate. In Questionnaire A, country Y has a
lower corporate tax rate of 5% and 10% in comparison with countries X and Z, respectively, 
while in B it is lower by 15% and 20% (in accordance with the difference in corporate tax
rates existing among large and small EU countries). In the quasi-experiment only 
questionnaire B is applied due to the lower number of answers. It is expected that the different
scenario (that of an economic area, associated with the European Union) does change the
perceptions of respondents about FDI determinants. Namely, that taxation becomes more 
relevant (Devereux and Griffith, 1998). 
Question 8 – It reveals an understanding of how changes in the corporate tax rate would affect 
investment decisions in the perception of the respondents. It can be used to compare
differences between respondents by using the three categories defined in questions 1 to 4. 
Questionnaire A presents a difference of 5% or 10% while Questionnaire B presents a 
difference of 15% and 20% (in accordance with the difference in corporate tax rates presented
in question 7). For question 8.2 only the answers whose chance was higher than the one 
indicated in 8.1 were considered valid (given the higher difference in tax rates).  
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Department of Economics and International Development – University of Bath 
Foreign Direct Investment Decisions
page 1
This questionnaire is confidential and the data will be used only for research
purposes. Please place a cross in the line corresponding to your chosen answer, or 
rank them where appropriate. When writing an answer (words or figures) please do so 
as clearly as possible. 
1 – Indicate, by placing a cross, in which sector are you working now:   
a) Manufacturing sector 
b) Financial sector 
c) Services sector 
d) Public, or state, sector 
e) Other (please specify) 
f) Not working at present 
2 – Indicate the total number of years of working experience     
3 - Indicate (with reference to sectors listed in question 1) the sector in which you 
have spent the majority of your working life: 
4 – In your working experience were you, in some way, involved in a firm’s decision 
process of investing abroad (choose yes or no in each question by placing a cross in 
accordance with your chosen answer)? 
Yes No
a) I had the final decision on whether to invest abroad or not. 
b) I made recommendations for investment decisions abroad. 
c) I executed technical/administrative work that was used as a support 

for recommendations for investment decisions abroad. 














































Department of Economics and International Development – University of Bath 
Foreign Direct Investment Decisions
page 2
5 – Suppose that a company decides to expand its business abroad and to make a 
significant investment in another country. Please, indicate the importance, in your
opinion, that each variable would have for the choice of the country in which the new 
investment will be located. Consider both a developed and a developing country as 
potential options. 
Score all variables presented in each box with a value between 0 (irrelevant) and 10
(very important). Please do not leave blank spaces. 
Box 5.1 Developed country Developing country 
Large market size 
High purchasing power (GDP per capita) 
Weak local competition 
Low business taxes 
Good infrastructure (roads, etc.) 
Low labour costs 
Box 5.2 Developed country Developing country 
Democratic political system 
Exchange rate stability 
Cultural affinity (e.g. same language) 
Appropriate technology 
Large market size 
Low energy costs 
Box 5.3 Developed country Developing country 
Low levels of corruption 
Good schools and hospitals for 
employees
Efficient legal system 
Low business taxes 
Exchange rate stability 
















































Department of Economics and International Development – University of Bath 
Foreign Direct Investment Decisions
page 3
5 – (cont.) 
Score all variables presented in each box with a value between 0 (irrelevant) and 10
(very important). Please do not leave blank spaces. 
Box 5.4 Developed country Developing country 
Weak trade union influence 
Low cost of capital 
Weak local competition 
Democratic political system 
Low levels of environmental regulation 
Efficient legal system 
Box 5.5 Developed country Developing country 
Available supply of labour 
Low business taxes 
Stable government 
High growth rate of the market 
Low cost of capital 
Cultural affinity (e.g. Same language) 
Box 5.6 Developed country Developing country 
Low energy costs 
Highly-skilled labours
Appropriate technology 
Few restrictions on capital movements 
Weak trade union influence 
Low business taxes 
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Department of Economics and International Development – University of Bath 
Foreign Direct Investment Decisions
page 4
6 - Imagine that you are the chairman of a government agency that has the main task
of attracting foreign direct investment to your country. Please choose from the list
provided the overall ten key variables to be used as an argument by the agency to 
attract foreign direct investment.  
Rank the ten key variables below (1 being the most important, followed by 2, 3, etc.) by placing the 
correspondent letter to each variable next to its respective ranking. 






Question 6: List of variables to choose L – High growth rate of the market 
A - Highly-skilled workers M - Few restrictions on capital movements 
B - Large market size  N - Low business taxes 
C – Low labour costs O - Good schools and hospitals for employees 
D - Weak local competition P - Weak trade union influence 
E - Good infrastructure (roads, etc.) Q - Available supply of labour 
F - High purchasing power (GDP per capita) R - Stable government 
G - Appropriate technology S - Cultural affinity, e.g. same language 
H - Low cost of capital T - Low levels of corruption 
I - Plentiful raw materials (minerals, etc.) U - Low levels of environmental regulation 
J - Low energy costs V - Democratic political system














                
 
 






                              
 
 




Department of Economics and International Development – University of Bath 
Foreign Direct Investment Decisions
Questionnaire A – page 5
7 - Suppose now that a company wishes to locate its overseas investment in an 
economic area that comprises three countries: X, Y and Z. These countries have 
different characteristics (presented in the table) but belong to the same economic
area (e.g. the European Union). Given that they are all part of the economic area the 
company can supply the entire market in this economic area from one of the 
countries. 
Variables X Y Z 
1 – Appropriate technology Very Good Good Reasonable 
2 – Legal system Reasonable Efficient Efficient 
3 – Quality of infrastructures Good Good Very Good 
4 – Corporate tax rate 30% 25%(15% in B) 35% 
5 - Hospitals and schools Good Good Very Good 
6 – Highly-skilled workers 60% 40% 70% 
7 – Labour days lost due to strike 3% 5% 1% 
7.1 - Based on this information, where do you think the company should invest?  
a) Country X b) Country Y            c) Country Z             
7.2 - Please indicate the main variable(s) that is (are) the basis of your choice: 
8 – Imagine that the company decided to invest in country A where the rate of 
corporate tax is 20% but noticed that country B has a lower corporate tax rate by 5%
(by 15% in questionnaire B). 
8.1 - What do you think is the chance of the company changing its decision and 
investing in country B, given the different corporate tax rates (please indicate from 0
to 100%)? 
% 
8.2 – If the difference between the two countries is 10% (20% in questionnaire B), 
what do you think is the chance (please indicate from 0 to 100%)?  
% 



























Annex 4.3 – General survey : Question 5
Statistics 
High Low Democratic 
Large Purchasing Weal Local Business Good Low Labour Political Exchange Cultural 
Market Size Power Competition Taxes Infrastructure Costs System Rate Stability Affinity
N Valid 112 113 111 112 112 112 113 113 112 
Missing 2 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 
Mean 7,2411 7,0088 6,1622 7,0804 7,0625 5,5982 6,3274 7,0088 4,9643 
Std. Deviation 2,13611 2,02439 2,40280 2,11446 1,96492 2,49490 2,57544 2,13598 2,41962 
Variance 4,563 4,098 5,773 4,471 3,861 6,225 6,633 4,562 5,855 
Good Schools 
and Hospitals Low
Appropriate Large Low Energy Low Level of for Efficient Legal Business Exchange Plentiful Raw
Technology Market Size Costs Corruption Employees System Taxes Rate Stability Materials 
ValidN 113 113 112 113 113 113 112 113 112 
Missing 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 
Mean 6,6726 7,0000 5,7679 6,7611 6,5664 7,5221 6,8571 7,0531 5,3750 
Std. Deviation 2,39956 2,19984 2,19328 2,50811 2,41231 2,03144 2,11753 2,09524 2,50090 




























Annex 4.3 – General survey: Question 5
Statistics 
Weak Trade Democratic Low Levels of Available Low
Union Low Cost Weal Local Political Environmental Efficient Legal Supply of Business Stable 
Influence of Capital Competition System Regulation System Labour Taxes Government 
N Valid 114 114 113 114 110 112 112 112 112 
Missing 0 0 1 0 4 2 2 2 2 
Mean 6,4649 6,4474 6,1681 6,3772 5,5273 7,3214 6,5982 6,8214 7,2679 
Std. Deviation 2,25843 2,13314 2,31031 2,52909 2,44465 2,16530 2,23993 2,23894 2,10953 
Variance 5,101 4,550 5,338 6,396 5,976 4,689 5,017 5,013 4,450 
Few
High Growth Restrictions on Weak Trade Low
Rate of the Low Cost Cultural Low Energy Highly-skilled Appropriate Capital Union Business 
Market of Capital Affinity Costs Labour Technology Movements Influence Taxes
ValidN 111 112 112 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Missing 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mean 7,2432 6,7143 5,2411 5,9909 7,5455 6,9545 6,9636 6,3000 6,8000 
Std. Deviation 2,13293 2,02875 2,43934 2,16941 1,91391 2,19836 2,36537 2,45155 2,25771 












   
 
   
  





   
 
   
  




   
 
   
  




   
 
   
  
   
  
 Annex 4.4 – Nonparametric tests
                                     Symmetric measures between:  
a) Rank of General Survey: Developed countries and Rank of Herald Tribune
Value Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b
Kendall's tau-c
Gamma 











b) Rank of General survey: Developed countries and Rank of Google
Value Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b
Kendall's tau-c
Gamma 











c) Rank of General survey: Less Developed countries and Rank of Herald Tribune 
Value Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b
Kendall's tau-c
Gamma 











d) Rank of General Survey: Less Developed countries and Rank of Google 
Value Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b
Kendall's tau-c
Gamma 


































Annex 4.5 – Characterization of respondents
In the natural quasi-experiment 
The main concern was to have two similar groups in terms of baccalaureate studies, 
current area of activity, sector where they have greatest working experience and years 
of working experience. This matching is useful to prevent bias from the composition of
the groups. 
The area of studies is important given that it gives us an idea of the diversity of 
respondents and of how many of them had theoretical teaching on FDI theory and 
corporate management. The number of years of working experience is also a way of
knowing the age of respondents. Finally, information about the sector of activity is
useful because different areas may give different perspectives on the role of taxation. 
Yes Group     No Group
Area of BSc or BA Nº % Area of BSc or BA Nº % 
Economics 8 26.7 Economics 9 31.0 
Management 7 23.3 Management 7 24.1 
Engineering 6 20.0 Engineering 7 24.1 
Law 2 6.7 Law 2 6.9 
Other 3 10.0 Other 2 6.9 
Missing 4 13.3 Missing 2 6.9 
Total 30 100 Total 29 100 
Yes Group     No Group 
Current sector of 
activity 
Nº % Current sector of 
activity 
Nº % 
Manufacturing 6 20.0 Manufacturing 3 10.3 
Financial 6 20.0 Financial 4 13.8 
Services 10 33.3 Services 3 10.3 
State 2 6.7 State 4 13.8 
Other 2 6.7 Other 5 17.2 
Missing 4 13.3 Missing 10 34.5 
Total 30 100 Total 29 100 
Yes Group     No Group
Longer working 
experience 
Nº % Longer working 
experience 
Nº % 
Manufacturing 6 20.0 Manufacturing 5 17.2 
Financial 8 26.7 Financial 5 17.2 
Services 11 36.6 Services 13 44.8 
State 3 10.0 State 6 20.7 
Other 2 6.7 Other 0 0 








Yes Group     No Group 
Years of working 
experience 
Nº % Years of working
experience 
Nº % 
0 – 6 7 23.3 0 – 6 13 44.8 
7 – 13 6 20.0 7 – 13 7 24.1 
14 – 20 10 33.3 14 – 20 5 17.2 
Above 20 7 23.7 Above 20 4 13.8 














Annex 4.6 – Natural quasi-experiment
Table 1 refers to the number of times each variable was ranked in the top 5 positions by 
respondents. 






Efficient legal system 16 9 
High growth rate of the market 12 8 
Highly-skilled labour 12 12 
Stable government 12 9 
Large market size 9 11 
Low business taxes 9 9 
Few restrictions on capital movements 7 7 
Low cost of capital 6 1 
Exchange rate stability 6 8 
Available supply of labour 6 8 
Low labour costs 6 4 
Democratic political system 5 3 
Appropriate technology 4 6 
Good infrastructure (roads, etc.) 4 7 
Low levels of corruption 3 5 
High purchasing power (GDP per capita) 3 8 
Low energy costs 3 3 
Weak local competition 2 1 
Weak trade union influence 1 0 
Plentiful raw materials (minerals, etc.) 1 2 
Good schools and hospitals for employees 0 2 
Low levels of environmental regulation 0 0 
Cultural affinity (e.g. Same language) 0 2 
Totals 127 125 
Question 6: Imagine that you are the chairman of a government agency that has the
main task of attracting foreign direct investment to your country. Please choose from 
the list provided the overall ten key variables to be used as an argument by the agency 
to attract foreign direct investment. Rank these below (1 being the most important, 
followed by 2, 3, etc.).
                        Table 2 – Comparison of answers to question 6









Yes group – No gr. 0.777 5.666 .000 0.818 6.506 .000 
Yes gr. – Students 0.726 4.835 .000 0.785 5.806 .000 
No gr. - Students 0.765 5.445 .000 0.763 5.409 .000 
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 Table 3 – Symmetric measures between Google and Managers in question 6 
 Ranks 
Value Approx. T(a) Approx. Sig. 
Yes group – Google Kendall's tau-b .193 1.268 .205 
Kendall's tau-c .195 1.268 .205 









Kendall's tau-c .037 .231 .818 
Gamma .038 .231 .818 
N of Valid Cases 23 
a Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Table 4 lists the variables referred by respondents when justifying their answer to 
question 7.1. 
Table 4 - Main variables indicated as reason for choice 










Quality of infrastructures 
Corporate tax rate 
Hospitals and schools 
Highly-skilled workers 




























































Annex 5.1 - Boxes 1 to 9: Evidence of bounded 
procedures and behavioural rules
Box 1 – Maximization prevention in FDI decisions 
Firm 1 produces cork stoppers in Australia for marketing reasons although it is
not rational, on economic terms, to produce there because the higher price, due 
to the extra costs in production, gives an opportunity to the competition, namely
plastic stoppers. The manager said: “’Made in Australia’ is important, it was a 
way of having value added in Australia and it was good for the Australian pride. 
But in rational terms there was no need to produce there. We simply could 
export the final product instead of exporting cork discs. In this way the price has
to compensate the higher cost of exporting cork discs”. 
Firm 5 is present in Cape Verde, an island with a very small market, where it
owns two retail banks that are able to do exactly the same operations. And in 
China: “We have a branch in Zuhai which is not very active because it operates 
only with foreign currency”. The branch not only is not operating despite the 
fixed costs but it is useless because all the operations in foreign currency can 
be booked in any other country or in a different off-shore branch. It should also
be noted that the firm has a representative office in Shangai that operates as a 
forefront for investment banking business.  
The same firm opened in New York in order to be able to participate in 
syndicated loans and other financial operations where the volume is huge 
although the spread is thin. The goal is to have an asset diversification but, 
simultaneously, it has a high opportunity cost due to the very small spread 
which in effect diminishes the average return of capital. 
A final example comes from firm 11 that made an investment with no return: 
“We wanted to help the development of Mozambique and agreed, with the state 
as a partner, to install a factory to produce components and assembly buses.
But the government, instead of giving some type of protection to the industry, 
decided to raise tariffs for the import of components and to eliminate tariffs for 
the import of buses. Thus, the factory is now inactive because the bus operators 
do not pay their debts and there are no good roads and no conditions to 






























Box 2 – Information collection and perception 
Firm 1 only invests in a country to where it exports and usually buys ”firms that 
are clients/importers because a new entrant in the market is strictly watched by
the existing firms”. Thus the collection of information is done, in the first place, 
by its own marketing network. Although there are other sources of information 
this means that the firm does not consider markets with no sales. Therefore, it
ignores if these markets are more or less profitable than the chosen ones and,
given that the firm does not collect all the relevant information, it cannot know if
it is optimizing its decision making.  
Firm 2 have several sources for business opportunities but it relies on informal 
contacts: ”we have contacts all over the world, given our old experience in the 
banking sector, and participate in non-official banking associations where we 
have access to off-the-record information about this or that firm”. It is clear that 
informal connections are of the most importance to investment decisions and 
are more important than the usual information collection procedures.  
Firm 8 had an operation in Poland that was, initially, not successful. ”I did travel 
through all the country in the beginning of the 1990’s, trying to speak with 
consumers when they spoke German, and did reach the conclusion that their
habits of consumption were very similar to those of Germany - where I had 
worked in 1957 and 1958”. But the firm started in Poland with a cash-and-carry 
business, where retailers are supposed to buy large quantities of goods. 
However, in 1994 the poles did not have large cars (or they did not have a car
at all) to transport goods from large shops and store them. Thus consumers 
needed smaller and closer to home shops and the firm changed the strategy 
after 1997 by heavily investing in discount supermarkets. 
Firm 15 tried to gain experience in the Portuguese and the Spanish markets 
simultaneously through the introduction of two new shop concepts. But the firm 
undervalued the competitiveness of the Spanish market and after a few years 



































Box 3 – Risk policy
Firm 3 is not mitigating the risk of investment in research. ”Recently we started 
research to develop new molecules. It is an immense financial effort to our
dimension. We expect sales of 100 million Euros in 2005 and are going to 
invest 200 million in research, in the next 5 years. The drugs industry is very 
risky in terms of research because you need to invest a lot of money before 
getting any results. And the possibility of success in a new molecule is very low,
less than 1 per thousand. It is a very risky strategy, but the only one that will 
allow us, in the long term, to have our own place in this industry. And the 
shareholder, the chairman, is taking a huge risk. A bank certainly would not 
advise us to take this risk. And the risk of the research (of having a null outcome
in terms of results) is not covered. We do not have venture capital or any
partnerships, although it is possible that we will in the near future”. 
Firm 4 have no financial participations abroad besides the affiliates. They only
have a portfolio of participations in Portuguese corporations. Thus, the portfolio 
is not geographically diversified and this is not explained by profitability. 
Firm 10 had an accumulation of debt from the Angolan state throughout the 
years but, despite using MIGA investment insurance provided by the World 
Bank when operating in other African countries, it does not in the case of
Angola. ”We think that Angola is more stable politically than most of the 
countries in the region, except Botswana and Namibia, and we have a 
privileged cultural relationship and very good connections, through the 
Portuguese state, with the local authorities”. 
Firm 14 decided not to cover the exchange rate risk with the UK despite the 
ever present hypothesis that large changes in the price of the pound in euros 















Box 4 – Learning 
Firm 5 is presently doing a new attempt to have a presence in Brazil by
returning to its initial role as an investment bank, although it was not very 
successful in the past and the market is not within its strategy. However, it is 
about to sell its participation in one of the largest Brazilian retail banks, a 
potential source of business for the investment bank. Thus it seems that the 
presence in Brazil is justified mainly by the holding of a licence to operate, the 
old presence in the market (since 1924) and by the will of the shareholder to be 
there due to political and cultural reasons. The same firm operates two 
competing banks in the same market, Cape Verde, despite its small size in 
terms of business volume. As the manager recognizes “We have two banks for
historical reasons and although they are becoming specialized in different 
areas, personal and corporate banking, there may be some questions on why
we keep them operating simultaneously”. 
Firm 8 wanted to diversify its retailing activity to sports goods and chose a new 
market, the UK, to start a new business. The Manager: “I wanted to test new 
products. There was an opportunity to buy a firm but, it is a funny thing, contrary
to the expected we were not able to learn and adapt to their culture”. To start 
simultaneously in a new market with a new business activity was too much for 
the firm. The problem was the lack of human resources in the firm to control the 
investments. The firms had detected it in Poland but decided anyway to expand 
simultaneously to Brazil and the UK. 
Firm 9 had, during more than 10 years, an accumulation of debts from the 
Angolan State despite the knowledge of the market (where it is present since 
1975). “We know very well the market thus the risk is lower” says the manager. 
But it took the firm more than a decade to learn: “There was an accumulation of 
debt from the past that is about to be sorted out after negotiations between the 
Portuguese and the Angolan states (private firms are supposed to forgive 75%
of the debts they own in a deal settled in 2005). So, our present policy is: no 
money, no work. We trust people up to a certain point, we start working for 
them. If there is no cash coming in we stop working until receiving the 
payment”. 
Firm 11 first invested in the UK, in 1984, to produce buses when its local 
representative was facing difficulties. After several years of losses due to 
unexpected changes in the tourism industry and the valuation of the pound the 
firm decided, in 1998, to change its strategy and invest in the production of
coaches. But, as the manager says “the outcome was not the expected. Further 
changes in the tourism industry were bad for the demand of our product. And 
our local partner (Dennis, a chassis producer) made other joint ventures with 
local producers and the price of chassis went up. We had to finish doing 
business because in a first moment there were no orders, due to cyclical 
reasons, and when there was an upsurge in demand our factory was not ready 
for it”. In 2004 the firm changed again its strategy and established a repairing 











Box 5 - Decision procedures 
Firm 10 is developing a complete new model of FDI location decision analysis
with the objective of providing coherence, in terms of strategy, to its investments 
abroad. According to the manager: ”in the past, we had ad-hoc investments 
without any strategic coherence but with a strong economic and financial 
rationale. The idea now is to build a model that includes different types of 
indicators such as risk, market potential, country potential, etc., with information 
about the level of market attractiveness for all investment opportunities. And, in 
this way, that allow us to filter any FDI location decisions”. It should be added 
that the rationale of some investments made in the past was mainly cultural and 
political. 
The first investment abroad made by firm 12 is now regarded as «too 
expensive». After this operation the firm decided to create a task force “in 
permanent alert to consider investment opportunities. They visit countries and 
firms, see the books and study the conditions for public tenders. It is composed 

























Box 6 – FDI decisions inconsistent with the strategy
Firm 5 is investing again in Brazil despite the strategy of targeting Spain and 
Africa, and since very recently China. The manager justifies this new investment
as a “new step in our Brazilian expansion policy now with the aim to serve our
clients and to support Portuguese interests in Mercosul”. Although there is a 
strategy in this firm, long-term investment decisions are not necessarily in 
accordance with it.  
Firm 9, a building company, operates two businesses abroad for several years 
although they are not within its strategy: “Our strategy is both to diversify
businesses, to related areas with construction, and markets (from Portugal, 
where the growth potential is very small, to Eastern Europe and Africa)”. In 
Peru, they have a machinery renting business “inherited” from a merger with 
another firm. But the manager states that “while there is profitability we will stay 
there” despite the successive economic problems in the country. In Angola, the 
firm operates as a car importer and owns a car repairing business. “It is a very
important market and we know a lot of wealthy people” justifies the manager.
“We also provide financial support to our partner, Volvo’s representative in 
Portugal. The importing firm works very well and we are still interested because
Volvo has trucks which are needed for our industry”. In this second case,
although there is a reason connected with construction it is a completely
different area of activity where further resources, needed for the core business,
are employed. 
Firm 12 has an operation, in Cape Verde, that does not comply with two of the 
main requirements of the strategy to invest abroad: The size of the market has 
to justify the investment without the risk of shortage of raw materials and the 
investment should located in the area of the Mediterranean Sea because it is
near the Portuguese market and thus the firm is able to supply it if needed. 
Firms 8 and 15 failed diversification attempts due to the absence of a clear
strategy at the time of decision. Firm 8 is a food retailing business and decided 
to “learn” a new business in a new market. “I wanted to test the possibility of
learning to deal with non-food products. There was a good opportunity in the UK 
to buy a firm focused on sports goods, Lilywhite. But we were not able to learn 
the specificities of the English market”. The failure is explained not by the 
attempt to learn a new business but by the new market. The firm stay there for
several years and never tried again to learn and expand to this new business as 
its main competitor in Portugal did. Firm 15 invested twice (in Sports goods and 
in “do-it-yourself” tools and products) in new retail businesses in Portugal and 
Spain, simultaneously. One reason for the choice of this market was
geographical proximity that allowed the firm to supply it from Portugal. However, 
both the logistics and the lack of knowledge about the Spanish market 
explained the failure in the two situations. “The Portuguese experience was not 
sufficient to invest in the Spanish market”. In the first attempt it was a test of a 
new business in a new market but in the second, also a new business, the 

















Box 7 – Managerial overconfidence 
Firm 2: “We are in Brazil since 1975 (insurance and agriculture businesses) 
and, in 1997, decided to buy a bank. But it did not work that well because it is a 
very peculiar market where foreigner are usually not successful. It is necessary 
to have a local management because they know better the market”. Despite the 
knowledge of the market, firm 2 trusted in its own capabilities without result. 
Firm 5 invested in Brazil in 1998, following the herd leaded by the Portuguese 
government, but three years later left the bank that it had bought. The manager 
explains: “The exit is due to the preference of having a small position in a big 
bank instead of owning a medium retail bank where it was needed a huge effort 
from our human resources to keep in touch with the management”. But the 
results of the bank were not good. 
Firm 11 overestimated the existence of an agreement where it was not
prevented alternative actions by partners that could harm the business. In 
Mozambique, the government (and shareholder of the firm) increased tariffs for 
the imports of the local investment and this should be not unexpected if it is 

















Box 8 – Cultural and historical anchoring
Firm 2: “We had a bank in Angola and investments in agriculture in Angola and 
Brazil, before 1974. When we lost our bank in Portugal the family decided to be 
in Europe and Brazil. This explains why we still are in these markets. And why
we did return to Angola in 2001”. 
The manager of firm 5 justifies FDI in this way: “The bank followed instructions
from the shareholder (the Portuguese state) to have a presence in Portuguese 
speaking countries”. 
The same with firm 6: “Brazil was a natural market for us due to the opportunity
(liberalization of the Brazilian market) and cultural reasons”. 
In firm 8, the interviewee explains the failure of the investment in Brazil in this 
way: ”The fact that we speak the same language and like to eat “churrasco” 
(meat) and rice is not enough”. 
Firm 10 confirms the importance of cultural linkages: “Our focus was in the 
Portuguese speaking countries due to affinity but not for profitability reasons”. 
Firm 15: ”We were in Brazil since 1989 through a partnership (in an industrial 
area). So, when we decided to invest there we already knew the market. The 
cultural aspect and the special affinity of the CEO to the country were decisive 
in the choice of Brazil”. 
288
 
   
 
                                    
        
            
              
                 
                  
                    
                    
                    
                      
                        
                        
                        
                        
                          
                          
                            
                            
                             
                              
                              
                              
                              
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
Annex 5.2 - FDI Determinants 

 
Firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total 
Determinants 
Growth of the firm (size) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 13 
Market growth rate x x x x x x x x x x x 11 
Cultural affinity x x x x x x x x x x 10 
Historical reasons x x x x x x x x x 9 
Legal environment x x x x x x x x 8 
Geographical proximity x x x x x x x 7 
Market size x x x x x x x 7 
Local competition x x x x x x x 7 
Superior know-how x x x x x x 6 
Political stability x x x x x 5 
To serve clients x x x x x 5 
Diversification (product/market) x x x x x 5 
To channel home production x x x x x 5 
Excess liquidity x x x x 4 
Factor costs (labour, energy)  x x x x 4 
Purchasing power x x x 3 
Fiscal efficiency x x x 3 
Government instructions x x x 3 
Exchange rate risk x x 2 
Raw Materials x x 2 
Distribution costs x x 2 
Experiment of a new service x x 2 
Fashion x 1 
Pressure from local representative x 1 
Owner's preference x 1 
Bargaining power with suppliers x 1 





         
           
 
 
           
 
 
Annex 5.3 – Level of internationalization
 
Firm Years Points Sales Points Employees Points Nr. of Points Average 
abroad abroad (%) abroad (%) markets points 
1 32 15 90.0% 15 26.0% 6 9 9 11.25 
2 32 15 12.0% 3 < 20% 3 13 13 8.50 
3 6 6 19.0% 3 30.0% 6 1 1 4.00 
4 8 8 14.8% 3 10.6% 3 5 5 4.75 
5 80 15 20.7% 6 19.9% 3 15 15 9.75 
6 7 7 24.8% 6 29.8% 6 5 5 6.00 
7 14 14 95.0% 15 89.2% 15 8 8 13.00 
8 9 9 30.3% 6 41.0% 9 3 3 6.75 
9 29 15 21.8% 6 23.2% 6 8 8 8.75 
10 15 15 24.9% 6 48.7% 9 17 17 11.75 
11 20 15 22.1% 6 46.4% 9 6 6 9.00 
12 3 3 14.7% 3 28.9% 6 4 4 4.00 
13 7 7 11.5% 3 26.1% 6 2 2 4.50 
14 16 15 40.0% 9 8.0% 3 2 2 7.25 
15 15 15 27.1% 6 53.4% 9 2 2 8.00 
16 3 3 < 20% 3 < 20% 3 1 1 2.50 






   
            
    
            
        
      
            
      
        
    
    
            
              
          
          
          









Annex 5.4 – Rules of behaviour per firm 

 
Firm Rules of behaviour 
Anchoring Cascading Fairness Herding Inconsistency Learning Mental Acc Overconfidence Total 
1 1 1 2 
2 4 1 3 1 1 1 11 
3 1 1 2 
4 2 1 1 1 5 
5 12 1 4 2 15 3 7 1 45 
6 3 1 2 8 4 18 
7 1 1 2 
8 1 2 2 1 1 7 
9 2 3 4 1 10 
10 8 6 2 16 1 8 41 
11 4 1 1 1 1 1 9 
12 2 3 5 
13 1 1 
14 1 1 1 3 
15 1 2 2 5 
16 1 1 1 3 
17 3 1 1 1 6 






















Nature Extrinsic Intrinsic Total 
Inter-expert 17 - 17 
Governmental 21 - 21 
Strategic 9 13 22 
Total 
47 13 60 
- Extrinsic nature: 21 + 17 (governmental and Inter-expert) are presented in 7.2.2.2. The remaining are:  
Firm 5: Keeps two banks operating in Cape Verde, investment banking in a non-strategic market, Brazil, Presence since 1991 in a non-strategic 

 
market, China, investment in a non-strategic market, Timor; 

Firm 6: Investments in non-strategic markets, Cape Verde and Macao; 

Firm 10: Not operating in mobile services in Mozambique, investment in non-strategic markets, Timor and Macao; 

- Intrinsic nature:  
Firm 5: Luxembourg, large presence in number of people to perform operations that can be done in other branches (London, Cayman);   

Firm 6: Guatemala, not a strategic market; 

Firm 8: Tried simultaneously a new business in a new market outside strategy, UK;  

Firm 9: Machinery renting business in Peru, car import and repairing in Angola, USA non-strategic market;  

Firm 10: Hungary, Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, non-strategic markets and non-strategic products; 

Firm 12: Angola and Cape Verde are markets of small size and not in the Mediterranean Sea where the firm is focused;  





























 Annex 5.5 – Financial margin
 
Firm 5 and the average of the Portuguese banking industry 











1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Firm 5 Banking industry Difference 
Financial margin is the ration between the financial result, that is, the difference 
between income and payments of interest, and the total financial assets that 
originate the financial result (deposits with central banks plus loans to other credit 
institutions and to clients and fixed income assets). All the information is reported 
















Annex 5.6 – FDI of Portuguese owned banks
 
Firms 2 17 4 5 Total Total Total 
Countries BES BCP BPI CGD MG Banif BPN Fini Finantia BPP branches Rep office 
Angola X X 2 0 2 
Belgium R R 0 2 2 
Brazil X R X X X R 4 2 6 
Canada R X R R 1 3 4 
Cape Verde X 1 0 1 
Cayman Islands (UK) X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  10  0  10 
China R X 1 1 2 
France X X X X R X 5 1 6 
Germany R R R R 0 4 4 
Greece X 1 0 1 
India R 0 1 1 
Ireland X 1 0 1 
Italy R 0 1 1 
Luxembourg X X R X R 3 2 5 
Macao X X X 3 0 3 
Mexico R X 1 1 2 
Monaco X 1 0 1 
Mozambique X X X 3 0 3 
Nassau X 1 0 1 
Poland X X 2 0 2 
S. Tomé e Princípe X 1 0 1 
South Africa R R X 1 2 3 
Spain X X X X X 5 0 5 
Switzerland X X R R R 2 3 5 
The Netherlands R 0 1 1 
Timor X 1 0 1 
Turkey X 1 0 1 
United Kingdom X X R R X 3 2 5 
United States X X R X R X X 5 2 7 
Venezuela R R R R 0 4 4 
Total 13 11 5 15 1 4 3 1 4 2 59 32 91 
X – Branches and other FDI, R – Representative Offices




            
 
 
        
         
        
       
        
        
        
        
        
       
    
       
        
        
         
       
       
       
        
          
        
      
       
       
        
        
Annex 5.7 – FDI location decisions explained by behavioural rules 

 
Nr. Firm Location 
Mental 
accounting Inconsistency Herding Cascading Anchoring Overconfidence Fairness Learning
1 Amorim Argelia 
2 Amorim Argentina 
3 Amorim Australia 
4 Amorim China 1 
5 Amorim Morocco 
6 Amorim Russia 
7 Amorim Spain 
8 Amorim Tunisia 
9 Amorim United States 
10 BES Angola 1 
11 BES Brazil 1 2 1 1 
12 BES Cayman Islands 1 
13 BES France 
14 BES Ireland 
15 BES Luxembourg
16 BES Macao 1 
17 BES Poland 1 
18 BES Spain 1 
19 BES Switzerland 
20 BES United Kingdom
21 BES United States 
22 Bial Spain 1 1 
23 BPI Angola 1 
24 BPI Cayman Islands 1 
25 BPI France 




        
  
   
       
    
       
        
      
        
     
    
        
     
    
          
          
    
    
       
     
     
        
        
         
         
         
       
        
         
    
       
       
27 BPI Spain 1 
28 CGD Brazil 1 2 1 2 1 1 
29 CGD Cape Verde 1 2 2 1 1 
30 CGD Cayman Islands 1 
31 CGD China 1 2 1 1 
32 CGD France 1 
33 CGD Luxembourg 2 
34 CGD Macao 1 1 
35 CGD Monaco 
36 CGD Mozambique 1 1 1 1 
37 CGD S. Tomé e Principe 1 1 2 1 
38 CGD South Africa 1 
39 CGD Spain 1 1 1 
40 CGD Timor 1 2 1 1 
41 CGD United Kingdom
42 CGD United States
43 EDP Brazil 1 1 1 1 
44 EDP Cape Verde 1 2 1 1 
45 EDP Guatemala 1 
46 EDP Macao 1 2 1 
47 EDP Spain 1 1 1 
48 Inapa Belgium 




53 Inapa Spain 1 
54 Inapa Switzerland 
55 Inapa United Kingdom 
56 JM Brazil 1 1 1 1 
57 JM Poland 1 




      
       
        
        
       
       
        
         
    
        
        
    
    
        
    
       
       
         
     
        
     
    
        
    
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
      
59 Mota Angola 1 1 1 
60 Mota Czech Republic 1 
61 Mota Hungary 1 
62 Mota Mozambique 1 
63 Mota Peru 1 
64 Mota Poland 1 
65 Mota Slovakia 
66 Mota United States 1 
67 PT Angola 1 1 1 1 
68 PT Argentina 
69 PT Botswana 1 
70 PT Brazil 1 1 1 1 
71 PT Cape Verde 1 1 1 1 
72 PT France 
73 PT Guinea Bissau 1 1 1 1 
74 PT Hungary 1 1 
75 PT Kenya 1 
76 PT Luxembourg
77 PT Macao 1 2 1 
78 PT Morocco 
79 PT Mozambique 1 2 1 1 
80 PT S. Tomé e Principe 1 1 1 1 
81 PT Switzerland 
82 PT Timor 1 2 1 1 
83 PT Uganda 1 
84 SC Angola 1 
85 SC Cape Verde 1 
86 SC Guinea Bissau 1 
87 SC Mozambique 1 1 
88 SC Spain 1 
89 SC United Kingdom 1 1 




       
        
        
        
        
       
         
      
     
     
       
        
       
       
        
        
         
        
       
        
         
          
    
 
 
91 Secil Cape Verde 1 1 
92 Secil Lebanon 
93 Secil Tunisia 
94 Sogrape Argentina 
95 Sogrape Spain 
96 Vicaima Spain 1 
97 Vicaima United Kingdom 
98 Modelo Brazil 1 1 
99 Modelo Spain 1 1 1 
100 Brisa Brazil 1 1 1 
101 BCP Angola 1 
102 BCP Canada 
103 BCP Cayman Islands 1 
104 BCP Macao 1 
105 BCP France 
106 BCP Greece 
107 BCP Luxembourg
108 BCP Mozambique 1 
109 BCP Poland 1 
110 BCP Switzerland 
111 BCP Turkey
112 BCP United States




























Annex 5.8 – Rating measures
1 - Standard & Poor’s (http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/)
S&P credit ratings are based on the following considerations: 
•	
 




Nature of and provisions of the obligation;  
• 	
 
Protection afforded by, and relative position of, the obligation in the event of bankruptcy, reorganization, or other arrangement under the laws of 
bankruptcy and other laws affecting creditors' rights.  
Rating definitions are expressed in terms of default risk and are simplified to simple notations A, B and C, where the first corresponds to lesser risk and the 
last to higher risk.
A
An obligor rated 'A' has at least strong capacity to meet its financial commitments although it can be susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions. 
B
An obligor rated 'B' has the capacity to meet its financial commitments. However, adverse business, financial, or economic conditions may impair the 
obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments.
C




   









2 - World Bank (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS) 
The Bank's analytical income categories (low, middle, high income) are based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, a broad measure considered to be
the best single indicator of economic capacity and progress of a country. 
The economies whose per capita GNI falls below the Bank's operational cut-off for "Civil Works Preference" are classified as low-income economies;
economies whose per capita GNI is higher than the Bank's operational threshold for "Civil Works Preference" and lower than the threshold for 17-year IBRD 
loans are classified as lower-middle income economies; and those economies whose per capita GNI is higher than the Bank's operational threshold for 17­
year IBRD loans and lower than the threshold for high-income economies are classified as upper-middle income economies. High-income countries have a
GNI per capita higher than $6,000 in 1987 prices. All thresholds remain constant in real terms over time. 
World Bank categories below correspond to country ratings in the following manner:
GNI per capita in US$ S&P Rating 
Low income (L) C 







































Annex 5.9 – Description of variables for
statistical tests
Rules of behaviour
Numbounded – Number of bounded procedures 
Numbehav – Number of behavioural rules. When aggregated information is required 
tests are made for two different groupings so that their robustness can be checked. The 
first considers three sets of country locations with zero rules, 1 rule or 2 rules or more. 
The second considers zero rules, 1 or 2 rules, and 3 rules or more. 
Uncertainty
At the level of the FDI operation: 
Proxy 1: Countryrating – Rating of the country where FDI is located. It varies from 
rating A, lower uncertainty (risk), to C, higher uncertainty (risk). 
Proxy 2: Typeofcountry – Divided by: Countries with a similar law and political and 
economic institutions (OECD and EU) where there is less uncertainty; countries with a 
common tongue and past with Portugal; remaining countries, with more uncertainty.  
Proxy 3: Numbmarkets – Number of external markets where the firm is present when 
the next FDI location decision is made. A higher number corresponds to lower
uncertainty.
Proxy 4: Numbyears – Number of years abroad when the next FDI location decision is 
made. A higher number corresponds to lower uncertainty 
Control variables
Decision – Influence of shareholders in decision-making. The shareholder structure did 
not significantly change in the past for the considered firms. This is divided in 4 
categories: Individual decisions with more than 5% and less than 50% or more than 
50%. And group decisions when the firm is public or when the Portuguese government 
has a role. 
Respondents – Influence of respondents divided in 3 categories: CEO’s, Other 
members of the board and Middle managers. 
Objective – Stated goals of the firm divided in 5 categories: Maximization, Minimum 
profitability, Other quantitative objective, Qualitative objectives and at least two of the 










Previlevel - Previous level of internationalization based on 2 indicators for each firm:
Number of years abroad and number of markets where a firm is present when each FDI
decision is made. This variable is classified in 3 different categories: 
a) Lower level (of internationalization): when the firm only has investments abroad less 
than 5 years old 
b) Medium level: when the firm has FDI for 5 or more years but it is present in less than 
5 countries 
c) Higher level: when the firm has FDI for 5 or more years and it is present in more than 
5 countries 
The number 5 is arbitrary in this classification although is confirmed in some verbal 
statements by interviewees. For example, the manager of firm 8 refers that “a firm 








   
 





   
                            
 
                                                     
 
                                            
 
  







                                                    
 
   
 
Annex 5.10 – Characterization of variables
 Table 1: Chi-square goodness of fit test 
 Variable: “Typeofcountry” 
Observed N Expected N Residual
OECD and EU


























a 0 cells (,0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 21,3. 
Table 2: Cross tabulations
  Countryrating * Numbehav Cross tabulation
Numbehav Total
,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 8,00 
Countryrating Low risk (A) 35 17 4 3 1 0 0 0 60 
Medium risk 
(B) 8 7 3 1 4 1 0 1 25 
High risk (C) 1 9 5 1 4 5 1 1 27 
Total 44 33 12 5 9 6 1 2 112
  Typeofcountry * Numbehav Crosstabulation 
Count  
Number of behavioural decisions (only rules of thumb) 















10 8 3 0 1 0 0 0 22 












    
    




    
    




    
    





    
    


















rules: 0, 1e 
2, 3 or 
more -
situation 1 
Individual with more 
than 50% 
N 37 37 37 37 
Poisson Parameter(a,b) Mean 1.8108 3.0000 .8919 .7297 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .164 .199 .062 .112 
Positive .110 .185 .062 .112 
Negative -.164 -.199 -.046 -.104 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .995 1.211 .374 .682 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .276 .106 .999 .741 
Individual with more 
than 5% 
N 13 13 13 13 
Poisson Parameter(a,b) Mean 1.3077 2.6154 .6923 .8462 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .270 .264 .039 .100 
Positive .145 .125 .033 .054 
Negative -.270 -.264 -.039 -.100 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .975 .953 .140 .359 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .298 .323 1.000 1.000 
Group in a public 
firm 
N 25 25 25 25 
Poisson Parameter(a,b) Mean 1.3600 2.4400 .4000 .4000 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .257 0.300 .070 .070 
Positive .194 .121 .062 .062 
Negative -.257 -.300 -.070 -.070 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.283 1.499 .352 .352 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .074 .022 1.000 1.000 
Group when 
government has a 
role 
N 
37 37 37 37 
Poisson Parameter(a,b) Mean 1.9730 3.0000 1.3784 1.7838 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .139 .199 .221 .248 
Positive .138 .185 .161 .106 
Negative -.139 -.199 -.221 -.248 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .846 1.211 1.344 1.511 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .472 .106 .054 .021 
a Test distribution is Poisson.
b Calculated from data. 
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rules: 0, 1e 
2, 3 or more 
- situation 1 
Individual with 
more than 50%
N 37 37 37 37 
Normal 
Parameters(a,b) 
Mean 1.8108 3.0000 .8919 .7297 
Std. 
Deviation .81096 .88192 .80911 .73214 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .274 .250 .243 .302 
Positive .274 .250 .243 .302 
Negative -.172 -.250 -.185 -.266 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.665 1.520 1.479 1.837 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .020 .025 .002 
Individual with 
more than 5%
N 13 13 13 13 
Normal 
Parameters(a,b) 
Mean 1.3077 2.6154 .6923 .8462 
Std. 
Deviation .63043 .76795 .75107 1.06819 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .456 .327 .283 .289 
Positive .456 .327 .283 .289 
Negative -.313 -.211 -.197 -.214 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.646 1.179 1.021 1.042 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .124 .248 .228 
Group in a public 
firm 
N 25 25 25 25 
Normal 
Parameters(a,b) 
Mean 1.3600 2.4400 .4000 .4000 
Std. 
Deviation .75719 .71181 .50000 .50000 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .483 .412 .388 .388 
Positive .483 .412 .388 .388 
Negative -.317 -.268 -.285 -.285 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2.414 2.059 1.941 1.941 





37 37 37 37 
Normal 
Parameters(a,b) 
Mean 1.9730 3.0000 1.3784 1.7838 
Std. 
Deviation .86559 .74536 .86124 1.31519 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .248 .230 .386 .336 
Positive .248 .230 .235 .211 
Negative -.234 -.230 -.386 -.336 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.508 1.397 2.350 2.044 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .040 .000 .000 
a Test distribution is Normal.
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Figure 3 – “Numbmarkets” frequency with normal curve
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 Figure 5a – Groups of rules frequency with normal curve
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Figure 6 – Behavioural rules frequency with normal curve
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N 37 37 
Parameters (a) Mean .9730 .9730 





Positive .219 .021 
Negative -.162 -.016 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.331 .130 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .058 1.000 
N 13 13 
Parameters (a) Mean 1.0000 1.0000 





Positive .346 .110 
Negative -.248 -.074 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.248 .398 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .089 .997 
N 25 25 
Normal Parameters (a) Mean .4000 .4000 





Positive .388 .062 
Negative -.285 -.070 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.941 .352 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 1,000 
N 37 37 
Parameters (a) Mean 2.7297 2.7297 





Positive .153 .178 
Negative -.143 -.140 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .931 1.083 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .351 .192 



























Table 6 -Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Numbyears 
.272 107 .000 .632 107 .000 
Numbmarkets
.175 107 .000 .900 107 .000 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Countryrating 
.337 112 .000 .728 112 .000 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Typeofcountry
.274 112 .000 .778 112 .000 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Numbehav .282 112 .000 .774 112 .000 
Groups of rules: 0, 1,
2 or more - sit 1 .256 112 .000 .780 112 .000 
Groups of rules: 0, 1e
2, 3 or more - sit 1 .301 112 .000 .748 112 .000 
















































































































Table 1 – Independence tests: Typeofcountry and Numbehav 
Groups of 0, 1, and 2 or more behavioural rules 
  Independence Tests 
Situation 1 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 55.099(a) 4 .000*** 
Likelihood Ratio 64.383 4 .000*** 
N of Valid Cases 112 
a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8,54. 
Situation 2 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.002(a) 4 .000*** 
Likelihood Ratio 53.651 4 .000*** 
N of Valid Cases 
112 
a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8,03. 
Situation 3 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.883(a) 2 .053* 
Likelihood Ratio 5.981 2 .050* 
N of Valid Cases 
72 
a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7,32. 
*** Significant at a 1% level; * significant at a 10% level;






























    
   
              
    
    
              
    
   
               
Table 2 – Independence Tests: Uncertainty (“Typeofcountry” and 
“Countryrating”) and Groups of 0, 1 and 2, 3 or more behavioural rules 
Countryrating Typeofcountry
Situation 1 Situation 1
Independence 
Tests Value DFr N Significance Value DFr N 
Pearson chi-
square 29.7 4 112 0.000 *** 61.6 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 34.7 4 112 0.000 *** 71.1 4 112 0.000 *** 
Situation 2 Situation 2
Independence 
Tests Value DFr N Significance Value DFr N 
Pearson chi-
square 23.9 4 112 0.000 *** 54.2 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 28.4 4 112 0.000 *** 62.5 4 112 0.000 *** 
Situation 3 Situation 3
Independence 
Tests Value DFr N Significance Value DFr N 
Pearson chi-
square 5.2 2 72 0.071 * 13.4 2 72 0.001 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 5.4 2 72 0.065 * 14.8 2 72 0.001 *** 






      
        
 
 




      







           




Table 3 - Association Tests: Uncertainty (“Countryrating” and “Typeofcountry”) 
and behavioural rules (“Numbehav”) - Situations 2 and 3 
Uncertainty and behavioural rules
Situation 2 Value N Signific. Value N Signific.
 Uncertainty proxy: Countryrating Typeofcountry
Symmetric 
Cramer' V (1)  0.357 112 
0.000 
*** 
0.443 112 0.000 
*** 
Contingency coef. (1) 0.451 112 
0.000 
*** 
0.531 112 0.000 
*** 
Kendall's tau-b 0.426 112 
0.000 
*** 
0.251 112 0.001 
*** 
Gamma 0.579 112 
0.000 
*** 
0.326 112 0.001 
*** 
Directional 
Lambda 0.097 112 
0.017 
** 
0.167 112 0.025 
** 
Goodman Kruskal 
Tau 0.081 112 
0.000 
*** 
0.140 112 0.000 
*** 
Somers' d 0.478 112 
0.000 
*** 
0.272 112 0.001 
*** 
Eta square 0.505 112 - 0.638 112 -
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; 
(1) Requires aggregated data in “Numbehav” because they are based on the chi-square 
Uncertainty and behavioural rules
Situation 3 Value N Signific. Value N Signific.
 Uncertainty proxy: Countryrating Typeofcountry
Symmetric 
Cramer' V (1) 0.377 112 
0.006 
*** 0.286 112 0.053 * 
Contingency coef. (1) 0.352 112 
0.006 
*** 0.275 112 0.053 * 
Kendall's tau-b 0.307 112 
0.001 
*** -0.072 112  0.447 
Gamma 0.419 112 
0.001 
*** -0.104 112 0.447 
Directional 
Lambda 0.024 112 0.739 - - -
Goodman Kruskal 
Tau 0.082 112 
0.001 
*** 0.071 112 
0.003 
*** 
Somers' d 0.327 112 
0.001 
*** -0.078 112 0.447 
Eta square 0.413 112 - 0.404 112 -
*** Significant at a 1% level; * Significant at a 10% level; 










     
        
           













Table 4 – Measures of association and direction 
Numbyears/Numbmarkets and Numbehav 
Cramer´s v and contingency coefficient are not feasible because they are based on the chi-square 
distribution and the number of observations is insufficient 
Statistical Tests Value N Signific. Value N Signific.
 Uncertainty proxy: Numbyears Numbmarkets 
Symmetric 
Kendall's tau-b 0.031 107 0.690 -0.057 107 0.466 
Gamma 0.036 107 0.690 -0.069 107 0.466 
Directional 
Lambda 0.239 107 
0.007 
*** 
0.179 107 0.025 
** 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.239 107 0.293 0.095 107 0.861 
Somers' d 0.027 107 0.690 -0.052 107 0.466 
Eta square 0.447 107 - 0.303 107 -











Table 5 – Control variables: “Countryrating” and “Numbehav” 
Table 5a: Decision 
Control variable: Decision 1 - Individual more than 50% 2 - Individual more than 5% 3 - Group in public firm 4 - Group with State role 
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =112 
Symmetric 
Kendall's tau-b 0.320 37 0.013 ** 0.583 13 0.004 *** 0.432 25 0.037 ** 0.541 37 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.459 37 0.013 ** 0.857 13 0.004 *** 0.818 25 0.037 ** 0.682 37 0.000 *** 
Asymmetric 
Lambda 0.174 37 0.278 0.286 13 0.124 0.400 25 0.029 ** 0.179 37 0.016 ** 
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.071 37 0.246 0.289 13 0.129 0.300 25 0.027 ** 0.127 37 0.004 *** 
Somers' d 0.329 37 0.013 ** 0.750 13 0.004 *** 0.519 25 0.037 ** 0.608 37 0.000 *** 
Eta 0.342 37 0.911 13 0.548 25 0.620 37 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 
Table 5b: Respondents 
Control variable: Respondent 1 - CEO 2 - Member of the Board 3 - Middle Manager 
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =112 
Symmetric 
Kendall's tau-b 0.617 5 0.025 ** 0.517 47 0.000 *** 0.465 60 0.000 *** 
Gamma 1.000 5 0.025 ** 0.742 47 0.000 *** 0.619 60 0.000 *** 
Asymmetric 
Lambda 0 - (1) 0.321 47 0.003 *** 0.111 60 0.095 * 
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.167 5 0.513 0.165 47 0.000 *** 0.103 60 0.000 *** 
Somers' d 0.667 5 0.025 ** 0.568 47 0.000 *** 0.510 60 0.000 *** 
Eta 0.662 5 0.569 47 0.579 60 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 
(1) - Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero














Table 5c: Objective 
Control variable: Objective 1 - Minimum profitability 2 - Other quantitative objective 3 - Qualitative objectives 4 - 1, 2 and 3 together 
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =112 
Symmetric Only 1 case 
Kendall's tau-b 0.483 20 0.001 *** 0.567 47 0.000 *** 0.399 44 0.001 *** 
Gamma 0.687 20 0.001 *** 0.752 47 0.000 *** 0.568 44 0.001 *** 
Asymmetric 
Lambda 0.273 20 0.060 * 0.161 47 0.122 0.040 44 0.562 
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.225 20 0.074 * 0.123 47 0.002 *** 0.066 44 0.137 
Somers' d 0.528 20 0.001 *** 0.610 47 0.000 *** 0.444 44 0.001 *** 
Eta 0.528 20 0.625 47 0.523 44 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 
Table 5d: Previlevel 
Control variable: Level Internationalization 1 - Lower level 2 - Medium level 3 - Higher level 
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =107 
Symmetric 
Kendall's tau-b 0.308 41 0.003 *** 0.529 27 0.000 *** 0.563 39 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.446 41 0.003 *** 0.698 27 0.000 *** 0.747 39 0.000 *** 
Asymmetric 
Lambda 0.192 41 0.017 ** 0.167 27 0.245 0.087 39 0.311 
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.101 41 0.027 ** 0.143 27 0.034 ** 0.142 39 0.001 *** 
Somers' d 0.353 41 0.003 *** 0.573 27 0.000 *** 0.616 39 0.000 *** 
Eta 0.370 41 0.544 27 0.648 39 
* Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; *** Significant at a 10% level 


















    
       
   
    
 
 
Table 6 – “Typeofcountry” and different types of behavioural rules 
TypeofCountry and Numbehav (Sit. 1) Rules of Extrinsic Origin Rules of Intrinsic Origin 
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance 
Independence 
Pearson Chi-sqaure 60.2 4 112 0.000 *** 18.0 4 112 0.001 *** 
Likelihood ration 73.4 4 112 0.000 *** 18.7 4 112 0.001 *** 
Symmetric 
Cramer' V 0.519 - 112 0.000 *** 0.284 - 112 0.001 *** 
Contingency coef. 0.591 - 112 0.000 *** 0.372 - 112 0.001 *** 
Kendall's tau-b 0.212 112 0.008 *** 0.129 112 0.120 
Gamma 0.283 - 112 0.008 *** 0.214 - 112 0.120 
- -
Directional 
Lambda 0.233 - 112 0.000 *** 0.028 - 112 0.857 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.214 - 112 0.000 *** 0.118 - 112 0.000 *** 
Somers' d 0.216 - 112 0.008 *** 0.110 - 112 0.120 
Eta square 0.725 - 112 0.352 112 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 
TypeofCountry and Numbehav (Sit. 1) Rules Originated in the Present Rules Originated in the Past 
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance 
Independence 
Pearson Chi-sqaure 34.3 4 112 0.000 *** 77.1 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood ration 31.7 4 112 0.000 *** 93.2 4 112 0.000 *** 
Symmetric 
Cramer' V 0.409 - 112 0.000 *** 0.370 - 112 0.097 * 
Contingency coef. 0.501 - 112 0.000 *** 0.464 - 112 0.097 * 
Kendall's tau-b 0.212 112 0.002 *** 0.137 - 112 0.121 
Gamma 0.307 - 112 0.002 *** 0.184 - 112 0.121 
- -
Directional 
Lambda 0.056 - 112 0.563 - - - (1) 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.117 - 112 0.000 *** 0.073 - 112 0.003 *** 
Somers' d 0.209 - 112 0.002 *** 0.129 - 112 0.121 
Eta square 0.423 - 112 0.819 112 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level 













Annex 6.1 – Incentives in FDI operations
 
Nature of Governmental Support Number of cases 
Fiscal (several types) 11 
Land 1 
Shareholding 1 
Searching for firms abroad 3 
Monopoly position in Portugal 3 







Portugal Total % 
Manufacturing 0 1 5 6 33.3 % 
Construction 0 0 3 3 25.0 % 
Services 4 1 3 8 22.2 % 
Financial 2 0 1 3 6.8 % 
Agriculture 1 0 1 2 100.0 % 







Annex 6.2 – Association between Portuguese FDI 





























Individual Scatter plots 
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Annex 6.3 – Questionnaire II
 
University of Bath, United Kingdom  Universidade da Beira Interior, Portugal 
Page 1
Fiscal Decisions by firms
This questionnaire is confidential and the data will be used only for research 
purposes. Please place a cross in the line corresponding to your chosen answer. 
When writing an answer (words or figures) please do so as clearly as possible.
Firm E has two factories, in Portugal and in the United Kingdom. Both produce good F 
by using input I. However, input I is only produced in Portugal. The factory in the UK 
imports input I from Portugal. Firm E pay taxes in both countries and this payment
varies with (i) the corporate tax rate (in Portugal and in the UK), (ii) income from sales 
of good F (in Portugal and in the UK) and input I (only in Portugal), and production 
costs namely the cost of importing Input I (only in the UK).  
1 – Consider that in Portugal the corporate tax rate (the fiscal burden) is 35% and in the
United Kingdom is 25%. What do you think is the chance of firm E to export input I 
from Portugal to the UK at the lower possible price so that production costs in the UK 
be smaller in a way that profits can be transferred to this country where the level of 
taxation is favourable (please indicate a value between 0 and 100%)?
_____________ %
2 – How do you classify the effect of this measure (question 1) in the profitability of 
firm E?
____ Essential  ____ Very important   ____ Important 
____ Less important ____ Irrelevant 
3 – Consider now that in the UK the corporate tax rate (the fiscal burden) is 25% and in 
Hungary is 15%. What do you think is the chance of firm E to close the factory in the 
UK, selling its assets and dispensing its workers, and to open a new one in Hungary 










































University of Bath, United Kingdom  Universidade da Beira Interior, Portugal 
Page 2
Fiscal Decisions by firms
This questionnaire is confidential and the data will be used only for research 
purposes. Please place a cross in the line corresponding to your chosen answer. 
When writing an answer (words or figures) please do so as clearly as possible.
4 - How do you classify the effect of this measure (question 3) in the profitability of 
firm E?
____ Essential  ____ Very important   ____ Important 
____ Less important ____ Irrelevant 
5 – Of the two above presented measures (questions 1 and 3) which one seems to be 
more important for the profitability of firm E?
_____ Question 1 _____ Question 3 
6 – In your opinion the corporate tax rate (choose one of the answers):  
____ Is more important for its direct effect on the profitability of the firm than as a 
determinant for the location of a foreign investment.  
____ Is more important as a determinant for the location of a foreign investment than 
for its direct effect on the profitability of the firm.  
____ It is equally important in both cases.  
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